Find Legal Information

THIRD DIVISION
November 8, 2000

In this case portions of Rhonda S's difficult life were recreated in a courtroom through testimonyand documents. When the hearing ended, the trial court found her to be an unfit parent andterminated her parental rights to Bradley S. (born May 9, 1988), Randall S. (born June 15, 1989), and Briana S.(born August 25, 1992). Then the trial court appointed a guardian with the power to consent toadoption of the three children. Rhonda S. appeals those orders. We affirm.

FACTS

The record shows that Rhonda began using marijuana in 1981, when she was 21 years old. Shortly after,Rhonda had her first psychotic break. Rhonda was hospitalized and diagnosed a schizophrenic. Herdrug usage, according to doctors, precipitated and/or exacerbated Rhonda's mental condition.

Since 1981, constants in Rhonda's life have been illegal drug use and psychotic episodes. A psychiatricevaluation completed by Forensic Clinical Services and dated

December 12, 1996, tells us that by 1986 Rhonda had been hospitalized privately twice and in a state facility(Tinley Park Mental Health Center) three times. A comprehensive psychiatric evaluation by MacFarlandMental Health Center, dated July 12, 1989, states: "[T]his is the third MacFarland hospitalization for[Rhonda]." In every case, hospitalization has come after Rhonda stopped taking her prescribedmedication, but continued regular use of marijuana and other drugs, ignoring repeated doctors'warnings that marijuana exacerbates her mental illness.

In May 1988, Rhonda became involved with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) afterthe birth of her first son, Bradley. During her pregnancy, Rhonda stopped taking her prescribedmedications. Rhonda then began experiencing hallucinations. After Bradley's birth, Rhondavoluntarily placed him in temporary foster care while she was hospitalized. On June 21, 1988, Bradley wasmade a ward of the court, but Rhonda was allowed to retain custody of Bradley. He was returned toher after her release from the hospital. DCFS, however, remained in close contact with Rhonda. Besideshaving home visits from her caseworker, Rhonda received homemaker services three times each week soshe could learn how to care for Bradley. Rhonda also received regular visits from her mental healthworker.

On June 15, 1989, Rhonda gave birth to her second son, Randall. Again, Rhonda discontinued hermedications during her pregnancy and, as a result, suffered acute schizophrenic symptoms. Shevoluntarily placed both of her children in foster care while she was re-hospitalized.

On July 6, 1989, Rhonda left the hospital. She insisted on leaving, though she still was having delusions. Four days later, she went to the emergency room and was admitted to MacFarland on July 11, 1989. Shestayed at MacFarland until September 28, 1989. During this stay, Rhonda told the doctors she had beenusing marijuana regularly since the age of 23. Just prior to her admission to the hospital in July 1989, shesaid, she had been smoking marijuana daily, several times throughout the day.

On October 26, 1989, Bradley and Randall were adjudged dependent. Because Rhonda did not have thecapacity to care for two children, only Randall was returned to her custody. In just 7 weeks, however -on December 15th - Randall was returned to foster care because Rhonda was unable to meet the infant'sneeds. On December 28, 1989, both Bradley and Randall were adjudicated wards of the court and placedin DCFS' custody and guardianship.

In 1990, Rhonda appeared to be making progress toward the return of her children until October 1990,when she relapsed into schizophrenia and began experiencing hallucinations. She requiredhospitalization through November and December 1990. Once again, Rhonda told doctors about herregular and excessive use of marijuana.

After her release from the hospital in December, Rhonda's overall compliance with DCFS improved. Shecooperated with her mental health professionals, began taking her medication regularly, andparticipated in parenting classes. Due to Rhonda's progress, visitations with her two boys wereincreased over the first 5 months of 1991. Rhonda appeared ready to have her children back. Bradleythen was returned to Rhonda's custody on June 8, 1991, and Randall was returned to Rhonda's custodyon September 28, 1991. Later, DCFS guardianship of the boys was vacated.

In 1991, Rhonda became pregnant for the third time. On August 25, 1992, she gave birth to Briana. Briana'sfather is Tyrone James, a drug abuser and suspected drug dealer.⁽¹⁾ In an intake fact sheet for Haymarket,dated July 14, 1995, Rhonda reported she began using crack cocaine in 1991. In that fact sheet she ratedcocaine as her number one drug of choice, followed by marijuana. We note, however, in a substanceabuse assessment dated August 1989, Rhonda reported she had used cocaine, at the urging of a boyfriend,on three occasions in 1985, when she was 25 years old.

