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SECOND DIVISION
NOVEMBER 6, 2001

The State filed petitions to adjudicate minors April C., AmyC., and Anna C. wards of the court. The circuit court found theminors were abused pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)) due to physical abuse andexcessive corporal punishment by their father, Ernie C., and due toa substantial risk of physical injury. A dispositional hearing washeld and parents respondent Kathleen C. and Ernie C. were found tobe unwilling, unable, and unfit to parent the minors, who were thenadjudicated wards of the court. Respondent now appeals both theadjudication of abuse and adjudication of wardship.⁽¹⁾

On June 13, 1997, the State filed petitions for theadjudication of wardship regarding respondents 11-year-old AprilC., 8-year-old Amy C., and 6-year-old Anna C. (collectively, thechildren or the minors), who had all been taken into custody twodays earlier. The petitions alleged that Anna and Amy had beensubjected to physical abuse and excessive corporal punishment andwere at substantial risk of physical injury. The petition forApril alleged that she was at substantial risk of physical injury. A case management conference order dated August 27, 1997, indicatesthat the parties were granted leave to amend the petition regardingApril to add allegations of physical abuse and excessive corporalpunishment.

On October 1, 1997, an adjudication hearing was held beforeJudge Sharon Coleman. At the hearing, the evidence consisted of astipulation entered into by the parties. Respondent and Ernie C.were represented by different counsel. According to thestipulation:

1. Respondent and Ernie C. were the natural parents of April,Amy, and Anna;

2. Respondent and Ernie C. were custodial at all relevanttimes;

3. Since September 1996, respondent and Ernie C. had also hadcustody of Ernie C.'s stepdaughter's children Jacoba, Angelica, andGuandensio⁽²⁾;

4. While in the custody of respondent and Ernie C., Jacobasustained a fractured transverse left femur;

5. Ernie C. admitted to forcefully holding Jacoba down on thetoilet seat in an effort to potty train;

6. Respondent and Ernie C. stated to doctors and nurses atChildren's Memorial Hospital that an explanation for the injurycould have been that Jacoba fell down a flight of stairs or felloff a toy;

7. If called to testify, Dr. Marianne Radkowski of Children'sMemorial Hospital would state that the injury to Jacoba could haveoccurred during toilet-training if Ernie C. placed his hands on thechild's thigh and used an extreme amount of force to push the childon the toilet seat. Dr. Radkowski would further testify that thetype of fracture sustained by the child would not occur fromfalling down the stairs or falling off a toy. Dr. Radkowski wouldalso state that a bone scan was completed and that this was aninstance of abuse;

8. A bone scan completed at Children's Memorial Hospitalrevealed that Jacoba also had healed fractures to his right radiusand ulna;

9. Based on Jacoba's healed fractures, fractured left femur,and lack of a plausible explanation by respondent and Ernie C., themultidisciplinary team at Children's Memorial Hospital ruled thatthe findings were consistent with physical abuse;

10. If called to testify, Susan Garner, a social worker at theminors' school, would state that (a) there had been a couple ofincidents regarding Ernie C. that had caused her concern; (b) in orabout May of 1997, Guandensio came to school with a bloody lip; (c)respondent told her Guandensio had bitten his lip when Ernie C.forcefully kept the minor on the toilet; and (d) on or about May21, 1997, Ernie C. was picking Anna up at school when he wasobserved grabbing her by the neck;

11. If called to testify, Nicholas Conway would state thatwhile speaking with respondent on June 9, 1997, she told him thatErnie C. had a temper, that she was aware of the neck incident withAnna; and that she had observed Ernie C. holding Guandensio down onthe toilet seat, and that it was excessive and was how Guandensiohad bitten his lip;

12. April and Amy had made statements that they got whippingsfrom Ernie C. with a belt, board, or a hand when they were introuble; and

13. The medical records from Mount Sinai for April, Anna, Amy,Guandensio, Angelica, and from Children's Memorial Hospital forJacoba were entered into evidence.

The parties also stipulated to a finding that April, Amy, andAnna had been physically abused by Ernie C., had been subjected toexcessive corporal punishment, and were at substantial risk ofinjury.

Based on the stipulated evidence, the court found that April,Amy, and Anna were abused in that they had been physically abusedby Ernie C., subjected to excessive corporal punishment by ErnieC., and were at substantial risk of physical injury.

A dispositional hearing commenced before Judge Paul Biebel onMarch 18, 1999. At the time of the hearing, April was 13, Amy was10, and Anna was 8 years old. At the dispositional hearing, thefollowing evidence was adduced.

Julie Dvorsky, a licensed clinical social worker with amaster's degree in social work, testified that she was employed byHephzibah Children's Association and had been assigned to work withthe C. family since August 21, 1997. The case first came into thesystem when Ernie C.'s grandchild Jacoba was found with a bonefracture. Several older healed fractures were discovered on Jacobaas well. During a home visit in August 1997, Ernie C. explained toDvorsky that he was trying to keep Jacoba on a toilet-training seatand heard a crack while pushing down on him.

