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Following the granting of a motion to have this minor defendant's case designated as anextended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) proceeding (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 1998)), ChristopherK (CK) was adjudicated by a jury to be delinquent by virtue of having committed first-degreemurder. CK is appealing both the conviction and the sentence. For the reasons that follow, weaffirm CK's conviction and sentence as modified.

On January 31, 1999, CK was arrested and taken into custody for the homicide of WillieLomax, a 16 year old. Lomax was shot and killed on January 23, 1999. The State filed adelinquency petition against the 14- year-old CK. Thereafter, CK was charged in juvenile courtwith first-degree murder for the shooting. The State then unsuccessfully sought to have himtransferred to adult court for prosecution. The State immediately appealed the trial court's denialof the motion to transfer the matter to adult court. This court affirmed the juvenile court's denialof the State's motion to transfer. In re C.K., No. 1-99-3175 (February 9, 2001)(unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23).

After the failure to have the matter transferred for adult prosecution, the State requestedthe trial court designate the matter as an EJJ proceeding. The trial court granted that motion. CKwas then tried, convicted and received a two-part sentence. First, he would be committed to theJuvenile Division of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) for 5 years or until he reachesthe age of 21, whichever comes first. Second, when he turns 21, CK will spend the next 40 yearsin the adult Department of Corrections. Pursuant to the EJJ statute, the adult portion of thesentence was stayed until further order of the trial court.

At the hearing on the motion to transfer, Detective Steve Buglio testified on the issue ofprobable cause. Detective Buglio testified that, during his investigation of the shooting, helearned that Lomax, Terrell Montgomery and Willie Griffin were walking down the street whenthey saw a white car full of people. Those people began flashing gang signs. Shortly thereafter,one male got out of the car, ran up and fatally shot Lomax. Griffin gave a description of theshooter as a white or Hispanic male in his late teens, 5 feet 6 inches tall, thin build, with short hairor a shaved head. Griffin indicated the shooter was wearing a Dallas Cowboys jacket with ahooded sweatshirt beneath. Griffin also described and suggested the name of a possible owner ofthe car.

Detective Buglio testified that he received an anonymous tip from a female caller claimingto have information about the shooting. The caller and three other people were driving in a carmatching the description Detective Buglio had. The woman claimed CK was one of the people inthe car and the person who shot Lomax.

On January 26, 1999, Detective Buglio spoke with Melissa Quinn, one of the people in thecar. Quinn told Detective Buglio that she was driving with two men when they encountered CK. CK told the men in the car that members of the Black Stones street gang were nearby. CK thenallegedly left to go get something and returned to the car. They drove around the neighborhooduntil they encountered the Black Stones. The driver pulled the car in the alley and CK exited thecar. Detective Buglio testified that 20-to-30 seconds later Quinn heard a single gunshot and,within seconds, CK returned to the car indicating that "I think I got one. I seen them go down. Ismell like gunpowder. There's only one shell in the gun."

Detective Buglio then asked police officers familiar with the Two-Six street gang for helplocating CK. While the officers were collecting information on CK, Detective Buglio continuedhis investigation by speaking with Jessica Cosgrove, the owner of a white four-door Ford Escort.Detective Buglio believed that was the car involved in the shooting. Cosgrove indicated that shemade changes to her car following the shooting out of a fear of getting in trouble with the police. Cosgrove's account of the shooting was similar to Quinn's. Both Quinn and Cosgrove gavewritten statements to the police, testified before the grand jury and positively identified CK as theshooter.

CK was arrested by Officer Herhold, who initially had gone to his house to speak withCK's mother. Officer Herhold visited CK's mother's house six times. CK's mother deniedhaving seen CK. On January 31, 1999, Officer Herhold took CK's mother with him when hearrested CK. CK does not challenge the claimed probable cause for his arrest. CK gave oral andwritten statements in which he admitted to shooting Lomax.

The trial court denied the motions to quash because, based upon the totality of thecircumstances, the trial court felt there was probable cause. In addition to the motions to quash,CK argued that the police violated his constitutional rights because, although the arresting officerread them, he was not read his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), by the interrogating detectives.

As to the motion to suppress, CK claims the police violated his rights by failing to have ayouth officer present during interrogation, forcing him to undergo interrogation when he allegedlylacked the physiological, mental, educational, and emotional states and capacities to fullyunderstand the meaning of the Miranda rights. In short, he alleged the confession was the resultof coercion. Officers Egan and Herhold testified that CK never indicated he did not understandthe Miranda rights. They also denied coercing CK.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motions to quash and suppress. The trial court indicated that, "considering the totality of the circumstances and the informationthat all the police knew at the time that [CK] was arrested, despite the fact that there was noarrest warrant, I believe that the police had probable cause to make [an] arrest."

When Officers Herhold and Egan transported CK to the Area One police facilities, he wasin the backseat of the police car with his mother. CK claims he was told by the officers that hewould be "going down" like Vincent Fox. The officers respond that, while they engaged in smalltalk, no such threats were made. CK arrived at Area One at approximately 3:20 or 3:25 p.m. Hewas met by Detectives Buglio and Winstead. With his mother present, CK was "Mirandized" byDetective Winstead. When asked if he understood the nature of the Miranda warnings, CKindicated that he did. Detective Winstead claims that after he read the rights, CK asked if heneeded a lawyer. The detective responded that "that's not my call." CK's mother told her son to"just tell him the truth." According to CK's mother, CK first indicated he thought he might needto speak with a lawyer, then he asked the police if he did. CK's mother claims the policeresponded to CK's question by asking him if he wanted to make a statement. At that point, CK'smother indicated that she had not had an opportunity to speak privately with her son. Thedetectives then allowed CK and his mother to speak alone for approximately 90 minutes while alineup was being prepared.