On September 6, 1992, shortly after Briana's birth, Rhonda placed all three children in foster care. Shethen voluntarily signed herself into the hospital because she was experiencing schizophrenicsymptoms.

On October 7, 1992, DCFS filed petitions alleging Bradley S., Randall S., and Briana S., were dependentminors pursuant to section 2-4 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-4 (West 1992)), because theirmother could not provide them proper care due to her mental disability.

Rhonda left the hospital against her doctor's recommendation on October 23, 1992. She did not ask tohave the children returned to her. She told her DCFS worker she "wasn't ready" and might not be"ready" for 6 months or more.

On November 24, 1992, all three children were adjudged dependent and, on December 23, all threechildren were adjudicated wards of the court and placed in the custody and guardianship ofDCFS.

Rhonda re-entered the MacFarland Mental Health facility on January 19, 1993. She refused to takemedications while at the hospital and signed herself out on January 27, 1993, even though she was stillexperiencing hallucinations. A discharge summary prepared by MacFarland Mental Health Center states:"[Rhonda] will need to continue to work with DCFS in regards to her children. She is not capable atthis time of caring for her children. In fact, she will have a big enough chore to manage care of herown self."

After leaving the hospital in January 1993, Rhonda began living with a man she met at a bus stop. Rhondaallowed her apartment to be used as a brothel and prostituted herself to obtain money for cocaineand marijuana.

In July 1993, Rhonda regained custody of her two older children based on the recommendation ofRhonda's psychiatrist, Dr. Sarma. The boys remained with Rhonda only 4 months - until November 1993 -when they were returned to the custody of DCFS because Rhonda admitted hitting Randall with a belt,leaving bruises.

After November 1993, Rhonda did little to demonstrate to DCFS an improvement in her ability to provideappropriate care for the children. Though Rhonda saw her therapist and took her medications for afew months, while she stayed with her father in Chicago from November 1993 through April 1994, by May1994 she returned to her former way of life. She moved out of her father's home, started using cocaineagain, and prostituted herself for money.

In August 1994, Rhonda had to be admitted to Jackson Park Hospital because she was experiencingparanoid delusions. She stayed there four weeks. She then transferred to Lydia Health Care Center,where she stayed until April 1995. In April 1995, Rhonda became extremely ill. She was hospitalized at OurLady of the Resurrection Hospital from April 6-14, 1995, in a diabetic coma.

After leaving this hospital, Rhonda was unable to maintain any permanent residence - she shiftedbetween stays with her sister, her father, at shelters, at recovery centers, or at motels. In July 1995, shestayed for one week at the Haymarket recovery center. She told Haymarket staff she smoked marijuanathree times per day and used cocaine four times per month.

After Haymarket, Rhonda was admitted to Jackson Park Hospital for two days, and then was released toa Catholic Charities shelter where she stayed for two to three weeks. In August 1995, Rhonda returnedto Springfield, even though her children were in foster care in Chicago. On September 15, 1995, Rhondawas admitted to MacFarland Mental Health Center. The admission report states:

"While [Rhonda] is very sincere, she lacks awareness of the chaotic and destructive pattern of livingsince her last discharge in January 1993 *** her actions and circumstances do not suggest that gettingher kids back is likely in the near future."

Rhonda was released from MacFarland on December 1, 1995, but was re-admitted later in the month andstayed until February 1996. After leaving MacFarland, Rhonda first lived with her mother, then inSection 8 housing, then with Tyrone James.

As part of her service plan, Rhonda was to make monthly urine drops. In May 1996, Rhonda tested positivefor cocaine and cannabis. She failed to show up for her monthly urine drops in June and July. She lateradmitted using drugs while living with Tyrone from April to August 1996.

On April 1, 1996, DCFS filed supplemental petitions on behalf of Rhonda's three children, for theappointment of a guardian with the right to consent to adoption. In the petitions it was allegedRhonda was "unfit," as that term is defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1996). Specifically, it was alleged Rhonda: (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility as to the children's welfare; (2) was a habitual drunkard or addicted to drugs, otherthan those prescribed by a physician, for at least one year immediately prior to the commencement ofthe unfitness proceedings; (3) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct conditions which were thebasis for the removal of the children and/or failed to make reasonable progress toward the return ofthe children, within 12 months after the children were adjudicated dependent; and (4) was unable todischarge her parental responsibilities due to mental impairment, mental illness, mental retardation,or other developmental disability, and there was sufficient justification to believe that the inabilitywould extend beyond a reasonable time period. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (k), (m), & (p) (West 1996).

