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THIRD DIVISION
FILED: March 24, 2004

No. 1-03-0182

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The respondent, Tieriel W., appeals from an order of thecircuit court finding her unfit as a parent as defined in section1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act of 1987 (Adoption Act) (750 ILCS50/1(D)(b) (West 2000)) and pursuant to section 2-29 of theJuvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-29West 2000)), and terminating her parental rights to her minorchildren, Dominique W., Donquishae W., and Donzell W. For thereasons which follow, we affirm.

The respondent and Donzell G.⁽¹⁾ are the natural parents of Dominique W. and Donquishae W., born on November 18, 1993; andDonzell W., born on April 27, 1995. The respondent's family cameto the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services(DCFS) in July 1995 when Donzell W. was hospitalized aftersuffering a seizure and water intoxication by reason of having beenfed water instead of milk. On July 18, 1995, the State filedpetitions for adjudication of wardship of the children, allegingthat they were abused and neglected due to the respondent's actionstoward Donzell W. That same day, the circuit court appointed thepublic guardian to serve as the children's guardian ad litem. Following a temporary custody hearing held on July 21, 1995, thecircuit court allowed the children to remain in the respondent'scustody under an order of protection.

On January 26, 1996, however, the circuit court found that therespondent violated the order of protection when Donzell W. wasagain hospitalized, suffering from seizures as a consequence of therespondent feeding him inappropriately. The court found that itwas a matter of immediate and urgent necessity to remove thechildren from the respondent's care, and temporary custody of thechildren was awarded to the DCFS guardianship administrator.

Following an adjudicatory hearing held on October 10, 1996,the circuit court found that the children had been neglected due toan injurious environment and abused due to substantial risk ofphysical injury as defined in the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS405/2-3 (West 2000)). After a dispositional hearing held onJanuary 22, 1997, the court found that the respondent was unable tocare for the children, adjudged them wards of the court, andappointed D. Jean Ortega Piron as their guardian.

On April 14, 1997, on motion of the respondent, the circuitcourt entered an order of protection allowing her unsupervised dayvisitation with the children at the discretion of the DCFS. A fewmonths later, the court entered another order of protectionallowing the respondent unsupervised overnight visitation with thechildren. On July 28, 1998, the court entered a modifieddispositional order finding the respondent fit, able, and willingto care for the minors, and returned custody of the children to therespondent under an order of protection.

On February 17, 1999, the State filed an emergency motion fora finding of a violation of the order of protection. The Statealleged, inter alia, that the respondent was refusing to allowsocial workers access to the children when requested. The courtgranted the State's motion and entered another dispositional orderfinding the respondent unable to care for Donzell W., Dominique W.,and Donquishae W., and again adjudging them wards of the court.

On September 10, 2001, the State filed supplemental petitionsseeking the appointment of a guardian with the right to consent tothe children's adoption (hereinafter "petitions for termination"). The petitions alleged, inter alia, that the respondent was an unfitparent as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act and pursuantto section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act, based on her failure tomaintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility for the children's welfare. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b)(West 2000); 705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 2000).

A hearing on the State's petitions for termination commencedon August 8, 2002, and concluded on September 5, 2002. Thefollowing evidence was presented at the hearing.

Yvette Grinstead, a caseworker from Catholic Charities,testified that she was assigned to the children's case in May 2000.

Grinstead stated that she reviewed the respondent's prior case fileat that time, and learned that the respondent had visited thechildren sporadically from January 2000 through April 2000. Duringthis time, the children were under the care of their foster parent,Catherine W., who was also the respondent's aunt.

The State admitted into evidence three service plans preparedby Grinstead. The first of these service plans, dated February 8,2001, covered the period of time from August 2000 through February2001. Grinstead gave the respondent an "unsatisfactory" rating forcomplying with the visitation plan. She testified that, althoughthe respondent completed 10 out of 12 visits from July 2000 throughOctober 2000, she only visited the children sporadically once shecompleted her quota. Grinstead further noted that the respondent'slast visit with the children was on December 2, 2000. According toGrinstead, the respondent did not see the children over theChristmas holidays nor on Dominique W. and Donquishae W.'sbirthday.