The detectives returned to the interview room at 5 p.m. to see if CK or his mother neededanything. CK testified that, at this point, Detective Buglio showed his gun and asked for thelocation of the murder weapon. The detectives dispute the claim that CK was threatened withjail, that a gun was ever waved in his face or that any promises were made to induce him to makea statement. CK also claims he was not in his right state of mind because he was worried abouthis mother. CK further claimed that Detective Buglio told him he would sit at the station until hetalked.

CK participated in the lineup at approximately 5 p.m. CK was viewed by Griffin, who hadpreviously identified Vincent Fox as the shooter. Griffin was not able to make a positiveidentification of CK. The detectives indicated that Griffin had suggested that CK resembled theperson who shot his friend.

After the lineup, CK and his mother were placed in another interview room. Present wereDetectives Buglio and Winstead, as well as youth investigator Bailey. CK, again with his motherpresent, was read his Miranda rights. Both he and his mother indicated the rights wereunderstood. After answering questions for 30-to-40 minutes, the detectives left to go contact theState's Attorney. When Assistant State's Attorney Adam Monreal (ASA Monreal) arrived, hewent with the detectives into the interview room. After another 30-to-40 minutes ofconversation, during which ASA Monreal indicated that he was not CK's lawyer, CK chose theoption of a court-reported statement. The court reporter arrived at approximately 9:30 p.m. ASA Monreal read CK his Miranda rights. Though he told ASA Monreal he understood theMiranda rights, CK testified that he did not.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress the statement because, to a great degree, CKwas read his Miranda warnings, gave assent to each warning, had his mother present for most ofthe day, was able to speak alone with his mother, and had a youth officer present who did notserve as the questioner. The trial court also found that CK's question "Do I need an attorney?"was not an invocation of his constitutional rights.

Following the hearings, the State moved to have the proceedings designated as an EJJproceeding. CK objected because the State had previously unsuccessfully moved to have thematter transferred to adult court. CK also claimed the EJJ statute was unconstitutional. Specifically, CK objected that the State presented no evidence related to the statutory factors thatthe court was required to consider before designating a case as an EJJ prosecution.

The matter thereafter proceeded to trial. CK's statement was admitted into evidenceagainst him. The jury convicted CK of first degree murder.

CK argues on appeal that the State was prohibited from seeking and receiving an EJJdesignation after unsuccessfully appealing the trial court's denial of the motion to transfer underthe rule of the law of the case. CK maintains that many of the factors the trial court is to considerare the same. CK argues that, in a discretionary transfer situation, the burden remains on theState. In an EJJ proceeding, the burden shifts such that, once the State meets its initial burden,the minor must demonstrate that EJJ designation is not appropriate. CK argues that, despite thedifferences, the ultimate issue in both the EJJ designation proceeding and the motion in juvenilecourt to transfer to adult court is whether CK should be subject to an adult sentence. This courtaffirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to transfer. CK argues that, implicit in that ruling isthe notion that an adult sentence is not appropriate. CK argues this amounts to multiple bites ofthe apple. CK argues that the rule of law of the case should apply to stop the State from re-raising the issue of adult punishment.

The State responds that the doctrine of law of the case is not applicable where the twostatutes do not involve the same legal inquiry, do not have the same effect or purpose and are notmutually exclusive. The State maintains that the EJJ designation is a way for the legislature todeal with juvenile problems by providing an option for dealing with more serious offenders. TheState argues that a plain reading of the two provisions demonstrates that the transfer provisionand the EJJ designation are not mutually exclusive. The State argues that one major differencebetween transfer and EJJ designation is the consideration of the best interest of the public. That isan element of transfer, but not of an EJJ designation. If a minor is found subject to transfer, he orshe serves the sentence in adult prison. By contrast, in an EJJ proceeding, a guilty defendant doesnot see adult prison until he or she reaches the age of 21. Further, the State maintains that an EJJsentence does not result in the inevitable imposition of an adult sentence. The adult sentence canbe vacated if the minor completes the juvenile sentence, complies with the conditions of thatsentence, and does not commit a new offense during the juvenile term. The State characterizes anEJJ sentence and the potential adult component as an incentive for the minor to neither re-offendnor violate the conditions of the juvenile sentence. The State also argues that the plain languageof the statute supports its position because it states that nothing prevents the State fromproceeding in a motion to transfer.