The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) referredthe family to receive psychological examinations and a bondingassessment in September 1997. Following the psychologicalassessment, it was recommended that respondent get individualpsychotherapy and couples or marital counseling, continue workingtoward her GED, and join a women's support group. The assessmentnoted that respondent was capable of good parenting but was notcapable at the present time of modifying her husband's behavior. It was recommended that Ernie C. get individual psychotherapy,vocational training, a bonding assessment, and a neurologicalevaluation to rule out narcolepsy.

The September 1997 bonding assessment recommended that thechildren not return home due to the psychological issues affectingeach parent. The assessment noted an apparent lack of emotional"connectedness" between respondent, Ernie C., and the children. The assessment contained statements made by all three children tothe effect that they missed their parents and wanted to return homeand noted that the children were respectful of their parents andwell-behaved. The assessment described respondent and Ernie C.'srelationship with each other as being of particular concern due tosuspected past physical abuse of respondent by Ernie C. and notedthat respondent "seemed incapable at the present time [of]modifying her husband's behavior." The assessment did describerespondent, however, as being able to acquire additional parentingskills that may help her in the future to better parent herchildren. Dvorsky testified that respondent had been cooperativewith the services, including the bonding assessment.

Through DCFS, both parents were referred to Mary and Tom Leoand Associates for individual counseling. The issues addressed intherapy included anger management and corporal punishment. Initialreports from the therapist were promising, especially regardingrespondent. Dvorsky acknowledged that a January 6, 1998, report bya counselor at Mary and Tom Leo and Associates stated thatrespondent's bond with her daughters should be further evaluatedand visited and that respondent appeared to be the more capableparent and the parent that would need to protect the children. That same report indicated that although respondent's descriptionsof her children contained "little sense of delight, warmth, or painat their removal," she may actually care for the children deeply. Dvorsky acknowledged that up until June 1998, the reports from Maryand Tom Leo and Associates expressed hope that respondent and ErnieC. would make significant progress in therapy. Dvorsky testifiedthat the hoped-for progress had not occurred. A June 1998 reportfrom Mary and Tom Leo and Associates stated that many of thesessions with respondent and Ernie C. had been struggles and thatboth respondent and Ernie C. seemed to believe that with theexception of Leroy Yates, a counselor the parents had sought out ontheir own, all of the professionals involved in the case were partof a conspiracy to prevent reunification with the children. At thetime of the hearing, respondent and Ernie C. were stillparticipating in individual psychotherapy sessions on a monthlybasis. The therapists felt the family needed to be involved infamily therapy in order to make any further progress.

According to Dvorsky, family therapy was attempted twice. Itwas first attempted in October 1997, but was discontinued after onemonth because the therapist felt no progress was being made andthat the parents needed to focus on their own individualpsychological issues in that they were coming into the familysessions angry and were not focusing on the goals established intherapy. The therapist told Dvorsky the children were "frozen"during the sessions and unable to speak. The therapist also statedthat this was one of the "most concerning" families he had seen.

Family therapy was attempted again in June 1998. Thesessions, which included just the children and respondent, wereagain discontinued after a month because the therapist foundrespondent to be "inappropriate." As an example, Dvorsky relatedthat respondent had walked out of the session while Anna wasrelating information on a life issue to respondent. When shereentered the session, the girls "completely shut down." Thechildren refused to bring forth issues to their mother out of fearshe would tell Ernie C., and April threatened to run away ratherthan attend family therapy sessions. According to Dvorsky, as ofthe date of the disposition hearing (March 1999), the children werenot ready to attempt family therapy again.

Respondent and Ernie C. attended a parenting class inSeptember 1997. Ernie C. wore sunglasses and fell asleep duringthe sessions, but respondent participated more. Dvorsky acknowledged that a report from the parenting class stated thatthere was a noticeable difference between respondent and Ernie C. The report stated that respondent could generally be described asfocused, her parenting comments and role-playing exercisesreflected a certain level of sensitivity and insightfulness, shedemonstrated a good understanding of encouragement while able todifferentiate between effective and noneffective parentingstatements, and she was able to complete the final examindependently. Both parents completed the class and furtherclasses were recommended. Respondent and Ernie C. took a childmanagement class in 1998. According to Dvorsky, that class wentbetter.

Respondent and Ernie C. participated in a clinical evaluationon November 2, 1998. Respondent did not acknowledge that physicalabuse had occurred in the home. The evaluating psychiatrist notedthat respondent "did not acknowledge that there was a substantiallikelihood that her husband could have been the perpetrator [of theinjury to Jacoba] yet when [Ernie C.] was interviewed separately hereadily admits that he was the perpetrator in this incident." Thepsychiatrist found respondent's evasiveness and denial that ErnieC. could have been the perpetrator to be of concern and stated thatalthough he did not question that respondent would be able toadequately protect the children as a single parent, she wasdeferential to Ernie C.'s thinking and that "issue in and of itselfmay place her in situations that she is unable to resolve on herown." Although the evaluating psychiatrist found that respondentappeared to lack insight into the needs of her children, Dvorskyacknowledged that the psychiatrist had also noted that respondentappeared to exhibit a caring attitude about the welfare of herchildren.

