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SIXTH DISTRICT

September 14, 2001

JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent is the mother of C.J., who is about 10 years old. Respondentappeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County which found her unfit,terminated her parental rights to C.J. and appointed a guardian with the right to consentto his adoption. In this court, respondent challenges the court's finding of unfitness.

Before proceeding in this cause of action, we must be certain of our jurisdiction. In re Application of the County Treasurer, 308 Ill. App. 3d 33, 39, 719 N.E.2d 143, 147(1999). The public guardian, who represents C.J., filed a motion to dismiss this appealbased on respondent's failure to file a timely notice of appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303. Thiscourt initially ordered that motion taken with the case, then subsequently grantedrespondent's motion to treat her notice of appeal as timely filed. The public guardianagain raised the jurisdictional issue in his brief, and respondent replied urging this courtto reject the public guardian's challenge to this court's order to treat her notice of appealas timely filed.

The denial of a contested motion to dismiss an appeal before briefing andargument is not final and may be revised at any time before the disposition of theappeal. In re Marriage of Tetzlaff, 304 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1035, 711 N.E.2d 346, 350(1999); see also Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co, 144 Ill. App. 3d 437, 439,494 N.E.2d 892, 894 (1986), rev'd on other grounds by Carter v. Chicago & IllinoisMidland Ry. Co, 119 Ill. 2d 296, 518 N.E.2d 1031 (1988). In light of our obligation toconsider our jurisdiction at any time and to dismiss an appeal where jurisdiction islacking, we reconsider the jurisdictional issue posed in this case. Tetzlaff, 304 Ill. App.3d at 1035, 711 N.E.2d at 350; see also In re Kerwood, 44 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1043, 359N.E.2d 183, 185-86 (1976).

The order terminating respondent's parental rights to her minor son was enteredon March 16, 1999. Respondent's notice of appeal from that order was filed in theclerk's office 31 days later on April 16, 1999. Respondent did not file any posthearingmotions or a motion to file a late notice of appeal, which could have extended the datefor filing the notice of appeal beyond 30 days from the entry of the termination order. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303. Based on these facts, the public guardian contends thatrespondent's appeal must be dismissed.

Respondent acknowledges that the notice of appeal was "file-stamped" April 16,1999, but maintains that the "window between the various dates coming out of theJuvenile Division" rebuts the public guardian's claim that any untimeliness waspersonally attributable to her. She also claims that the public guardian was barred bylaches from contesting her notice of appeal after she filed her opening brief and urgesthis court to enter an order amending the filing date of the notice or by filing it nunc protunc under the authority granted to the reviewing court in Supreme Court Rules 362(f)and 366. 155 Ill. 2d Rs. 362(f), 366. Respondent further claims that the rules,procedures and practices applied to promote the right to appeal in criminal casesshould be applied here.

Supreme Court Rule 660, which relates to appeals in cases arising under theJuvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)), provides thatappeals from delinquency judgments are to be governed by the rules applicable tocriminal cases. 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(a). Subsection (b) of the same rule provides that "Inall other proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, appeals from final judgments shallbe governed by the rules applicable to civil cases." 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(b). Here, we donot consider an appeal from a delinquency judgment but, rather, an appeal from a finaljudgment which terminated respondent's parental rights to C.J. and appointed aguardian with the right to consent to his adoption. In re Harrison, 120 Ill. App. 3d 108,112, 458 N.E.2d 146, 149 (1983). Thus, respondent's appeal is governed by the rulespertaining to civil cases. 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(b); see Kerwood, 44 Ill. App. 3d at 1046-47,359 N.E.2d at 188.

Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) provides that the notice of appeal from finaljudgments "must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entryof the final judgment appealed from." 155 Ill. 2d R. 303 (a)(1). That time period may beextended for an additional 30 days "[o]n motion supported by a showing of reasonableexcuse for failure to file a notice of appeal on time." 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(d).

The notice of appeal in this case was time-stamped April 16, 1999. Respondentasserts that this is not necessarily the actual filing date and that she should not lose herright to appeal on "little more than speculation about a filing date." However, there isnothing in the record to support her bald assertion that the date stamped on the noticeof appeal was not the actual filing date, and it is clear that the notice, as filed, wasoutside the prescribed 30-day limit. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). It is also clear thatrespondent had no posthearing petition pending in the circuit court and that she did notfile a motion to extend the filing period. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(d). Under thesecircumstances, we find that respondent failed to invoke the jurisdiction of this court andthat her appeal must be dismissed. Mitchell v. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 143, 151, 632N.E.2d 1010, 1013 (1994).

In reaching that conclusion, we have considered, but are not persuaded, that theremedial measures proposed by respondent allow this court to ignore our lack ofjurisdiction. As noted, a reviewing court has no jurisdiction over an appeal in theabsence of a properly filed notice of appeal (County Treasurer, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 39,719 N.E.2d at 147), nor authority to excuse compliance with the filing requirements ofthe rules of the supreme court that govern appeals. Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 150, 632N.E.2d at 1012.

Although Supreme Court Rule 366 allows a reviewing court to "exercise all orany of the powers of amendment of the trial court" and to "enter any judgment andmake any order that ought to have been given or made" (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 366(a)(1),(a)(5)), we do not find the authority granted therein so broad as to allow an appellatecourt to correct respondent's failure to comply with the filing requirements of Rule 303. In re M.S., 210 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 569 N.E.2d 1282 (1991), cited by respondent, isdistinguishable in that the tardy filing in that case was attributable to the trial court clerk. No comparable fault or error is evident here. Nor do we find that Supreme Court Rule362(f) provides authority for this court to sua sponte amend the filing date of the noticethereby excusing compliance with the filing rules of the supreme court that govern thiscivil appeal. Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 150, 632 N.E.2d at 1012.

Accordingly, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to entertain the appealdue to respondent's failure to file a timely notice of appeal from the termination hearingorder, and we therefore dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

CAMPBELL, P.J., and BUCKLEY, J., concur.