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FIRST DIVISION
May 14, 2001

The trial court found that the State proved, by clear andconvincing evidence, that S.K. was an unfit parent for F.S. S.K.appeals from the order terminating her parental rights over F.S.

S.K. gave birth to F.S. on March 17, 1996. The trial courtgave the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)temporary custody of F.S. on April 11, 1997. On August 11, 1997,the court entered its adjudication order finding F.S. neglected. The State petitioned for termination of S.K.'s parental rights inNovember 1998, alleging that she failed to maintain a reasonableinterest in F.S.'s welfare, and she failed to make reasonableprogress towards return of the child within nine months of theadjudication of neglect. The State also charged S.K. with drugaddiction, but withdrew the charge before trial in light ofevidence that she had overcome her addiction.

Following trial, the court entered findings against S.K. onboth charges and terminated her parental rights. Using the powersgranted by section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998)), the court appointed a guardian withpower to consent to F.S.'s adoption. The public defenderrepresenting S.K. filed a timely notice of appeal on July 21, 1999.

We allowed the public defender two unopposed extensions oftime for filing the record on appeal. In February 2000 the publicdefender requested a five-month extension of time for filing theappellant's brief. Although the public guardian and the State didnot oppose the motion, in the interest of resolving the casequickly we granted only half of the requested extension, setting afiling date of May 8, 2000. We later granted the public defender'sunopposed motion for an extension of seven more weeks. We alsogranted the public guardian and the State three extensions of timefor filing appellees' briefs on appeal. The parties finishedbriefing the case on February 28, 2001, almost 20 months after thecourt terminated S.K.'s rights over her child.

Our supreme court, in In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 727N.E.2d 990 (2000), held that for a charge of failure to makereasonable progress towards the return of a child, only evidenceconcerning the parent's conduct in the nine months following theneglect adjudication is admissible. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West1998). Due to the differences between the evidence admissible onthe two charges, we will recount the facts separately for theseparate charges.

But for both charges, we bear in mind the fundamental purposesof proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act. Our supreme court hasrecently clarified that we should consider statutory statements ofpurpose in applying statutes, even if the statutes are notambiguous. Primeco Personal Communications, L.P. v. IllinoisCommerce Comm'n, No. 89075, slip op. at 13 (March 29, 2001). TheJuvenile Court Act states that its purposes include:

"secur[ing] for each minor subject hereto such care andguidance, preferably in his or her own home, as willserve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, andphysical welfare of the minor and the best interests ofthe community; [and] preserv[ing] and strengthen[ing] theminor's family ties whenever possible, removing him orher from the custody of his or her parents only when hisor her safety or welfare or the protection of the publiccannot be adequately safeguarded without removal." 705ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 1998).

The statutory scheme of the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act(750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)) "evinces twin policiesfavoring the superior rights of natural parents to the custody oftheir children and of fostering greater stability in the homeenvironment." In re Custody of Menconi, 117 Ill. App. 3d 394, 398,453 N.E.2d 835 (1983).

Because the termination of parental rights is a drastic actionwhich deprives a parent of rights that are "fundamental and asancient as mankind" (In re Custody of Townsend, 86 Ill. 2d 502,509, 427 N.E.2d 1231 (1981)), the statutory scheme requires proofof unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. In re A.J., 296 Ill.App. 3d 903, 913, 695 N.E.2d 551 (1998). We review the facts insuch cases with careful scrutiny, but we will not reverse the trialcourt's findings on factual issues unless the findings are contraryto the manifest weight of the evidence. In re M.W., 199 Ill. App.3d 1050, 1052-53, 557 N.E.2d 959 (1990).

The trial court placed F.S. in the temporary custody of DCFSbased on findings that S.K. had a filthy home, a history ofinadequate supervision and food, and a drug habit. The court madeno new findings upon entering the adjudication order dated August11, 1997.

S.K. was in jail on that date. DCFS had established a serviceplan requiring S.K. to attend parenting skills classes and toundergo treatment for drug addiction and a psychologicalevaluation. S.K. had requested visitation with F.S., and she hadall visits DCFS permitted her in jail. She successfully completeda parenting skills class in jail shortly after the court enteredthe adjudication order. She also participated in the jail'sprogram for treating drug addiction.

S.K. visited F.S. shortly after her release from jail inOctober 1997. The caseworker who supervised the visit noted thatS.K. and F.S. "interacted appropriately. [S.K.] was very happy andloving. Child was happy and appeared to have a relationship [with]natural family."

But despite the many drug treatment programs S.K. had tried,including the one in jail, she used cocaine again shortly after herrelease from jail. She did not pursue DCFS services, and she didnot see her child, for the following four months. In February 1998she began a drug treatment program at Chicago Victory Church (CVC).

