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THIRD DIVISION
Date Filed: September 30, 2002

The intervenor, Oak Park River Forest High School, District No. 200(School District), appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook Countydirecting it to pay the educational costs of D.D., a minor, while he attends anout-of-state school.

On May 13, 1999, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardshipfor D.D. On July 13, 2000, the State filed a petition for supplemental relief,alleging that D.D. had not complied with the conditions of his probationimposed by the juvenile court on October 14, 1999.⁽¹⁾

Subsequently, D.D. was again placed on probation. Louise Bartnicki,D.D.'s probation officer, recommended that D.D. receive residential placement,based upon the fact that D.D.'s mother was unable to get him to go tocounseling, keep his appointments with the probation department or go toschool. In December 2000, Judge Walsh, a juvenile court judge, entered anorder placing D.D. at Heritage Center in Provo, Utah. D.D. was admitted toHeritage Center on March 7, 2001.

Thereafter, the office of the public defender of Cook County filed amotion in juvenile court for an order for the care and support of D.D. Themotion was scheduled for a hearing on February 28, 2001. However, the recordon appeal does not contain a copy of the motion, a transcript of a hearing onthat date or the order that was entered on that date.⁽²⁾

On March 8, 2001, the School District filed an objection to an order ofpayment for the educational component of D.D.'s court-ordered residentialplacement. The objection alleged the following facts.

D.D. was adjudicated a delinquent minor on October 14, 1999. At the timeof his sentencing, D.D. was a resident and special education student of theElmwood Park School District, which in turn is a member of the Leyden AreaSpecial Education Cooperative. D.D. was receiving special education servicesat Elmwood High School.

On March 16, 2000, the Elmwood Park special education program team met todiscuss D.D.'s educational placement. The team concluded that D.D.'seducational needs required placement in a therapeutic day school within thecommunity, which was agreeable to both D.D. and his mother.

In January 2001, D.D.'s mother became a resident of the School District. In February 2001, the School District received a notice to appear in thejuvenile court of Cook County to discuss its obligation to pay for theeducational component of D.D.'s residential placement at Heritage Center.

The School District maintained that it had no obligation to pay for theeducational component of a minor's residential placement when that placement ismade for noneducational reasons.

On May 21, 2001, Judge Berman, a juvenile court judge, held a hearing onthe School District's objection at which the following testimony was given.

Ronald Sesterhenn testified as follows. He is the technical assistantsupervisor and manages all the special education services for District 401 inElmwood Park. In May 1997 D.D., who was in sixth grade, was identified asbehavior disordered and eligible for special education services. D.D. sufferedfrom poor impulse control, lack of cooperation with staff, and low self-confidence and had failing grades. Once D.D. was identified as eligible forspecial education services, he then would be reviewed yearly under the"Individual Educational Program" (IEP). While D.D. was in seventh grade, hisneeds did not change; his grades were still failing, and attendance startedbecoming an issue. D.D. remained in the eighth grade for two years.

In February 2000 D.D. had his three-year reevaluation, and it wasdetermined that he required more services through the IEP process. Given thatD.D. was still failing academically, the reevaluation team felt that herequired more structure, and D.D. was enrolled in a therapeutic day program atJoseph's Academy. D.D.'s attendance improved from what it had been in thepast, and he was able to graduate from eighth grade, albeit with C's and D's. However, in November 2000 Mr. Sesterhenn wrote to D.D.'s mother explaining thatbus service for D.D. was being discontinued because D.D. was being held in theDepartment of Corrections. D.D.'s attendance at Joseph's Academy had begun todrop due to unexcused absences, court appearances and his detention in jail. Even though he was discharged from Joseph's Academy, D.D. was still consideredto be in need of services.

According to Mr. Sesterhenn, while D.D. was at Joseph's Academy, hereceived counseling to address his emotional disorders. Mr. Sesterhennexplained that at Joseph's Academy, the whole school day was involved andwrapped around meeting the emotional needs of the students there.

In December 2000 D.D.'s mother informed Mr. Sesterhenn that she had movedto Oak Park.