The psychiatrist was concerned about Ernie C.'s ability toparent the children due to psychiatric issues affecting him. Thepsychiatrist diagnosed Ernie C. as suffering from post-traumaticstress disorder, with a secondary diagnosis of childhood physicalabuse and neglect and an anti-social personality disorder withschizotypal features, resulting in social anxiety and problems withinterpersonal relationships. The psychiatrist recommended Ernie C.be put on anxiety medication.

Respondent and Ernie C. had supervised visitation with thechildren from August 1997 through December 1998. Initially, bothparents, but particularly Ernie C., would be very hostile andnegative during the visits. Respondent and Ernie C. wouldinterrogate the children about the foster home and tell thechildren that the agency was trying to adopt them out and was notworking toward returning them home. Respondent in particular wouldask questions about the foster home in a sarcastic manner and makenegative comments about the foster parents and other children inthe home. The children informed Dvorsky that respondent'squestioning made them uncomfortable. Although Dvorsky acknowledgedthat respondent acted more appropriately when Ernie C. was notpresent at visitation, Dvorsky did not believe respondent wasutilizing any of the knowledge gained from parenting classes in hervisits with the children. In November 1997, a Hephzibah employeereported that Ernie C. made an aggressive move toward her and thepolice were called, resulting in a temporary suspension ofvisitation.

In December 1998, Hephzibah decided that it would have atleast three workers present during each supervised visit becauserespondent and Ernie C. were attempting to whisper to the childrenso that supervisors could not hear and because the children'sbehavior before and after the visits was causing concern. Thechildren would be angry and break items in the foster home beforeand after the visits and Amy would wet the bed. During visits, thechildren were very flat and did not show much emotion. Thechildren were much more talkative both before and after the visits. During visits where only respondent and the children were present,the children appeared much more comfortable and the interactionsmore free in nature. Dvorsky had observed some of the visits andhad seen the children frightened, especially when Ernie C. had beenhostile toward workers. Dvorsky testified that the children'stherapist recommended that the children not be returned home andbelieved the children would make more progress if visitation withthe parents were limited further.

Anna, who was eight years old at the time of the hearing, hadbegun to act out sexually in the foster home in May 1998. She hadasked who was going to pat her vagina and who was going to pull theblack stuff out of Amy's vagina, and she had masturbated in frontof a younger child in the foster home and had attempted to get thatchild involved in the masturbation. None of the other minors inthe foster home had been acting out sexually. Dvorsky acknowledgedthat there was no evidence that Ernie C. was the perpetrator ofsexual abuse toward Anna.

Dvorsky testified that up until December 1998, the goal of thecase was to return the children to the home. In December 1998, thegoal was changed to substitute care upon a determination that thehome environment was not appropriate.

Dvorsky testified that, in her opinion, respondent and ErnieC. were not able and fit to parent their children. She testifiedthat she was concerned Ernie C. did not have his anger issues undercontrol and that respondent did not have the ability to protect thechildren from him. Dvorsky testified that despite the servicesrespondent had received and successfully completed, she was stillnot a fit parent, had made little progress, and had not followedthrough in visitations with the children by applying any of thetechniques she had learned. When Ernie C. had been volatile andthreatening during visitation, respondent had not attempted tointervene on behalf of the children. She had continued to whisperto the children and interrogate them about the foster home in anonnurturing manner. Dvorsky said respondent was not emotionallyresponsive to the children when they became upset during visitationand was unable to identify the feelings the children presentedduring the visits. In addition, respondent had not acknowledgedthe abuse suffered by the children via Ernie C. Dvorsky testifiedthat she did not believe the children trusted respondent or feltthat she would protect them and keep them safe. In Dvorsky'sopinion, it would be in the best interests of the minors if DCFSwere appointed with the right to place the children. Dvorskystated that the children were together in a nonrelative foster homewhere the foster parent was committed to permanency for thechildren. Dvorsky recommended that permanency be established inorder for the children to feel more safe and stable.

Dvorsky agreed that respondent could still acquire additionalparenting skills that would benefit her in parenting the children.

Lysa Seghetti, a DCFS social worker, testified that she hadbeen assigned to the case from the time it came into the systemuntil shortly before the dispositional hearing.

Seghetti referred Ernie C. for domestic violence counseling inJanuary 1999. Ernie C. informed her that he wanted to confer withhis attorney regarding the referral. Seghetti had not heard backfrom Ernie C. regarding the referral at the time of the dispositionhearing. She was also aware of referrals for Ernie C. for aneuropsychological examination in December 1998 and for apsychiatric follow-up in February 1999. Seghetti did not know ifErnie C. had followed through on those referrals.