None of the drug counselors at CVC had professional educationin treating drug addiction. All of the counselors had been drugaddicts who tried treatment programs run by professionals, andthose programs failed to alleviate their drug dependencies. Thecounselors had recovered from addiction through CVC's programinstead. The counselors used the Bible to teach Christian values. For the first nine months after an addict entered the program,counselors supervised the addict 24 hours a day. A staff memberaccompanied the addict even when the addict opened mail or went tothe bathroom. If the addict completed the first phasesuccessfully, CVC worked with her through a second phase of helpingher adjust to a more normal life.

CVC sent DCFS letters detailing S.K.'s progress in theprogram, and CVC invited DCFS to contact CVC for any furtherinformation DCFS might need. DCFS never requested any information. Although S.K. invited a caseworker to visit CVC, the caseworker didnot do so.

By May 11, 1998, nine months after the court entered theadjudication order, S.K. had been drug-free for almost threemonths. One caseworker reported that S.K. had missed no visitswith F.S. after February 1998.

All caseworkers agreed that S.K. interacted appropriately withF.S. in all visits. But one caseworker's report from June 1998rated S.K.'s progress as unsatisfactory, because she took parentingclasses in jail, not through DCFS, she had drug treatment from CVC,not a program recommended by DCFS, and she had not had thepsychological evaluation mentioned in the service plan. Thecaseworker also claimed that S.K. visited F.S. only once betweenOctober 1997 and June 1998. The caseworker did not testify attrial and no document explained the discrepancy with the visitationinformation in the other caseworker's report.

The pastor of CVC testified that 25% of the addicts who cameto CVC successfully recovered from addiction, and that ratesurpassed the success rate of the programs DCFS approved. CVC hadappropriate facilities for families of members who reached thesecond phase of recovery, as well as for church ministers.

In summarizing the evidence, the judge emphasized that frommid-October 1997 until late February 1998, S.K. failed to contactDCFS. She did not begin treatment for her drug addiction untilFebruary 1998, and the program she entered had no professionals onstaff. S.K. completed the first phase of CVC's program more thannine months after the adjudication order. The judge commended S.K.for changing her life and freeing herself from drug dependency, andcontinued:

"The Court also acknowledges the succes[s] of [CVC]in helping turn people's lives around to becomeproductive members of society, but the fact remains thatthis program is not staffed by licensed professionalswith any professional training to treat others. It isnot an acceptable service provider for DCFS *** and doesnot meet the requirements in the service plan.

The evidence has shown that there are no educationalor training requirements for staff members ***.

It *** certainly has had many successes, but it doesnot qualify as a treatment program. *** [S.K.] gotrepeated referrals for inpatient and outpatient drugtreatment programs which were approved by DCFS *** [and]she in fact refused *** all such referrals ***."

After noting again that CVC "is not a licensed programapproved by the State agencies," the judge held that S.K. failed tomake reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led toremoval of F.S. from her home, and she failed to make reasonableprogress towards return of F.S.

Under the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act, a parentmay be found unfit if the State presents clear and convincingevidence of:

"Failure by a parent to make reasonable efforts tocorrect the conditions that were the basis for theremoval of the child from the parent, or to makereasonable progress toward the return of the child to theparent within 9 months after an adjudication of neglectedor abused minor ***. If a service plan has beenestablished *** to correct the conditions that were thebasis for the removal of the child from the parent and ifthose services were available, then, for purposes of thisAct, 'failure to make reasonable progress toward thereturn of the child to the parent' includes the parent'sfailure to substantially fulfill his or her obligationsunder the service plan and correct the conditions thatbrought the child into care within 9 months after theadjudication ***." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998).

This section of the statute establishes two separate criteriafor finding a parent unfit. In re S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d 88, 117,598 N.E.2d 456 (1992). To determine whether a parent has madereasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to thechild's removal, the court must consider the kind of effort thatwould be reasonable for the particular parent from that parent'spoint of view. In re K.P., 305 Ill. App. 3d 175, 180, 711 N.E.2d478 (1999). The determination of reasonable progress, on the otherhand, involves an evaluation of progress measured against theconditions that led to the child's removal (A.J., 296 Ill. App. 3dat 913), or any conditions newly arising which might warrantcontinuing custody of the child in DCFS (see In re C.S., 294 Ill.App. 3d 780, 789-90, 691 N.E.2d 161 (1998)).

Two conditions led to removal of F.S. from S.K.'s care: drugabuse, and poor parenting skills evidenced by a filthy home andallegations of inadequate supervision and food. The Statepresented no evidence of any new grounds for preventing familyreunification. S.K. successfully completed parenting classes injail shortly after the adjudication of neglect. The Statepresented no evidence concerning S.K.'s parenting skills or thecleanliness of her home at the end of the relevant time period. The evidence cannot support a finding that S.K. failed to makereasonable efforts and reasonable progress towards correcting herdeficient parenting skills.

