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THIRD DIVISION

June 28, 2002

JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Deshawn F. and Danella F. were taken from their mother,Lashawn F., and placed in foster care after their well-being cameto the attention of the Illinois Department of Children andFamily Services (DCFS).

At an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court found thechildren were abused and neglected and, at the dispositionalhearing, adjudged them wards of the court. Then, after anevidentiary hearing, the trial court found Lashawn was an unfitparent on the following grounds: (1) she failed to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basisfor the removal of the children within nine months after theadjudication of abuse and neglect, and (2) she failed to makereasonable progress toward the return of the children within thesame time period.

Lashawn appeals the trial court's judgment, contending thetrial court applied the wrong time periods in evaluating both herefforts and her progress. According to Lashawn, when we considerthe proper time periods we should conclude the trial court'sfindings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Weaffirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTS

Deshawn was born on March 27, 1994, and Danella was born onJuly 25, 1992. Both children tested positive for cocaine shortlyafter birth. Deshawn was also treated for syphilis. DCFS wasnotified about the family after Deshawn was born.

On January 18, 1995, the State filed petitions to adjudicateDanella and Deshawn wards of the court and moved to place thechildren in the temporary custody of the DCFS guardianshipadministrator. The court found probable cause existed that thechildren were abused and neglected, and placed them in temporarycustody.

The trial court held the adjudicatory hearing on June 16,1995. At the hearing, Mark Kolp, a paramedic for the ChicagoPolice Department, testified he responded to a 911 call onSeptember 15, 1994. Lashawn made the call for an ambulance totake Deshawn to the hospital. When Kolp questioned Lashawn,Lashawn responded she had just returned home after being away forfour hours during which time she "was drinking and smokingreefer." Kolp was also able to learn from Lashawn that Deshawnwas "a cocaine baby."

During the ride to the hospital, Kolp observed Lashawnshaking and unable to maintain a thought. He also noticed bothLashawn and the child were unclean and unkempt. Kolp said hebelieved he told Lashawn he intended to contact DCFS out ofconcern for Lashawn's ability to care for Deshawn.

DCFS Investigator Levelle Kimble testified he investigatedLashawn's residence on September 15, 1994. During the visit, heobserved roaches in the home and that the home was "very untidy." On January 12, 1995, Kimble again visited Lashawn, this timeat a new residence. During this visit, Kimble observed the homehad roaches and was not adequately clean and the children weredirty.

The State then introduced evidence that both Danella andDeshawn tested positive for the presence of cocaine metabolitesin their system shortly after birth. The State also introduced areport indicating Lashawn was admitted to the hospital aftercomplaining of hearing voices. Lashawn was diagnosed as having"Access 1 major depression with psychotic features" anddischarged on November 19, 1994, with medication.

Lashawn then introduced a report prepared by a doctor at thehospital where Deshawn was treated on September 15, 1994. In thereport, the doctor disagreed with an assessment that Lashawn wasunable to care for Deshawn. According to the doctor's report,Lashawn appeared well-bonded to Deshawn.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found "that theminors are neglected as to controlled substance as well asinjurious environment and that they are abused in that they havebeen subjected to substantial risk of harm."

At the dispositional hearing on February 14, 1996, the trialcourt again heard how the case came to the attention of DCFS. Derrick Cargle, the DCFS case worker assigned to this case inNovember 1994, also testified Lashawn had a service planavailable to her that included recommendations to follow up ondrug rehabilitation referrals and complete a psychologicalevaluation and special clinical services requirements. Lashawndid not comply with the service plan. She only completed one ofthe "psychologicals" and two initial screenings (presumably fordrug treatment programs), but failed to follow up with thoseservices. Lashawn's reason for not participating in services wasthat she had no transportation. But Cargle testified he agreedto provide her with tokens.

