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FIRST DIVISION
September 15, 2003

Respondent, Edward T., appeals from the circuit court's orders finding his two childrenneglected due to an injurious environment and finding him unable, for some reason other thanfinancial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train, or discipline the children. Respondentcontends that the trial court's finding of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidenceand that the court abused its discretion in not granting him custody of the minors. For thefollowing reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Respondent is the biological father of the two children involved in this cause of action:Edward T. (hereinafter referred to as Eddie), born September 9, 1997, and Ariel T., born January27, 2000. Latrena S.,⁽¹⁾ the biological mother of the two children, gave birth to a third child,Cassio G. on October 18, 2000. Brian G. is the biological father of Cassio. Cassio was borneight weeks premature and was hospitalized until November 21, 2000.

On August 24, 2001, Latrena took all three children to Illinois Masonic Hospital for adoctor's appointment. Hospital records indicate that Ariel was 17 months old at the time and hadnot received all of her recommended immunizations. She was also diagnosed with a speech delay. Cassio, 10 months, had not received the three sets of immunizations he should have received bysix months of age and was diagnosed with a failure to thrive due to his below normal weight of6,340 grams (in his brief, respondent converts this weight to 13.9 pounds). The records alsorevealed that Cassio had a "severe" developmental delay as he had not yet begun to sit up orcrawl. Cassio was admitted to the hospital for treatment and Eddie and Ariel were taken into thecustody of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on August 30, 2001. OnSeptember 4, 2001, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship. On the same day,temporary custody orders were entered for Eddie and Ariel, which stated that "probable causedoes exist the minor is abused/neglected/dependant," and found their removal from their homewas an immediate necessity. The orders were entered with prejudice as to respondent, anoncustodial parent, based on his stipulation to the facts alleged in the State's petition. Thepetition stated that Ariel's and Cassio's immunizations were not current, Ariel wasdevelopmentally delayed, Cassio was diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive and Latrena wasnot addressing Ariel's and Cassio's medical needs.

An adjudication hearing was commenced on February 26, 2002, and continued to April18, 2002, and May 17, 2002. At the hearing, Dr. Silviano Gomez testified that he received hismedical degree from the University of Salamanca in Spain in 1967. He subsequently completedan internship at Illinois Masonic Medical Center, a residency in pediatrics and a fellowship inambulatory pediatrics. He served as a staff physician in pediatric and ambulatory care at IllinoisMasonic and as an assistant professor in pediatric medicine at the University of Illinois. The courtqualified Dr. Gomez as an expert in pediatric medicine.

Dr. Gomez testified that he treated Cassio in the hospital from August 24 to September14, 2001. When Cassio arrived at the hospital, he weighed between 13 and 14 pounds, which wasbelow the fifth percentile for a 10-month-old child. In addition, he had not received anyimmunizations and could not sit up, a six-month milestone, or crawl, a nine-month milestone. Dr.Gomez and Cassio's nurse practitioner, Catherine Tomaka, agreed that Cassio needed to beadmitted to the hospital for treatment of his failure to thrive.

Dr. Gomez testified that a failure to thrive is diagnosed by a child's weight. A failure tothrive is considered nonorganic, and generally the result of neglect, where the child gains aroundtwo ounces a day during hospitalization and his blood, lead, urine and neurological tests arenormal. An organic failure to thrive on the other hand is the result of a disease such as anemia,tubular acidosis, lead poisoning or dehydration. Dr. Gomez stated that Cassio's tests were normaland, during his first week of hospitalization, he gained about one pound. As a result, Dr. Gomezdiagnosed him with nonorganic failure to thrive due to inadequate nutrition. Although Cassio waspremature, Dr. Gomez stated that a premature child will generally be within the normal weightlimits by six months of age.

On cross-examination, Dr. Gomez agreed that the Nelson Textbook of Pediatrics is areliable authority on pediatrics, and admitted it provided that a "corrected age" should be usedwhen measuring the growth of a premature infant until he/she reaches the "corrected age" of oneto two years. He further testified he could not state how many grams Cassio gained in thehospital because he could not convert pounds to grams in his head. Dr. Gomez was unable totestify as to Cassio's date of admission without referring to the hospital records and did not knowCassio's rate of weight gain prior to being admitted because he was not the child's primaryphysician. When diagnosing Cassio, Dr. Gomez did not take into account Cassio's culturalbackground or diet and did not conduct any endocrinology tests, which would show whether thefailure to thrive was due to a gland problem. He believed, however, that Cassio's ability to gainweight on a proper diet ruled out such a problem.

John Gac testified that he is a child protection investigator with DCFS. Gac receivedEddie's, Ariel's and Cassio's cases on August 28, 2001, one day after a report was made to DCFSfor medical neglect and failure to thrive. Gac stated he spoke with Latrena at the hospital. Shetold him she did not believe there was anything wrong with Cassio and that he had, in fact, gaineda significant amount of weight over the past two months. She further stated that she was atrained nurse's assistant and that her opinion regarding her son was just as valid as the doctor's. According to Gac, Latrena admitted that Ariel's immunizations were not current and that, likeCassio, Ariel had been unable to sit up at 10 months.

Latrena explained to Gac that she worked full-time. She awoke at 4:30 a.m. to giveCassio a bottle of milk. She also prepared cereal for her brother to give him later, as her brothercared for the children while she was at work. When Latrena returned from work, she would giveCassio another bottle and later feed him. Gac visited Latrena's apartment and met her brother. He did not see any baby food in the home and, when he asked where the baby food was kept,Latrena's brother was unable to find any. Gac saw the children during his visit to the apartmentand he stated they "showed no emotion whatsoever." However, he did not see any signs of abuseor neglect.

