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FOURTH DIVISION
June 13, 2002

JUSTICE KARNEZIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondents Terry and Lisa S. appeal from a July 6, 2000, order of the circuitcourt denying their motion for the return home of their minor children, Adam andBrandon S., or, in the alternative, unsupervised visitation with the children. Respondents argue that the trial court's decision was contrary to the manifest weight ofthe evidence because the court erred in (1) making respondents' admission thatBrandon was abused a condition of family reunification and (2) determining thatrespondents' extensive therapy had been ineffective and the admission was necessaryin the best interests of the children. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In March 1998, four-month old Brandon sustained a complex fracture to his skulland a fracture of his left femur. Lisa claimed that the injuries occurred when she wasshowering with Brandon and he slipped from her arms twice. The Illinois Department ofChildren and Family Services (DCFS) took protective custody of Brandon and 20-monthold Adam. The State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging that Brandonhad been physically abused and that both boys were neglected. DCFS put the childrenin foster care with Terry's brother and sister-in-law pending an adjudication hearing. During the hearing, the court heard testimony from a medical expert that Brandon'sinjuries were caused by child abuse. The expert opined that neither the complex skullfracture nor the femur break could have resulted from a simple fall in the bathtub. Thefemur fracture could be caused by someone jumping on the leg or by a fall from aseven story building while the skull fracture could have been caused by hitting the edgeof a table or from a baseball bat, not from falling on a flat surface.

Based on the evidence presented, the court found Brandon to be an abusedminor and that there was a substantial risk of physical injury to both Brandon andAdam. On August 31, 1998, the court made Brandon and Adam wards of the court,appointed DCFS as their guardian with the right to place the children with a substitutecare provider, and ordered that respondents' visits with their children be supervised. DCFS placed the children in foster care with their grandmother. Respondents did notappeal the court's disposition order or the adjudication of abuse and neglect. The courtthen entered a permanency order setting as the goal return home of the children within12 months. Pursuant to a DCFS service plan, respondents participated in parentingclasses and attended counseling sessions with a therapist. Respondents were deemedto be making satisfactory progress under the service plan.

On April 8, 1999, and again on July 8, 1999, respondents filed a motion forunsupervised visitation with their children. On March 8, 2000, respondents substitutednew counsel. They also filed a motion for a declaratory judgment as to the legal validityof the State's requirement that respondents admit to abuse as a prerequisite toreunification with their children. After argument on April 9, 2000, the court found thatthe matter was not ripe for adjudication. The court agreed that respondents could notbe compelled by the court to incriminate themselves but, given that the requirementwas merely the State's position rather than a court imposed condition of reunification,there was no controversy yet.

Respondents' new counsel adopted the motions for unsupervised visitation andwas given leave by the court to file an additional motion to that effect. On May 31,2000, respondents filed a motion for the return home of the children or, in thealternative, unsupervised visitation. On July 6, 2000, after a full hearing during whichtherapists, medical experts and caseworkers testified, the court denied the motion. Thecourt found that the law of the case was that child abuse occurred and that, becauserespondents had not addressed the court's factual findings and continued to refer toBrandon's injuries as accidental, therapy had been ineffective. The court stated that itwas not asking respondents to admit their abuse to the court or to their therapist, "but atleast they have to admit it to themselves. Based upon their own testimony, I do notbelieve they have." The court found it in the best interests of the children to deny themotion for return home or unsupervised visits. Respondents appeal from that order.

Before addressing respondents' arguments, we must be certain of ourjurisdiction. In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector ofCook County, 308 Ill. App. 3d 33, 39, 719 N.E.2d 143, 147 (1999). Except for appealsfrom delinquency judgments, "[i]n all other proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act [of1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1998))], appeals from final judgments shall begoverned by the rules applicable to civil cases." (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R.660(b). Respondents' jurisdictional statement asserts that our jurisdiction over thisappeal lies under Supreme Court Rule 301 (appeals from final judgments of a circuitcourt in a civil case as a matter of right) and Supreme Court Rule 303 (timing of thefiling of the notice of appeal after entry of the final judgment). 155 Ill.2d Rs. 301, 303. The State argues that the order at issue here was not a final order and that, therefore,we do not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. We agree.

A disposition order from the juvenile court is generally considered final andappealable. In re D.S., 307 Ill. App. 3d 362, 365, 717 N.E.2d 497, 500 (1999). Adisposition order concerning a ward of the court may, among other options, order thatthe child remain with his parents, place the child with a relative or other legal guardian,commit the child to the DCFS for care and service, restore the child to his parents, ororder that the child be partially or completely emancipated. 705 ILCS 405/2-23 (West1998). Here, the court's August 31, 1998, disposition order made Brandon and Adamwards of the court, appointed DCFS as their guardian and allowed only supervisedvisitation with respondents. Respondents did not appeal from that order. Rather, eightmonths later, citing respondents' satisfactory progress under the DCFS service plan,respondents filed a motion requesting unsupervised visitation and one year after that, asecond motion requesting that the children be returned home because the parents were"ready" or, in the alternative, that unsupervised visitation be allowed.

Any party interested in a minor may apply to the court for a change in custody ofthe minor or restoration of the minor to the custody of his parents. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(4) (West 1998). Unless the disposition order expressly provides that it operates toclose the pending petition proceedings, a court may modify a disposition order at anytime if warranted by a change in circumstances. 705 ILCS 405/2-23(2) (West 1998). Such a modified disposition serves to vacate the original disposition and supercede it. In re D.S., 307 Ill. App. 3d at 366, 717 N.E.2d at 500. Here, respondents requestedmodification of the existing disposition order but the court denied that request. Thequestion is whether denial of respondents' motion constitutes a final appealabledisposition order.

A final judgment "fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in thelawsuit; it is final if it determines the litigation on the merits so that, if affirmed, the onlything remaining is to proceed with the execution of the judgment." In re T.M., 302 Ill.App. 3d 33, 37, 706 N.E.2d 931, 934 (1998). Any "matters left for future determinationare merely incidental to the ultimate rights that have been adjudicated by the order." Inre T.M., 302 Ill. App. 3d at 37, 706 N.E.2d at 934. The order at issue here is clearly nota final appealable order. The order denied the motion for modification and therefore didnot change the status quo. The disposition of the case did not change and the parties'status quo continued unaffected. The order did not permanently determine the rights ofthe parties nor definitely resolve any issue in the case. The ultimate issue, the returnhome of the children, remained to be determined.

Respondents' motion, in essence, jumped the gun on the next scheduledpermanency hearing and the order resulting therefrom could be analogized to an orderresulting from a permanency hearing. After an initial permanency hearing setting apermanency goal, such as the return home of the children within 12 months, the courtmust conduct a permanency hearing at least every six months until the court finds thatthe goal has been achieved. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998). Section 2-28(3) ofthe Juvenile Court Act provides in part that any order entered following a permanencyhearing "shall be immediately appealable as a matter of right under Supreme CourtRule 304(b)(1)." 705 ILCS 405/2-28(3) (West 1998). However, a permanency goal isnot a final order because it "'does not finally determine a right or status of a party butinstead looks at the anticipated future status of the child.'" (Emphasis in original) In reCurtis B., 325 Ill. App. 3d 393, 396, 758 N.E.2d 312, 314 (2001) quoting In re D.D.H.,319 Ill. App. 3d 989, 991, 749 N.E.2d 31, 33-34 (2001). Therefore, following decisionsof the Fourth and Fifth Districts, we recently held that the portion of section 2-28(3)which allows the immediate appeal of a nonfinal permanency order under Rule304(b)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers clause of theIllinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II,