Cargle also testified the children were currently placedwith Lorelle Boyce, their great-aunt, and that the children weredoing well there. Lashawn visited them only sporadically. Cargle recommended the court take guardianship of Danella andDeshawn. He did not recommend any unsupervised contact betweenLashawn and the children.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found itin the best interests of the children to adjudge them wards ofthe court. The court found Lashawn unable to care for, protect,train, or discipline the children. The children were allowed toremain with Boyce.

On November 1, 1999, the State filed supplemental petitionsfor the appointment of a guardian with right to consent to theadoption of the minors. The petitions contained numerous groundsof parental unfitness, including:

"[Lashawn] failed to make reasonable efforts to correct theconditions which were the basis for the removal of thechild[ren] from [her] within 9 months after the adjudicationof neglect or abuse under the Juvenile Court Act *** whichconduct is in violation of 750 ILCS 50/1D(m) ***.

and/or

[Lashawn] failed to make reasonable progress toward thereturn of the child[ren] to [her] within 9 months after theadjudication of neglect or abuse under the Juvenile CourtAct *** which conduct is in violation of 750 ILCS 50/1D(m)***."

On August 18, 2000, the hearing to determine whether Lashawnwas a fit parent began. The trial court heard testimony fromseveral case workers and Lashawn. The parties also introducedinto evidence various documents, including service plans preparedand evaluated by the case workers that documented, among otherthings, Lashawn's cooperation with the case workers'recommendations.

On December 1, 2000, the court found Lashawn was unfitbecause

"she *** failed to make reasonable efforts to correct theconditions which were the basis for the removal of thechild[ren from her] within nine months after theadjudication [of] neglect or abuse under the Juvenile CourtAct and *** failed to make reasonable progress toward thereturn of the child[ren to her] within nine months after theadjudication of neglect or abuse under the Juvenile CourtAct. ***"

The court also said the relevant time period to assessLashawn's efforts and progress was from June 15, 1995 -- the datethe children were adjudicated neglected and abused -- to March15, 1996. The record indicates the actual date the children wereadjudicated neglected was June 16, 1995.

On January 30, 2001, the court held a hearing on whether itwas in the best interests of the children to terminate Lashawn'sparental rights. The court heard testimony from Carla Wages,Lashawn's case worker at the time; Boyce; Lashawn; and EdwinaHood, Lashawn's sister and a potential adoptive parent. At theconclusion of the hearing, the court determined it was not in thebest interests of the children to terminate Lashawn's parentalrights.

Lashawn now appeals the trial court's December 1, 2000,finding of unfitness, contending: (1) under the current versionof section 1D(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1D(m) (WestSupp. 2002)), the trial court did not consider evidence from theappropriate time periods in making its findings; and (2) evidencepresented from the proper time periods shows the trial court'sfindings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In thealternative, Lashawn says we should vacate the finding ofunfitness and direct the trial court on remand to evaluate theevidence under the relevant time periods.

DECISION

The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 and the Adoption Act

Under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the involuntarytermination of parental rights involves a two-step process: (1)the State must prove the parent is unfit as defined in section 1Dof the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1D (West Supp. 2002)); and (2)the court considers whether it is in the best interests of theminor to terminate parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West1999); see also In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210, 766 N.E.2d 1105(2002). The Adoption Act lists various grounds under which aparent may be found unfit. 750 ILCS 50/1D (West Supp. 2002).

Under the version of the Act in place at the time the Statefiled its supplemental petitions for appointment of a guardianwith the right to consent to adoption, section 1D(m) containedthe following two grounds for unfitness:

"Failure by a parent to make reasonable efforts to correctthe conditions that were the basis for the removal of thechild from the parent, or to make reasonable progress towardthe return of the child to the parent within 9 months afteran adjudication of neglected or abused minor *** ordependent minor ***." 750 ILCS 50/1D(m) (West 1999).