Gac instructed Latrena to take Eddie and Ariel to the doctor to be evaluated. On August29, 2001, Latrena called Gac to tell him she could not take the children to the doctor because shecould not get an appointment until the following day. She also told Gac that she would no longerhave her brother care for the children while she was at work. On August 30, 2001, Gac placedthe children in protective custody due to Cassio's diagnosis of nonorganic failure to thrive and therisk of neglect to Eddie and Ariel due to their young age.

Marjorie Kaplan testified that she is a social worker at Illinois Masonic Hospital. She metwith Latrena and Brian G. on August 27, 2001. Latrena told Kaplan that Cassio was fine and shedid not understand why he could not return home. Latrena also stated that she had not takenCassio for his immunizations because she did not have a medical card. Kaplan testified thatLatrena said her medical card had expired and, because she refused to provide certain information,it was not renewed for six months. Kaplan explained to Latrena that the hospital would bereporting her case to DCFS because Cassio was below the normal weight and height for a childhis age, he had not received his immunizations and he was developmentally delayed. Latrenastated she did not understand why the case was being reported and repeated that Cassio was fine. Because Kaplan was concerned Latrena might remove the child from the hospital, Cassio wasmoved to the pediatric specialty care unit where he could be more closely observed.

Dr. Leslie Zun testified on Latrena's behalf. He stated that he obtained his medical degreefrom Rush Medical College and completed a residency in emergency medicine at the University ofIllinois. At the time of the hearing, Dr. Zun was chairman of the department of emergencymedicine at Mount Sinai Hospital. During his residency he "rotate[d] on the inpatient unit" and"dealt with many pediatric patients" in other rotations. He testified that about 25% of his patientswere children and that he had experience in making hot line calls to DCFS and in filling out DCFSpaperwork. Dr. Zun stated he was involved in 10 to 12 failure-to-thrive cases per year. Helectured medical students, residents, physicians and occasionally public defenders and had been aprofessor of emergency medicine at Chicago Medical School. Finally, Dr. Zun stated that heserved on a committee at the hospital reviewing abuse and neglect cases to determine whetherappropriate action had been taken in each case. He concluded, however, that he was "not trainedin pediatrics per se," as he did not complete a fellowship or residency in pediatrics, he was notboard certified in pediatrics nor was he a member of the American Academy of Pediatrics. Healso admitted that an official diagnosis of abuse or neglect could not be made by him, but must bemade by a specialist. Nonetheless, the court qualified Dr. Zun as an expert in emergencymedicine, abuse and neglect, and pediatrics.

Dr. Zun reviewed the medical records in the cases of Cassio, Ariel and Eddie, but statedthat he had never examined the children themselves. He determined from the medical records thatCassio's and Ariel's immunizations were current, but stated on cross-examination that the medicalrecords were inconsistent with regard to the children's immunizations. Dr. Zun concluded thatCassio's developmental delays were due to his failure to thrive. In turn, his failure to thrive wasthe result of a combination of conditions -- esophageal reflux, a neurological impairment whichprevented him from sucking, swallowing and breathing simultaneously, his premature birth, andthe fact that his parents were small people by nature. Dr. Zun concluded that Cassio was notabused or neglected and that, when charted, his growth remained consistent through his first yearof life, whether during his hospitalization or at home.

Respondent and Latrena also produced medical records reflecting that Ariel had receivedimmunizations on March 29, 2000, and August 24, 2001, and that Eddie also had difficultygaining weight as an infant, but was subsequently evaluated as a healthy infant and toddler.

The trial court found that the State had proven Cassio neglected and/or abused by apreponderance of the evidence. It concluded that the medical records established that Cassio andAriel were late in receiving their vaccinations and that Dr. Gomez' testimony was more crediblethan Dr. Zun's because he was Cassio's treating physician during his hospitalization. The courtfurther found that the State had proven neglect due to an injurious environment in Ariel's andEddie's cases, but it dismissed a count alleging lack of medical care as to Ariel.

The dispositional hearing for the children was subsequently commenced on May 20, 2000,and continued to June 4, June 25, June 28, July 23 and August 6, 2002. Sharon Moriarity, a childwelfare specialist with DCFS and the caseworker for Ariel and Eddie, testified on three separateoccasions during the hearing. At the opening of the dispositional hearing, Moriarity stated thatAriel and Eddie were both placed in a nonrelative, DCFS licensed home. There had been noincidents to report from Moriarity's visit to the foster home and there were no signs of abuse orneglect. Ariel was assessed for services in September 2001 and began receiving speech anddevelopmental therapy at that time. Upon her reassessment in March 2002, developmentaltherapy was discontinued. Eddie was also assessed for services and began play therapy withtherapist Michelle Flaherty due to reported sadness and withdrawal. Upon making allegations toFlaherty that he was "whooped" by his parents, Eddie was referred to therapist Vernon Glass for apsychological evaluation. Glass reported to Moriarity in late April 2002, that Eddie said hisparents "whooped" him with a belt and burned him with cigarettes. When Moriarity initially heardthe allegations from Glass, she understood that only Latrena was inflicting the alleged abuse;however, Glass' report introduced at the hearing indicated the abuse was being perpetrated byboth Latrena and respondent. Moriarity stated that the parents should have been told of theallegations by "the investigator," but the parents indicated to her that they were unaware of theallegations until the hearing.

Moriarity testified that respondent and Latrena were assessed for services in September2001. At that time, they were referred to parenting classes and a parenting capacity assessment,which were both successfully completed. The parenting capacity report stated that "[u]nless thereis convincing evidence to the contrary, it seems clear that the best interests of Eddie and Arielwould be served by returning them to the custody of the parents as soon as possible." Moriaritystated she did not agree with the recommendation of return home even before Eddie's recentallegations of physical abuse. Following the assessment, Latrena was referred to a therapist forindividual therapy. Upon the establishment of a relationship with the therapist, both Latrena andrespondent were to begin family coaching. Latrena, however, did not attend therapy sessionswhen she was initially referred in April. As a result, respondent was unable to begin familycoaching and was referred for individual therapy sessions instead. Latrena subsequently beganattending individual therapy in May 2002 and parent coaching sessions with the entire familybegan soon thereafter. After two or three sessions, the therapist reported to Moriarity thatindividual and group sessions were going well and both parents were very responsive.