"In general, when the State petitions the court for an adjudication of delinquency, theminor is subject only to the sanctions prescribed under the [Juvenile Court] Act." In re MatthewM., 335 Ill. App. 3d 276, 286 (2002), citing 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2000). "The mostserious of these sanctions is the minor's commitment to the juvenile division of the Department ofCorrections until the minor's twenty-first birthday." Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d at 286, citing705 ILCS 405/5-750 (West 2000). As an alternative under appropriate statutorily definedcircumstances, "at any time prior to the commencement of the minor's trial, " the State may askthe trial court to have the proceedings designated as an EJJ prosecution. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(1)(West 1998). "If the trial court agrees to designate the proceeding as an EJJ prosecution, then thecourt, upon finding the minor guilty, must impose one or more of the penalties provided for insection 5-710 of the [Juvenile Court] Act and a conditional adult criminal sentence." (Emphasisomitted.) Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d at 286, citing 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4) (West 2000). "Inthe event that the minor violates the conditions of his or her juvenile sentence or commits a newoffense, the trial court must order the execution of the conditional adult criminal sentence." Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d at 286, citing 705 ILCS 405/5- 810(6) (West 1998).

"To seek the designation of the proceeding as an EJJ prosecution,the State must allege that (1) a minor 13 years of age or oldercommitted an offense that would be a felony if committed by anadult and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the allegationsin the delinquency petition and motion are true. (705 ILCS405/5-810(1) (West 2000)). If the trial court finds that there isprobable cause to believe the allegations are true, then the courtmust designate the proceeding as an EJJ prosecution unless thecourt finds, based on clear and convincing evidence, that adultsentencing would not be appropriate for the minor based on thefollowing factors: (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense; (2) theminor's history of delinquency; (3) the minor's age; (4) the minor'sculpability in committing the alleged offense; (5) whether theoffense was committed in an aggressive or premeditated manner;and (6) whether the minor used or possessed a deadly weaponwhen committing the alleged offense. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(1)(b)(West 2000)." Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d at 286.

The law is replete with alternatives such as the way EJJ prosecutions work in the juvenilejustice arena. This speaks to judicial discretion and the ability to craft sentences so as to balancethe competing interests our society has in punishment and rehabilitation. However, there areinstances when discretion must yield to timing. By that, we mean that the right to proceed as anEJJ prosecution is not unfettered. The legislature clearly contemplated the simultaneous filing ofmotions for EJJ designation and transfer in stating that "[n]othing in [the EJJ section] precludesthe State from filing a motion for transfer under Section 5-805." 705 ILCS 405/5-810(8) (West1998). The State chose not to proceed simultaneously in the alternative. We believe that, basedupon the timing of the events in this case and the doctrine of the law of the case, an EJJproceeding ceased to be available when the issue of transfer was resolved by this court.

"Under the law of the case doctrine, a rule established as controlling in a particular casewill continue to be the law of the case, as long as the facts remain the same." People v.Rodriguez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 877, 884 (2000), citing People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 468(1992). "The preclusion doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and law of the case preventa defendant from 'taking two bites out of the same appellate apple.' " People v. Tenner, 206 Ill.2d 381, 395 (2002), quoting People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 37 (1988). "However, the doctrineis not applicable where either different parties or issues are involved." Lake Bluff Heating & AirConditioning Supply, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 117 Ill. App. 3d 284, 290-91 (1983),citing Miscevich v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d 400, 402 (1982).

When the trial court made its discretionary determination that CK's case should not betransferred to adult court, the ultimate issue was whether he should be tried and punished as anadult. Though the EJJ mechanism offers an extra opportunity for a juvenile defendant to avoid anadult sentence by fulfilling the conditions of his juvenile sentence, the ultimate issue is alsowhether that defendant should be punished as an adult. Law of the case prohibits the State fromseeking an EJJ designation following the unsuccessful attempt at an ordinary transfer.

CK next argues that the designation of his case as an EJJ proceeding after the trial courtdetermined that he should be sentenced under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1et seq. (West 1998)) (the Act) is contrary to the legislative intent of the Act. CK maintains thatan EJJ proceeding is an alternative to transfer proceedings. CK argues that the EJJ statuteshould not be allowed to be used as a second chance for the State to avoid a judicial finding that itis in the minor's and public's interest that the minor be adjudicated and sentenced under the Act.

"When the EJJ provisions were added to the Juvenile Court Act,the legislature adopted the 'balanced and restorative justice model'of juvenile justice, attempting to strike a balance betweenpunishment and treatment."

The State responds that the application of the EJJ statute following a denial of a motion totransfer is not prohibited by the plain language of the statute nor is it contrary to the legislativeintent. The State maintains that it is not necessary to go to the legislative history when the plainlanguage of the statutes is clear. The State argues the statutory language contains no prohibitionagainst prosecution under the EJJ statute following the denial of a motion for discretionarytransfer. The State argues that the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act has changed in recent yearsaway from pure rehabilitation toward a combination of that and concern for juvenileaccountability and public safety.

The EJJ statute allows for simultaneous motions for an EJJ proceeding and for ordinarytransfer under section 5-805. 705 ILCS 405/5-805 (West 1998). The rules for an EJJ proceedingand an ordinary transfer are similar, but not identical. This is significant because for an ordinarytransfer under section 5-805 there are extra considerations a trial court must evaluate.

"In making its determination on a motion to permit prosecutionunder the criminal laws, the trial court shall consider among othermatters:

(I) the seriousness of the alleged offenses; (ii) theminor's history of delinquency; (iii) the age of theminor; (iv) the culpability of the minor in committingthe alleged offense; (v) whether the offense wascommitted in an aggressive and premeditatedmanner; (vi) whether the minor used or possessed adeadly weapon when committing the alleged offense;(vii) the minor's history of services, including theminor's willingness to participate meaningfully inavailable services, and (viii) the adequacy of thepunishment or services available in the juvenilejustice system." In re C.K., slip op at 7, citing 705ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a),(b) (West 1998).