Effective January 1, 2000, the legislature amended thesection to read:

"Failure by a parent (i) to make reasonable efforts tocorrect the conditions that were the basis for the removalof the child from the parent, or (ii) to make reasonableprogress toward the return of the child to the parent within9 months after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor*** or dependent minor ***, or (iii) to make reasonableprogress toward the return of the child to the parent duringany 9-month period after the end of the initial 9-monthperiod following the adjudication of neglected or abusedminor *** or dependent minor ***." 750 ILCS 50/1D(m) (WestSupp. 2002).

The parties agree we should use the statute as amended todetermine the appropriate time periods applicable in this case.

Lashawn contends that under the current version of thestatute, the nine-month period to assess a parent's fitness islimited to the reasonable progress ground and does not apply tothe reasonable efforts ground. Lashawn also contends the properdate to begin assessing whether the parent has made reasonableefforts or reasonable progress is the date of the dispositionalorder, not the date of the adjudication of neglect, abuse, ordependency. Lashawn finally contends, when viewing the evidencefrom the appropriate time period, the trial court's findings areagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.

Applicability of the Nine-Month Period

to the "Reasonable Efforts" Analysis

In support of her contention that the nine-month limitationdoes not apply to the reasonable efforts analysis, Lashawn relieson In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d 461, 740 N.E.2d 60 (2000). Inthat case, the Fourth District said the 2000 amendment to section1D(m) "strongly suggest[s] that the legislature did not intendthe nine-month limitation to apply to a reasonable effortanalysis. The current version sets forth three separateenumerated grounds, specifying a time period for the second andthird but not the first." In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 464-65. The Fourth District also said the amendment placed in doubtthe supreme court's holding in In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 727N.E.2d 990 (2000). In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 464-65.

In In re D.L., the supreme court concluded that under thepre-amended statute the then 12-month limitation in Section 1D(m)(amended to nine months in 1997) applied to both the reasonableefforts and reasonable progress grounds listed in the section. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 10.

Purely legal issues regarding the proper construction of astatute are reviewed de novo. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 211. The primary objective in construing a statute is to give effectto the intention of the legislature. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at211. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, acourt must give effect to the statute as written. In re C.W.,199 Ill. 2d at 211.

Where the legislature has amended a statute after it hasbeen interpreted in the courts, "we presume the legislature wasaware of the judicial construction and acted with that knowledge.*** Thus, where the amendment did not change the substance of thestatute, prior judicial interpretations retain their validity." S.D. v. Kishwaukee Community Hospital, 288 Ill. App. 3d 472, 477-78, 681 N.E.2d 140 (1997); see also Bruso v. Alexian BrothersHospital, 178 Ill. 2d 445, 458-59, 687 N.E.2d 1014 (1997)(legislature did not intend to amend clause that was previouslyinterpreted by courts where amendment to the statute did notsubstantively change the clause at issue).

Under the clear and unambiguous language of the amendedsection 1D(m) and the holding in In re D.L., a court's review ofa parent's efforts to correct the conditions that were the basisfor the removal of the minor is limited to the nine-month periodfollowing the adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency. Thesupreme court held "the relevant period of time under thisprovision, in which the parent's efforts or progress must beassessed and measured, is the 12-month period following theadjudication." (Emphasis added.) In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at10. The legislature's amendment that shortened the relevant timeperiod from 12 months to nine months did not affect the supremecourt's holding. See In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 564, 736N.E.2d 678 (2000) (subsection (m) limits the evidence that may beconsidered for both reasonable progress and reasonable efforts tothe nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect).

We respectfully disagree with the Fourth District'sconclusion that the 2000 amendment "strongly suggest[s] that thelegislature did not intend the nine-month limitation to apply toa reasonable effort analysis" and that "the application of thesupreme court's decision [in In re D.L.] to [section 1D(m)] nowappears to be in doubt regarding the 'reasonable efforts' prong." (Emphasis added.) In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 464-65. Contrary to the Fourth District's position, the 2000 amendmentdid not substantively change the language interpreted by thesupreme court in In re D.L. The Fourth District reads too muchinto the legislature's addition of numbers and a third element.