Grinstead next testified concerning the service plan datedAugust 15, 2001, which covered the period of time from February2001 through August 2001. Grinstead again gave the respondent an"unsatisfactory" rating during this time period because she had notvisited her children since December 2000. Grinstead stated thatshe spoke to the respondent by phone on April 5, 2001, and in May2001. She testified that the respondent did not ask for visitationduring either conversation. Further, the respondent did not sendany gifts, cards, or letters to the children during this time. According to Grinstead, on July 24, 2001, the children were placedunder the care of foster parents, Aretha and Clarence Armstrong,who live across the street from Catherine W.

Finally, Grinstead testified concerning the service plan datedFebruary 14, 2002, which covered the period of time from August2001 through February 2002, when the children were living with theArmstrongs. With respect to visitation, Grinstead gave therespondent an "unsatisfactory" rating, noting that she had notvisited her children during this time. Grinstead testified that,from the time the children began living with the Armstrongs in July2001, the only time the respondent called to request a visit was onApril 4, 2002. However, when Grinstead called the respondent backto schedule the visit, she received a recording stating that thetelephone customer was unavailable. Grinstead sent the respondenta letter, but never heard back from her.

Catherine W. testified that she had been the children's fosterparent for six years until the Armstrongs became their fosterparents in July 2001. During this time, the respondent called her"off and on" and Catherine W. herself called the respondent toschedule visits with the children. In January 2001, the respondentvisited the children at Catherine W.'s house and brought toys forthem. The visit in January, however, was the last time therespondent visited the children while they were living withCatherine W. Catherine W. stated that she had severalconversations with the respondent in February 2001 and March 2001,but the respondent never came to visit the children. In June 2001,respondent called Catherine W. three or four times to schedulevisits, but they never took place. Catherine W. stated that, whenshe called the respondent after the missed visits, the respondentstated that she could not visit the children because she could notfind a babysitter to look after her other children. In July 2001,the respondent called twice about scheduling visits, but could notattend for the same reason.

Catherine W. stated that she became the children's babysitterafter the Armstrongs became their foster parents. She stated thatshe still has contact with the respondent, and that the respondentasks about the children's well-being. Finally, Catherine W.testified that, although visitation "kind of slacked" during theprior year and a half, the respondent visited the children on aweekly basis prior to Grinstead taking over as the children'scaseworker.

Aretha Armstrong testified that, when she became thechildren's foster parent in July 2001, Grinstead was supposed topick up the children from her house, and take them to CatholicCharities to visit with the respondent. According to Armstrong,from July 24, 2001, through April 3, 2002, the respondent did notvisit the children. Armstrong testified that the respondent didnot send any gifts, cards, or letters to the children during thistime either. Following Armstrong's testimony, both the State andthe public guardian rested. The respondent did not present anytestimony.

On September 5, 2002, the circuit court denied the State'spetitions for termination. In so doing, the court held that it wasprecluded from considering evidence of the respondent's conductafter September 10, 2001, the date on which the State filed itspetitions for termination, in determining whether the respondentfailed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility for the children's welfare.

On September 27, 2002, the public guardian filed a motion forreconsideration of the circuit court's September 5, 2002, order. A hearing on the motion took place on November 8, 2002. Atranscript of the proceeding on that date, however, is not includedin the record on appeal. The matter was continued to November 14,2002, on which date the circuit court granted the public guardian'smotion to reconsider, holding that it was not precluded fromconsidering evidence after the State filed its petitions fortermination. As a consequence, the court reversed its prior rulingand found that the State had proved by clear and convincingevidence that the respondent was an unfit parent as defined insection 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act and pursuant to section 2-29 ofthe Juvenile Court Act.

A dispositional hearing regarding the best interests of thechildren was held on December 10, 2002, and December 17, 2002. Grinstead testified that she was still the caseworker for thechildren and that they were still living with the Armstrongs. Grinstead, having observed the children interact with theArmstrongs, described their relationship as a "typical positiveparent and child relationship based on love, nurturance, andrespect." She stated that the children refer to the Armstrongs as"mom" and "dad", and they appear to be well-bonded with theArmstrongs' children. According to Grinstead, the Armstrongs wishto adopt Donzell W., Dominique W., and Donquishae W. Grinsteadstated that she spoke to the children about adoption the day beforethe hearing, and they told her that they wished to stay with theArmstrongs.