S.K. also participated in treatment for her drug addiction injail, but that treatment had no beneficial effect. When the jailreleased her, S.K. quickly returned to drug dependency. Althoughshe rejected other programs DCFS recommended, she found, on herown, a program that actually helped her. She committed herself tothe intense regimen CVC imposed for treatment of her drug andalcohol addictions. By the end of the relevant time period, S.K.had ingested no drugs or alcohol for almost three months. Whileshe could not claim a complete cure at that point, she had madereasonable efforts, and she had achieved reasonable progress,towards curing her drug and alcohol addictions.

In finding to the contrary, the trial court relied primarilyon CVC's lack of licensed professionals on staff and the lack ofDCFS approval for the program. But DCFS employees turned down aninvitation to visit CVC, and DCFS made no response to CVC's offerof further information DCFS might need about its program or S.K.'sprogress. DCFS and the State presented no evidence to contradicttestimony that CVC achieved a success rate of 25%, and that thesuccess rate exceeded that of the programs DCFS approved.

The Adoption Act specifies that insofar as a DCFS service planis designed to correct the conditions that led to removal of achild, the parent's failure to substantially fulfill obligationsunder the service plan can show a failure to make reasonableprogress to return of the child. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998). But in assessing substantial fulfillment of the parent'sobligations, the court must "recogniz[e] that compliance with DCFSservice plans is a means to a desired end, not the end in itself***. A parent might succeed at reaching a goal envisioned by DCFSwithout following DCFS' specific directives." In re S.J., 233 Ill.App. 3d 88, 120, 598 N.E.2d 456 (1992).

In S.J., as here, the parent found better therapy for drugdependency in a program DCFS did not recommend. The court said:"To hold that her failure to comply with the specifics of theservice plans in this regard is probative of her lack of reasonableprogress would unfairly and irrationally elevate administrativemeans over statutory ends." S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 120; seeA.J., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 916. Requiring specific compliance withthe service plan would also contravene the explicit statutorypurpose of preserving and strengthening family ties wheneverpossible. 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 1998). The court in S.J.clarified that the failure to comply with a service plan remainedrelevant, but such failure alone could not overcome evidence ofreasonable progress toward correction of the conditions that led toremoval of the child. S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 121; see alsoA.J., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 916 (where the State presented noevidence that a parent had drug problems affecting the ability toraise children, the parent's failure to attend drug counseling wasnot grounds for terminating parental rights, although the serviceplan required drug counseling).

The trial court here accepted the uncontradicted evidence ofreasonable progress towards curing the drug addiction and commendedS.K. in open court for her efforts. Although S.K. missed scheduledappointments with licensed psychologists for the evaluationrequired by the service plan, that requirement related remotely atbest to the conditions that led to removal of the child. S.K. madereasonable efforts and achieved reasonable progress towardcorrecting the deficient parenting skills and the drug and alcoholdependencies that led to removal of F.S. from her home. The factthat she made her progress and met her obligations outside of DCFSprograms cannot show that she failed to make progress or that shefailed to substantially fulfill her obligations under the serviceplan. The lack of DCFS approval of CVC has particularly littleprobative value here, because the caseworker turned down aninvitation to visit CVC and DCFS never requested furtherinformation about CVC. We cannot say that the State proved, byclear and convincing evidence, that S.K. failed to make reasonableefforts and reasonable progress towards correction of conditionsthat led to removal of F.S. within nine months of the neglectadjudication. The trial court's finding against S.K. on this issueis contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

The trial court also found that the State proved, by clear andconvincing evidence, that S.K. failed to maintain a reasonabledegree of interest, concern or responsibility as to F.S.'s welfare. For this issue the court, over S.K.'s objection, admitted evidencefrom the years before F.S.'s birth.

As a teenager, S.K. began using drugs and she attemptedsuicide. A psychiatrist diagnosed her condition as bipolardisorder and borderline schizophrenia resulting from drug abuse. Professionals treated her drug dependency repeatedly, and she evencompleted one program for recovery from drug addiction. Still, sheremained addicted.

S.K. gave birth to her first child in 1987 and to her secondin 1989. In November 1994, more than a year before the birth ofF.S., a DCFS investigator responded to a report that S.K. did notprovide her children adequate food. The investigator foundadequate food for the children, and S.K.'s mother supervised themappropriately. Because the investigator found no signs of abuse orneglect, he left the children in S.K.'s home.

Another DCFS investigator went to S.K.'s home in April 1996,one month after F.S.'s birth. S.K. had been in an approved drugtreatment program run by professionals, but she relapsed to drugusage when she left on a pass. The investigator found S.K.'s home"clean and appropriate," and she concluded that S.K.'s motheradequately supervised the children. Again, the children showed nosigns of abuse or neglect. The investigator especially noted thatF.S. was "clean and very well taken care of." Again, DCFS left thechildren in their home.

In February 1997 DCFS received a report that S.K.'s mother hadbegun using illegal narcotics. A new investigator wrote that theresidence was

"dirty, cluttered & disorganized. Clothing was piledappr. 1