In the 2000 amendment, the only change the legislature madeto the language interpreted by the supreme court in In re D.L.was to add lowercase roman numerals. The only other change thelegislature made to section 1D(m) in the 2000 amendment was toadd another ground under which a court may find a parent unfit. In light of the additional ground added to the section, thelegislature added the roman numerals to maintain clarity in thestatute. Because the amendment did not change the wording of thesections of the statute examined by the supreme court in In reD.L., the supreme court's interpretation retains its validity andapplicability to the current section 1D(m).

This interpretation of the amended statute is entirelyconsistent with other provisions of the Adoption Act and with thepurpose of the Juvenile Court Act. Section 20a of the AdoptionAct states:

"It is in the best interests of persons to be adopted thatthis Act be construed and interpreted so as not to result inextending time limits beyond those set forth herein." 750ILCS 50/20a (West 1999).

As the supreme court said, reading section 1D(m) to allowthe court to consider evidence beyond the period specified in thesection "would be inconsistent with the preceding provision." Inre D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 11. Section 20 of the Adoption Actrequires "[p]roceedings under this Act *** receive priority overother civil cases in being set for hearing." 750 ILCS 50/20(West 1999). Also, "[a]n appeal from a judgment order foradoption or other appealable orders under this Act shall beprosecuted and heard on an expedited basis ***." 750 ILCS 50/20(West 1999). Section 1-2 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987provides that when a child is removed from the custody of hisparent DCFS shall consider concurrent planning, "so thatpermanency may occur at the earliest opportunity." (Emphasisadded.) 705 ILCS 405/1-2 (West 1999).

All these provisions show a desire by the legislature toexpedite adoptions and provide a permanent environment for theminor as soon as possible. Reading section 1D(m) as allowing aparent a potentially unlimited amount of time to exhibitreasonable efforts towards the return of the child isinconsistent with these provisions.

Under the current version of the statute, a trial court'sreview of a parent's reasonable efforts and reasonable progressfor the purposes of determining fitness is limited to the nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect, abuse, ordependency.

The Starting Date of the Nine-Month Period

Lashawn also contends the appropriate date to beginmeasuring the nine-month period is the date the court determinedthe disposition of the minors, February 14, 1996, not the datethe trial court adjudicated the minors neglected and abused, June16, 1995. In support of her contention, Lashawn cites In reD.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 730 N.E.2d 637 (2000), along withother cases that either rely on In re D.S. or contain no analysison the issue.

In In re D.S., the Fourth District held the nine-month timeperiod specified in section 1D(m) under which the court shouldreview the parent's progress begins on the filing of thedispositional order. In re D.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1028. Inreaching its conclusion, the Fourth District said the supremecourt's use of the date of adjudication of neglect in calculatingthe appropriate time period in In re D.L. was not binding. In reD.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1027-28. According to the FourthDistrict, the issue before the court in In re D.L. was whetherthe trial court could look beyond the then 12-month perioddictated by section 1D(m), not whether the date of theadjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency was the properstart date for the 12-month period. In re D.S., 313 Ill. App. 3dat 1027-28.

The Fourth District held the filing of the dispositionalorder was the appropriate starting date because "[t]he filing ofthe dispositional order completes the adjudication, renders itfinal, and gives rise to the right to appeal the adjudication ofneglect, abuse, or dependency." In re D.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at1028. The court observed that had the legislature intended thetime period begin on the date of the adjudicatory finding ofneglect, abuse, or dependency, as opposed to the date of thedispositional order, the legislature would have said so as it didin section 1D(m-1). In re D.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1028 (citing750 ILCS 50/1D(m-1) (West 1998) ("the date of entering fostercare is the earlier of: (i) the date of a judicial finding at anadjudicatory hearing that the child is an abused, neglected, ordependent minor ***")).