Moriatiry reported that both parents had four-hour, weekly supervised visits with thechildren. Respondent and Latrena had each missed a couple of visits for reasons unknown toMoriatiry. She observed weekly visits between the children and parents from September toDecember 18, 2001. She had no concerns about any of the visits until receiving a report about avisit on May 25, 2002, following Eddie's allegations of abuse. Other than the report from theMay 25 visit, Moriarity had received no reports of unusual incidents from the agency monitoringthe visits. The parents acted appropriately with the children, and the children seemed happy tosee them. They all appeared to enjoy the visits and were sometimes sad at their conclusion.

Moriarity stated she would not recommend unsupervised visits and felt it was in the bestinterests of the children to make them wards of the court. Her recommendation was based on therecent allegations of abuse by Eddie and the family's need for services. She concluded that,assuming the allegations of abuse by respondent contained in Glass' report were not true, she hadonly one concern with the children being returned to him -- namely, that she believed respondentwas living with Latrena, who was the perpetrator of the nelgect. On cross-examination, Moriaritystated that respondent told her in February that Latrena would be moving out of his apartment. He further told her at one of the court dates that he had made potential arrangements for day care. However, Moriarity reported that the investigation into the allegations of physical abuse withregard to Eddie was still ongoing at that time and, if the allegations were found to be warranted,respondent would be in need of additional services. Moriarity added that she had requested asecond psychological evaluation of Latrena after seeing her throw a can of soda at an attorney inthe courthouse waiting room during the adjudication hearing.

Vernon Glass testified that he is chief executive officer and a therapist at the counselingagency Right Frame of Mind. He has a master's degree in counseling and psychology, but is notlicensed in the State of Illinois. Eddie was referred to Glass' agency by DCFS for aneuropsychological assessment in February 2002. Glass met with Eddie approximately seventimes, with his foster father present for two of those meetings. Glass did not review any ofEddie's medical records, nor did he talk to Latrena or respondent. He received Eddie'sbackground information from Eddie's foster mother, Ms. Johnson. Johnson told Glass that Eddiewas having nightmares, wetting his bed and soiling his clothes.

Glass reported that, during their meetings, Eddie told him that his mother and fatherburned him in his mouth with cigarettes. Eddie stated that the burns "would just sting a while"after the cigarette was removed. Glass also testified that Eddie told him his mother stuck pins inhis nose until it started to bleed. He later stated that Eddie said both his mother and father stuckpins in his nose. Eddie did not tell Glass where or how often the abuse occurred. Glass statedthat in order to prove the allegations of abuse, he took Eddie outside and lit a cigarette. When hedid so, Eddie began to tremble. Glass testified that from the time he lit the cigarette until the timehe finished it, Eddie watched the cigarette. Glass felt that smoking a cigarette around the childwas an effective way to test his reaction. Ultimately, Glass concluded that Eddie suffered fromposttraumatic stress disorder and that he required more intensive counseling, but he did notcontinue to see Eddie himself. The results of Eddie's neuropsychological test were generallynormal, except that he fell into the borderline category for motor behavior, visual attention andnarrative memory.

Kelly Ecker testified that she is a family therapist at Family Care of Illinois. She has amaster's in social work and had been employed by Family Care for approximately 10 weeks. Eddie was referred to the organization for therapy to address his depression and his separationfrom his parents. In January or February 2002, social worker Michelle Flaherty began seeingEddie and, in April 2002, Ecker was assigned to his case. At the time, Eddie was four years old.

Ecker testified that she discussed the allegations of physical abuse with Eddie and withGlass. She stated that, when she met Eddie, she said, "[H]i, I'm Kelly." Eddie responded that the"last therapist was here because my parents whipped me. You're here to see this." According toEcker, Eddie then opened his mouth and pointed inside. He then told her, "this is where myparents put their cigarettes out." Ecker met with Eddie for one hour each week. She stated thatshe often spoke with Johnson, Eddie's foster mother, who told her that Eddie had nightmaressurrounding the visits with his parents during which he screams, "daddy please don't beat me. Iwill be a good boy." Johnson also told Ecker that Ariel had diarrhea that could last up to two orthree days after the visits with her parents.

On May 25, 2002, Ecker went to observe a visit between Eddie and Ariel and theirparents. The visits were routinely supervised by a social service agency called Passages. Due to amisunderstanding regarding the location of the visit, Ecker was late and telephoned Johnson. During the telephone conversation, Johnson told Ecker that Ms. Jackson, the Passages workersupervising the visit, had called Johnson and was upset because Latrena was yelling at Eddie. Ecker told Johnson to instruct Jackson to separate the parents and the children until she arrived. When Ecker arrived at the Passages office, Latrena and respondent were in the hallway and Eddieand Ariel were in an office with Jackson. Jackson told Ecker that after respondent and Latrenaarrived for the visit, Latrena took Eddie by the shoulder and told him to sit down in a chair. Latrena then sat very close to Eddie and asked him if he knew the difference between a story andthe truth. She then stated, "I did whip you, but I never burned [sic.]." Jackson told Ecker thatshe called Johnson because she "didn't know what to do." Upon her arrival, Ecker toldrespondent and Latrena that they should not speak to the children about the recent allegations,and they should only address their concerns with her or their lawyers. Ecker then observed thevisit for 1 hour and 40 minutes. Although Ecker asked Jackson to help supervise the visit, shetestified that Jackson persisted in reading a newspaper at a table in the corner.