Seghetti had contact with Ernie C.'s daughter Molly, whosethree children were also in the care of respondent and Ernie C.when the case came into the system. It was Molly's son Jacoba whohad sustained a fracture while in the care of respondent and ErnieC. In December 1998, Molly informed Seghetti that when she was achild, Ernie C. molested her. Later, Ernie C. had intercourse withher. The sexual abuse went on until Molly was an adolescent andleft the home. Seghetti found Molly to be credible. Seghettifound the information to be of concern because April, the oldest ofrespondent and Ernie C.'s three children, had told Seghetti thatshe would run away if family therapy resumed and reported that shehad had thoughts of running away since she was five years old. Seghetti testified that when the case first came into the system,the children were sent to the Under the Rainbow Program at MountSinai for a five-day evaluation for physical abuse, sexual abuse,and neglect. The children were diagnosed as having been physicallyabused by Ernie C. Seghetti acknowledged that the evaluation foundno evidence of sexual abuse.

Seghetti testified that at one court hearing, Ernie C. becameaggressive with her and she had to summon a sheriff to intervene. On two occasions, Ernie C. told her she was "evil" and "from thedevil." Respondent had also accused Seghetti of working with thedevil and informed her that Jesus was going to get her.

Seghetti concurred with Dvorsky's recommendation that theState be appointed as guardian for the children. She did notbelieve it was in the children's best interests to return home totheir parents, as she had concerns regarding their safety andwhether respondent could actually protect them from Ernie C. Finally, she did not believe Ernie C. had received all of theservices necessary to make the home environment safe with himpresent. Seghetti testified that respondent could probably parentthe children in the absence of Ernie C. but she had grave concernsregarding the relationship of respondent and Ernie C. andrespondent's ability to sever that relationship.

Tracy Handalman, a DCFS social worker with a master's degreein education and child development, testified that she had been thecaseworker for the case involving respondent and Ernie C.'s threegrandchildren since August 1997, and had recently been assigned asthe social worker to the instant case involving April, Amy, andAnna. She testified that the foster parent of the grandchildrenhad told her that Ernie C. had been showing up outside thegrandchildren's day care. In one instance, Ernie C. approached thefoster parent's car. The foster parent reported that the childrenhad suffered emotional problems after seeing Ernie C.

Handalman recommended that it would be in the best interest ofthe children in the instant case to be placed under theguardianship of DCFS. She did not believe it would be in thechildren's best interests to be in an environment where Ernie C.was living. Her opinion was based on her belief that Ernie C. wasthe person who broke Jacoba's leg, the allegations of physicalabuse against April, Amy, and Anna, and the fear she had seen inboth the children and grandchildren regarding Ernie C.

Molly Ann Ruiz-C., the 28-year-old daughter of Ernie C.,testified over the objection of the attorneys for both parents. Molly testified that when she was around three years old, Ernie C.began to touch her in inappropriate places. He would fondle her,put his fingers in her vagina, and put his penis between her legsand move up and down. This happened a number of times and Mollyrecalled one instance where it hurt a lot. Molly testified thather mother (who was not respondent) knew what Ernie C. was doing toher but did nothing about it. Ernie moved out when she was aboutsix years old. Ernie C. was physically abusive to her, hersiblings, and her mother. Ernie would come back for visits afterhe moved out and would touch her, but, according to Molly, she knewbetter by then and he would stop.

Molly left home at age 13 and subsequently had 9 children andserious problems with drugs. She was 28 years old at the time ofthe dispositional hearing and had been drug free for two years. While attempting to recover from her drug problems, she had askedErnie C. and respondent to care for her three children Guandensio,Angelica, and Jacoba. At the time, she thought Ernie C. may havechanged due to his religious beliefs and she liked respondent. Respondent was not Molly's mother, but she treated the kids likethey were her own grandchildren.

The Reverend LeRoy Yates testified on behalf of respondentthat he was a minister, professional counselor at the WestsideHolistic Family Center, and had a master's degree in psychotherapy. Ernie C. and respondent came to him in July 1997 for counselinghelp. They were not referred to him by DCFS. In counseling, heworked with respondent in helping her to understand the need toprotect the children from Ernie in cases where things got out ofcontrol. Yates believed that respondent would be willing to dowhatever was necessary to protect the children and testified thatshe had become more forceful in taking charge of decision-making inthe family. He concluded that respondent had the skills to be afit parent for the children.

At the request of Lysa Seghetti, Yates prepared progressreports from time to time. She would also notify him whenstaffings in the case were to take place and he would attend.

Reverend Yates acknowledged that he had met the children onlyin passing. According to Yates, Ernie C. believed that heaccidently injured Jacoba during toilet-training and respondent wasnot sure what happened.