Grinstead testified that, since the Armstrongs became thechildren's foster parents in July 2001, the respondent visited themon only two occasions. The first visit took place on September 19,2002. That visit was safe and appropriate, and the children werehappy to see the respondent because they had not seen her for sometime. Donzell W., however, told Grinstead that he did not want tolive with the respondent, and Grinstead explained to him that hewas just going to visit her, and that he would return to theArmstrongs. Grinstead testified that the respondent missed a visitscheduled for October 17, 2002. The respondent called a week laterto say that she forgot to confirm the visit. The next visit withthe children took place on November 27, 2002. Grinstead statedthat the visit was also safe and appropriate. However, it wasDominique W. and Donquishae W.'s birthday a week earlier, and therespondent did not bring any gifts. According to Grinstead, therespondent has not sent any gifts, cards, or letters to thechildren since they were placed under the Armstrongs' care. Withrespect to phone calls, Grinstead testified that the respondent hasspoken to the children on two occasions since September 19, 2002. Grinstead stated that the phone calls were initiated by CatherineW., and not the respondent.

Grinstead opined that it is in the best interests of thechildren that the respondent's parental rights be terminated andthat they be made available for adoption. She based her opinion onthe fact that the children are receiving love and nurturance fromthe Armstrongs, and they have been living in a stable homeenvironment for the past year. Further, the children have a lovingbond with Catherine W., who lives across the street, and they areliving in the same community that they have been living in for thepast six years. Grinstead testified that, after observing thechildren with the Armstrongs and with the respondent, she believesthat the children have a stronger bond with the Armstrongs becausethey have a parent-child relationship; whereas, the respondent andthe children relate more as friends. Following Grinstead'stestimony, both the State and the public guardian rested.

The respondent testified on her own behalf. She stated that,while her children were living with Catherine W. from January 2001until July 2001, she called her children on the phone. Therespondent testified that she did not visit her children duringthis time because she was having a difficult pregnancy and neededbed rest. She further stated that she did not have a car, and hadproblems taking her other two children to the visits. Sheadmitted, however, that she did not inform Grinstead of anytransportation problems. The respondent testified that, after theArmstrongs became the children's foster parents, she "kind of gaveup" and did not believe she had a chance to regain custody of them. She admitted that she did not send the children any gifts, cards,or letters during this time.

According to the respondent, the children were happy to seeher at the September 19, 2002, visit. Dominique W. asked her whenshe was moving into her own house so she could come there to stay. With respect to the November 27, 2002, visit, the respondenttestified that she had bought birthday gifts for Dominique W. andDonquishae W., but had left them at home. The respondent admitted,however, that she never sent the gifts to the children. Accordingto the respondent, she has called Catherine W. seven or eight timeswithin the last six months attempting to arrange phone calls withthe children. Finally, the respondent stated that she still lovesher children and wants to try to have a relationship with them.

Catherine W. also testified on behalf of the respondent. According to Catherine W., when the children left her care in July2001, the respondent had a good bond with them. She further statedthat the children and the Armstrongs have a loving bond and arehappy together. Catherine W. believed that it was in the bestinterests of the children to stay with the Armstrongs because theyare in school and are doing well. She stated that "it would be abit too much" for the respondent if the children were returned toher. Catherine W. acknowledged, however, that the children shouldstill have some contact with the respondent.

On December 23, 2002, the circuit court found that it was inthe best interests of the children to terminate the respondent'sparental rights. Accordingly, the court terminated therespondent's parental rights based on its prior finding ofunfitness under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act and the bestinterests of the children. The respondent now appeals.

The respondent argues that: (1) the State's petitions fortermination are legally insufficient and fail to allege that shewas an unfit parent; (2) the circuit court erred in considering herconduct after the date on which the State filed its petitions fortermination in making its finding of unfitness; and (3) the circuitcourt's decision that it was in the best interests of the childrento terminate the respondent's parental rights is against themanifest weight of the evidence.

Before turning to the respondent's arguments on appeal, weaddress the public guardian's motion for affirmance pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 23(c) (166 Ill. 2d R. 23(c)), which we havetaken with the case. In his motion, the public guardian arguesthat the record on appeal is incomplete, as it does not contain allof the transcripts from the proceedings below. Specifically, thepublic guardian alleges that the record does not contain thetranscript from November 8, 2002, on which date the parties arguedtheir positions with respect to the public guardian's motion toreconsider the circuit court's initial September 5, 2002, orderdenying the State's petitions for termination. The public guardianacknowledges that the record contains an affidavit from the courtreporter, wherein she averred that she conducted a thorough anddiligent search of her notes, but could not find a record ofproceedings from that date. He argues, however, that therespondent should have filed a bystander's report of theproceedings. Although the record does not contain the November 8,2002, transcript, we note that at most legal argument was presentedon that date. Moreover, the transcript from November 14, 2002, onwhich date the circuit court rendered its ruling on the motion toreconsider, is contained in the record. Accordingly, we believethat the omission of the November 8, 2002, transcript is not fatalto the respondent's case. See Dubey v. Abam Building Corp., 266Ill. App. 3d 44, 46, 639 N.E.2d 215 (1994) (even an incompleterecord does not preclude a reviewing court from determining whethera trial court's findings or rulings are correct where thatdetermination can be made from the incomplete record presented).