Lashawn waived the issue of whether the trial court erred inusing the date of adjudication of neglect and abuse as theappropriate start date for the nine-month period under section1D(m). At trial, Lashawn's counsel not only failed to object tothe time period used, but also invited the court to choose thedate of adjudication of neglect in his closing argument when hesaid: "Reasonable efforts, your Honor, should then be consideredfrom the date of the adjudication, which as June of '95; or thedate of the disposition which was February 14th of '96." See Inre April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242, 760 N.E.2d 85 (2001)("[w]here a party fails to make an appropriate objection in thecourt below, he or she has failed to preserve the question forreview and the issue is waived"). We, nonetheless, choose toaddress the matter. See Kus v. Sherman Hospital, 268 Ill. App.3d 771, 781, 644 N.E.2d 1214 (1995) ("[T]he waiver rule is alimitation on the parties to an appeal, not on the reviewingcourt"). Again, we respectfully disagree with the FourthDistrict.

We find Lashawn's contention that the date of thedispositional order is the appropriate start date is incorrect. The supreme court has emphasized the importance of applying theplain language of the Adoption Act. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at212-15. The plain language of section 1D(m) says the relevanttime period during which to assess a parent's conduct beginsafter the "adjudication of neglected or abused minor underSection 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minorunder Section 2-4 of that Act." 750 ILCS 50/1D(m) (West Supp.2002). The statute does not say the relevant period begins onthe date the children are adjudged wards of the court.

Any ambiguity Lashawn may read into the statute should bedispelled by those sections of the Juvenile Court Act thatexplain what occurs at the adjudicatory hearing and thedispositional hearing.

Section 2.1 of the Adoption Act says that the act "shall beconstrued in concert with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 ***." 750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West 1999). Under the Juvenile Court Act,"adjudicatory hearing" is defined in relevant part as "a hearingto determine whether the allegations *** that a minor *** isabused, neglected or dependent, *** are supported by apreponderance of the evidence." 705 ILCS 405/1-3(1) (West Supp.2002). The Juvenile Court Act defines "dispositional hearing" as"a hearing to determine whether a minor should be adjudged to bea ward of the court, and to determine what order of dispositionshould be made in respect to a minor adjudged to be a ward of thecourt." 705 ILCS 405/1-3(6) (West Supp. 2002).

Sections 2-21 and 2-22 reemphasize the adjudication ofneglect, abuse, or dependency occurs before the dispositionalhearing and the trial court's role in the dispositional hearingis not to determine whether the minor is neglected, abused, ordependent. Section 2-21(2) states in part:

"If *** the court determines *** that the minor is eitherabused or neglected or dependent [at the adjudicatoryhearing], the court shall then set a time *** for adispositional hearing *** to be conducted under Section 2-22at which hearing the court shall determine whether it isconsistent with the health, safety and best interests of theminor and the public that he be made a ward of the court." 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 1999).

Section 2-22(1) reiterates the purpose of the dispositionalhearing: to "determine whether it is in the best interests of theminor and the public that he be made a ward of the court, and,[if so, to] determine the proper disposition best serving thehealth, safety and interests of the minor and the public." 705ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 1999).

These sections of the Juvenile Court Act show thedispositional hearing does not involve adjudicating whether theminor is abused, neglected, or dependent. That determination ismade at the adjudicatory hearing, which occurs before thedispositional hearing. Thus, "an adjudication of neglected orabused minor" as used in section 1D(m) of the Adoption Act doesnot refer to the trial court's findings at the dispositionalhearing, but instead to the trial court's findings at theadjudicatory hearing. As the State said, had the legislatureintended the nine-month time period to begin on the date thedispositional order is entered, it could have easily said theperiod begins after "the adjudication of the minor as a ward ofthe court."