Ecker testified that during the visit, Eddie appeared distressed and would stand by herevery time Latrena touched Ariel. She further stated that respondent "would occasionally pinchor push [Eddie]" and Eddie would loudly tell him to stop. Respondent would either laugh orcontinue his behavior. At one point, Latrena saw some liquid coming from Ariel's pierced ear. She stated that it was infected and attempted to squeeze the liquid out. According to Ecker, Arielwas pulling away and looking at Ecker, but Latrena continued. Ecker intervened at that time andLatrena "responded appropriately." Ecker stated she redirected the parents on several occasionswhen she felt their conduct was inappropriate. At other times, the children appeared to enjoyplaying with their parents. She stated the visit went "fairly well."

Three days after the visit, Ecker spoke on the phone with Johnson. Johnson reported thatafter the visit with his parents, Eddie sat on the couch and stared at the wall for six hours. Shethen told Ecker that Eddie was not playing or talking and had been soiling his clothes and hidinghis soiled underwear. On May 30, 2000, Ecker met with Eddie in his foster home. Ecker testifiedthat Eddie requested that she or Glass attend all of the visits with his parents because his motherwould not hurt Ariel if they were there. He further stated he wanted to live with Johnson foreverbecause she bought him spiderman and does not smoke. Ecker reported that Eddie was quiet andinsecure and was upset when she left. Ecker recommended that visits between the children andtheir parents be suspended because they were traumatizing and because Eddie had symptoms ofposttraumatic stress disorder and depression. She further recommended that Passages notsupervise any more of the family's visits.

Willie Jean Jackson testified that she worked for Passages and was assigned to Eddie andAriel's case. She observed the four-hour weekly visits between the children and their parents andwas authorized to stop any inappropriate behavior. Jackson stated she never needed to interveneduring a visit. The children always seemed happy to attend the visits and greeted their parentswith hugs and kisses. After the visits, Eddie generally told Jackson he enjoyed himself. Jacksonstated that Latrena and respondent played with the children during the visits and they usually atelunch together.

Jackson testified that on May 25, 2002, she attended a visit between respondent, Latrenaand the children. She reported that respondent greeted the children normally. When Latrenaentered the room, however, she was upset and told Eddie she wanted to talk to him. Latrenaasked Eddie if he knew the difference between a story and the truth. Jackson stated that Eddiebegan to look nervous, but Latrena told him he was not going to get into trouble, he just neededto tell the truth. She then asked him repeatedly why he told people she burned him with acigarette. Jackson stated she became nervous and left to call Johnson to inquire about where thetherapist was. Jackson was then instructed to separate the children and parents until the therapistarrived. When Ecker arrived, Latrena was by the elevator crying and Ecker went to talk to her.

Jackson stated that during the remainder of the visit, the children played. At one point,respondent was wrestling with Eddie and tickling him. Eddie told him to stop and respondentcomplied. As Ecker testified, Jackson stated that Latrena noticed Ariel's pierced ear was infectedand squeezed some fluid out of the hole. Jackson retrieved some alcohol and tissue and Latrenacleaned Ariel's ear. Jackson stated that Ariel was "squinting a little bit," but did not cry orscream. Jackson thought the children were fine during the visit and did not know why Ecker toldher to observe the visit closely after she left.

On June 25, 2002, Moriarity was again called to testify. She stated that she received areport dated June 18, 2002, from the State Central Registry, which stated that the allegations ofphysical abuse against Latrena and respondent were unfounded based on a lack of physicalevidence. The report was admitted into evidence.

Dr. Mary Zashin testified that she is a clinical psychologist with a Ph.D. in clinicalpsychology from the University of Texas at Austin and is licensed in the State of Illinois. Shestated that she was asked to do a parenting character assessment for Latrena, respondent and thethree children. In December 2001 and January 2002, she observed the children and their parentson two separate occasions. She also met with Latrena and respondent at their homes, andreviewed the DCFS service plans and social histories. Dr. Zashin testified that the interactionsbetween the parents and children were generally positive, but that the parents needed "coaching"to learn how to set limits with the children. She felt such coaching could be done while thechildren were in the parents' custody. During her meetings with Latrena and respondent, Dr.Zashin administered a psychological test called the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory III, thechild abuse potential inventory, and the parenting stress index. Zashin testified that both parents'test results were well within normal limits.

At the time Dr. Zashin conducted the assessment, she was aware of the allegation thatEddie was "whooped" by his parents. She later learned of the allegations of burning and pins. Dr.Zashin testified that she reviewed the therapy notes of Flaherty, Ecker, Jackson, and Glass andread the transcript of the adjucatory hearing. She expressed her opinion that Glass "violated ***some of the very important requirements for conducting an unbiased interview which is likely toelicit, especially from a small child, an accurate report of events." She felt that Glass should nothave received his first information, which included the new allegations of abuse, from Eddie'sfoster mother as it potentially biased his interview. She further stated that she had never heard ofan investigative interviewing technique which involves exposing a child to cues suggesting atrauma the interviewer believes to have occurred. She believed Glass' lighting of a cigarette infront of Eddie was suggestive. She also commented that Glass' notes contained unfoundedallegations ascribed to the foster mother that Latrena and respondent were substance abusers andthat respondent was not Eddie's father.

Aside from Glass' techniques, Dr. Zashin had other concerns regarding Eddie's treatment. In her opinion, it was not good clinical practice for Eddie to receive therapy from two therapistsat once. She also believed it unlikely that symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder wouldappear 8 to 10 months after the traumatic events took place, and that Ecker did not properlyhandle the visit on May 25, 2002. Ecker had never met the parents before that time, she had onlymet Eddie three times, she had the parents and children separated based solely on informationreceived from the foster mother over the telephone, and she "redirected" interactions when therewas no indication the parents were behaving inappropriately.