The public guardian also claims in his motion that theDecember 10, 2002, and December 17, 2002, transcripts from the bestinterests hearing were missing from the record. The publicguardian argues in his appellate brief that, although therespondent filed motions requesting to file copies of thesetranscripts in this court, the respondent's brief was preparedwithout the transcripts, and, therefore, the respondent's argumentswere made without a complete record. We note, however, that onNovember 6, 2003, we allowed the respondent to supplement therecord with the transcripts of the proceedings on December 10,2002, and December 17, 2002, and further allowed her to file asubstitute brief. Accordingly, we reject the public guardian'sargument in this regard. We now turn to the arguments raised bythe respondent on appeal.

The respondent first contends that the State's petitions fortermination are legally insufficient to allege that she was anunfit parent. Specifically, she claims that the petitions merelyrecited the statutory language of section 1(D)(b), without allegingany specific facts of misconduct. The respondent admits that shefailed to raise the alleged pleading defect in the circuit court,and acknowledges that section 2-612(c) of the Code of CivilProcedure provides that failing to object to a pleading defect inthe circuit court waives review of that issue on appeal. See 735ILCS 5/2-612(c) (West 2000). She urges this court, however, toreview this issue under the plain error doctrine. We find thatthis issue is waived. Waiver aside, the respondent's argument inthis regard has no merit.

The essential test of the sufficiency of a State's petitionfor termination is whether it reasonably informs a respondent of avalid claim against her. In re M.S., 210 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1092,569 N.E.2d 1282 (1991). It is well-settled that the requirement ofpleading with specificity does not require more than setting forththe specific statutory ground of unfitness. In re Dragoo, 96 Ill.App. 3d 1104, 1107, 422 N.E.2d 263 (1981); In re G.W.S., 196 Ill.App. 3d 107, 109, 553 N.E.2d 85 (1990); In re L.M., 205 Ill. App.3d 497, 504, 563 N.E.2d 999 (1990); In re M.S., 210 Ill. App. 3d at1092-93; In re Andrea D., 342 Ill. App. 3d 233, 242, 794 N.E.2d1043 (2003).

Here, the State alleged in its petitions for termination thatthe respondent was unfit in that she "failed to maintain areasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to thechild's welfare, in violation of 750 ILCS 50/1 D(b) and 705 ILCS405/2-29." By clearly setting forth the specific statutory groundof unfitness, which is all that was required in the pleading, theState's petitions were sufficient to apprise the respondent of thecharge against her. See In re M.S., 210 Ill. App. 3d at 1092-93;In re Andrea D., 342 Ill. App. 3d at 242.

We next address the respondent's contention that the circuitcourt erred in finding her unfit under section 1(D)(b) of theAdoption Act. Specifically, section 1(D)(b) allows a finding ofunfitness based on a parent's "[f]ailure to maintain a reasonabledegree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child'swelfare." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2000). In making herargument, the respondent essentially concedes that there wassufficient evidence after September 10, 2001, the date on which theState filed its petitions for termination, to support a finding ofunfitness under section 1(D)(b). Her argument on appeal is limitedto the narrow question of whether it was proper for the circuitcourt to consider her conduct after the State filed its petitionsfor termination in making its determination as to unfitness undersection 1(D)(b).