Rhonda re-entered MacFarland on August 26, 1996, experiencing paranoid delusions. She reported shehad stopped her medications and said she was upset because she ended her relationship with herboyfriend. When she was admitted, Rhonda reported she had used crack cocaine and marijuana, butclaimed she last used drugs about 6 months before. Later, however, in a progress note dated August 29,1996, Rhonda admitted using alcohol and marijuana on a daily basis prior to her admission. She alsoadmitting using crack cocaine in June 1996. A toxicology report verified Rhonda's recent use ofmarijuana. Her chronic use of alcohol and marijuana and "sporadic" use of cocaine were noted again ina psychological assessment dated September 5, 1996.

Rhonda stayed at MacFarland through November 1996. The exact date of her release is not known. Wedo know, however, she and Tyrone had a visit with the children on December 11, 1996 - the first in fourmonths.

Rhonda had a good visit with the children in March 1997, but during the April 1997 visit, she was actingin a paranoid delusional manner. She was hospitalized a few days later. Again, she admitted she hadstopped taking her medications.

Rhonda saw her children only three times between May 1997 and May 1998. Her DCFS client reviews showthat during this time Rhonda was exhibiting the same lifestyle patterns - she had no permanenthousing, failed to participate in outpatient activities aimed at stabilizing her on medication, andfailed to participate in counseling.

A fitness hearing was held on September 10, 1998. After the hearing, the court ruled Rhonda an unfitparent under sections 1(D)(k), (m), and (p), but not under section 1(D)(b). Immediately following thisruling, the court heard additional evidence and determined it was in the best interest of Rhonda'sthree children to terminate her parental rights and to appoint a guardian with the right to consentto their adoption. Rhonda now appeals the trial court's determinations of unfitness and the court'sdecision to terminate her parental rights.

DECISION

Rhonda contends the trial court's findings that she is an unfit parent pursuant to sections 1(D)(k), (m)and (p) of the Adoption Act are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(4)(West 1996)("A finding of unfitness of a parent must be made in compliance with the Adoption Act and bebased upon clear and convincing evidence.") A correct finding under any one of the statutoryprovisions is enough to support the order declaring Rhonda an unfit parent. We conclude the trialcourt did not err when it found she was unfit under the three separate provisions.

On review, a trial court's finding as to fitness is to be afforded great deference and should be reversedonly when the trial court's ruling is shown to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. In reLatifah P., Nos. 1-98-0434, 1-98-0908 (August 18, 2000); In re A.S.B., 293 Ill. App. 3d 836, 843, 688 N.E.2d 1215, (1997). Adecision regarding parental fitness is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the oppositeresult is clearly the proper result. In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062, 574 N.E.2d 893 (1991). If there is sufficientevidence to support a finding of unfitness on any one statutory ground, a finding of unfitness will beupheld. In re M.M., 303 Ill. App. 3d 559, 567, 709 N.E.2d 259 (1999).

Section 1(D)(m)

Section 1(D)(m) requires a parent, "within 12 months after an adjudication of neglected minor, abusedminor or dependent minor under the Juvenile Court Act": (1) to "make reasonable efforts to correct theconditions that were the basis for removal of the child from the parent," or (2) to "make reasonableprogress toward the return of the child to the parent." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1996). Failure to makeadvancements in either of these two separate and distinct areas is grounds for finding a parent unfit. In re J.A., No. 1-99-0768 (September 15, 2000); In re C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d 154, 711 N.E.2d 809 (1999).

When deciding whether "reasonable effort" has been made, a court must take a subjective look at theachievements of the parent whose rights are at stake and determine whether that parent has madeearnest and conscientious strides toward correcting the conditions which led to the loss ofcustody. In re C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 163-64. "Parental deficiencies collateral to the conditions that werethe basis for the child's [adjudication], even if serious enough to prevent the return of the child, areoutside the scope of inquiry and are therefore not relevant." In re C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 164.