According to Mr. Sesterhenn, truancy is not considered a special educationproblem.

Louise Bartnicki, a probation officer assigned to the juvenile court,testified as follows. She was assigned D.D.'s case in October 1999 when hewas placed on probation for reckless conduct. At that time, D.D. was repeatingthe eighth grade at Elm Middle School in Elmwood Park. While he was repeatingthe eighth grade, D.D. was not in compliance with the terms of his probation. He was truant quite a bit and failed to comply with counseling and drugtreatment requirements. In school, he was placed on suspension, did not servehis detentions, and engaged in fighting and in general gross behavior. Hisacademic progress was difficult to gauge because of his truancy problem. Ms.Bartnicki was not part of the team that recommended D.D.'s placement atJoseph's Academy; she was merely told by Mr. Sesterhenn that the placement wasgoing to occur. She was invited to attend the IEP placement review with D.D.

According to Ms. Bartnicki, it was difficult to determine if D.D.'sbehavior improved at Joseph's Academy because of his absences and truancy. D.D. was not in compliance with the terms of his probation order since hecontinued to be absent from school, did not comply with TASC (TreatmentAlternatives for Special Clients), and did not do his community service or goto counseling. D.D. was in juvenile detention sometime in late June or earlyJuly 2000 for a couple of weeks, and then again in November 2000, at which timehe was held until placement was made. However, his truancy problems were not adirect result of his being in detention.

At this point, Judge Berman interjected that the common law record showedthat D.D. was in detention as of October 6, 2000, and remained there untilplacement and that there were two different detention periods, one of which wasabout two weeks and the other of which was about a week when he was held incustody and then released.

Ms. Bartnicki reiterated that D.D. continued to have absentee problemseven when he was not in detention, with some of the absences excused andothers, unexcused. D.D. was incarcerated for violating his probation, andthere was also an immediate threat that he would harm himself and use drugs. Ms. Bartnicki made no recommendations for alternative placements for D.D.through the school. However, she did recommend therapeutic residentialplacement for D.D. before Judge Walsh in view of D.D.'s continued problems withattendance at school, going to counseling and keeping his probationappointments. Had D.D. attended Joseph's Academy on a consistent basis andcomplied with probation and counseling requirements, he might have been "okay"there, but he was not doing that.

Kevin Hickey, supervisor of the advocacy unit of the Cook County JuvenileProbation Department, testified as follows.

D.D. was recommended for residential placement as the result of severalviolations of probation and a clinical evaluation conducted in August 2000which recommended residential placement. Judge Walsh determined that as partof D.D.'s sentence, D.D. was to be residentially placed, and the case wasreferred to the probation department for placement. In making thedetermination of residential placement for D.D., Mr. Hickey reviewed the socialinvestigation report by Ms. Bartnicki, the clinical evaluation and the schoolrecords from Leyden School District.

Based on these records, Mr. Hickey determined that D.D. required morestructure in the home and community; he had educational needs; he continued tohave truancy and discipline problems at Joseph's Academy; there were drug useconcerns; and he needed individual and family counseling. Heritage Center inUtah was chosen for D.D. Heritage Center is a facility for troubled minors,not necessarily delinquent, and offers individual, group, and family counselingand recreational therapy for children, as well as addressing educational needs. Other minors with special education needs had been placed at Heritage Center.

Mr. Hickey understood that D.D. would be provided with special educationservices at Heritage Center, which would include six hours of education a dayin a special education classroom, and he would receive individual attention inthat classroom to meet his special needs. Based upon his review of the IEP andD.D.'s history of lack of motivation, Mr. Hickey believed that Heritage Centerwas appropriate.

Mr. Hickey monitors D.D.'s progress at Heritage Center through monthlyreports, as well as telephone conferences with D.D. and his therapist. WhileMr. Hickey stated that, at the present time, D.D. is doing fairly well, heacknowledged that D. D. is having some difficulty with his peers. At first,his academic progress was good, and he was maintaining high grades. However,it was reported that he had not completed the work in one class and had fallenasleep in an independent study course. Nevertheless, Mr. Hickey believed thatD.D. continued to need the structure, therapy and counseling that HeritageCenter affords him. In Mr. Hickey's opinion, D.D. is making more progress thanat Joseph's Academy because he can attend school on a regular basis in anenvironment in which he can excel.