The EJJ statute requires the first six of those factors and not the last two. Procedurallyspeaking, the State got six out of the eight factors considered by the trial court and reviewed bythis court in our prior order. It would be unconstitutional as applied to CK to allow the State,after having the higher burden of having the eight transfer factors considered and rejected, tomake a second attempt under a lesser burden. We review questions of statutory constructionunder the de novo standard. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418 (2001). The cardinal rule ofstatutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature whilepresuming the legislature did not intend to create absurdity, inconvenience or injustice. D.D., 196Ill. 2d at 418-19, citing In re Application of the Cook County Treasurer, 185 Ill. 2d 428 (1998),citing People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269 (1998), Solich v. George & Anna Portes CancerPrevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994), Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d178, 189 (1990), and Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1998). In orderto comport with the Illinois Supreme Court's guidelines for the interpretation of statutes, and toensure that the State's actions do not violate the constitution, we must conclude that thelegislature intended for the transfer motions under section 5-805 and EJJ designations undersection 5-810 to be made simultaneously. Any other construction of the applicable statutes wouldlead to an unjust result.

CK next argues that the EJJ statute is unconstitutional because it requires a judge and nota jury to make a factual finding that results in an imposition of a sentence that exceeds themaximum allowed under the Juvenile Court Act. CK claims this is a violation of the rule inApprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). He claimsthe EJJ statute permits the imposition of a dual sentence upon a trial court's determination thatthere is probable cause to believe the minor committed an offense that would be a felony ifcommitted by an adult and the trial court makes a finding that an adult sentence would not beappropriate for the minor. CK argues he was entitled to have a jury determine beyond areasonable doubt whether he should receive a sentence that extends beyond his twenty-firstbirthday. CK also argues that the procedure for lifting the stay and, thereby, imposing the adultsentence violates Apprendi. He argues that the provision for execution of the adult portion of thesentence requires that the trial court make a finding, based upon a preponderance of the evidence,that the minor violated the conditions of the juvenile portion of his sentence. Because it uses thepreponderance standard, CK argues the EJJ statute violates Apprendi and such a finding willincrease his sentence by at least 35 years, well beyond that allowed for juvenile first-degreemurder.

The State responds that the EJJ provisions wholly comport with Apprendi. In CK's case,a jury found him guilty of the criminal offense of first-degree murder after considering all theevidence and determining that each and every element of the offense had been proven beyond areasonable doubt. None of the elements were excluded from the jury's consideration as a resultof the EJJ statute. Apprendi has been held in Illinois inapplicable to questions of juvenile courtjurisdiction. The State urges this court to treat a violation by a minor of the terms of the juvenilesentence in the same manner as any criminal defendant that violates a probation hearing. TheState argues this should require only minimal due process.

The Apprendi argument, that the adult portion of the sentence amounts to a finding by thetrial court based on less than "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the longer sentence is necessary,has been addressed by this court in In re Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d 276 (2002). In MatthewM., the Second District of this court held:

"An EJJ prosecution, like a section 5-805(2) transfer, requires thetrial court to make a procedural determination as to whether thejuvenile should receive an adult sentence under chapter V of theUnified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/ 5-1-1 et seq. (West2000)). The only difference between section 5- 805(2) and an EJJprosecution is that the adult sentence in an EJJ prosecution isstayed pending the juvenile's successful completion of the juvenilesentence. Because the trial court's determination to designate aproceeding as an EJJ prosecution does not adjudicate the minor'sguilt, due process would not require a jury to make such aprocedural determination. [See People v. Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d685, 691(2002).] Although we agree with respondent that, indesignating a proceeding as an EJJ prosecution, the trial court maymake findings that expose him to a greater sanction, he has no dueprocess right to have a jury make those findings. We therefore holdthat, for the same reasons articulated in Beltran, Apprendi isinapplicable to the present case." Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d at289.

As in Matthew M., we conclude that, although proof beyond a reasonable doubt isrequired during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile hearing, that standard does not apply to thedispositional stage of a juvenile prosecution. Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d at 288, citing Peoplev. Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d 685 (2002), citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 n.1, 25 L. Ed. 2d368, 372 n.1, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1070 n.1(1970). " 'Because Apprendi bears only on the process duein criminal proceedings, the case is simply inapplicable here.' " Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d at288, quoting People v. Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 690-91.

CK next argues that the EJJ provision of the Juvenile Court Act is unconstitutionallyvague because it fails to give proper notice as to what actions are sufficient to trigger the stay-lifting mechanism. He argues the statute is not sufficiently clear as to inform CK of the standardto which he would need to conform his conduct. CK also argues the EJJ statute is vague becausethe trial court failed to specify the conditions under which a violation will predicate the impositionof an adult offense. He argues the EJJ provision fails to specify the type of new offense necessaryto justify the imposition of the adult sentence. CK claims the term "new offense" has not beendescribed with particularity. CK also argues the EJJ statute encourages arbitrary anddiscriminatory enforcement and has been applied to him in an unconstitutional manner. Specifically, CK argues the trial court did not outline conditions he needed to fulfill in order tosuccessfully complete the juvenile portion of his sentence.