Dr. Zashin concluded that it was in the children's best interest to continue visits with theirparents, as suspending visits was likely to cause Eddie more anxiety and distress. She felt thatalthough Eddie's display of distress surrounding the visits with his parents could be attributed tothe upsetting nature of the visits themselves, such behavior is also common in children who havebeen separated from their parents. She also thought it likely that Eddie might be angry at hisparents for not preventing his removal or that he may feel divided loyalties between his parentsand his foster parents. She recommended that the children be returned to one of their parents assoon as possible, and her report reflected that respondent would be a more practical choice as hehad more stable employment, stronger family support and more realistic and appropriateexpectations of the children.

The court admitted into evidence a June 2002 psychological evaluation of Latrena by Dr.Alice Murata. In the evaluation, Dr. Murata concluded that Latrena was clinically depressed. According to Murata, Latrena indicated she would cry for a week before every court date andwould "cease[] to function" after them. Latrena further lost her job because she was unable toleave the house some days. Murata reported that although Latrena realized she failed herchildren, she did not realize she needed to change her behavior nor did she recognize theimportance of therapy. Murata concluded that Latrena was a bright woman who was capable oflearning better parenting skills, but recommended that Latrena only see the children during familytherapy while receiving services to improve her skills. According to the report, Latrena toldMurata she was living with respondent and hopes to marry him.

On August 6, 2002, the trial court adjudicated Ariel and Eddie wards of the court anddetermined that it was in their best interests to grant guardianship to DCFS with the discretion toplace the children in foster care. In its findings, the court stated that both Latrena and respondentwere unable to care for the children for some reason other than financial circumstances alone. Latrena's inability to care for the children due to her depression was evidenced by her June 2002psychological evaluation. Her problems with anger were demonstrated by her behavior at theMay 25 visitation and by her throwing a can of soda at an attorney in the courtroom hallway. Although the court found that the allegations of sticking pins in Eddie's nose and burning him withcigarettes were uncorroborated, it did find that Latrena whipped Eddie given Eddie's allegations,Latrena's May 25 admission, "I did whip you, but I never burned [you]," and a report byrespondent's parents that Latrena whipped Eddie with a belt. The court ordered Latrena tocomplete anger management classes and further parenting classes.

With regard to respondent, the court found that the evidence showed he was still livingwith Latrena, his behavior at the May 25 visit was inappropriate, and he did nothing to stopLatrena's confrontation with Eddie at that time. The court further stated that respondent neededto complete parenting coaching and ordered him to undergo a psychological assessment todetermine his ability to parent the children and protect them from Latrena's "wrath."

On January 29, 2003, the public defender of Cook County filed a motion for leave towithdraw as appellate counsel for Latrena pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 95 L.Ed. 2d 539, 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987). This court granted the motion to withdraw and affirmed thetrial court's order as to Latrena on June 16, 2003. Respondent now separately appeals the trialcourt's orders, contending that the court improperly conducted the temporary custody hearing andthat its findings of neglect at the adjudicatory hearing were against the manifest weight of theevidence. Respondent further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in not grantinghim custody of Eddie and Ariel because he participated in and completed all recommendedservices prior to the disposition.

ANALYSIS

Respondent's contentions address three stages of the instant proceedings -- the temporarycustody hearing, the adjudication of neglect, and the dispositional hearing which adjudicatedEddie and Ariel wards of the court. The process of determining whether a child should beremoved from his parents and made a ward of the court is prescribed by the Juvenile Court Act of1987. 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2002). Where a petition for adjudication of wardship isfiled by the State, the Act provides that a temporary custody hearing shall be held during whichthe court shall determine whether there is probable cause to believe the child is neglected, whetherthere is an immediate and urgent necessity to remove the child from the home and whetherreasonable efforts have been made to prevent the removal of the child or that no effortsreasonably can be made to prevent or eliminate the necessity of removal. 705 ILCS 405/2-10(West 2002). Each finding must be made in writing. 705 ILCS 405/2-10 (West 2002).

Initially, we address respondent's argument that the trial court failed to conduct a propertemporary custody hearing and that, pursuant to In re Patricia S., 222 Ill. App. 3d 585, 584N.E.2d 270 (1991), the court erred in failing to determine at the hearing whether DCFS madereasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the removal of the children from their home. Respondent adds that this error also appears on the face of the temporary custody order as thecourt did not state in writing the nature of the services that were offered prior to the children'sremoval. The State contends that this issue is moot or, in the alternative, that respondent haswaived the issue by not raising it in the trial court and by failing to provide a sufficient record forappellate review. We agree with each of these contentions.

Generally, an appeal of findings made in a temporary custody hearing is moot where thereis a subsequent adjudication of wardship supported by adequate evidence. See In re A.D.W., 278Ill. App. 3d 476, 480-81, 663 N.E.2d 58, 61 (1996). As shall be discussed below, there wasadequate evidence to support the adjudication and disposition in this case. Therefore, anycontention of error regarding the temporary custody hearing and written order is moot. Even ifwe were to agree with respondent, as we did in In re Patricia S., 222 Ill. App. 3d at 589-90, 584N.E.2d at 273, that this court may consider these moot issues because they concern issues ofgreat public interest or that are likely to be repeated yet evade review (a determination we are notconstrained to make here), we would be unable to apply these exceptions in this case. In order toreview the findings made at the temporary custody hearing, we would need to review thetranscript of that hearing. However, respondent has not provided this court with a transcript ofthe hearing and it is his burden to file an adequate record on appeal. See Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958, 960 (1984).

Even more specifically, without an adequate record, we would in any event be unable todetermine the applicability of the holding in Patricia S. to the instant case. In Patricia S., thiscourt held that the trial court was required to conduct a reasonable efforts hearing beforetemporary custody was granted and the trial court erred in declining to do so. However, in thatcase the public guardian in Patricia S. requested such a hearing on the record. Becauserespondent in this case has failed to provide this court with a transcript of the temporary custodyhearing, we are unable to determine whether respondent made such a request and whether therequest was denied. Since there is no other indication in the record that respondent requested areasonable efforts hearing or that he raised an objection in the trial court regarding the allegedlack of such a finding, the issue has been waived. In re R.M., 283 Ill. App. 3d 469, 472, 670N.E.2d 827, 829 (1996).