Mr. Hickey related that the lowest grade that D.D. had received atHeritage Center was a C-; the rest of his grades were A's and B's. Accordingto Mr. Hickey, Heritage Center would be considered a secure facility withD.D.'s attendance and residence there well monitored, although it was possiblefor him to run away from there.

In response to Judge Berman's questions in clarification, Mr. Hickeyexplained that D.D. was placed at Heritage Center for a variety reasons. Inthe past, when a minor had special education needs, a portion of the placementcost was paid by the minor's school district. In D. D.'s case, the tuition is$70 per each day that school is in session.

On June 15, 2001, Judge Berman ruled that the School District was liableto pay the educational component of D.D.'s residential placement. On June 29,2000, Judge Berman entered an order requiring the School District to providepayment to Heritage Center for D.D.'s education costs. The juvenile courtfurther ordered that the order be nunc pro tunc to March 7, 2001, the date D.D.was placed at Heritage Center.

The School District filed its notice of appeal on July 17, 2001.

On appeal the School District raises the following issues:

whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to order a School District to paythe educational component of a delinquent minor's out-of-state placement; and,in the event that jurisdiction is found, whether the juvenile court's orderrequiring the School District to pay the educational component of D.D.'sresidential placement was proper. Before proceeding to the merits of theseissues, we first address the State's contention that we lack jurisdiction overthis appeal.

During the pendency of this appeal, the State filed a motion to dismissfor lack of jurisdiction, which we ordered taken with this case. At oralargument, the State raised a second basis for its jurisdictional challenge tothe School District's appeal.

The State contends that the order of June 29, 2001, was not a final andappealable order because the case remains active for purposes of regular statusreports as to D.D.'s progress at Heritage Center, as well as his compliancewith the terms of his probation. The State further maintains that the June 29,2001, order does not contain the requisite language to make it appealablepursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Finally, inoral argument, the State raised the argument that the School District's appealshould have been brought pursuant to the supreme court rules applicable tocriminal appeals and not pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R.303), a rule applicable to civil appeals.

Except where a supreme court rule provides for an interlocutory appeal,the appellate court has jurisdiction to review only final judgments. In reJ.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 126, 435 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1982). A judgment is final ifit decides the controversy between the parties on the merits and fixes theirrights, so that, if the judgment is affirmed, nothing remains for the trialcourt to do but proceed with its execution. J.N., 91 Ill. 2d at 127, 435N.E.2d at 475.

A disposition order from the juvenile court is generally considered finaland appealable. In re Brandon S., 331 Ill. App. 3d 757, 760, 771 N.E.2d 1117,1120 (2002). Any "'matters left for future determination are merely incidentalto the ultimate rights that have been adjudicated by the order.'" Brandon S.,331 Ill. App. 3d at 761, 771 N.E.2d at 1120, quoting In re T.M., 302 Ill. App.3d 33, 37, 706 N.E.2d 931, 934 (1998).

In this case, the disposition order was entered on October 14, 1999, atwhich time D.D. was placed on probation based upon the finding of delinquency. Thereafter, the dispositional order was modified to allow D.D. to be placed atHeritage Center, while his probation was continuing.

The June 29, 2001, order was a final order as to the School District'sobligation to pay for the educational component of D.D.'s residentialplacement. All that remained was enforcement of the order. The order alsoprovided that the order of February 28, 2001, remained in full force and effectuntil further order of the court. In other words, for review of D.D.'s statusand a determination if further modification of the dispositional order wasnecessary. However, the fact that the dispositional order is subject to futuremodification as regards D.D.'s future does not make the June 29, 2001, ordernonfinal since the order resolved the issue of whether the School District hadto pay the educational component of D.D.'s residential placement. CompareBrandon S., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 761, 771 N.E.2d at 1120-21 (parents who failedto appeal from the dispositional order could not appeal from the denial oftheir request to modify the disposition order because the disposition did notchange, and the order appealed from did not permanently determine the rights ofthe parties or definitely resolve any issue in the case).

