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FOURTH DIVISION

SEPTEMBER 26, 2002

JUSTICE HARTMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent Debra T.-M. appeals from an order of the circuitcourt finding that respondent's minor daughter, Christina M., was"neglected" based on a lack of necessary care, as defined insection 2-3(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2000)).

On August 1, 2000, the State filed a petition for adjudicationof wardship regarding Christina (born January 30, 1984), allegingthat she was neglected due to a lack of necessary care byrespondent.⁽¹⁾ Specifically, the petition stated that on July 20,2000, respondent locked Christina and Christina's infant daughterout of her home and to date, refuses to allow Christina to returnhome. The petition stated further that respondent has five otherchildren who are or were in the custody of the Department ofChildren and Family Services (DCFS) based on findings of abuseand/or neglect, and that Christina was previously a DCFS ward basedon a finding of neglect. Following a hearing, the circuit courtawarded temporary custody of Christina to the DCFS guardianshipadministrator.

At the adjudicatory hearing held on January 3, 2001, StevenMittons, a DCFS investigator, testified that on July 20, 2000, hewas called to investigate an allegation that Christina had left herchild unattended at respondent's residence. He interviewedrespondent, who stated that she received information that Christinahad left her baby unattended at her home. Respondent called thepolice, and Christina was taken into custody, then released. Respondent stated that she told Christina that neither she nor herdaughter could continue to reside at the home. Christina confirmedin a separate interview that she had been told to leaverespondent's residence.

Mittons met with respondent again at her home and advised herthat legally she could not lock her minor child, Christina, out ofher residence. Respondent agreed to allow Christina to returnhome. Mittons brought Christina back and had a discussion withboth Christina and respondent during which he and respondent triedto facilitate a care plan that would allow Christina and her childto remain in the home. The conversation "escalated into anargument" between respondent and Christina when Christina said thatrespondent had never been a mother to her. Respondent then "rosefrom her seat and stepped forward aggressively." Mittons steppedin between the two, and respondent backed away. He then removedChristina and her child from respondent's residence for safetyreasons.

On July 27, 2000, Mittons interviewed respondent regarding anallegation that she had locked Christina out of the home. He saidhe and respondent tried to facilitate some type of care plan, andhe informed her of the probability of the case being brought intocourt if she did not take Christina back into her home. He askedrespondent if Christina could stay with another relative, butrespondent was unable to recommend any family member. Respondentstated that she was not willing to allow Christina back into thehome because she felt uncomfortable and believed it was best forall concerned.

On cross-examination, Mittons testified that Christinaadmitted leaving her baby alone at respondent's house, and shethought there would be no harm as long as the baby was asleep. Respondent told him that she previously had warned Christinanumerous times about leaving the baby home alone. She had alsoforbade Christina from selling or using drugs or drinking alcoholin the apartment. Respondent previously had caught Christina inthe apartment using drugs with fellow gang members. DuringMitton's discussion with both respondent and Christina, respondentstated that she would allow Christina to return home if shefollowed her rules and agreed not to bring gang members to theapartment. Christina made a statement indicating that she believedher mother's rules were overbearing. After Christina expressedthat she would not follow the rules, respondent said she could notremain in respondent's home. Respondent also stated that forsafety reasons she was fearful of Christina being present aroundrespondent's other daughter, Shelly.

The State then introduced certified copies of adjudicatoryorders finding that Christina and three of her siblings had beenabused or neglected. In 1995, Christina was found neglectedbecause of an injurious environment. Also in 1995, Shelly wasfound neglected because of lack of necessary care and injuriousenvironment. In 1996, another sibling was found neglected becauseof an injurious environment. A fourth sibling was found abusedbased on excessive corporal punishment.

During closing arguments, the State requested a finding ofneglect based on an injurious environment. Respondent asked thatthe circuit court either dismiss the petition or enter a finding ofdependency. In making its finding of neglect based on a lack ofnecessary care, the court noted the relevance of the other findingsof neglect as to Christina and her siblings. The court found thatrespondent's frustration with Christina's behavior, whilereasonable, did not justify her locking Christina out of the houseor refusing to cooperate in arranging a care plan for Christina.

At the dispositional hearing, Rashida Fearn, a caseworker withthe Chicago Child Care Society, testified that Christina wascurrently placed in a nonrelative foster home with her 11-month-olddaughter. She was attending school, and her grades had improved. Referrals had been made for her to attend parenting classes andcounseling. Fearn set up a visit between respondent and Christinaand referred respondent to parenting classes. Respondent refusedthe parenting classes, saying she had already taken those and didnot need them again. Christina stated she was happy in her newplacement and did not want further visits with respondent becauserespondent did not want Christina back in her home. Fearn spokewith respondent before the hearing, and respondent stated that itwould not be reasonable to allow Christina back in her home becauseChristina was unwilling to follow the rules.

