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SIXTH DIVISION
July 11, 2003

PRESIDING JUSTICE O'BRIEN delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Following a stipulated bench trial, respondent, 16-year-old D.R., was adjudicated delinquent for committing theoffense of criminal sexual abuse and sentenced to 1 year ofprobation, 40 hours of community service, and sex offendercounseling. The court also ordered D.R. to register as a sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act(Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)) and tosubmit a blood sample pursuant to section 5-4-3 of theUnified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2000)). Uponappeal, D.R. argues that: (1) his stipulated bench trial wastantamount to a guilty plea and the trial court erred byfailing to give the necessary admonishments prior toaccepting the guilty plea; (2) the court erred in ordering himto register as a sex offender pursuant to the RegistrationAct, as the Registration Act does not apply to juveniles; and(3) the Registration Act violates procedural due processbecause it does not afford registrants a predeprivationhearing to determine whether they are currentlydangerous. We affirm.

At trial, the parties stipulated that if called to testify,Officer Crimmins would state that he met with D.R. onOctober 26, 1999, and that D.R. admitted having vaginalintercourse with the victim, M.L. The parties furtherstipulated that if called to testify, M.L. would identify D.R. inopen court and state that on September 25, 1999, D.R. placed hispenis in her vagina. Finally, the parties stipulated that D.R.was 16 years old and M.L. was 13 years old on September 25, 1999.

The trial court adjudicated D.R. delinquent forviolating section 12-15(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961, whichstates:

"The accused commits criminal sexual abuse if theaccused was under 17 years of age and commits an act ofsexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim whowas at least 9 years of age but under 17 years of age whenthe act was committed." 720 ILCS 5/12-15(b)(West 2000).

Upon appeal, D.R. first argues that his stipulated benchtrial was tantamount to a guilty plea and that the trialcourt erred by failing to give him the necessaryadmonishments pursuant to section 5-605 of the JuvenileCourt Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-605 (West 2000)). Section 5-605provides that prior to accepting a guilty plea, the courtmust admonish the defendant about the consequence of hisplea and of the maximum penalty that may be imposed. 705 ILCS405/5-605(2)(a) (West 2000).

When a defendant in a stipulated bench trial stipulatesnot only to the evidence, but also to the sufficiency of theevidence to convict, the proceeding is tantamount to aguilty plea. People v. Bellmyer, 199 Ill. 2d 529, 538-39 (2002). Whenthe trial court is called upon to perform its function ofdetermining guilt or innocence, no guilty plea is involved. Bellmyer, 199 Ill. 2d at 540.

Here, D.R. never stipulated that the evidence wassufficient to sustain a finding of delinquency; rather, thetrial judge was called upon to determine whether thestipulated evidence was sufficient to find D.R. delinquentfor committing criminal sexual abuse. Accordingly, D.R.'sstipulated bench trial was not tantamount to a guilty plea,and therefore no section 5-605 admonishments wererequired here.

This case is similar to In re J.R, No. 1-01-2318 (1st Dist. June27, 2003) in which the respondent was charged as adelinquent minor under the Juvenile Court Act withcriminal sexual abuse. At the stipulated bench trial, theparties stipulated that: the victim would testify she was 12years old on July 1, 1999, when the respondent put his handunder her underwear and digitally penetrated her vaginaand then put his penis in her vagina before pulling out andejaculating; the forensic scientist would state that thesemen stain from the victim's underwear was consistentwith having originated from respondent; and the policesergeant would testify that respondent admitted to tryingto place his penis in the victim's vagina. In re J.R., slip op. at 3.

The trial court accepted the stipulation and entered afinding of delinquency for criminal sexual abuse. In re J.R.,slip op. at 3. The appellate court affirmed, noting thatdefense counsel "in no way stipulated that the evidence wassufficient to convict respondent. *** Rather, the State washeld to its burden of proof, the trial judge was called uponto decide the issue of guilt or innocence and the issue ofthe sufficiency of the evidence was preserved for appeal." Inre J.R., slip op. at 24. Therefore, the appellate court held thatrespondent's stipulated bench trial was not tantamount toa guilty plea and the trial court did not err in failing toprovide admonishments. In re J.R., slip op. at 24.

In the present case, as in In re J.R., the State was held toits burden of proof, the trial judge was called upon todecide the issue of guilt or innocence, and the issue of thesufficiency of the evidence was preserved for review. Accordingly, D.R.'s stipulated bench trial was nottantamount to a guilty plea and the trial court did not errin failing to provide admonishments.

D.R. contends that People v. Stepheny, 56 Ill. 2d 237 (1974),compels a different result. In Stepheny, the defendant wascharged with murder and convicted of voluntarymanslaughter after a bench trial. Stepheny, 56 Ill. 2d at 238-39. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that his trial was a "shamand a mere formality" because his attorney, the prosecutor,and the judge had previously agreed to the result in the casewithout informing the defendant. Stepheny, 56 Ill. 2d at 239. In fact, the judge and opposing counsel had agreed that,regardless of the evidence, the defendant would be foundguilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 10 to 20 years'imprisonment. Stepheny, 56 Ill. 2d at 239. The supreme courtreversed the defendant's convictions, holding that thetrial was tantamount to a guilty plea and that defendanthad not been given the appropriate admonishments. Stepheny, 56 Ill. 2d at 240.