The cases relied on by the State are distinguishable. In In re L.S., 318Ill. App. 3d 566, 742 N.E.2d 760 (2000), the reviewing court held that thecourt-appointed attorney could not appeal from the denial of certain portionsof his fee petition. The minors in the case had been adjudicated abused andneglected, but the attorney's client, the mother of the minors, had fled thejurisdiction. The underlying matter was continuing, and there is no indicationthat a dispositional order was entered in the case.

In In re Guzik, 249 Ill. App. 3d 95, 617 N.E.2d 1322 (1993), the orderappealed from, which found the respondent to be a person subject to involuntaryadmission, was a nonfinal order since the order stated that the court wouldenter a commitment order at a later date. In the present case, thedispositional order placed D.D. on probation; all that was left to do was toexecute the order. See In re J.N. 91 Ill. 2d at 128, 435 N.E.2d at 476(placing the minor on supervision was a final order because all that remainedto be done by the court was to execute the judgment).

Assuming that the June 29, 2001, order was final for purposes of appeal,the State then argues that the order is not appealable because the juvenilecourt made no finding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) that there was nojust reason to delay appeal or enforcement of the June 29, 2001, order. TheState maintains that the language of the June 29, 2001, order clearly showsthat the juvenile court maintained jurisdiction over the case, and therefore,it was necessary for the juvenile court to make a Rule 304(a) finding in orderfor the School District to appeal the June 29, 2001, order.

Appeals in juvenile cases are governed by Rule 660, which provides asfollows:

"(a) Delinquent Minors. Appeals from final judgments in delinquentminor proceedings, except as otherwise specifically provided, shall begoverned by the rules applicable to criminal cases.

(b) Other Proceedings. In all other proceedings under the JuvenileCourt Act, appeals from final judgments shall be governed by the rulesapplicable to civil cases." 134 Ill. 2d R. 660.

The order appealed from in this case was entered in a delinquencyproceeding, and therefore, this case is governed by the rules applicable tocriminal appeals. But see In re D.M.A., 136 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 483 N.E.2d 1022(1985) (appeal of mother's supplemental petition for guardianship of adelinquent minor was not an appeal from a final judgment of delinquency, andthe civil appeal rules applied).⁽³⁾

Rule 304(a) is not applicable to criminal appeals. See 177 Ill. 2d R.612. Therefore, it is inapplicable to the case before us.

We granted the State's motion to cite as additional authority In re J.R.,307 Ill. App. 3d 175, 717 N.E.2d 468 (1999). In that case, the appellate courtheld that regardless of whether civil or criminal appeal rules applied, Rule304(a) was not applicable to the minor's appeal because no matters were pendingbefore the trial court at the time of the appeal. However, in this case, wehave determined that Rule 304(a) does not apply because this appeal is governedby the criminal appeal rules.

In the alternative, the State then maintains that the School District wasrequired to bring its appeal pursuant to the rules applicable to criminal casesrather than civil cases.

Rule 303, relied on by the School District as the basis for this court'sjurisdiction, is also not one of the civil appeal rules applicable to criminalappeals. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 612. Nonetheless, the School District's failure tocite the correct rule is not fatal to its appeal to this court.

Supreme Court Rule 606(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 606(a)), applicable to criminalappeals, provides that in all cases, other than those in which a sentence ofdeath has been imposed, appeals are perfected by filing a notice of appeal withthe clerk of the trial court. Generally, the filing of the notice of appeal isthe only jurisdictional step required to perfect an appeal. People v. Jackson,239 Ill. App. 3d 165, 166, 606 N.E.2d 809, 810 (1992). In this case, theSchool District timely filed its notice of appeal in the trial court. TheSchool District having perfected its appeal, this court has jurisdiction overthis appeal. See In re O.H., 329 Ill. App. 3d 254, 257, 768 N.E.2d 799, 801(2002) (State not prejudiced by the fact that the respondent appealed under thecivil appeal rules rather than the applicable criminal appeal rules, andappellate jurisdiction was properly invoked).