The State and public guardian point out that this preciseissue was addressed by the court in In re N.H., 175 Ill. App. 3d343, 529 N.E.2d 1115 (1988) and In re L.M., 205 Ill. App. 3d 497,563 N.E.2d 999 (1990). In In re N.H., the circuit court found therespondent unfit pursuant to section 1(D)(b), and, in doing so,expressly considered his conduct from the date on which the Statefiled its petition for termination through the date of thetermination hearing. In determining that the circuit court couldconsider this evidence, the court in In re N.H. stated that therespondent's subsequent failure to make visitations "further added"to the evidence establishing his failure to maintain a reasonabledegree of interest in his child. In re N.H., 175 Ill. App. 3d at346. Subsequently, in In re L.M., 205 Ill. App. 3d 497 (1990), therespondent argued that, in making its determination as tounfitness, the circuit court improperly refused to exclude asirrelevant evidence of occurrences arising after the date the Statefiled its petition for termination. The court, applying theholding in In re N.H., rejected the respondent's argument, statingthat "this court has already determined that matters occurringright up to the date of the hearing on termination of parentalrights may properly be considered." In re L.M., 205 Ill. App. 3dat 506-07.

The respondent acknowledges the court's holdings in In re N.H.and In re L.M. She argues, however, that the facts in In re N.H.are distinguishable because, in that case, sufficient evidenceexisted before the State filed its petition for termination tosupport a finding of unfitness under section 1(D)(b). Therespondent similarly maintains that, in In re L.M., there is noindication that the only evidence supporting the finding ofunfitness came from the period of time after the State's petitionfor termination was filed. The respondent argues, instead, thatthe supreme court's decision in In re J.J., 201 Ill. 2d 236, 776N.E.2d 138 (2002), is dispositive of the question of whether thecircuit court can consider a respondent's conduct subsequent to thedate on which the State files its petition for termination inmaking a finding of unfitness under section 1(D)(b).

In In re J.J., the court determined the proper time frame forconsidering evidence under section 1(D)(k) of the Adoption Act,which provides that a finding of unfitness may be based on aparent's habitual drunkenness. The court noted that section1(D)(k) requires proof of habitual drunkenness "for at least oneyear immediately prior to the commencement of the unfitnessproceeding." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 2000). The court went onto say that the respondent had notice that she must defend againstevidence of her actions from March 19, l998, to March 19, 1999, thedate on which the State filed its petition for termination. However, due to the serious nature of termination proceedings, thecourt reasoned that it would be improper to raise additionalallegations against a parent for the first time at the hearing. Accordingly, the court held that evidence of habitual drunkennessarising after the filing of the State's initial petition could onlybe considered if the State filed an amended or subsequent petition. The court reasoned that an amended petition alleging the additionalfactual claims being made would provide the parent with propernotice and allow the preparation of an appropriate defense. In reJ.J., 201 Ill. 2d at 243-44. Relying on the court's holding in Inre J.J., the respondent contends that the circuit court in thiscase could only consider her conduct after September 10, 2001, ifthe State had amended its petitions for termination to includeadditional factual claims reflecting the subsequent time period.

We find the defendant's reliance on In re J.J. to bemisplaced. Section 1(D)(k) defines a time frame during which theState must provide evidence of habitual drunkenness; namely, oneyear prior to the filing of the State's petition for termination. In addition to section 1(D)(k), the legislature has specified anumber of different time periods for other grounds of unfitnessunder section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. See e.g., 750 ILCS50/1(D)(c) (West 2000) ("Desertion of the child for more than 3months next preceding the commencement of the Adoptionproceeding"); 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(l) (West 2000) ("Failure todemonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern orresponsibility as to the welfare of a new born child during thefirst 30 days after its birth"); 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2000)("Failure by a parent to make reasonable efforts to correct theconditions that were the basis for the removal of the child fromthe parent, or to make reasonable progress toward the return of thechild to the parent within 9 months after an adjudication ofneglected or abused minor ***"). Section 1(D)(b), which is thestatutory ground at issue in this case, however, provides no suchevidentiary time frame.

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertainand give effect to the intention of the legislature. In re D.L.,191 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 727 N.E.2d 990 (2000). The language of thestatute is the best indication of legislative intent, and ourinquiry appropriately begins with the words used by thelegislature. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 9. Where the language ofa statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must give it effect aswritten, without "reading into it exceptions, limitations orconditions that the legislature did not express." In re D.L., 191Ill. 2d at 9.

The language in section 1(D)(b) is clear and unambiguous. Thesection provides that a finding of unfitness may be based on aparent's "[f]ailure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare." 750 ILCS50/1(D)(b) (West 2000). Had the legislature intended that a courtonly consider the period of time before the petition fortermination is filed, it would have stated so, as it did in section1(D)(k). Likewise, had the legislature intended that the Stateneeded to prove a lack of interest, concern or responsibility fora particular duration of time, it likewise would have included sucha limitation as it did in section 1(D)(m). As stated, thelegislature included no evidentiary time limitation whatsoever insection 1(D)(b), and we will not read one into the statute. Because section 1(D)(b) does not contain any time limitation, thenotice considerations at issue in In re J.J., are not implicated inthe instant case.

