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Fifth Division
May 28,2004

After a hearing, respondent Denise C. was found to be aperson subject to involuntary admission under the Mental Healthand Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/1-100 etseq. (West 2002)) and the circuit court ordered that her hospi-talization in the Department of Mental Health and DevelopmentalDisabilities (Department) continue. Respondent contends that theorder authorizing her continued involuntary admission should bereversed because the State did not comply with section 3-601(b)(2) of the Code, which requires the provision of specifiedinformation in a petition for involuntary admission. 405 ILCS5/3-601(b)(2) (West 2002).

On April 26, 2002, Department social worker Alice Money-penny filed a petition for the involuntary admission of respon-dent. The petition alleged that respondent "continues to besubject to involuntary admission" and was "in need of immediatehospitalization" because she was mentally ill and due to thatmental illness was reasonably expected to inflict seriousphysical harm upon herself or another in the near future and wasunable to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guardherself from serious harm. Specifically, Moneypenny alleged thatrespondent "remains very easily agitated and at times paranoid"and had engaged in "karate hand chops and kicks" and "threateningbehavior towards staff" because "her hostility is fueled bydelusions [that] staff are sorcerers and have evil powers" andbecause she "accuses women here of wanting her 'husband' (abusiveex-boyfriend) and becomes irate." Where the petition form askedfor "the names and addresses of the spouse, parent, guardian,close relative or, if none, a friend of the respondent," Money-penny answered that respondent "has never provided this informa-tion." The petition was supported by psychiatrist certificatesby Dr. Phyu Marhla and Dr. Marlene Alejos, indicating examina-tions on April 26, 2002, the date of the petition.

A hearing was held on the petition on May 7, 2002. Dr.Marhla, the sole witness, testified in part that respondentreferred to a certain man as her husband, fiancé, and boyfriend. When Department staff telephoned the man identified by respon-dent, he cursed and hung up. Respondent referred to particularDepartment staff members as her brother or son, while in factthey were not related to respondent. No family member ofrespondent had visited or telephoned her while she was in theDepartment hospital. When asked by Department staff who couldtake care of her if she were released and could not go to herhusband, respondent identified a community mental health agency. The court found that respondent was subject to involuntaryadmission and that hospitalization was the least restrictivetreatment. Respondent did not object to the petition at thehearing or make a motion to strike or dismiss the petition.

Respondent solely contends on appeal that the order author-izing her continued involuntary admission should be reversedbecause the State did not comply in its petition for involuntaryadmission with section 3-601(b)(2) requiring that such a petitioncontain information regarding relatives, guardians, or friends. She does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.

Section 3-601(b)(2) of the Code requires that a petition forinvoluntary admission contain:

"The name and address of the spouse, parent, guardian,substitute decision maker, if any, and close relative,or if none, the name and address of any known friend ofthe respondent whom the petitioner has reason tobelieve may know or have any of the other names andaddresses. If the petitioner is unable to supply anysuch names and addresses, the petitioner shall statethat diligent inquiry was made to learn this informa-tion and specify the steps taken."

A petition that does not list relatives or friends or indicatethat a diligent inquiry was made to locate them is fatally defec-tive under the Code. In re Adams, 239 Ill. App. 3d 880, 884-85(1993); In re Wiessing, 229 Ill. App. 3d 737, 738-39 (1992).Reversal is mandated because the error may prejudice the respon-dent, even where the respondent did not object in the trial courtto the lack of familial information in the petition. Adams, 239Ill. App. 3d at 884-85. However, a petition for involuntarycommitment should be read in its entirety, and it is sufficientto provide information required by the Code somewhere in thepetition. In re Bert W., 313 Ill. App. 3d 788, 796 (2000). Where a petition did not provide the required familial informa-tion but an attached report explained that the respondent refusedto give a social history and had no known family or friendsexcept for a named sister whom the respondent would not acknow-ledge and was thus not contacted, the petition as a whole indi-cated that a diligent effort had been made to find family andfriends as required by the Code and that there was no prejudiceto the respondent. In re Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1095(1997).

Here, while the petition did not list any family members orfriends as required by the Code, the question was not simply leftunanswered as in Adams and Wiessing. Instead, the petitionstated that respondent had never provided the information andthat respondent claimed to have a husband who was in fact an"abusive ex-boyfriend," clearly not the responsible contactperson contemplated by the Code. This case is analogous toRobinson, where a statement that respondent refused to give asocial history and did not acknowledge her one known relative wasa sufficient indication of the diligence required by the Code. Also, the hearing testimony indicates that Department personnelasked respondent questions and gathered information to determinewhether she had any relatives or friends of the sort contemplatedby the Code. In contrast to Robinson, where the respondent'ssister was not contacted because the respondent did not acknow-ledge her, here the Department contacted respondent's one knownacquaintance, the husband/fiancé/boyfriend, who expressed hisrefusal to cooperate. It is reasonable to conclude from theevidence that the Department made diligent efforts to find familyand friends as contemplated by section 3-601(b)(2), that willingor concerned family or friends could not be found, and thus thatrespondent suffered no prejudice.

As to respondent's argument that the form petition used heredoes not comply with section 3-601(b)(2) because it does notsolicit from petitioners the name and address of respondent'ssubstitute decision maker, a reviewing court will not reverse acivil commitment for minor deviations in form which cause noprejudice to respondent. Bert W., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 796. Asubstitute decision maker is a person designated "under thePowers of Attorney for Health Care Law or under the Mental HealthTreatment Preference Declaration Act." 405 ILCS 5/1-110.5 (West2002). Here, there is no indication that respondent designated asubstitute decision maker and thus no showing of prejudice. Also, the phrase "substitute decision maker, if any," in section3-601(b)(2) clearly indicates that the legislature was aware ofthe prospect that a respondent may not have a substitute decisionmaker. While it would be preferable for the State's petitionform to refer to all the persons listed in section 3-601(b)(2),we will not reverse the trial court's judgment on such a formalbasis absent some showing of prejudice to respondent.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL, P.J., and REID, J., concur.