The State responds that CK is without standing to mount a facial and "as applied"challenge to the statute where the provisions of the EJJ statute have no bearing on the presentcontroversy. The State reminds this court that the issue at the center of this controversy iswhether CK's case should have been designated as an EJJ proceeding. The State maintains thatCK lacks standing to challenge the EJJ statute's imposition of an adult sentence because he hasnot suffered any present injury in need of redress. The State maintains that CK's adult portion ofthe sentence may, by operation of law, never be implemented. Even if this court would find thesentencing provision constitutionally vague, that finding would have no impact on CK in this case. The State argues it would be in the nature of an advisory opinion.

The State argues in the alternative that the language of the statute and the sentence aresufficiently specific as to the possible events that would trigger the imposition of the adultsentence. Section 5-810(6) explains the two conditions under which the adult sentence will beimposed as: (1) a violation of the terms of the juvenile portion of the sentence; and (2) thecommission of a new offense. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(6) (West 1998). If the minor does not doeither of those two things, the adult portion of the sentence is vacated by operation of law. Toentertain CK's arguments, this court would have to accept his premise that the statute provides noguidance as to the meaning of the terms "offense" and "conditions." The State argues that it isthe trial court and not the legislature that defines the conditions in each case based upon its uniquecircumstances. Though CK claims he does not know whether getting a disciplinary ticket for atechnical violation of a regulation within the IDOC or doing poorly in school would result in thestay being lifted, the State argues such confusion is unwarranted. The State argues the veryobvious condition means CK should complete the terms of his juvenile sentence. By extension,the State argues that would include complying with all the rules. Because CK is afforded noticeof that requirement, his vagueness challenge must fail. As to the term "offense," the Stateresponds that it clearly means that the minor must commit no criminal offense during the term ofhis or her juvenile sentence.

The question before us is whether the EJJ provision of the Juvenile Court Act isunconstitutionally vague. "Statutes are presumed constitutional, and a party challenging theconstitutionality of a statute has the burden of establishing its invalidity." People v. Law, 202 Ill.2d 578, 582 (2002).

"A criminal law may be declared unconstitutionally vague for eitherof two independent reasons. First, the statute may fail to providethe kind of notice that would enable a person of ordinaryintelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited. City ofChicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67, 80, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1859 (1999); see People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109, 113(2001); People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 356 (1996); see alsoGrayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222,227, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99 (1972) (due process requires that astatute 'give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonableopportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may actaccordingly'). Second, a statute may be declared unconstitutionallyvague if it fails to provide explicit standards for those who apply it,thus authorizing or even encouraging arbitrary and discriminatoryenforcement. Morales, 527 U.S. at 56, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 80, 119 S.Ct. at 1859; see Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 33 L. Ed. 2d at227-28, 92 S. Ct. at 2299; Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d at 113; Warren, 173 Ill.2d at 356." Law, 202 Ill. 2d at 582-83.

"In construing the meaning of a statute, the primary objective of this court is to ascertainand give effect to the intention of the legislature." People ex rel Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d264, 279 (2003), citing In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307 (2002), and MichiganAvenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). "All other rules ofstatutory construction are subordinate to this cardinal principle." Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 279, citingSylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001), and Henrich v. Libertyville HighSchool, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1998). "We ascertain the intent of the legislature by examining thelanguage of the statute, which is 'the most reliable indicator of the legislature's objectives inenacting a particular law.' " Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 279, quoting Michigan Avenue National Bank,191 Ill. 2d at 504, and citing Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001). "The languageof the statute must be afforded its plain, ordinary and popularly understood meaning (Lieberman,201 Ill. 2d at 308; Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 381 (1995)), and weare to give the statutory language the fullest, rather than the narrowest, possible meaning to whichit is susceptible (Lake County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 119 Ill. 2d 419,423 (1988)). This court will not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into itexceptions, limitations or conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent. Petersen v.Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 446 (2002); Yang, 195 Ill. 2d at 103." Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 279. "Allprovisions of a statutory enactment are viewed as a whole." Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 279, citingMichigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504; Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 382. "Therefore, wordsand phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not beconstrued in isolation." Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 279-80, citing Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232; Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill.2d at 504. "Each word, clause and sentence of thestatute, if possible, must be given reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous." Cryns, 203Ill. 2d at 280, citing Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232.

According to 5-810(6), the adult criminal sentence may be imposed in either of the twofollowing circumstances:

"When it appears that a minor convicted in an extended jurisdictionjuvenile prosecution under subsection (1) has violated theconditions of his or her sentence, or is alleged to have committed anew offense upon the filing of a petition to revoke the stay, thecourt may, without notice, issue a warrant for the arrest of theminor. After a hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of theevidence that the minor committed a new offense, the court shallorder execution of the previously imposed adult criminal sentence. After a hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of theevidence that the minor committed a violation of his or her sentenceother than by a new offense, the court may order execution of thepreviously imposed adult criminal sentence or may continue him orher on the existing juvenile sentence with or without modifying orenlarging the conditions. Upon revocation of the stay of the adultcriminal sentence and imposition of that sentence, the minor'sextended jurisdiction juvenile status shall be terminated. Theon-going jurisdiction over the minor's case shall be assumed by theadult criminal court and juvenile court jurisdiction shall beterminated and a report of the imposition of the adult sentence shallbe sent to the Department of State Police." (Emphasis added.) 705ILCS 405/5-810(6) (West 1998).