Lashawn's contention disregards our previous uses of thedate the trial court found the minor neglected, abused, ordependent in determining the relevant period during which toassess a parent's efforts or progress under section 1D(m). See,e.g, In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 392, 757 N.E.2d 613(2001); In re D.H., 323 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11, 751 N.E.2d 54 (2001);In re C.M., 319 Ill. App. 3d 344, 357, 744 N.E.2d 916 (2001); Inre B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 650, 658, 661, 740 N.E.2d 404 (2000). For example, in In re B.S., the trial court used the date theminor was adjudged a ward of the court as the beginning of therelevant time period instead of the date the minor was adjudgeddependent. We held the relevant time period to evaluate whetherthe parent made reasonable efforts or progress began on the datethe minor was adjudicated dependent, not on the date of thedispositional order. In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 658, 661.

The supreme court also used the date the trial court foundthe minor neglected, abused, or dependent in determining therelevant period under section 1D(m) in In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at13. We disagree with Lashawn's characterization of the supremecourt's use of the adjudicatory finding as the appropriate startdate as dicta. Unlike the Fourth District, we would interpret Inre D.L. as establishing the relevant time period in which thetrial court should assess the parent's efforts and progress.

In In re D.L., the trial court adjudged the minor neglectedand a ward of the court. The State filed a supplemental petitionfor the termination of the mother's parental rights on severalgrounds. More than three years after the minor was adjudged award of the court, the trial court found the mother was notunfit. The trial court relied on the mother's conduct occurringmore than 12 months after the adjudication of neglect. In reD.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 8. The appellate court reversed, findingshe was unfit under three grounds, one of which was the mother'sfailure to make reasonable progress toward the return of thechild within the 12 months following the adjudication of neglect. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 7.

The mother appealed only from the finding she was unfit forfailure to make reasonable progress, contending the trial courtproperly considered her recent attempts to improve her life andregain custody of the minor. The supreme court rejected herargument, concluding, under section 1D(m) as it then existed, thetrial court could consider only the parent's efforts or progresswithin the 12 months following the adjudication of neglect. Inre D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 10. In determining the exact time periodapplicable to her case, the supreme court used the date the trialcourt adjudged the minor neglected, not the date the trial courtadjudged the minor a ward of the court. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2dat 13.

The issue in In re D.L. was the exact time period duringwhich the trial court could assess the parent's efforts andprogress under section 1D(m). Necessary to the supreme court'sanalysis was a determination of the proper start date for therelevant time period. The supreme court's designation of thedate of adjudication of neglect as the appropriate start date wasnot dicta. It was necessary to the decision in the case.

Use of the date the minor is adjudicated neglected, abused,or dependent, as opposed to the date of the dispositional order,is consistent with the purposes underlying the Adoption Act andthe Juvenile Court Act discussed in the previous section: toexpedite issues relating to the custody of minors.

We conclude the trial court did not err in using the date itissued its findings of neglect as the start date for the nine-month period during which Lashawn's efforts and progress wereconsidered.

The Trial Court's Findings

Lashawn also contends that if we use the proper timeperiods, the trial court's findings of lack of reasonable effortsand lack of reasonable progress would be against the manifestweight of the evidence.

The State must prove parental unfitness by clear andconvincing evidence. In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d 262, 270, 760N.E.2d 542 (2001). Because the trial court's opportunity to viewand evaluate the parties and their testimony is superior to thatof the reviewing court's, a trial court's finding of unfitness isentitled to great deference and will be disturbed on appeal onlyif it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In reGrant M., 307 Ill. App. 3d 865, 868, 719 N.E.2d 195 (1999). Thetrial court's finding is against the manifest weight of theevidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. In reD.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 270.

The Adoption Act contains several grounds for unfitness;proof of any one of them is sufficient to support a finding ofunfitness. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 210. Under section 1D(m),reasonable efforts and reasonable progress are two distinctgrounds of unfitness, each requiring separate analysis. In reJ.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 564, 736 N.E.2d 678 (2000).