We therefore deny the State's motion to dismiss this appeal for lack ofjurisdiction and turn to the issues raised by the School District

Because this case involves the interpretation of a statute, the standardof review is de novo. In re D.D., 312 Ill. App. 3d 806, 809, 728 N.E.2d 119,121 (2000).

At the heart of the controversy in this case are two separate statutoryschemes, namely, the School Code (105 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2000)) and theJuvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2000)).

The School Code requires that the State Board of Education promulgaterules to insure that children with disabilities are provided with a freeappropriate public education. 105 ILCS 5/14-8.02(a) (West 1998). Pertinent toour review in this case are the provisions of the School Code governing thepayment of educational expenses.

Section 14-7.02, which applies to children attending private schools,public out-of-state schools, public school residential facilities or privatespecial education facilities, provides as follows:

"If because of his or her disability the special education program of a district is unable to meet the needs of achild and the child attends a non-public school or special educationfacility,⁽⁴⁾ *** the school district in which the child is a resident shallpay the actual cost of tuition for special education and related servicesprovided during the regular school term and during the summer school termif the child's educational needs so require, excluding room, board andtransportation costs charged the child by that non-public school orspecial education facility, *** or $4,500 per year, whichever is less,and shall provide him any necessary transportation." 105 ILCS 5/14-7.02(West 2000).

Section 14-7.02 further provides as follows:

"Any educational or related services provided, pursuant to thisSection in a non-public or special education facility or a specialeducational facility owned and operated by a county government unit shallbe at no cost to the parent or guardian of the child." 105 ILCS 5/14-7.02 (West 2000).

Section 14-7.03, which is applicable to children from orphanages, fosterhomes, children's homes, or in-state housing units, provides in pertinent partas follows:

"Commencing July 1, 1992, for each disabled student who is placedresidentially by a State agency or the courts for care or custody or bothcare and custody, welfare, medical or mental health treatment or bothmedical and mental health treatment, rehabilitation, and protection, ***the costs for educating the student are eligible for reimbursement underthis Section providing the placing agency or court has notified theappropriate school district authorities of the status of studentresidency where applicable prior to or upon placement.

The district of residence of the parent, guardian, or disabledstudent as defined in Sections 14-1.11 [(105 ILCS 5/14-1.11 (West 2000))]and 14-1.11a [(105 ILCS 5/14-1.11a (West 2000))] is responsible for theactual costs of the student's special education program and is eligiblefor reimbursement under this Section when placement is made by a Stateagency or the courts." 105 ILCS 5/14-7.03 (West 1998).

After a minor is found guilty of an offense, the court must conduct asentencing hearing and decide if it is in the best interest of the minor to bemade a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/5-620 (West 2000). If the courtdetermines that it is in the best interest of the minor that he be made a wardof the court, then the court shall determine the proper disposition bestserving the interests of the minor and the public. 705 ILCS 405/5-705 (West2000). As part of a minor's sentence, the court may order the minor placed inaccordance with section 5-740, with or without being placed on probation orcourt supervision. 705 ILCS 405/5-710 (West 2000).

Section 5-740 (705 ILCS 405/5-740 (West 2000)) provides in pertinent partas follows:

"(1) If the court finds that *** it is in the best interest of the minor to take him or her from the custody of his or her parents, guardianor custodian, the court may:

(c) commit him or her to an agency for care or placement, except an institution under the authority of the Department ofCorrections or of the Department of Children and Family Services;

***

(e) commit him or her to any appropriate institution havingamong its purposes the care of delinquent children, including a childprotective facility maintained by a child protection district serving the county from which commitment is made, but not including anyinstitution under the authority of the Department of Corrections or ofthe Department of Children and Family Services.