Reverend Yates believed that respondent was much betterequipped to take care of the family following therapy, because shehad learned to protect the children and to be more "hands-on." Hestated that respondent had acknowledged that Ernie C. had gottenphysical with her in the past but he was not aware of any incidentsof battery during the period he had been counseling the couple. Yates testified that, in his opinion, a battered woman is someonewho has been beaten black and blue or someone who may havefractures. He was not aware that an Under the Rainbow report fromJune 1997 had described respondent as someone who appeared to be abattered wife who refused to leave her current situation.

Reverend Yates stated that respondent told him she couldmanage the family on her own and would leave Ernie C. if necessary. Reverend Yates stated that he did not believe the children neededto be protected from Ernie C.

Yates had worked with Ernie C. on anger-management issues. Yates acknowledged that Ernie C. had admitted sexually abusingMolly during her childhood but Yates did not pursue that admissionin therapy because he was primarily focusing on the current family. Reverend Yates did not mention the sexual abuse of Molly in any ofhis reports concerning his treatment of Ernie C. and respondentaside from noting that Ernie C.'s second marriage was "a disaster." Reverend Yates testified that the family was caring and normaland had high potential for reunification. He acknowledged,however, that it was not normal for a family to have issues ofdomestic violence, incest, and a broken bone caused by a caretaker.

On cross-examination, Reverend Yates acknowledged that he wasnot a licensed clinical social worker and was not State certified.

Dvorsky testified that in addition to counseling through DCFSreferrals, respondent and Ernie C. began counseling with ReverendLeroy Yates of the Westside Holistic Family Center in July 1997. Respondent and Ernie C. found Reverend Yates on their own and werenot referred to him by DCFS.

Dvorsky testified that Hephzibah, upon examining psychologicalevaluations tendered by Yates, determined that he was not qualifiedto provide respondent and Ernie C. with the counseling servicesthat they needed. Dvorsky testified that Yates had participated inseveral staffings at Hephzibah and had tendered reports on thecase. Yates had noted in a September 1997 report submitted toHephzibah that respondent and Ernie C. were cooperative, werelearning how to communicate and listen, and were finding new waysto solve problems and live together peacefully. The reportconcluded that if the family continued to cooperate with thecounseling process, in time they may grow into an adjusted,functional family. In a May 9, 1998, document prepared forHephzibah by Yates, he indicated that respondent and Ernie C. weremaking progress in counseling and concluded that continuing topostpone reunification of the family would be unwise.

Seghetti testified that she had spoken with Leroy Yatesapproximately a dozen times over the past two years. Seghettibelieved that Yates minimized the allegations contained in thepetitions for adjudication of wardship. She believed Yates hadsimply accepted what Ernie C. told him happened and had failed toconsider the best interests of the children. Seghetti testifiedthat Yates was a pastor and that his reports in the case did notcomport with the usual standards of therapy and scientific analysisand protocols. Based on things Ernie C. and Yates had said in thepast, Seghetti believed Yates had told respondent and Ernie C. thatDCFS was involved in conspiracies designed to take children awayfrom their families. Yates also passed on to respondent and ErnieC. some sensitive and confidential information revealed by thechildren's therapist in a June 1998 staffing.

After hearing the evidence, the court made extensive findingsand held that respondent and Ernie C. were both unable, unwilling,and unfit. The court adjudged the children wards of the court andordered that the children be placed in the guardianship of DCFS.

Respondent now appeals the circuit court's adjudications ofabuse and wardship, contending that the court committed reversibleerror in making both findings.

In addition to briefs filed by the State and respondent, wenote that the Cook County public guardian, as guardian ad litem forApril, Amy, and Anna, has filed a brief urging that the trialcourt's orders be affirmed.

Respondent first contends that the trial court's decisionfinding her unwilling, unable, and unfit to parent her daughterswas against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically,respondent argues that the court's finding should be reversed wherethere was no evidence that she physically abused her children orErnie C.'s grandchildren, where there was evidence she couldfunction as a single parent, and where the trial court never warnedher that remaining with Ernie C. could cause her to lose herchildren.

Initially, we agree with the State and public guardian thatrespondent, in her brief, fails to distinguish between adjudicatingminors wards of the State at a dispositional hearing upon a findingthat the parents are unfit, unable, or unwilling to care for,protect, train or discipline a minor, as took place here, and afinding of unfitness for the purpose of terminating parentalrights. Throughout her argument, respondent makes references toher parental rights having been "terminated" and relies upon caselaw in which the issue was termination of parental rights.

The petitions in this case were asking that April, Amy, andAnna be adjudicated wards of the court. The court, through thedispositional hearing, was attempting to determine whether thechildren should be adjudged wards of the court on the basis thatrespondent and Ernie C. are "unfit or are unable, for some reasonother than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect,train, or discipline the minor[s] or are unwilling to do so, andthat [it is in the] best interest of the minor[s] [to take themfrom] the custody of [their] parents, guardian or custodian." 705ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 1998). The purpose of a dispositionalhearing is not to terminate parental rights. To the contrary, asdescribed in In re G.F.H., 315 Ill. App. 3d 711, 715, 734 N.E.2d519 (2000), a dispositional hearing serves the purpose of allowingthe circuit court to decide what further actions are in the bestinterests of a minor, and the hearing and ruling on whether to makea minor a ward of the court gives the parents "fair notice of whatthey must do to retain their rights to their child" in the face ofany future termination proceedings. In contrast, a termination ofparental rights is a final and complete severance of the child fromthe parent and removes the entire bundle of custodial andnoncustodial rights. See In re P.F., 265 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 1101,638 N.E.2d 716 (1994).