Finally, we note that even in Patricia S., this court did not order the cause remanded. Instead, it found that "a ruling now on whether, at the time of the temporary custody hearings,DCFS was making reasonable efforts to keep the minors with their mother would be pointless.*** [R]easonable efforts determinations are time specific: they address the adequacy of DCFSefforts only as of the time of the ruling. A finding now concerning reasonable efforts at thetemporary custody stage would have no effect on the minors." In re Patricia S., 222 Ill. App. 3dat 593-94, 584 N.E.2d at 275. The same is true in this case where the children were properlyadjudicated wards of the court at the disposition hearing which followed the temporary custodyhearing. As a result, mootness and waiver aside, remand would be unwarranted.

Respondent next contends that the trial court's finding of nonorganic failure to thrive forCassio, on which it based Eddie's and Ariel's findings of neglect, was against the manifest weightof the evidence. In the alternative, he argues that, even if Cassio's diagnosis of nonorganic failureto thrive was proper, the findings of neglect as to Ariel and Eddie were against the manifestweight of the evidence. We disagree.

Following a child's placement in temporary custody, the court must make a finding ofabuse, neglect or dependence before it conducts an adjudication of wardship. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(West 2002). In determining whether a child is neglected, the State must prove the allegations ofneglect by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning it must demonstrate that the allegations aremore probable than not. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 343, 730 N.E.2d 1086, 1088 (2000); In reArthur H., Jr., 338 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1035, 789 N.E.2d 890, 896 (2003). A reviewing court willnot reverse a trial court's finding of neglect unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Arthur H., Jr., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 789 N.E.2d at 896. The court's determination isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. In reArthur H., Jr., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 789 N.E.2d at 896. Under this standard of review, thereviewing court must give deference to the trial court's findings of fact as the trial court is in thebest position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses, assess theircredibility, and weigh the evidence. In re Arthur H., Jr., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 789 N.E.2d at896.

Neglect is generally seen as a "failure to exercise the care that circumstances justlydemand and encompasses both wilful and unintentional disregard of parental duty." In re ArthurH., Jr., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 789 N.E.2d at 896. Pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, a minormay be neglected where his "environment is injurious to his *** welfare." 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2002). The term "injurious environment" is generally interpreted to include "thebreach of a parent's duty to ensure a 'safe and nurturing shelter' for his or her children." In reN.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 346, 730 N.E.2d at 1090, quoting In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d 820, 826, 649N.E.2d 74, 79 (1995). However, our courts have recognized that the concept of neglect has nofixed meaning and that the term "injurious environment" is "an amorphous concept." In re N.B.,191 Ill. 2d at 346, 730 N.E.2d at 1090; In re Arthur H., Jr., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 789 N.E.2dat 896; In re J.P., 331 Ill. App. 3d 220, 234, 770 N.E.2d 1160, 1172 (2002). As a result, casesaddressing an adjudication of neglect and wardship are sui generis, and must be consideredaccording to their own particular facts. In re Arthur H., Jr., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 789 N.E.2dat 896; In re Christina M., 333 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1034, 777 N.E.2d 655, 659 (2002).

Citing In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d 728, 682 N.E.2d 95 (1997), and In re Edricka C., 276Ill. App. 3d 18, 657 N.E.2d 78 (1995), respondent argues that the State's evidence that Cassio'sfailure to thrive was nonorganic was rebutted by the presentation of evidence that his failure tothrive was organic and, therefore, not the result of neglect. See In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d at736, 682 N.E.2d at 100; In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d at 28, 657 N.E.2d at 84 (prima facieevidence of neglect creates only a rebuttable presumption which may be overcome by otherevidence). Respondent asserts that both Dr. Gomez and Dr. Zun agreed that the primary factor indiagnosing a failure to thrive is the child's weight gain during hospitalization; but, he argues,Cassio's medical records did not reveal a weight gain significant enough to support Dr. Gomez'diagnosis of nonorganic failure to thrive. He further states that Dr. Zun's diagnosis of organicfailure to thrive was wholly supported by the medical records. In response, the State argues thatthe trial court erred in qualifying Dr. Zun as an expert witness.

Dr. Gomez testified at the adjudicatory hearing that when Cassio arrived at the hospital, hehad not received any immunizations and he could not sit up or crawl. His blood, lead, urine andneurological tests were normal and he gained approximately one pound during his first week ofhospitalization. Dr. Gomez stated that all of these symptoms pointed to a diagnosis of nonorganicfailure to thrive. To the contrary, Dr. Zun concluded that, although Cassio's failure to thrive wasthe result of his inability to gain weight, it was organic in nature and was the result of esophagealreflux, a neurological impairment and the small stature of his parents. The court concluded thatDr, Gomez' testimony was more credible as he was Cassio's treating physician while the child wasin the hospital. As previously stated, the trial court is in the best position to observe the conductand demeanor of the witnesses, assess their credibility, and weigh the evidence. In re Arthur H.,Jr., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 789 N.E.2d at 896. We will not reassess witness credibility orreweigh the evidence, and we find no reason to overturn the trial court's findings regarding Dr.Gomez' testimony. See In re Chyna B., 331 Ill. App. 3d 591, 595, 772 N.E.2d 301, 305 (2002). Contrary to respondent's argument, Dr. Gomez' inability to recall details without Cassio's medicalrecords and to convert grams to pounds in his head did not render his testimony unbelievable.

Furthermore, although the evidence of Cassio's improvement while hospitalized was notoverwhelming, there is sufficient support for Dr. Gomez' testimony and the trial court'sdetermination in the record. Cassio's medical records reflect that when Cassio was admitted onAugust 24, 2001, he weighed 6,340 grams. By September 2, 2001, he weighed 6,800 grams (aweight gain of approximately one pound), and on September 13 he weighed 6,870 grams. Although Cassio's weight decreased 130 grams between September 13 and 14, the day he wasdischarged, the records reflect that he had contracted a virus and had been running a fever for afew days. Regardless, the record sufficiently supports the testimony of Dr. Gomez that Cassiogained about one pound during his first week in the hospital and that he continued to gain asignificant amount of weight during the rest of his hospitalization.