(4) No placement by any probation officer or agency whoserepresentative is appointed guardian of the person or legal custodian ofa minor may be made in any out of State child care facility unless itcomplies with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children." 705ILCS 405/5-740(1)(c), (1)(e), (4) (West 2000).

The School District contends that the juvenile court did not havejurisdiction to order it to pay for D.D.'s educational expenses at Heritagebecause the School District was never served with summons and a copy of thepetition in the underlying delinquency petition. While the School Districtconcedes that it was notified of the proceeding to hold it financially accountablefor D.D.'s educational costs, it's complaint is that it was not made a party tothe proceedings in which D.D.'s placement at Heritage was determined. As aresult, the School District argues, it was prohibited from carrying out itsobligations in connection with D.D.'s special education needs.

The failure to name and serve a necessary party in a juvenile proceedingraises the question not of personal jurisdiction over that party, but of thesubject matter jurisdiction of the court. In re K.C., 323 Ill. App. 3d 839, 846,753 N.E.2d 314, 319 (2001).

Relying on In re C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d 263, 271, 644 N.E.2d 1153, 1157 (1994),the School District maintains that it was a necessary party to the delinquencyproceedings and that as it was not named or notified of the delinquencyproceeding, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was not invoked, rendering itsorders void, However, in C.R.H., the supreme court referred to "necessaryrespondents" as including "parents or a legal guardian." C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d at271, 644 N.E.2d at 1157.

Section 5-525 of the Juvenile Court Act provides that upon the commencementof a delinquency prosecution, a summons with a copy of the petition attached"shall be directed to the minor's parent, guardian or legal custodian and to eachperson named as a respondent in the petition." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-525 (West 2000). In addition, section 1-5(2)(a) of the Juvenile Court Actspecifically provides as follows:

"Though not appointed guardian or legal custodian or otherwise made aparty to the proceeding, any current or previously appointed foster parentor relative caregiver, or representative of an agency or associationinterested in the minor has the right to be heard by the court, but does notthereby become a party to the proceeding." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS405/1-5(2)(a) (West 2000).⁽⁵⁾

We conclude, therefore, that the School District was not a necessary partyto the delinquency proceedings, and the juvenile court's order requiring it to paythe educational portion of D.D.'s placement at Heritage was not void on thatbasis.

Next, the School District contends that the juvenile court exceeded itssubject matter jurisdiction in entering the order requiring it to pay for D.D.'seducation expenses.

We note that the School District first raised this specific argument in itsreply brief. Nonetheless, "'[a]ny action taken by the circuit court that exceedsits jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any time.'" In re A.H., 195 Ill.2d 408, 416, 748 N.E.2d 183, 189 (2001), quoting In re Estate of Gebis, 186 Ill.2d 188, 193, 710 N.E.2d 385, 387 (1999).

Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the court's power both to adjudicatethe general question involved and to grant the particular relief requested. A.H.,195 Ill. 2d at 415, 748 N.E.2d at 188 (2001). With limited exceptions, thecircuit courts enjoy "'original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters.'[Citation.]" A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 415, 748 N.E.2d at 188. The legislature maycreate a justiciable matter by creating rights and duties that had no counterpartin common law or equity. A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 415, 728 N.E.2d at 188.

The scope and application of the Juvenile Court Act are defined solely by thelegislature; there is no counterpart in common law or equity. In re Vanessa C.,316 Ill. App. 3d 475, 479, 736 N.E.2d 593, 596 (2000). Because a justiciablematter is statutorily derived, the legislature may define it in such a way as tolimit or preclude the circuit court's authority. A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 416, 748N.E.2d at 189. Where a court's power to act is controlled by statute, the courtis governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction. Vanessa C., 316 Ill. App. 3dat 479, 736 N.E.2d at 596. Therefore, it is axiomatic that courts exercisingjurisdiction over the Juvenile Court Act must proceed within the strictures of thestatute. Vanessa C., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 479, 736 N.E.2d at 596. Acts of thecourt that exceed the bounds of its subject matter jurisdiction are void. VanessaC., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 479, 736 N.E.2d at 596.⁽⁶⁾