Reasonable progress is an objective standard that focuses onthe steps the parent has taken toward the goal of reunification. In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 658. The standard by whichprogress is measured is the parent's compliance with the court'sdirectives, service plans, or both. In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3dat 564. Reasonable progress requires, at a minimum, the parentmake measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal ofreunification. In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 658.

Reasonable efforts, on the other hand, is a subjectivereview of the parent's achievements. In re B.S., 317 Ill. App.3d at 658. The court must determine whether the parent has made"earnest and conscientious strides" toward correcting theconditions which led to the removal of the children. In re B.S.,317 Ill. App. 3d at 658. A parent's deficiencies collateral tothe conditions that were the basis for the removal of thechildren are not relevant to the reasonable efforts analysis. Inre B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 658.

Restricting our review of the evidence to the nine-monthperiod following the adjudication of neglect, June 16, 1995, toMarch 16, 1996, we disagree with Lashawn's contention that thetrial court's findings are against the manifest weight of theevidence. During the fitness hearing, the State introduced aDCFS service plan, prepared and evaluated by Cargle, Lashawn'scase worker, during the relevant time period. The service plancovered the period from August 1995 to February 1996.

According to the service plan, the problems or conditions tobe addressed by the plan were Lashawn's drug usage and heremotional health, including problems resulting from depression. Among the tasks Lashawn was supposed to complete according to theservice plan were: (1) enroll in a substance abuse program; (2)complete a urine analysis and forward DCFS a copy of the results;(3) enter a job training program; and (4) participate in aparenting class. Cargle rated Lashawn unsatisfactory on each ofthese tasks. The State provided no evidence concerning Lashawn'sefforts or progress during March 1996.

Lashawn testified she did not attend all the referrals madeby Cargle because she did not have transportation. She also saidshe was unable to reach Cargle to explain the situation. Lashawnadmitted she attended several meetings of a substance abuseprogram, but did not complete the program. She said that duringthe relevant time period she visited the children regularly.Lashawn also introduced into evidence orders of the trial courtshowing Cargle failed to submit to the trial court the nextperiod's service plan when it was due.

Based on the evidence, the trial court concluded Lashawnfailed to make both reasonable efforts and reasonable progresstoward the return of her children. We conclude the oppositeresult is not clearly evident. Lashawn's participation insubstance abuse programs, parenting classes, drug screening, andjob training were essential to correcting the problems that ledto the removal of the children. Yet, Lashawn did notsatisfactorily complete one of those tasks. Lashawn's failure tocomplete any of these tasks does not demonstrate any measurableor demonstrable movement toward the return of the children.

The only evidence Lashawn presented in her favor was thatshe visited the children regularly, about twice a week. Apparently the trial court concluded Lashawn's visits did notoutweigh her non-compliance with the service plan. Thisconclusion is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

We understand "the involuntary termination of a parent'srights is a drastic step that permanently severs the parent-childrelationship." In re J.J., No. 90529, slip op. at 8 (Ill. June20, 2002). For that reason we have carefully reviewed the recordto ensure the existence of clear and convincing evidence ofunfitness during the statutorily-dictated relevant time periods.

Lashawn directs this court to the efforts she made in 2000to comply with the then-current service plans. The trial courtwas not permitted to consider any evidence outside of the nine-month period dictated by section 1D(m). Thus, Lashawn's progressand efforts in 2000 are irrelevant to the fitness determination. As Lashawn admitted during the January 30, 2001, hearing, "I havedone everything that I was supposed to do; but I didn't do it,you know, in the time span that I had to do it. And, you know,honestly, it's probably too little too late."

CONCLUSION

We agree with the State and the Public Guardian that thetrial court did not err in reviewing Lashawn's efforts andprogress during the nine-month period immediately following thetrial court's findings that Danella and Deshawn were neglectedand abused. We also conclude the trial court's findings thatLashawn was an unfit parent because she failed to make reasonableefforts and reasonable progress toward the return of the childrenare not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Affirmed.

CERDA, and SOUTH, JJ., concur.