We disagree with the defendant's theory that the EJJ statute is unconstitutionally vague. In orderto be eligible to have the adult portion of the sentence vacated, a defendant must successfullycomplete the juvenile portion of the sentence. We believe that a reasonable mind would interpretthe term "offense" as included in the EJJ statute to mean a criminal offense. As the IllinoisSupreme Court instructs, "[i]f a statute can be made more definite by a reasonable construction,the court must give the statute that interpretation." East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local1220, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. East St. Louis School District No. 189Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 425 (1997), citing People v. Lang, 113 Ill. 2d 407, 455(1986). Because the EJJ statute covers both the failure to comply with the juvenile sentence andthe commission of a new offense, we find it reasonable to assume that "offense" means somethingthat would, if done without any previous history, subject a minor to a juvenile sentence. Incontext of the entire Juvenile Court Act, we find the legislature must have meant "offense" as acriminal offense as such is defined in the Criminal Code.

CK next argues that, under the EJJ provisions, once the State has met its initial burden ofproof that a minor qualifies for EJJ designation, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove byclear and convincing evidence that the case should not be designated as an EJJ prosecution. Thetrial court must look at the statutory factors in making this determination. CK argues he receivedineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to present any evidence on thosestatutory factors. CK argues the failure to present evidence was as a result of a misapprehensionof the law, not a strategic decision. The lawyer indicated to the court that she believed the EJJrules did not allow her to present mitigating evidence. She believed the trial court had nodiscretion and so there was nothing for the defense to do. CK maintains there was evidencedealing with lack of criminal history, need for therapeutic intervention, amenability to services inthe juvenile court, and expert testimony of why an adult sentence would be inappropriate thatcould have been presented, but the trial counsel failed to do so. Because the judge whoevaluation the EJJ petition was not the same judge who heard the prior motion to transfer, he wasdeprived of critical information in making the determination. CK also argues that the trial court'sfailure to take evidence regarding the relevant factors makes the EJJ designation void. CK alsoargues that, in light of the claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court should havefulfilled an independent duty to inquire into the factors relevant to an EJJ designation.

The State responds that, in terms of what was relevant to the EJJ determination, CKreceived effective assistance of counsel. The EJJ statute does not enumerate the factors cited byCK as being appropriate considerations. While these may be relevant considerations for a transferdetermination, the State argues they are not relevant to an EJJ determination. The EJJ statutelists the relevant factors as the seriousness of the offense, the history of delinquency, age,culpability in the commission of the offense, whether the offense was committed in an aggressiveand premeditated manner, and whether a deadly weapon was used and/or possessed at the time. The State argues the juvenile court is not asked to assess the factors cited by CK. The Statemaintains that the evidence showed probable cause to believe that CK shot an unarmed rival gangmember merely because of his gang membership. CK's counsel presented evidence detailing whatthe detectives, police officers, and Assistant State's Attorney would say to attempt to rebut theclaim of probable cause. Their testimony would also go towards the claim that CK did not do thecrime at all. After considering all the evidence from both sides, the judge granted the motion forthe EJJ designation. The State also argues that, to the extent that CK now claims his counselfailed to present sufficient evidence, he fails to point to any real evidence regarding how theseriousness of the offense, his criminal history, his age, or his culpability for the crime wouldmilitate against the application of the EJJ statute . He also fails to mention that the offense wascommitted in an aggressive and premeditated manner with a deadly weapon. Accordingly, theState argues not one of the statutorily sanctioned considerations inures in his favor. The Stateemphasizes that it would be improper for this court to interject transfer factors into an EJJinquiry. The State also argues that the trial court considered that which it was supposed toconsider. The EJJ designation is not void. As to the alleged trial error for failure to conduct anindependent inquiry into the EJJ factors, the State argues that the trial court considered everyappropriate factor before making its determination.

"The sixth and fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantee thefundamental right of a defendant in a criminal case to be effectively assisted by counsel." Peoplev. Spann, 332 Ill. App. 3d 425,429 (2002), citing U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV. "Effectiveassistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect, representation." Spann, 332 Ill. App. 3d at430, citing People v. Odle, 151 Ill. 2d 168, 173 (1992). The Illinois Supreme Court hasrepeatedly held that "[t]o demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show (1)that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) thatthe attorney's deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant." People v. Villarreal,198 Ill. 2d 209, 228 (2001), citing People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 320 (1998); Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). "In orderto establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show that 'there is areasonable probability that, but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of theproceeding would have been different." People v. Brooks, 334 Ill. App. 3d 722, 725-26 (2002),citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A reasonableprobability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, namely, thatcounsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceedingfundamentally unfair. People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 376-77 (2000), citing Strickland, 466 U.S.at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999); Brooks, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 725-26. There is a strong presumption that counsel's performancefalls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 376-77,citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. The failure tosatisfy either the deficiency prong or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test precludes a findingof ineffective assistance of counsel. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 377, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697,80 L. Ed. 2d at 699; 104 S. Ct. at 2069; People v. Wilson, 191 Ill. 2d 363, 370 (2000). "InPeople v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525-26 (1984), the Illinois Supreme Court adopted theStrickland rule that the 'benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whethercounsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trialcannot be relied on as having produced a just result' and that '[t]he defendant must show thatthere is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of theproceeding would have been different.' " Spann, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 429, quoting Strickland, 466U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 692-693, 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

When the claimed error is based on trial strategy, trial counsel's decisions are generallyimmune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 310(1997), citing People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 148 (1997). The Illinois Supreme Court hascarved out an exception to this general rule when the strategy chosen is "so unsound that counselentirely fails to conduct meaningful adversarial testing." Reid, 179 Ill. 2d at 310, citing Madej,177 Ill. 2d at 149. "Counsel's performance is measured by an objective standard of competenceunder prevailing professional norms." People v. Arroyo, 339 Ill. App. 3d 137, 155 (2003), citingPeople v. Smith, 195 Ill. 2d 179, 188 (2000).