The medical records also indicate that Cassio was eating well while in the hospital and thathis developmental delays improved. Upon admission, Cassio could not sit up or crawl, but themedical notes reflect that by September 10, 2001, Cassio was lifting his head better and he hadbegun to crawl. Hospital staff notes also support the hearing testimony that Latrena was"defensive" when informed about the child's condition and that she denied that there was anythingwrong with him. Latrena refused to discuss Cassio's diet, stating that she knew what her baby ate. Although respondent asserts that as of August 24, 2001,⁽²⁾ Cassio's immunizations were current, themedical records indicate that Cassio was given his first immunizations on that date, when heshould have already received three sets of immunizations by that time.

In sum, given the testimony of Dr. Gomez and the medical records introduced at trial, wecannot find that the trial court's determination that Cassio had nonorganic failure to thrive due toparental neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Dr. Gomez' testimony and therecords sufficiently satisfied the standard of proving the allegations of neglect were more probablethan not and we cannot find that the opposite conclusion was clearly evident. In re N.B., 191 Ill.2d at 343, 730 N.E.2d at 1088. Because we find there was sufficient support for the court'sdetermination that Cassio suffered from nonorganic failure to thrive despite Dr. Zun's testimony,we need not address the State's contention that Dr. Zun should not have been qualified as anexpert witness in pediatric medicine.

Despite this determination that there was sufficient evidence to support Cassio's diagnosisof nonorganic failure to thrive, respondent contends that the findings of neglect for Eddie andAriel were still against the manifest weight of the evidence. He asserts that the children'simmunizations were current, there was no evidence of abuse or neglect and there was no urgentand immediate necessity to remove the children from their home. He urges that the court erred inadjudicating Eddie and Ariel neglected based solely on Cassio's nonorganic failure to thrive.

As previously stated, neglect is generally seen as a "failure to exercise the care thatcircumstances justly demand." In re Arthur H., Jr., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 789 N.E.2d at 896. An injurious environment is defined by a parent's failure to provide a safe and nurturing shelter forhis children (In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 346, 730 N.E.2d at 1090), and proof of neglect of oneminor is admissible evidence as to the neglect of another minor for whom the parent is responsible. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2002). However, such neglect should be measured not only by thecircumstances surrounding the sibling, but also by the care and condition of the child in question. In re Arthur H., Jr., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1036, 789 N.E.2d at 897.

In considering the alleged neglect of Eddie and Ariel, the trial court heard the previouslydiscussed testimony of Dr. Gomez and Dr. Zun regarding Cassio's failure to thrive. The courtfurther considered the testimony of John Gac, who testified that Eddie and Ariel displayed novisible signs of abuse or neglect, but that Latrena admitted Ariel was behind on her immunizations. Gac stated that Latrena denied there was anything wrong with Cassio and asserted that heropinion was as valid as the doctor's due to her training as a nurse's assistant. Gac believed thatCassio's diagnosis, combined with Eddie's and Ariel's young age, put Eddie and Ariel at risk ofneglect. The court next heard the testimony of social worker Marjorie Kaplan. Like Gac, Kaplantestified that Latrena insisted Cassio was fine, but admitted that he was behind on hisimmunizations. Latrena told Kaplan that her children's development was normal and she dismissedthe opinions of the hospital staff.

This testimony, combined with the medical records previously discussed, adequatelyestablished that Cassio suffered from nonorganic failure to thrive, that Latrena refused to addressCassio's medical condition and Cassio's and Ariel's developmental disabilities, and that Ariel andCassio were behind on their immunizations. In turn, these findings sufficiently supported the trialcourt's determination of neglect for Eddie and Ariel, and we cannot find that the oppositeconclusion was clearly evident.

Citing In re K.G., respondent argues that Cassio's nonorganic failure to thrive alone doesnot sufficiently support the finding of injurious environment as to his siblings because there was noevidence that Eddie and Ariel were abused or neglected. In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 682N.E.2d at 100. In K.G., the respondent gave birth to two children with cocaine in their systems. The respondent was also the mother of two older children. Although DCFS did not attempt toremove any of the children from their mother's care due to her drug use, she did receivecounseling and rehabilitation which were both reportedly successful. Subsequently, therespondent's youngest child died in what was determined to be an accident, and DCFS removedthe remaining three children from the respondent's care. At the adjudicatory hearing for the twoolder children, the trial court found that the children were not neglected even though the twoyounger siblings were born with cocaine in their systems. This court agreed, stating that althougha parent's neglect of one child may be considered when determining whether a sibling is exposedto an injurious environment, such prima facie evidence of neglect only creates a rebuttablepresumption which may be overcome by other evidence. In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 682N.E.2d at 100. We found that the presence of cocaine in the younger children's systems was notsufficient to show that the two older children were neglected, particularly when the evidenceshowed that the respondent had been drug free for over one year before the children wereremoved from her care and that no effort had ever been made to remove the children from herbefore the accidental death of her youngest child, despite DCFS knowledge of her drug use. In reK.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d at 736-37, 682 N.E.2d at 100.