The circuit court adjudicated Christina a ward of the courtand found respondent unable to care for, protect, train ordiscipline Christina for other than financial reasons alone.Respondent contends that the circuit court erred in findingChristina neglected based on a lack of necessary care. She arguesthat Christina should have been found a dependent minor, or, in thealternative, a minor requiring authoritative intervention.

The circuit court's determination that a child is neglected isentitled to great deference on appeal and will not be overturnedunless the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of theevidence. In re M.Z., 294 Ill. App. 3d 581, 691 N.E.2d 35 (1998). The State bears the burden of proving neglect by a preponderance ofthe evidence. In re M.D.H., 297 Ill. App. 3d 181, 697 N.E.2d 417(1998) (M.D.H.).

By statute, a "neglected minor" includes one "who is notreceiving the proper or necessary support, education as required bylaw, or medical or other remedial care recognized under State lawas necessary for a minor's well-being, or other care necessary forhis or her well-being, including adequate food, clothing andshelter." 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2000). In general,"neglect" is defined as the failure to exercise the care thatcircumstances justly demand and encompasses both willful andunintentional disregard of parental duties. In re Edricka C., 276Ill. App. 3d 18, 657 N.E.2d 78 (1995) (Edricka C.). The term isnot one of "fixed and measured meaning" and takes its content fromthe specific circumstances of each case. In re J.M., 245 Ill. App.3d 909, 613 N.E.2d 1346 (1993). Cases involving an adjudication ofneglect and wardship are sui generis, and each case must ultimatelybe decided on the basis of its own particular facts. Edricka C.,276 Ill. App. 3d at 25.

Respondent argues that she should not "bear the onus of beinglegally adjudged a neglectful parent." First, respondentmisconstrues the purpose of an adjudicatory finding of neglect. The purpose of an adjudicatory hearing is to determine whether thechild has been neglected, not to determine the status of theparent. See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(1) (West 2000).

Second, the circuit court's finding of neglect justifiably wasbased upon respondent's conduct in this case, as well as her priorhistory with DCFS, and was not against the manifest weight of theevidence. The evidence at the adjudicatory hearing establishedthat respondent locked Christina and her infant daughter out of herhome, refused to cooperate with DCFS staff to facilitate a careplan for Christina, and refused to attend parenting classes. ADCFS investigator also testified regarding an incident whererespondent moved "aggressively" toward Christina, requiring theinvestigator to step between them. Further, the record revealsthat prior to this case, Christina and three other children ofrespondent had at various times been found neglected or abused andplaced in DCFS custody. Proof of the abuse, neglect or dependencyof one minor is admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse,neglect or dependency of any other minor for whom the respondent isresponsible. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2000); M.D.H., 297 Ill.App. 3d at 188-89. While respondent was justified in insistingthat Christina follow reasonable rules while living with her, herresponse to Christina's refusal to abide by the rules wasinappropriate. A finding of neglect is appropriate where a minoris not receiving care necessary for his or her well-being,including shelter. The evidence was sufficient to prove thatrespondent neglected Christina by failing to provide necessarycare, and the circuit court's finding was not against the manifestweight of the evidence.

Respondent's argument that the circuit court should have foundChristina a dependent minor or a minor requiring authoritativeintervention is without merit. A "dependent minor" includes aminor who is (1) without a parent, guardian or custodian, (2)without proper care due to a physical or mental disability of hisparent, guardian or custodian, (3) without proper care through nofault, neglect or lack of concern by his parents, guardian orcustodian, or, (4) whose parent, guardian or custodian with goodcause wishes to be relieved of all parental rights andresponsibilities. 705 ILCS 405/2-4(1) (West 2000). Respondentacted affirmatively to refuse Christina shelter and lock her out ofher home, against the advice of the DCFS investigator, and sherefused to participate in facilitating a care plan for Christina. Consequently, the evidence supports classifying Christina asneglected and not dependent because respondent was responsible forplacing Christina in her current position.

A "minor requiring authoritative intervention" is:

"any minor under 18 years of age (1) who is(a) absent from home without consent ofparent, guardian or custodian, or (b) beyondthe control of his or her parent, guardian orcustodian, in circumstances which constitute asubstantial or immediate danger to the minor'sphysical safety; and (2) who, after beingtaken into limited custody *** and offeredinterim crisis intervention services, whereavailable, refuses to return home after theminor and his or her parent, guardian orcustodian cannot agree to an arrangement foran alternative voluntary residential placementor to the continuation of such placement." 705 ILCS 405/3-3 (West 2000) (section 405/3-3).

The evidence does not support a classification of Christina as aminor requiring authoritative intervention where she was absentfrom home with the consent of respondent, and the requirements ofsubsection (2) of section 405/3-3 have not been met.

The circuit court's determination that Christina was neglectedbased on a lack of necessary care was not against the manifestweight of the evidence.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

THEIS, P.J., and KARNEZIS, J., concur.

1. The minor's father was defaulted by publication on January3, 2001, and is not a party to this appeal.