In light of our determination that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion tomake CK's case an EJJ prosecution, we decline to reach the substance of either the ineffectiveassistance of counsel claim or the claim of judicial error for failure to conduct an independentinvestigation into the adequacy of the EJJ factors. Both of these issues are rendered moot by ourdecision. We need not discuss these matters further.

CK next argues that the trial court erred on two fronts. First, the trial court erred when itdenied CK's motion to suppress the statement. He argues that CK invoked his right to counselwhich the police investigators ignored. CK also argues that the youth officer and CK's mothertook no actions to ensure that CK understood his rights. As such, CK argues their presence wasimmaterial and may have contributed to the coerciveness of the environment. CK argues that hismother was in no position to help him because she had been harassed by the police in the daysleading up to CK's arrest. CK also argues that no one took the time to explain to him themeaning of the rights he said he understood. This was combined with his lack of experience withthe criminal justice system, the seven-hour interrogation, his mother's hysteria, and the officers'threats. CK argues that the totality of the circumstances makes the statement involuntary.

CK further argues that the arrest should have been quashed and the resulting confessionsuppressed. CK maintains the arrest was the product of an unlawful seizure. Second, if therewas probable cause it was based on illegally seized evidence. CK argues the police lacked specificor credible evidence to arrest him. While the police had the name "Little Chris," they lacked aphysical description. Griffin had identified another boy as the shooter. When the officers went toCK's mother's house, they did not gather additional evidence, specifically any evidence that CKtraveled under the name "Little Chris." The single piece of evidence obtained at CK's mother'shouse was a photograph of CK. The State failed to establish that the officers knew that theperson in the photograph shown to witnesses at the grand jury was in fact CK. CK argues that hismother did not give the police permission to do more than a general search of her premises anddid not give permission for anything to be removed from the house.

The State responds that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress where theevidence established that CK did not request an attorney, did not refuse to speak with the police,was provided Miranda warnings that he indicated he understood, and was accompanied by andgot the chance to speak alone with his mother at most stages of the interrogation. The Stateargues there is nothing in the record to suggest that CK could not articulate for himself if he felthe wanted an attorney present. As to the motion to quash the arrest, the State argues the trialcourt did not err because CK was known to police and in the community as Little Chris. TheState also argues that witnesses identified CK as Little Chris.

"A motion to suppress statements presents the court with a mixed question of law andfact." People v. Flores, 315 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391 (2000), citing People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 25-26 (1996). "Where the facts are essentially uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is notat issue, de novo review is appropriate." Flores, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 391-92, citing People v.Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 447-48 (1996). However, where the facts are in dispute, "[w]henreviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress statements, we give deference to thatcourt's factual findings and will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weightof the evidence." People v. Graham, 339 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1054 (2003), citing People v.DeSantis, 319 Ill. App. 3d 795, 802 (2000); People v. Allen, 249 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1016 (1993),citing People v. Gray, 212 Ill. App. 3d 613, 616 (1991) (when a defendant who has invoked hisright to counsel and to remain silent is found to have voluntarily waived such rights, the trialcourt's finding on the issue will not be reversed unless it is manifestly erroneous).

During the interrogation, CK asked Detective Winstead "Do I need a lawyer?" CK arguesthat, owing to his youth and inexperience with the police, that question was effectively anassertion of his right to counsel. CK argues that neither the youth officer nor his mother tookactions to ensure that he understood his rights. In fact, CK claims the presence of his mother andthe youth officer may have helped to contribute to the coercive environment. CK argues the trialcourt put too much emphasis on their presence when CK was interrogated.

The law is clear that, "[u]nder Miranda [citation], a defendant invokes his fifth amendmentprotections when he asserts 'in any manner' his right to counsel. Once the accused has invokedhis right to counsel, he cannot waive this right unless he has consulted an attorney or reinitiated aconversation with the officers." People v. Tackett, 150 Ill. App. 3d 406, 417 (1986), quotingEdwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981). As for asking "DoI need a lawyer?," the Illinois Supreme Court has indicated that not every reference to anattorney, no matter how vague, indecisive or ambiguous constitutes an invocation of the right tocounsel. People v. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d 305, 311 (1980). " 'The [Illinois] [S]upreme [C]ourt ruledthat the officer's interpretation of the defendant's statement was reasonable because, under thecircumstances, 'a more positive indication or manifestation of a desire for an attorney wasrequired than was made here.' " People v. Tackett, 150 Ill. App. 3d 406, 418 (1986), quotingKrueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 312. Thus an inquiry such as this must be made on a case by case basis.