Although parental rights may be terminated at a dispositionalhearing if certain statutory conditions are met, the record doesnot indicate that a termination of parental rights was sought inthe instant case. Where, as here, the State did not seek toterminate the parental rights of respondent and Ernie C., thecourt, upon finding respondent was unfit, unable, and unwilling,was limited to the placement options in section 2-27(1). 705 ILCS405/2-27(1) (West 1998). The consequences of a proceeding seekingto remove custody and guardianship from a parent following afinding of abuse or neglect and a proceeding seeking termination ofparental rights for purposes of appointing a guardian with consentto adopt are different and the meaning of the term "unfit" as itrelates to each proceeding is different as well. In re T.B., 215Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1061, 574 N.E.2d 893 (1991).

Significantly, while the appointment of a guardian with thepower to consent to adoption pursuant to section 2-29 requiresproof of unfitness by clear and convincing evidence (see 705 ILCS405/2-29 (West 1998)), the standard of proof in a trial court'ssection 2-27 finding of unfitness that does not result in acomplete termination of all parental rights is a preponderance ofthe evidence (see In re Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 994, 697N.E.2d 830 (1998)). "On review, the trial court's determinationwill be reversed only if the findings of fact are against themanifest weight of the evidence or if the trial court committed anabuse of discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositionalorder." In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d at 1062. A finding isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence where a review of therecord clearly demonstrates that the result opposite to thatreached by the trial court was the proper result. In re T.B., 215Ill. App. 3d at 1062. Because a trial court is in a superiorposition to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh theevidence, a reviewing court will not overturn the trial court'sfindings merely because the reviewing court may have reached adifferent decision. In re Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 994.

Respondent, in arguing that the court's decision was notsupported by the evidence, points to the fact that there was noevidence that she physically abused any of the children and to thefact that there was some evidence that she could parent thechildren as a single parent. Those facts, however, do not persuadeus that the trial court's finding was against the manifest weightof the evidence where a review of the record reveals ample supportfor the court's decision.

The evidence showed that Ernie C. committed various acts ofphysical abuse against the children in the home, including breakinga bone of one of the grandchildren, grabbing Anna by the neck, andwhipping April, Amy, and Anna with a board, belt, or hand wheneverthey got into "trouble." We note that various other instances ofabuse not specifically referred to in testimony during trial arenoted in various reports entered into evidence. For example, onereport notes that Amy reported to her school teacher that herfather had twisted her ankle "because she had been bad thatweekend."

Three different caseworkers involved in the case testifiedthat it was in the best interests of the children to be made wardsof the court. The two workers with the longest involvement in theinstant case testified that they did not believe respondent wascapable of protecting the children from the physical abuse of ErnieC. Although respondent had participated in the servicesrecommended by the various professionals involved in the case,those services had resulted in "minimal progress." Respondent, insupervised visitations with April, Amy, and Anna, was not observedto be emotionally responsive or nurturing, had continued tointerrogate the children about the foster home, and had engaged inother inappropriate behavior, such as whispering to the girls,which resulted in negative effects in the girls behavior uponreturning to the foster home. Visitation deteriorated to the pointthat three workers were required to be present at the supervisedvisitations to prevent respondent and Ernie C. from whispering tothe girls. Respondent had failed to intervene on behalf of thechildren when Ernie C. became volatile during visitation. Thesecond and most recent attempt at family therapy had beenterminated due to respondent's inappropriate behavior and the firstattempt had also ended, in part, due to respondent's attitude andbehavior. One report described respondent as a "battered wife whorefuses to leave her husband even if the consequence is losing herchildren." Another report noted that respondent failed toacknowledge the "substantial likelihood" that Ernie C. had brokenJacoba's leg through abuse despite the fact that Ernie C. "readilyadmits he was the perpetrator in this incident."

Julie Dvorsky, the Hephzibah worker most involved in the case,summed up much of the evidence regarding respondent in hertestimony regarding why, in her opinion, it was not in thechildren's best interest to be returned to respondent's care:

"[D]uring the visitation, [respondent] has notused the skills necessary to parent thechildren or protect the children from [ErnieC.] when he's become volatile.

I have not seen that she has beenemotionally responsive to her children whenher children have been upset duringvisitation, and I have addressed that with[respondent] as well as [Ernie C.]. Theyhaven't been able to identify the feelingsthat their children presented during thevisit.

She has not acknowledged the abusesuffered by her children by [Ernie C.], and Ido not feel the children trust her, nor dothey feel that she would protect them and keepthem safe."

