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Respondent Richard Bailey appeals from an order of the circuit court denying his motion to dismissthe State's petition to declare him a sexually violent person, contending that the Sexually ViolentPersons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 (West Supp. 2000))⁽¹⁾ is unconstitutional. Onappeal, respondent asks us to answer the five questions certified by the trial court in theaffirmative. For the reasons set forth below, we answer each of the certified questions in thenegative.

STATEMENT OF FACTS⁽²⁾

In the Fall of 1989, the Chicago police department and the Cook County State's Attorney's officebegan investigating respondent for numerous sexual offenses directed at six boys between the agesof 5 and 10. Assistant State's Attorney Sandra Stavropoulous interviewed each victim during whichthey described sexual acts perpetrated upon them by respondent. Thereafter, the police discoveredvideotapes at respondent's home documenting some of the events. Respondent was indicted withrespect to each victim and indicted on one count of child pornography.

On December 18, 1990, a Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402) conference was conducted. TheState recommended that respondent receive a sentence of at least 50 years' imprisonment. Thejudge, on the other hand, agreed to impose a sentence of 17 years if respondent would agree to astipulated bench trial. This trial was conducted on December 26 and at the conclusion of thestipulated evidence, the trial court sentenced respondent to 17 years' imprisonment.

On January 1, 1998, the State filed a petition, alleging that respondent was a sexually violentperson pursuant to the Act and sought his commitment to the Department of Human Services (theDepartment). Respondent was apparently the first individual petitioned for commitment under theAct. In its petition, the State alleged that respondent suffered from the mental disorders ofpedophilea--same sex, and antisocial personality disorder. Respondent was 46 years old and hadbeen attracted to prepubescent boys since he was a teenager. Respondent committed his firstoffense at the age of 19 when he assaulted a nine-year-old boy. Respondent was convicted in 1980of five counts of indecent liberties with a child and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. Thepetition further alleged that respondent was not responsive to treatment provided to him by the SexOffenders Program while incarcerated because he continued to have recurrent, intense urges to havesexual contact with young boys. His treatment was therefore terminated because he refused tofollow the rules and continued to make written contact with young boys. Respondent further refusedto recognize the inappropriateness of his obsessions.

The petition also alleged that respondent admitted to having sexually abused at least 400 boys--200while acting as a camp counselor in five different states and another 200 in his neighborhood. Attached to the petition was a report from a psychologist, Dr. Gerald Burgener, who, afterexamining respondent, opined that respondent should be civilly committed.

In response to the petition, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the Act wasunconstitutional in numerous respects. Following testimony and arguments of the parties, the trialcourt entered a written memorandum and order on October 6, 1998, concluding that the Act wasconstitutional except for section 65 which deprived respondent of the right to a jury trial at adischarge hearing.⁽³⁾ The trial court found that this provision violated equal protectionprinciples, but concluded it was severable from the remainder of the Act.

Respondent filed a notice of appeal on October 27, 1998. On October 6, 1999, we grantedrespondent's permissive interlocutory appeal to consider five questions certified by the trialcourt concerning the constitutionality of the Act and whether it violates the equal protectionclauses of the state and federal constitutions, whether it constitutes an ex post facto law andviolates the prohibition against double jeopardy, whether it violates substantive and proceduraldue process, and whether it violates the petition clause of the first amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution and article I, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution.

ANALYSIS

Our scope of review is strictly limited to the questions certified by the trial court. In reDetention of Anders, 304 Ill. App. 3d 117, 120, 710 N.E.2d 475 (1999). Our standard of review isde novo. Anders, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 120. All statutes carry a presumption of constitutionalityand the party challenging a statute must clearly demonstrate it is unconstitutional. In reDetention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548, 558, 727 N.E.2d 228 (2000). Any doubts are resolved infavor of a statute's validity and we will uphold a statute whenever reasonably possible. Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 558.

Initially, we note that numerous cases have addressed the constitutionality of the Act. At leasttwo of these cases were decided prior to the time respondent filed his brief in the instant case. However, respondent failed to mention either of those cases and, in his reply brief, respondent didnot cite to and/or address all of the cases that had been decided at that time. Additionally, withthe exception of one case, neither of the parties has sought to supplement the record with relevantauthority.

In Samuelson, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed, in part, the constitutionality of the Act. TheSamuelson respondent first contended that the Act violated double jeopardy and ex post factoprinciples. The court rejected these arguments, finding that the United States Supreme Court caseof Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 138 L. Ed 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) was dispositive. InHendricks, the Court held that a Kansas statute, very similar to the Act, was civil, not criminal,and that involuntary confinement pursuant to the statute was not punitive. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at369, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 519, 117 S. Ct. at 2085. The Hendricks Court concluded that, for doublejeopardy purposes, the initiation of commitment proceedings was not a second prosecution and,similarly, because punishment was not imposed, there were no ex post facto concerns. Hendricks,521 U.S. at 369-71, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 519-21, 117 S. Ct. at 2085-86. The Samuelson court found theholdings of Hendricks to apply with equal force to the Act. In Illinois, proceedings under the Actare civil and there is no retroactive effect because a respondent cannot be committed based on pastconduct but only where he or she presently suffers from a mental disorder and it is substantiallyprobable that he or she will engage in future sexually violent acts. Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at559. Therefore, our supreme court in Samuelson held that the Act was not subject to challenges onex post facto or double jeopardy grounds. Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 559.

The Samuelson respondent next contended that the Act violated article I, section 13, of theIllinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,