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SIXTH DIVISION
March 23, 2001

No. 1-00-0084

JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Following an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court found thatthe minor Briana D. had been physically abused and the minor Brian D. had beenneglected while in the care and custody of their mother, respondent Joyce T.After a dispositional hearing, the minors were placed in the guardianship of theDepartment of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Respondent contends on appealthat the minors should be returned to her custody because the trial court'sfinding that she was unable to care for them was against the manifest weight ofthe evidence.

This cause originated from events occurring on December 11,1998. Respondent left the minors with her husband, Aaron T. When respondentreturned that evening, Briana began complaining of a stomachache. Respondenttook the minor to the hospital. The minor was transferred to another hospitalwhere surgery was performed to repair her duodenal intestine, which hadruptured. The hospital performed a victim-sensitive interview during which theminor said Aaron T. had kicked her in the stomach. Citing the high potential forfatality from such an injury, the hospital diagnosed the minor as having beenphysically abused.

Subsequent investigation revealed that Aaron T. had fourprior reports of child abuse registered against him with DCFS. Petitions foradjudication of wardship for both minors were filed. An adjudicatory hearing washeld on July 8, 1999. The trial court found that Briana had been physicallyabused and that Brian had been neglected, having been placed in an injuriousenvironment by respondent.

The trial court held a dispositional hearing on November 29,1999. Dr. Michael Fernando, the medical director of clinical ser-vices of theagency to which respondent was assigned, was qualified as a psychiatric expertat this hearing. He testified that respon-dent's caseworker requested he do afull diagnostic evaluation of respondent due to the caseworker's observations ofdepression. After their first meeting, Dr. Fernando initially evaluatedrespondent as possibly having bipolar II disorder, cyclothymic disorder andmajor depressive disorder recurrent with psychosis. He prescribed moodstabilizing medication; respondent refused to take it, insisting there wasnothing wrong with her. One month later, Dr. Fernando conducted a secondpsychiatric status interview with respondent. He testified that respondent hadnot taken any of the prescribed medication. During the interview, respondentwould describe symptoms she was experiencing, including daily anxious andnervous episodes, but would then deny she had such symptoms. Dr. Fernando'sfinal diagnosis concluded respondent had bipolar II disorder and he againrecommended medication, the primary treatment for this disorder.

Sidney St. Leger, a clinical psychologist for 18 years, alsotestified. He conducted a psychological evaluation of respondent for the agencyin order to determine whether she could provide competent care for the minors.St. Leger testified respondent did not believe Briana had really been injured,but rather the hospitals caring for her were participating in a cover-up;respondent showed no remorse and did not assume any responsibility for theminor's injuries. St. Leger evaluated respondent as "very angry andsuspicious," diagnosing her with borderline personality disorder. Hedetermined that she was not competent to provide independent parenting for theminors because she lacked skills, maturity and the ability to protect them. Hedid not order unsupervised visits and instead recommended respondent completeboth a program of parenting skills and therapy, followed by a reevaluation.

Marla Lawrence, the agency supervisor assigned to the case,testified on respondent's behalf. Lawrence reviewed respondent's case file for afew weeks and discussed it with three other workers. Lawrence testified thatrespondent had been "substantially compliant" in completing therecommended services, visited the minors and made progress in therapy. Lawrencealso testified that she felt the tension between Dr. Fernando and respondent hadcolored Dr. Fernando's evaluation of respondent and considered sendingrespondent to another doctor for a second opinion. Lawrence recommendedreturning the minors to respondent's care. However, Lawrence admitted oncross-examination that she knew Dr. Fernando diagnosed respondent with bipolarII disorder and prescribed necessary medication which respondent refused totake. Moreover, Lawrence knew respondent had not completed the therapyrecommended by St. Leger, and Lawrence had not received any evaluations fromrespondent's therapist. Lawrence did not know where or with whom respondentlived, never visited respondent's home and had never seen respondent interactwith the minors. Lawrence never sent respondent to a second doctor, as shecontemplated. Finally, Lawrence testified that one factor in the agency'sdetermination of whether to return a minor to the parent's care is whether theparent accepts responsibility for how the minor was injured. Lawrence admittedthat for the first seven months of this case, respondent denied Briana's injuryand refused to accept any responsibility.