Although there was speculation and comments in various reports tothe effect that respondent might be fit to parent the children asa single parent, respondent was not a single parent and the trialcourt therefore noted, correctly, that the issue was not before it.

Respondent maintains that no one connected to the case,including the circuit court judges involved in the adjudicatory anddispositional hearings, informed her that if she did not leaveErnie C., she risked losing custody of her daughters. As authoritythat it was required she be informed of the necessity of makingsuch a choice, respondent relies on In re R.B., 297 Ill. App. 3d97, 696 N.E.2d 1259 (1998). In In re R.B., the circuit court founda mother unfit and terminated her parental rights after findingthat although she had ended her own substance abuse, she continuedto reside with her substance-abusing husband and had therefore"refused to make a choice for her children and against herhusband." In re R.B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 99. On appeal, thetermination of the mother's parental rights was found to be againstthe manifest weight of the evidence where she was never explicitlyinformed by the court that she must leave her husband or have herparental rights terminated. In re R.B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 101.

We find In re R.B. to be distinguishable. That case involveda finding of unfitness and termination of parental rights pursuantto section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West1996)). As noted earlier, the termination of parental rights is afinal and complete severance of the child from the parent andremoves the entire bundle of custodial and noncustodial rights (seeIn re P.F., 265 Ill. App. 3d at 1101), and a finding of unfitnessfor the purpose of terminating parental rights differs in meaningfrom a finding that a parent is unfit in the context of adispositional hearing where termination of parental rights is notbeing sought (see In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d at 1061). Moreover,as previously noted, one of the purposes of a dispositional hearingand adjudication of wardship is to give the parents "fair notice ofwhat they must do to retain their rights to their child" in theface of any future termination proceedings. In re G.F.H., 315 Ill.App. 3d at 715. Considering that purpose, as well as thedifferences between findings of unfitness in a hearing where thetermination of parental rights is being sought and a dispositionalhearing where the court is determining whether a minor should beadjudged a ward of the court, we decline to extend the holding inIn re R.B. requiring explicit notice to a parent that he or shemust make a choice to the facts of this case, where the terminationof parental rights was not at issue. See In re A.D., 199 Ill. App.3d 158, 161-62, 556 N.E.2d 799 (1990) (despite trial court'sfinding that the mother had "made commendable progress in the lasttwo months preceding the disposition hearing," the trial court'sdecision to grant guardianship of respondent's three children toDCFS was affirmed where her husband was still a danger and wasstill a part of her life. The appellate court noted that,following its affirmance, the respondent would "have to choosewhether she wants to include [her husband] in her life or whethershe wants custody of her children").

In sum, the circuit court's finding that respondent wasunable, unwilling, and unfit to care for April, Amy, and Anna wasnot against the manifest weight of the evidence. The fact that sheherself was not alleged to have physically abused the children andmight be able to parent the children as a single parent does notpersuade us that the trial court's decision was against themanifest weight of the evidence where there was ample evidence thatrespondent continues to live with Ernie C., Ernie C. continues tobe a threat to the children's safety, and respondent has not madesufficient progress in a number of areas, including her ability toprotect the children from Ernie C. in the home.

Respondent also maintains that the findings of the trial courtshould be vacated where the court never ensured that she was awareof the consequences of entering into a stipulation admitting thather children had been abused.

During the adjudicatory stage of this case, respondent andErnie C., represented by different counsel, entered into astipulation. In addition to stipulating to a number of facts,respondent and Ernie C. stipulated that April, Amy, and Anna werephysically abused and subjected to excessive corporal punishment byErnie C. and in substantial risk of physical injury. Respondentnow argues that despite the fact that she committed no actual actsof physical abuse, she entered into a stipulation tantamount to anadmission that she was an abusive parent. According to respondent,the trial court was "obligated to ensure that she was aware of theconsequences of entering into such a stipulation" prior to takingthe stipulation. Where the court failed to do so, respondentconcludes, the findings of physical abuse, substantial risk ofphysical injury and excessive corporal punishment should be vacatedas to her and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

We agree with the public guardian that respondent has waivedthis issue by failing to raise it before the trial court. Respondent's counsel did not raise any objection or issue relatedto the stipulation at the time it was entered, when it was laterrevisited by a motion of Ernie C.'s counsel to amend theadjudication order, during the subsequent four-day dispositionalhearing, or after the court's ruling following the dispositionalhearing. Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection inthe court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question forreview and the issue is waived. In re Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3dat 991.

Waiver aside, we find that the entry of the stipulation offacts in the instant case does not require reversal. Admissionsunder the Juvenile Court Act must be voluntarily and intelligentlymade. In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 366, 751 N.E.2d 1134 (2001).