"Reasonable progress," on the other hand, is an objective review of the steps the parent has takentoward the goal of reunification. In re C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 164. For a parent to make "reasonableprogress" toward the return of a child, he or she must make "a minimum measurable or demonstrablemovement toward that goal." In re Sheltanya S., 309 Ill. App. 3d 941, 954, 723 N.E.2d 744 (1999), citing In reBoolman, 141 Ill. App. 3d 508, 511-12, 491 N.E.2d 1 (1986).

When considering whether a parent is unfit under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act, the "relevantperiod of time *** in which the parent's efforts and progress must be assessed and measured is the 12-month period following the adjudication" of neglect, abuse, or dependency. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 727N.E.2d 990 (2000). See also In re K.B., 314 Ill. App. 3d 739, 750, 732 N.E.2d 1198 (2000); In re J.A., No. 1-99-0768, slip op. at 19.

In accord with the holding in In re D.L., we have limited our consideration of Rhonda's conduct tothe 12-month period following the adjudication of dependency, i.e., from November 24, 1992, to November24, 1993. Rhonda contends the record, during this time period, does not support a finding that shefailed to make reasonable efforts to correct conditions which led to the removal of her children orthat she failed to make reasonable progress toward their return. We disagree.

The record shows that on October 23, 1992, one month before the time the children were adjudicateddependent, Rhonda left the hospital against her doctor's recommendation. After she left MacFarlandin October 1992 until her re-admission in January 1993, Rhonda had persistent hallucinations, largelybecause she refused medications and failed to follow her doctor's recommendations.

When Rhonda left MacFarland later in January 1993, Rhonda did not use the next months to correct thecircumstances which led to the removal of the children or prepare for their return. An intake reportfrom MacFarland Mental Health Center dated September 15, 1995, chronicles Rhonda behavior. It reportsthat from January 19-27, 1993, Rhonda was hospitalized at MacFarland. After her release Rhonda lived byherself in an apartment. She used cocaine regularly and allowed her apartment to be used as a brothelin exchange for money to pay for cocaine and marijuana. Rhonda also prostituted herself during thistime for additional cash. In September 1993, Rhonda moved from Springfield to her father's home inChicago. Rhonda said when she arrived in Chicago, she "was in pretty bad shape" because she had stoppedtaking her medications. In November 1993, the boys were taken away from Rhonda because she hitRandall with a belt, leaving bruises.

DCFS case notes provide a more detailed picture:

On November 23, 1992, one day before the dispositional hearing on the three children, Rhonda asked tohave visitation with her children decreased from three hours unsupervised visits to one-hourpartially-supervised visits because three hours was too much stress on her.

December 1992 - Rhonda hit Randall during visitation.

January 1993 - During a visit with her children early in the month, Rhonda displayed schizophrenicsymptoms (laughing inappropriately, having a poor appearance, her house was in disarray). Rhondaentered MacFarland on January 19, 1993, but signed herself out on January 27, though she was stillexperiencing hallucinations. On January 28, Rhonda told her DCFS worker a man she met at the bus stop(Jeff) moved into her apartment with her.

April 1993 - Jeff moved out of Rhonda's apartment. Rhonda asked to have the children returned to herbecause she was lonely without Jeff. Rhonda also told the worker her Public Aid check had been cut,putting her in a "financial bind." Rhonda's mental health worker suggested Rhonda only wanted thechildren back for the extra money.

May 1993 - Dr. Sarma, Rhonda's psychiatrist, believed Rhonda was ready to have the two boys, but notBriana, returned to her custody. Visitation was increased, including some overnight visits.

June 1993 - Rhonda canceled visitation with the children, saying she had an "emergency." The"emergency" turned out to be a trip to Chicago.

July 1993 - The two boys were returned to Rhonda. Within two weeks, Rhonda was showing signs ofstress.

A DCFS worker reprimanded Rhonda for allowing people Rhonda didn't know stay in the apartment (inexchange for cigarettes).

August 1993 - Rhonda didn't have enough money to pay the electricity bill.

In sum, Rhonda's conduct between November 1992 and November 1993 does not show consistent effort toimprove the conditions which led to the removal of the children. The finding of dependency wasbased on Rhonda's mental illness. To a large degree, Rhonda's mental illness is controllable. Rhonda'smedical records contain the repeated observation that Rhonda is capable of functioning quitenormally when stabilized on her prescribed medications. It is clear, however, that Rhonda has beenunwilling to commit herself to staying on her prescribed medication and staying off illegal drugs. Her failure to do these two things is what causes her to have recurring schizophrenic episodes andparanoid delusions. Consequently, she has remained unable to care for her children.