Under the Act, the court has the authority make a placement decision as toa delinquent minor, including committing him to an agency for placement or aninstitution appropriate for delinquent minors. See 705 ILCS 405/5-740(1)(c),(1)(e) (West 2000). In regard to placements made pursuant to section 5-740, theAct provides as follows:

"Any sentencing order where the minor is committed or placed in accordance with Section 5-740 shall provide for the parents or guardian ofthe estate of the minor to pay to the legal custodian or guardian of theperson of the minor such sums as are determined by the custodian or guardianof the person of the minor as necessary for the minor's needs. The paymentsmay not exceed the maximum amounts provided for by Section 9.1 of theChildren and Family Services Act [(20 ILCS 505/9.1 (West 2000))]." 705 ILCS405/5-710(5) (West 2000).

Additional sections of the Act provide for the county to make payments forthe minor's care and support to the person or agency that is the minor's appointedguardian or legal custodian (705 ILCS 405/6-8(2) (West 2000)) and for payment by"a parent or any other person named in the petition" of a reasonable sum for the"care, support and necessary special care or treatment of the minor." 705 ILCS405/6-9 (West 2000). Finally, section 6-10(a) provides for state reimbursementof funds expended by the county for minors placed pursuant to section 5-740. See705 ILCS 405/6-10(a) (West 2000).

Under the above statutory provisions, the legislature has given the juvenilecourt the authority to order payment of a delinquent minor's expenses inconnection with his residential placement. Therefore, we conclude that thejuvenile court in this case had the jurisdiction to enter orders for payment ofD.D.'s educational expenses at Heritage Center. Compare A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 420,748 N.E.2d at 191 (while no provision in the Act addressed the specific situationbefore the court, the Act did authorize the court to enter orders relating to theminor's custody).

Having determined that the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction toenter an order for the payment of D.D.'s educational expenses, we must determinewhether the court may order the School District to make such payment. See A.H.,195 Ill. 2d at 420, 748 N.E.2d at 191 (after determining that the court hadjurisdiction to enter the orders, it must be determined under what circumstancesand standard the court might do so).

The constitutional source of a circuit court's jurisdiction does not carrywith it a license to act in ways inconsistent with controlling statutory law. Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d at 529, 670 N.E.2d at 714.

As the various sections of the Act set forth above make clear, it is theparents or the legal guardian of the minor or, in certain instances, the county,who is initially responsible for the payment of a delinquent minor's needs. See705 ILCS 405/5-710, 6-8(2), 6-9, 6-10 (West 2000). The authority to place thedelinquent minor at Heritage Center did not give the juvenile court the right toorder the School District to pay for the educational component in light of thestatutory provisions setting forth the parties who are responsible for the minor'scare, which did not include the School District. Thus, in ordering the SchoolDistrict to pay for the delinquent minor's educational needs, the juvenile courtviolated the statutory provisions.

The case relied on by the juvenile court and the State is distinguishable. Board of Education of Oak Park & River Forest High School District No. 200 v.Illinois State Board of Education, 21 F. Supp. 2d 862 (N.D. Ill. 1998), was a suitbrought by the school district after an administrative decision was made requiringthe school district to reimburse the parents of a student, Kelly E., for the costsof her education at an out-of-state school where Kelly E.'s mother had placed her. The district court ordered the school district to reimburse Kelly E.'s parents forher tuition costs and related expenses. The reimbursement decision was madepursuant to the review procedure set forth in section 14-8.02 of the School Code. 105 ILCS 5/14-8.02 (West 1998). As Kelly's placement was not made pursuant to adelinquency determination, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was not atissue.⁽⁷⁾

In Ashland School District v. New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth &Families, 141 N.H. 45, 681 A.2d 71 (1996), the minor was placed at a youth centeras the result of delinquency proceedings. The reviewing court reversed the lowercourt decision finding that the defendant was solely responsible for theeducational component of the minor's placement and held that the school districtwas responsible for the special education costs of the minor at the youth center. However, in that case, the New Hampshire statute required joinder of the legallyliable school district in the juvenile proceedings, "if the court contemplates aresidential placement." Ashland School District, 141 N.H. at 48, 681 A.2d at 73.⁽⁸⁾

Unlike the New Hampshire statute, the Illinois Act does not provide for thejoinder of the school district in cases where residential placement is beingconsidered for a delinquent minor and does not grant the juvenile court the powerto require a school district to pay for the education component of a delinquentminor's residential placement.