Based on the decisions in In re N.H. and In re L.M., and theplain language of section 1(D)(b), we conclude that the circuitcourt was not precluded from considering evidence of therespondent's conduct after the State filed its petitions fortermination in making its finding of unfitness under section1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act. As stated, the respondent does notdispute that there was sufficient evidence after that date tosupport the court's finding of unfitness. Accordingly, we concludethat the circuit court's finding of unfitness based on section1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act is not against the manifest weight ofthe evidence.

Finally, the respondent contends that the State failed toprove that terminating her parental rights was in the bestinterests of the children. Specifically, the respondent arguesthat the evidence failed to show any benefit to the children fromterminating her parental rights, and did not reveal that continuedcontact with her would harm them.

Once the circuit court finds that a parent is unfit, it mustthen determine whether termination of parental rights is in thebest interests of the child. In re J.T.C., 273 Ill. App. 3d 193,199, 652 N.E.2d 421 (1995). In making this determination, thecourt is required to consider the following factors: the child'sphysical safety and welfare; the development of the child'sidentity; the child's familial, cultural, and religious background;the child's sense of attachment, including love, security,familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least disruptiveplacement alternative; the child's wishes; the child's ties to hiscommunity; the child's need for permanence including his need forstability and continuity of relationships with parent figures andother relatives; the uniqueness of every family and child; therisks related to substitute care; and the preferences of the personavailable to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West2000).

The parties disagree over the appropriate standard of reviewto be applied in reviewing a circuit court's determination as tothe best interests of a child. It is true that certain divisionsof this court have reviewed a circuit court's decision in thisregard under an abuse of discretion standard (see In re E.C., 337Ill. App. 3d 391, 401, 786 N.E.2d 590 (2003); In re D.L., 326 Ill.App. 3d 262, 270-71, 760 N.E.2d 542 (2001); In re D.H., 323 Ill.App. 3d 1, 13, 751 N.E.2d 54 (2001); In re Jason U., 214 Ill. App.3d 545, 550, 574 N.E.2d 90 (1991)), while other divisions of thiscourt have elected to review the issue under a manifest weight ofthe evidence standard (see In re Gwynne P., Nos. 1-03-1427 & 1-03-1601 (cons.), slip op. at 16 (February 24, 2004); In re J.B., No.1-03-0178, slip op. at 8 (January 22, 2004); In re C.M., 319 Ill.App. 3d 344, 360, 744 N.E.2d 916 (2001); In re Sheltanya S., 309Ill. App. 3d 941, 955, 723 N.E.2d 744 (1999)). We believe that,under either standard of review, the circuit court's determinationas to the children's best interests in this case was proper.

The evidence presented at the best interests hearing showedthat the children were living with Catherine W. for six years,until the Armstrongs became their foster parents in July 2001. Grinstead described the relationship between the Armstrongs and thechildren as a positive parent and child relationship based on love,nurturance, and respect. According to Grinstead, the children hadmore of a friendship, rather than a parent and child, relationshipwith the respondent. She stated that the children refer to theArmstrongs as "mom" and "dad", and they appear to be well-bondedwith the Armstrongs' children. Grinstead testified that theArmstrongs wish to adopt Donzell W., Dominique, W., and DonquishaeW., and the children wish to stay with the Armstrongs. Grinsteadopined that it is the best interests of the children that therespondent's parental rights be terminated. She based her opinionon the fact that the children reside in the Armstrongs' home, wherethey are living in a stable environment and which is also in thesame community where they have been living for the past six years. Further, the children have a loving bond with Catherine W., wholives across the street and also serves as their babysitter.Catherine W. similarly testified that the children have a lovingbond with the Armstrongs, and that it is in the best interests ofthe children to stay with them because they are in school and weredoing well.

Taking all of the statutory factors into consideration, wefind that the circuit court's determination that terminating therespondent's parental rights was in the best interests of thechildren was neither an abuse of discretion nor contrary to themanifest weight of the evidence.

Affirmed.

SOUTH and HALL, JJ., concur.

1. Donzell G.'s parental rights were also terminated;however, he is not a party to this appeal.