Respondent compares the instant case to K.G. in arguing that Cassio's nonorganic failureto thrive was not sufficient to establish that Eddie and Ariel were neglected. We disagree. InK.G., this court held that the neglect of one child is prima facie evidence of the neglect of thatchild's siblings. However, in K.G., there was sufficient evidence to overcome the prima facie caseestablished by the evidence of the younger children's drug exposure. Here, unlike K.G., there wasno evidence offered at the adjudicatory hearing to overcome this prima facie evidence of Cassio'sneglect. In fact, there was evidence with respect to Eddie and Ariel that bolstered the prima facieevidence of neglect engendered by Cassio's condition. As previously stated, the evidence showedthat Latrena failed to accept or address Cassio's medical problems, that Ariel also suffered fromdevelopmental delays requiring therapy, and that Ariel had not received her immunizationsbecause respondent failed to take her to the doctor for over a year. Furthermore, the manifestweight standard of review is highly deferential to the trial court. In K.G., the trial court found theState had not established neglect, and this court could not find on appeal that such a determinationwas against the manifest weight of the evidence. Likewise, in this case, the trial court found Eddieand Ariel to be neglected and we cannot find that the opposite conclusion was clearly evident.

Respondent also compares this case to In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 730 N.E.2d 1086(2000), where the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a finding of neglect due to an injuriousenvironment. In N.B., the trial court found the respondent's two children to be neglected due totwo incidents during which the respondent displayed inappropriate anger toward employees of thehealth department. However, the supreme court noted that the anger in those incidents was notdirected at the children, nor was there any proof of any mistreatment or actual harm to either ofthe two children. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 351, 730 N.E.2d at 1093. Because there was noevidence suggesting that the respondent had not fulfilled her duty to provide a safe and nurturingshelter, the court reversed the trial court's finding of neglect and the appellate court's affirmance ofthat finding. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 351-54, 730 N.E.2d at 1093-94.

The instant case is distinguishable from N.B., however, in that here there was evidence ofactual harm to one of the children -- Cassio suffered from nonorganic failure to thrive due toinadequate nutrition. Furthermore, when informed of Cassio's condition, Latrena denied he wasmalnurished or developmentally delayed. She also denied Ariel was developmentally delayed, andshe refused to accept or even consider the doctor's opinion. Unlike the children in N.B., Eddieand Ariel were found to be neglected based on evidence of actual harm caused to their sibling andtheir mother's refusal to address that harm, as well as evidence that Ariel's developmental andmedical needs were not being met.

Finally, respondent contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant himcustody of his two children. Respondent argues that he was a fit and able parent as evidenced bythe lack of allegations of abuse or neglect against him, his completion of all required services andhis consistent visitation with the children. He further argues that the court should not consider thefact that he was living with Latrena at the time of the disposition hearing as there is no evidence hewas told to "evict" her.

Under section 2-27(1) of the Juvenile Court Act, the trial court may commit a minor toDCFS wardship if it determines that the parent is unable, for some reason other than financialcircumstances alone, to care for, protect, train, or discipline the minor and that the health, safety,and best interests of the minor will be jeopardized if the minor remains in the custody of theparent. 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2002). Generally, both parents must be adjudged unfit orunable to care for a child before placement with DCFS is authorized, as the child's biologicalparents have a "superior right of custody" unless such a finding has been made. In re Arthur H.,Jr., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1041, 789 N.E.2d at 901. However, we note that an adjudication ofwardship under section 2-27 is not a complete termination of all parental rights. See In re LakitaB., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 993-94, 697 N.E.2d 830, 836 (1998) (parental rights may bepermanently terminated under section 2-13 or 2-29(2) of the Act). The nonpermanent nature ofthe ruling is evidenced in this case by the court's setting of a date for a permanency planninghearing within the disposition order.

Although we agree that the record shows respondent was cooperative in completing theservices recommended by DCFS and that he was a noncustodial parent when the children wereremoved from their home, the State is correct in its assertion that the purpose of the dispositionalhearing was for the court to determine whether it was in the best interests of the children to bemade wards of the court. See In re J.J., 327 Ill. App. 3d 70, 77, 761 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (2001)(child's best interests are superior to all other factors even if the parent is not found to be unfit);see also In re Chyna B., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 597, 772 N.E.2d at 306-07. In this regard, the courtcould consider any evidence presented at the hearing pertaining to the children's best interests,including respondent's living arrangements. See In re S.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d 121, 129, 728 N.E.2d1165, 1171 (2000) (a "very important" factor to consider in determining wardship is whether aparent who did not inflict abuse or neglect is living in the home with the parent who did). Thecourt was not, as respondent argues, limited to only considering respondent's compliance withDCFS service plans. See In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 214-15, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1049 (2001).

Clearly, the fact that respondent was living with Latrena was a concern for DCFS and thetrial court. Moriarity testified that she raised this concern with respondent and he told her inFebruary 2002 that Latrena would be moving out of his apartment. However, Latrena's June 2002psychological evaluation reflects that she was still living with respondent at that time. In addition,the trial court noted there was no indication respondent was willing or able to protect the childrenfrom Latrena's temper, as evidenced by the May 2001 visitation, during which Latrena confrontedEddie and respondent did not protect him or divert her. As a result, respondent's behavior at theMay 2001 visitation, combined with the fact that he was living with Latrena, provided sufficientgrounds for the court to conclude that respondent was unable to protect Eddie and Ariel and thebest interests of the minors would be jeopardized if respondent was granted custody. Therefore,the children were properly adjudicated wards of the court without finding respondent unfit andwithout finally terminating his parental rights, and the court will continue to monitor its remainingquestions as to respondent's ability to parent and protect his children from their mother, the parentwho initially perpetrated the neglect. See In re Chyna B., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 597, 772 N.E.2d at306-07.

Accordingly, we cannot find the court's actions were an abuse of discretion given thecircumstances at the time of its judgment. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McNULTY, J. and McBRIDE, J. concur

1. On June 16, 2003, this court granted the Cook County public defender's motion towithdraw from the mother's appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 95 L. Ed.2d 539, 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987). In the Interest of A.T., No. 1-02-2668 (June 16, 2003)(unpublished opinion under Supreme Court Rule 23).

2. Respondent's brief provides the date August 24, 2002, for Cassio's immunizations;however, the hospital records to which he cites are dated 2001.