The trial court's dispositional order found respondent unableto care for the minors, made them wards of the court and appointed a DCFSguardian with the right to place them. In its decision, the court stated that itwas "very upset" that "there would be a recommendation of returnhome" in light of the evidence presented. The court found Dr. Fernando tohave been very credible. He was the only medical doctor to testify, he was themedical director of the very agency in charge of evaluating respondent andrespondent never presented any medical evidence to contradict his medicalopinion.

Respondent does not challenge the determination of abuse andneglect. Instead, the sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court's findingthat respondent could not care for the minors was against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. Respondent contends that the minors should be returned to her careand custody because the trial court ignored Lawrence's "unrebutted"testimony that respondent is fit and able to care for the minors, improperlyrelied on Dr. Fernando's opinion and violated the best interests of the minorsby removing them. We disagree.

In an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court has theopportunity to hear and see the witnesses testifying before it and is "inthe best position to determine the credibility and weight of the witnesses'testimony." In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 204 (1997). The court isalso in the best position to determine the best interest of a minor (In reMarriage of Divelbiss, 308 Ill. App. 3d 198, 207 (1999)), the centralstandard in cases such as the instant one (In re Stilley, 66 Ill. 2d 515,521 (1977)). A minor's best interest stands independent of all otherconsiderations, even that of a parent's right to custody. In re J.L.,308 Ill. App. 3d 859, 864 (1999).

The trial court is given "broad discretion" (Stilley,66 Ill. 2d at 520) and "great deference" (Marriage of Divelbiss,308 Ill. App. 3d at 207) in matters involving minors. See In re Marriage ofValliere, 275 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1100 (1995) (trial court vested withsignificant discretion in child custody matters); In re D.L., 226 Ill.App. 3d 177, 185 (1992), quoting In re Martin, 31 Ill. App. 3d 288, 293(1975) (" 'wide discretion is vested in the trial judge to an even greaterdegree than [any] ordinary appeal to which the familiar manifest weightprinciple is applied' "). Accord-ingly, a dispositional order finding aparent unable to care for a minor will not be reversed on appeal unless it isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. In re T.B.,215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062 (1991).

Under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the trial court in adispositional hearing determines whether it is in the minor's best interest tobe made a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 1998). The court alsodetermines whether the minor's parent is fit to care for her (705 ILCS405/2-27(1) (West 1998)) and whether custody of an abused or neglected minorshould be restored to the parent (705 ILCS 405/2-23(1)(a) (West 1998)). As partof these determinations, the court must consider any qualified and competentmedical testimony presented regarding the minor and her custodial situation. J.L.,308 Ill. App. 3d at 865. In fact, where such medical evidence is not offset orcontradicted by other competent medical evidence, the court cannot disregard it.In re Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d 849, 890 (1991) (it is error for thecourt to "second-guess medical experts"). Challenging medical experttestimony is the responsibility of its opponent. Adams v. Family PlanningAssociates Medical Group, Inc., 315 Ill. App. 3d 533, 550 (2000). Theultimate determination of weight afforded such testimony lies with the trier offact. Adams, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 550.

Ashley K. and In re Marcus H., 297 Ill. App. 3d1089, 1097 (1998), are illustrative of these legal principles. In Ashley K.,two psychiatrists testified that the minor involved required continuingpsychotherapy and visitation with her foster parents. However, the minor'stherapist disagreed with these qualified experts. The trial court accepted thetherapist's testimony and ordered the minor to cease therapy and visitation.However, finding that competent expert medical evidence cannot be refuted bynonmedical testimony, this court held that rejecting such medical testimony waserror. Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90. Similarly, in Marcus H.,this court found error where a doctor's competent expert medical opinion thatthe minor's burns were the result of abuse was disregarded absent medicalevidence to the contrary. Marcus H., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 1097; see also Peoplev. Cooper, 283 Ill. App. 3d 86, 93 (1996) (trial court properly held thatminor's burns were not accidental when no contrary expert medical evidence waspresented).