We also cannot say that, during the relevant time period, the record provides demonstrable evidenceof Rhonda's progress toward reunification with her children. Between January and September 1993,Rhonda allowed her apartment to be used as a brothel and prostituted herself for the purpose ofobtaining money to pay for her drug habit. These are not the actions of a person trying to be reunitedwith her children.

Though Rhonda regained custody of her two sons in July 1993, the experiment failed. Rhonda wasunable to maintain a stable environment for them. She jeopardized her children's welfare by allowingstrangers to stay in her home in exchange for cigarettes. She could not pay her bills, had to give upher apartment, and moved to Chicago to live with relatives. Just before moving to Chicago in September1993, she stopped taking her medicine and was "in bad shape." When she moved to Chicago, she left 13month-old Briana in foster care in Springfield.

Even after moving in with relatives, the stress of managing two small boys was soon manifest - Rhondadisciplined Randall by hitting him with a belt, leaving bruises. In less than four months, Rhonda lostcustody of the boys again. At no time has Rhonda been able to take custody ofBriana.

The evidence persuades us Rhonda has little insight into her own needs. Her motivation in life is self-gratification. Even when Rhonda voices a desire to have her children returned to her, it is often forthe wrong reasons - because she is lonely or needs additional income. Rhonda has consistently shownan unwillingness to take the steps necessary to insure her own stability and, thereby, provide a safe andnurturing home for her children.

Having considered Rhonda's conduct during the relevant 12-month period, we conclude the trialcourt's determination of Rhonda's unfitness under both parts of section 1(D)(m) is not against themanifest weight of the evidence. Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that the trial court used aslightly different time period - the 12-month period following December 23, 1992 - the date the childrenwere adjudicated wards of the court. Since nothing of critical importance occurred betweenNovember 24 and December 23, 1993, the trial court could not have relied on events after November 24,1993, for its finding . The trial court's minor deviation from the relevant time period is of littlesignificance.

Section 1(D)(k)

Under section 1(D)(k), a parent may be found unfit if the evidence shows the parent to be "a habitualdrunkard or addicted to drugs, other than those prescribed by a physician, for at least one yearimmediately prior to the commencement of the unfitness proceeding." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 1996).

Though there has been some confusion about when a fitness proceeding commences for the purposes ofthis statute, this question was recently resolved in In re Latifah P., Nos. 1-98-0434, 1-98-0908. The court inIn re Latifah P. concluded a fitness hearing commences with the State's filing of its supplementalpetition for the termination of a parent's rights.

In the present case, then, the trial court's finding that Rhonda was unfit will be upheld if the recordprovides clear and convincing evidence that Rhonda was a habitual drunkard or abuser of drugs forat least one year immediately prior to April 1, 1996, the date on which the State filed the supplementalpetitions to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to adoption. We find the record before usoverwhelmingly supports the trial court's finding of unfitness due to Rhonda's persistent addictionto marijuana and cocaine.

We adopt the view of the court in In the Interest of D.M., 298 Ill. App. 3d 574, 580, 699 N.E.2d 212 (1998):

"*** [W]e interpret 'addiction to drugs' under section 1(D)(k) as the inability or unwillingness to refrainfrom the use of drugs because frequent indulgence has instilled in the person an habitual cravingwhich is manifested in an ongoing pattern of drug use. As with habitual drunkenness, we find thatevidence of indulgence without intermission is not necessary to prove drug addiction and the factthat one may voluntarily abstain for short periods of time will not preclude a finding of drugaddiction. It is sufficient to show that a person has demonstrated an inability to successfully gaincontrol over his or her habitual craving to use the drug." (Citations omitted.)

In this case, there can be no doubt that Rhonda had a long-standing addiction to drugs which didnot abate in the year prior to April 1, 1996, when the supplemental petitions were filed. Except for timeswhen she has been a patient in a mental hospital or recovery facility, Rhonda has been a constant abuserof marijuana since 1981. Rhonda has consistently ignored warnings that marijuana exacerbates hermental condition. The reason for this self-destructive behavior is self-gratification - Rhondareported in 1990 that "cannabis allows her pleasure like nothing else."