Unlike Stepheny, the proceedings here were nottantamount to a guilty plea, as there is no indication in therecord that defense counsel agreed to the defendant'sadjudication of delinquency or that the trial became a meresham.

Next, D.R. argues that the court erred by ordering himto register as a sex offender under the Registration Act, asthe Registration Act does not apply to juveniles. In support,D.R. cites In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d 497 (2001), in which theAppellate Court for the Second District held that juvenilesex offenders are not required to register under theRegistration Act because section 3 of the Registration Act,concerning the duty to register, does not specifically referto juvenile sex offenders. Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 500.

However, in In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50 (2003), our supremecourt rejected the Nicholas K. analysis and stated:

"Although section 3 of the Registration Act does notspecifically refer to juvenile sex offenders, section 3does provide that sex offenders and sexual predatorsshall register. 730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2000). *** [W]e note thata juvenile sex offender is a sex offender, albeit a specificcategory of sex offender. Juvenile sex offenderstherefore are included within the larger category ofsex offenders required to register." (Emphasis inoriginal.) In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 65.

Our supreme court also found support for itsconclusion in the legislative debates concerning House Bill2721, which added the definition of juvenile sex offender tothe Registration Act. The court specifically noted thestatements of Representative Klingler and Senator Klem thatthe bill requires juvenile sex offenders to register. In re J.W.,204 Ill. 2d at 66.

Finally, our supreme court noted (In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at66) that the corresponding Sex Offender and Child MurdererCommunity Notification Law (Notification Law) (730 ILCS152/101 et seq. (West 2000)) provides that the Department ofState Police is to establish and maintain a sex offenderdatabase of those persons registered as sex offenders underthe Registration Act. 730 ILCS 152/115 (West 2000). TheNotification Law expressly includes juvenile sex offenders. 730 ILCS 152/105, 120(e)(West 2000).

Accordingly, the supreme court held "[c]learly, then,juvenile sex offenders do fall within the purview of section3 of the Registration Act and are required to register." In reJ.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 66. See also In re J.R., op. at 10 (holding thatjuvenile sex offenders are required to register under theRegistration Act.)

In the present case, D.R. is a juvenile sex offender, as hewas adjudicated delinquent of criminal sexual abuse, one ofthe sex offenses listed in the Registration Act. 730 ILCS150/2(B)(1)(West 2000). Therefore, D.R. is required to register asa sex offender.

Next, D.R. argues that the Registration Act and theNotification Law violate procedural due process becausethey fail to afford the juvenile an opportunity to be heardon the issue of his current dangerousness to the communitybefore requiring him to register as a sex offender anddisclosing the registry information to the public. Wedisagree. In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe,538, U.S._, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98, 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003), the United StatesSupreme Court examined the Connecticut sex registrationstatute, which required a sex offender to register based notupon dangerousness, but upon his conviction for a sexoffense. The United States Supreme Court held thatprocedural due process did not entitle the convicted sexoffender to a hearing to establish that he was notcurrently dangerous, where current dangerousness was notmaterial under the statute. Doe, _ U.S._, 155 L. Ed. 2d at _, 123 S. Ct.at 1164.

In the present case, the Illinois Registration Act, like theConnecticut registry, requires a sex offender to registerbased not upon dangerousness, but on his conviction for asex offense. Accordingly, the Registration Act does notviolate due process because there is no material connectionbetween the sex offender's current level of dangerousnessand his duty to register under the Registration Act. Procedural due process does not entitle D.R. to a hearing todetermine that he is not currently dangerous, as currentdangerousness is not material to the duty to register underthe statute. See also In re J.R., slip op. at 15(holding that theRegistration Act does not violate procedural due process).

Similarly, the Notification Law requires publicdisclosure by all offenders who commit the listed sexoffenses. That requirement is not based upon currentdangerousness, but is instead based upon the fact that theoffender was convicted of a sex offense. Accordingly, theNotification Law does not violate procedural due processbecause there is no material connection between theoffender's current level of dangerousness and thedisclosure requirements of the Notification Law. Procedural due process does not entitle D.R. to a hearing todetermine that he is not currently dangerous, wherecurrent dangerousness is not material to the disclosurerequirements of the Notification Law. See also In re J.R. slipop. at 20 (holding that the Notification Law does not violateprocedural due process).

Finally, D.R. argues that the Registration Act andNotification Law violate the confidentiality provided by theJuvenile Court Act. This same argument was made andrejected in In re J.R., slip op. at 20, 22, in which we noted thestrict limits placed upon access to the registry informationand held that neither the Registry Act nor the NotificationLaw violates the confidentiality of juvenile court recordsas provided by the Juvenile Court Act.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court.

Affirmed.

GALLAGHER, and O'MARA FROSSARD, JJ's concur.