The instant case is very similar to Ashley K. and MarcusH. The trial court found Dr. Fernando, who was qualified as a psychiatricexpert at the dispositional hearing, to have been very credible. Significantly,respondent presented absolutely no competent medical testimony or evidence tocontradict the testimony of Dr. Fernando, his diagnosis that respondent hasbipolar II disorder or his recommendation that she take necessary medicationprescribed to her, the primary treatment for this disorder.

Respondent claims that the trial court improperly relied onDr. Fernando's opinion because he was not a parenting expert, he did notcontradict Lawrence's testimony of respondent's fitness and St. Leger diagnosedrespondent as having a different disorder not requiring medication. First, thepurpose of Dr. Fernando's evaluation of respondent was not to determine herparenting skills. Instead, as a psychiatrist, he was asked by her caseworker tocomplete a personal psychiatric evaluation because respondent was exhibitingsigns of depression. Whether Dr. Fernando is a parenting expert is not relevantto his psychiatric diagnosis of respondent or to this cause.

Second, Lawrence's testimony did not directly contradict Dr.Fernando's medical opinion; Lawrence testified as to respondent's fitness tocare for the minors (contradicted by St. Leger) while Dr. Fernando testified asto respondent's general need to be on medication. Though Lawrence disagreed withDr. Fernando's diagnosis, this is the only testimony in the entire record insuch disagreement. Moreover, this testimony is nonmedical. Lawrence wasrespondent's caseworker, not a medical doctor, and therefore does not have thecredentials to refute the expert medical opinion of Dr. Fernando. Moreover,Lawrence reviewed respondent's case file for only a few weeks. She knewrespondent needed medication and was not taking it. She never sent respondent toa second doctor when she felt personal tensions had colored Dr. Fernando'sdiagnosis. She knew respondent was supposed to complete therapy but had not. Shenever spoke to respondent's therapist or requested any reports. She knewrespondent denied for several months that Briana was injured. Lawrence has neverseen respondent interact with the minors and does not even know respondent'saddress or with whom she lives.

Finally, Dr. Fernando's opinion was not contradicted by St.Leger as respondent claims. St. Leger's psychological evaluation had a differentpurpose, that is, to assess whether respondent could provide competent care forthe minors, which he found she could not. St. Leger is not of the same medicaldiscipline as Dr. Fernando. But while his diagnosis may have been different, itwas not contradictory. It was, however, in direct contradiction to Lawrence'sopinion of fitness. Though St. Leger is not a medical doctor and cannotprescribe medication, he has been a psychologist for 18 years. He recommendedrespondent complete parenting classes and therapy and be reevaluated beforereturn of the minors to her custody could even be considered. Lawrence, wholacks qualifications similar to those of St. Leger, admitted respondent did notcomply completely with these recommendations.

The trial court did not ignore Lawrence's testimony, asrespondent argues. The court found that her nonmedical testimony, to the extentit contradicted the "very credible" expert medical testimony of Dr.Fernando and the qualified testimony of St. Leger, had no bearing. Simply put,respondent presented no competent testimony to contradict that of Dr. Fernandoand St. Leger.

The trial court exercised its wide discretion in this custodymatter after having observed the witnesses and considering uncontradicted expertmedical testimony. In light of the record, the court's holding that it was inthe best interest of Briana D. and Brian D. to become wards of the court, asrespondent was unable to care for them, was not against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. Therefore, we find no reason to disturb these findings on appeal.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

O'BRIEN and GALLAGHER, JJ., concur.