In 1993, in addition to smoking marijuana three times a day, every day, Rhonda began using crack cocaineregularly. She was willing to do anything to support her addiction - allowed her apartment to be usedas a brothel, sold her own body. After a brief hiatus, while she had custody of her two boys and stayedwith her father in Chicago, Rhonda returned to prostitution to gain access to crack cocaine andmarijuana. This lifestyle soon landed her back in the hospital.

From August 1994 until April 1995, Rhonda was a patient at Jackson Park and then Lydia Health Carerecovery center. But as soon as she was back on the streets, Rhonda took up her addictions. When sheentered Haymarket in July 1995, she admitted she had been smoking marijuana three times a day and usingcocaine four times each month. At this point, Rhonda claimed cocaine as her drug of choice.

Rhonda was in and out of facilities during 1995 and 1996, but sometime after leaving MacFarland inFebruary 1996, Rhonda began living with Tyrone James. It is no surprise, then, that her monthly urinedrop in May 1996 tested positive for both cannabis and cocaine.

The evidence clearly supports the finding that Rhonda's addiction to drugs began long before April 1,1995, and continued through April 1, 1996, and beyond. The addiction was long-standing and well-established. There were no signs of abatement. The finding of unfitness due to addictions to drugs issupported by an abundance of clear and convincing evidence.

Section 1(D)(p)

Section 1(D)(p) provides that a parent will be found unfit if there is competent evidence from apsychiatrist, licensed social worker, or clinical psychologist that the parent is unable to dischargehis or her parental responsibilities due to mental impairment, mental illness, mental retardation ordevelopmental disability and "there is sufficient justification to believe that the inability *** shallextend beyond a reasonable time period." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(p) (West 1996).

Rhonda does not, and could not, contend there is insufficient competent evidence to show she suffersfrom a mental illness which precludes her from caring for her children, or that this condition haspersisted since 1981 and is likely to continue for a long time in the future. Instead, she raises a claim notpresented in the trial court - that section 1(D)(p) is unconstitutional. Rhonda contends statutoryprovision 1(D)(p) is so vague it violates procedural and substantive due process. She also claims theprovision violates equal protection because it discriminates against persons suffering from mental ordevelopmental impairments without any rational basis.

Rhonda provides no argument or analysis to assist us in our resolution of her constitutional claims. Instead, she merely advises us of a case currently before our Illinois Supreme Court in which theseconstitutional claims have been successfully advanced before a trial judge. See In the Matter of theAdoption of Rosemary C., Nos. 88891, 89018, (consolidated).

Assuming Rhonda has not forfeited the right to have us consider this claim - she failed to raise it inthe trial court and failed to present any argument on appeal (In the Interest of I.D., 205 Ill. App. 3d 543, 548,563 N.E.2d 1200 (1990) (there is a strong presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional,anyone who asserts otherwise must clearly establish the constitutional violation) - we will addressthe question of the constitutionality of provision 1(D)(p).

Biological parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the custody of their children protectedunder the Fourteenth Amendment. In re Enis, 121 Ill. 2d 124, 128-29, 520 N.E.2d 362 (1988); Regenold v. BabyFold, Inc., 68 Ill. 2d 419, 438, 369 N.E.2d 858 (1977). At the same time, "[t]he State as parens patriae has aright and duty, as well as the authority, to legislate for the protection and welfare of childrenwithin its jurisdiction." In re J.S., 213 Ill. App. 3d 126, 131, 571 N.E.2d 507 (1991) quoting I.D., 205 Ill. App. 3d at 549. Balancing these two concerns, courts have held legislatures must not take any "action which isarbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State toenact." I.D., 205 Ill. App. 3d at 549, citing Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Ill. 2d at 436-37.

We conclude, then, as the court did in I.D., that equal protection and due process challenges tosection 1(D)(p) should be subject to a rational basis test.⁽²⁾ That is, "a statute will be upheld in the face of adue-process challenge, if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate State purpose and is neither arbitrary nordiscriminatory (Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368, 489 N.E.2d 1374 (1986)) and, when faced with an equalprotection argument, it will be upheld as long as the distinctions drawn bear some rational relationship to alegitimate State end (Harris, 111 Ill. 2d at 371)." I.D., 205 Ill. App. 3d at 549.