The principles of law concerning the voluntariness of a confession are well established. The test of voluntariness is whether the respondent " 'made the statement freely, voluntarily, andwithout compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the [respondents] will was overcomeat the time he or she confessed.' " In Re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 54 (2000), quoting People v.Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996). If so, the confession cannot be deemed the product of arational intellect and a free will. Factors to be considered in determining whether a confessionwas voluntary include the defendant's age, intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity,education, and physical condition at the time of questioning; the legality and duration of thedetention; the duration of the questioning; and any physical or mental abuse by the police,including the existence of threats or promises. Additionally, consideration must be given towhether or not the defendant was informed of his constitutional rights. People v. Fuller, 292 Ill.App. 3d 651, 665 (1997). When a juvenile's confession is at issue, additional factors come intoplay, including the time of day and the presence of a parent or other adult interested in thejuvenile's welfare. People v. Brown, 235 Ill. App. 3d 479 (1992). Courts scrutinize custodialstatements by juvenile suspects with particular care, given that the potential for coercion isenhanced. The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized that the taking of a juvenile's confession isa "sensitive concern." Because of this, the "greatest care" must be taken to assure that theconfession was not coerced or suggested and that " ' "it was not the product of ignorance of rightsor of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair." ' " In Re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, quoting People v.Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 88 L. Ed. 2d 527, 561,87 S. Ct. 1428, 1458 (1967).

Although the presence of a youth officer does not per se make a juvenile's confessionvoluntary, it is a significant factor. In re G. O., 191 Ill. 2d at 55; In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d545, 557 (1996). Additional factors must be considered, such as the time of day and the presenceof a parent or other adult concerned about the juvenile's welfare. People v. Lee, 335 Ill. App. 3d659, 666 (2002), citing People v. Kolakowski, 319 Ill. App. 3d 200, 213 (2001), citing In reJ.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d 227, 234 (1998). The trial court found significant the fact that both aparent and a youth officer were present. This, coupled with the fact that CK and his motherrepeatedly indicated to the police that they understood the Miranda rights. CK's mother wasallowed to privately confer with her son more than once during the time he was beinginterrogated. We believe the trial court properly evaluated the relevant factors without givingundue emphasis and denied the motion to suppress.

The second claimed trial error resulted from the denial of CK's motion to quash his arrest. CK argues that the police did not have probable cause to justify his arrest. "Probable cause existsfor an arrest when the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers is such that areasonably prudent person would believe that the suspect is committing or has committed acrime." In re D.W., 341 Ill. App. 3d 517, 523 (2003), citing People v. Montgomery, 112 Ill. 2d517, 525 (1986). "Probable cause to arrest is a nontechnical concept determined according to thetotality of the circumstances confronting the officers at the time of the arrest." People v. Sims,167 Ill. 2d 483, 500 (1995), citing People v. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108, 128 (1991).

"In determining whether the trial court correctly found probable cause to arrest theaccused, a reviewing court is not limited to the evidence presented at the circuit court's pretrialsuppression hearing, but may also consider evidence that was offered at the defendant's trial." Sims, 167 Ill. 2d at 500, citing People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 450 (1992), People v.Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 433 (1992), and People v. Cabellero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 36 (1984). Commonsense and practical considerations are properly considered in viewing the totality of thecircumstances surrounding the probable cause determination. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d397, 405 (1995).

Our review of the record suggests that the decision of the trial court was the correct one. Eyewitnesses to the shooting identified the vehicle involved as belonging to Jessica Cosgrove. Another witness described the shooter with measurements and clothing similar to those of CK. These descriptions and an anonymous tip led the officers to Jessica Cosgrove and Melissa Quinn. These witnesses provided the police with the nickname Little Chris. Once locked in on the nameLittle Chris, the officers with experience with CK's street gang knew Little Chris and CK are oneand the same. When the police asked, Quinn confirmed that she had long-term familiarity withCK. "A police officer's knowledge of probable cause may be based on an informant's tip and, ifthe facts supplied in such a tip are essential to a finding of probable cause, the tip must bereliable." D.W., 341 Ill. App. 3d at 523, citing People v. Patterson, 282 Ill. App. 3d 219, 227(1996). Because Quinn knew CK for at least a year, and the police knew of CK's street gang andthe members therein, we conclude that there was probable cause to justify the arrest. Becausethere was probable cause to arrest CK, the seizure of a photograph is not fruit of the poisonoustree. We need not discuss the matter further.

" 'Reviewing courts have the power and authority under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4)[134Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)] to reduce a sentence imposed by the trial court.' " People v. Jones, 168Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1995), quoting People v. O'Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 297-98 (1988). We recognizeand give appropriate deference to the trial court where it is due, but must conclude that the adultportion of CK's sentence, imposed as part of the EJJ proceedings is an error. However, becausewe find no error with the juvenile portion of the sentence, we reduce CK's sentence ofincarceration to his twenty-first birthday. We reach this conclusion after deliberate, "consideratecaution and circumspection." People v. Turner, 156 Ill. 2d 354, 359 (1993), citing People v.Taylor, 33 Ill. 2d 417, 424 (1965). " '[T]he mere fact that the trial court has a superioropportunity to make a determination concerning final disposition and punishment of a defendantdoes not imply that a particular sentence imposed is always just and equitable.' " Jones, 168 Ill.2d at 376 , quoting O'Neal, 125 Ill. 2d at 297-98.

In light of the foregoing, CK's conviction and sentence as modified is affirmed.

Affirmed as modified.

Hartigan, J., concurs.

Campbell, P.J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.