Finally, we conclude that section 14-7.03 of the School Code does not supportthe State's position in this case. That section merely provides for eligibilityfor reimbursement where the court has notified the School District, either priorto or upon placement. Nothing in that section permits the juvenile court to orderreimbursement by a school district for a delinquent minor. See 105 ILCS 5/14-7.03.

We conclude that, while the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdictionto order the payment of the educational component of D.D.'s out-of-stateresidential placement, in light of the provisions of the Act denoting who wasresponsible for a delinquent minor's expenses, the court may not order the SchoolDistrict to pay D.D.'s educational expenses. We therefore do not reach the issueof whether the State is entitled to reimbursement of D.D.'s educational expensesfrom the School District.⁽⁹⁾

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed.

Reversed.

CERDA and SOUTH, JJ., concur.

1. The record in the juvenile court proceedings is not a part of the recordon appeal. However, the parties do not dispute what took place in thoseproceedings.

2. Apparently there was an order entered on that date since the juvenilecourt referred to the February 28, 2001, order in the order entered on June 29,2001.

3. However, Rule 660(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 660(a)) specifies "final judgmentsin delinquent minor proceedings" not a "final judgment of delinquency" asstated by the court in D.M.A.. D.M.A., 136 Ill. App. 3d at 1029, 483 N.E.2d at1024.

4. Under section 14-7.02, "'Nonpublic special education facility' shallinclude a residential facility, within or without the State of Illinois, whichprovides special education and related services to meet the needs of the child***." 105 ILCS 5/14-7.02 (West 2000).

5. In contrast, under section 1-5(2)(a), in the case of an abused orneglected minor, any current foster parent, relative caregiver of a minor andthe agency acting as custodian of the minor is entitled to notice of all theproceedings and may bring a mandamus action to enforce that right. 705 ILCS405/1-5(2)(a) (West 2000).

6. In the recent case of In re K.C., 325 Ill. App. 3d 771, 759 N.E.2d 15(2001), the court, relying on In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 670 N.E.2d710 (1996), held that because the circuit court's jurisdiction isconstitutional, its subject matter jurisdiction is not limited by the JuvenileCourt Act. K.C., 325 Ill. App. 3d at 776, 759 N.E.2d at 20. However, thatholding is contrary to the supreme court's language in A.H.

7. The district court also ordered the Illinois State Board of Education(ISBE) to reimburse the school district in accordance with its existing formulafor approved placements and to share equally in any award of attorney fees andcosts made to the plaintiffs. On appeal, the 7th Circuit vacated that portionof the judgment requiring the ISBE to reimburse Oak Park for any of theeducation costs and the attorney fees paid to the minor's parents. Board ofEducation of Oak Park & River Forest High School District No. 200 v. Kelly E.,207 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2000)

8. The court in Ashland School District noted that in the prior case of Inre Todd P., 127 N.H. 792, 509 A.2d 140 (1986), the state statute granted thejuvenile court the authority to issue a liability order against a schooldistrict for educational expenses. However, joinder of the legally liableschool district was permissive rather than required. The court held that theschool district's lack of participation in the minor's placement by thejuvenile court allowed the school district to evade its financialresponsibility for the minor's education. Following that decision, the statutewas amended to require joinder if a residential placement was underconsideration. Ashland School District, 141 N.H. at 48, 681 A.2d at 73.

9. Under section 14-7.02, D.D.'s educational and related expenses are to beat no cost to his parents or guardian since he attends a "non-public or specialeducational facility" which includes "a residential facility within or withoutthe State of Illinois." 105 ILCS 5/14-7.02 (West 2000).