We agree with the court in In re J.S., that section 1(D)(p) is "neither vague nor inherently confusing andincapable of reasonable application." In re J.S., 213 Ill. App. 3d at 131. The Adoption Act provides for theinvoluntary termination of a parent's rights if: (1) the natural parent is found unfit by clear andconvincing evidence, and (2) it is determined that adoption will best serve the child's needs." In re M.M.,156 Ill. 2d 53, 60-61, 619 N.E.2d 702 (1993).

Under section 1(D)(p) of the Act there is a two-part analysis to determine whether or not a parent isunfit due to a form of mental disability. First, one or more of a certain category of experts mustpresent competent evidence to show the parent suffers from a mental disability which prevents theparent from discharging parental responsibilities. Second, there must be sufficient justification tobelieve the inability will extend beyond a reasonable time period. In re J.A.S., 255 Ill. App. 3d 822, 824, 627 N.E.2d770 (1994).

Not every parent with a psychiatric illness or condition is per se unfit to be a parent and tomaintain custody of her children. In re A. J., 269 Ill. App. 3d 824, 646 N.E.2d 1239 (1994). The Act affects onlythose parents "who cannot discharge their parental responsibility due to these disabilities and whoseinability to do so will extend beyond a reasonable time." I.D., 205 Ill. App. 3d at 549.

Under these circumstances, we find, as did the courts in I.D. and In re J.S., that provision 1(D)(p) of theAdoption Act is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, and is rationally related to the State's purpose of ensuring theproper care and training for children. There is no constitutional violation.

Termination of Parental Rights

The last issue raised by Rhonda is the trial court's decision to terminate her parental rights. "Even if a parent has beenfound unfit to have custody of a child, it does not necessarily follow that the parent cannot remain the child'slegal parent with attendant rights and privileges." In re B.C., 247 Ill. App. 3d 803, 806, 617 N.E.2d 1207 (1993). However, once thetrial court has made a finding of unfitness, all considerations must yield to the best interests of the child orchildren. In re M.C., 197 Ill. App. 3d 802, 806, 555 N.E.2d 111 (1990). A trial court's decision to terminate an unfit parent'sparental rights rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of thatdiscretion. In re M.S., 302 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1002, 706 N.E.2d 524 (1999); In re V.O., 284 Ill. App. 3d 686, 691, 673 N.E.2d 439 (1996).

Rhonda contends that even if the trial court properly found her to be an unfit mother, the decision to terminate herparental rights was error because there are no prospective adoptive parents at this time.

The decision to terminate a parent's rights is based on the court's determination that freeing the children foradoption would be in the best interests of the children. Though the current availability of an adoptive home is one ofthe considerations when deciding whether termination of a parent's rights is in the best interests of a child, it is notthe only one. It may be just as important to free children from continued involvement with a mother whose chaoticand disruptive lifestyle is a detriment to their welfare.

In September 1998, at the time of the termination hearing in this case, the three children resided together in the samefoster home. Bradley, age 10, and Randall, age 9, had been in the same home since July 1994. Briana, age 6, joined them inJuly 1997. The children were doing well and had no special needs at that time. The DCFS worker testified she hadconsulted the children about their situation and they expressed a desire to stay in their present foster home. Thoughthe foster parents did not wish to adopt the children, they were willing to keep all three children. DCFS informedthe court that subsidized guardianship was being considered as an alternative to adoption, due to the age of thechildren, but that search for an adoptive home would continue to be explored.

The trial court concluded that here, as in many cases, there is no perfect solution. Rather, the better alternative hasto be taken. In this case, the court found the better alternative was to give the children a chance for somepermanency in their lives, even if that meant they were not adopted, but continued to have a secure and stable homeenvironment with the foster family they had been with for some years.

We cannot say the trial court's decision to terminate Rhonda's parental rights under the circumstances here was anabuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court's findings that Rhonda S. is unfit pursuant to sections 1(D)(m), (k), and (p) of the Adoption Act. Also, we affirm the trial court's decision to terminate Rhonda's parental rights and appoint a guardian with the rightto consent to adoption.

Affirmed.

HALL, P.J., and CERDA, J., concur.

1. Mr. James' parental rights also were terminated by the court on September 10, 1998, but that determination isnot being appealed.

2. Rhonda appears to concede the rational basis test applies, though, as we noted before, she provides noanalysis or argument.