Most significantly, the record reveals that, contrary torespondent's contention that the trial court failed to advise herof the consequences of her entering into a stipulation, the courtexplained the nature of a stipulation and advised respondent thatit would be basing its findings on the facts contained therein. Specifically, the court, prior to respondent entering into thestipulation in the instant case, addressed respondent and Ernie C.and stated:

"We are proceeding by way of stipulation,according to the information that the courthas received; that is an agreement between theparties that there will be no sworn testimonytoday but they are agreeing to the facts thatif there was testimony those facts would bepresented to the court. You both understand?"

After respondent and Ernie C. indicated that they understood, thecourt informed them that "[a]fter those facts are presented to thecourt then the court will make its decision on those facts. Do youunderstand?" Finally, the court informed respondent and Ernie C.that they would hear the term "so stipulated" and that that termmeant "agree." The record therefore demonstrates that the courtwas clear in conveying that the stipulation would be enteredinstead of live testimony and in explaining that it would be basingits findings on the facts contained in the stipulation, and madesure that respondent understood what it was saying.

We also find significant the fact that respondent wasrepresented by counsel at all relevant times. Her appeal containsno allegations that her counsel was ineffective or failed toexplain the nature and ramifications of the proceedings to her.

Moreover, unlike some of the cases relied upon by respondent(discussed below), the petitions in this case clearly stated, intheir titles and in the bodies of the documents, that the State wasseeking to have April, Amy, and Anna adjudicated wards of thecourt. Such an adjudication, and no more, was the ultimate resultof the proceedings.

In addition, Ernie C. entered into the same stipulation offacts. That stipulation alone would have provided a sufficientfactual basis for the trial court to make its findings of abuse. See In re Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1014, 429 N.E.2d 1364(1981) (noting that the minor mother's stipulation of facts aloneprovided sufficient basis by itself for trial court's finding ofneglect).

The circumstances of the instant case detailed above serve todistinguish this case from those cited by respondent.

In In re Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 1012-13, the courtexamined the validity of the appellant's admission, noting that tobe valid, such an admission in a Juvenile Court Act proceeding:

"must be intelligently and voluntarily made;that is, it must be apparent from the recordthat the party making the admission was awareof the consequences of his admission.[Citations.] Thus, for the admission of aparent to be valid in the adjudicatory phaseof a neglect proceeding, it must be apparentfrom the record that the parent making theadmission understood the consequences of hisadmission - that a finding of neglect givesthe court jurisdiction of the minor who thenbecomes subject to the dispositional powers ofthe court. [Citation.]"

The reviewing court concluded that the record was devoid of anyindication that the appellant understood the consequences of hisadmission. The court based its conclusion in part on the fact thatthe petition requested only "temporary custody" and "otherappropriate relief." The court also relied on the fact that theappellant agreed to enter an admission and agreed to theappointment of a guardian for his son prior to the appointment ofcounsel, and the counsel that was then appointed also representedthe child's mother despite a conflict between the interests of theparties. Finally, the court also relied on the fact that neitherthe trial court nor an attorney explained the consequences of theadmission to the appellant, and the appellant, represented bysubsequent counsel, attempted to withdraw the previously enteredstipulation of facts and admission but was denied.

In In re Moore, 87 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 409 N.E.2d 435 (1980),a mother contested an admission that led to the appointment of herchild's maternal grandmother as guardian. On review, the courtreversed for a new adjudicatory hearing upon finding, inter alia,that the petition failed to apprise the respondent she could losepermanent custody of her child where it only requested temporarycustody and "other appropriate relief," the court accepted theadmission without addressing the respondent or determining whethercounsel had addressed her regarding the nature of the proceedings,and the court was unable to determine from the record whether therespondent was aware of the nature of the proceedings.

The differences between the above cases and the instant caseare readily apparent. In the instant case, the court advisedrespondent as to the nature of a stipulation and of the fact thatits decision would be based upon it. In addition, the petitions inthe instant case advised respondent of the nature of theproceedings. Respondent was represented by counsel at all relevanttimes and does not complain that her counsel was ineffective. Moreover, respondent and Ernie C. were represented by separatecounsel to prevent any possible conflict. Lastly, respondent madeno effort to withdraw or object to the stipulation subsequent toits entry.

Finally, in In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 751 N.E.2d 1134(2001), also cited by respondent⁽³⁾, the circuit court accepted therespondent's admission that she was unfit without hearing arecitation of the facts supporting the underlying petition andwithout determining whether a factual basis existed for anadmission of parental unfitness. The Illinois Supreme Courtaffirmed the Second District's judgment, which vacated therespondent's admission of unfitness where there was no factual-basis determination, reversed the order terminating therespondent's parental rights, and remanded the cause for a newfitness hearing. In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 363-68. Althoughrespondent here does not contend that the circuit court made nofactual basis determination, we note that there was more than abald admission of abuse in the instant case. In fact, an extensivestipulation of facts was read into the record. The court, infinding the children had been abused, then reiterated the factualbasis set out in the stipulation as the basis for its finding. Theinstant case thus conforms to the dictates of In re M.H.

Accordingly, the findings and orders of the circuit court areaffirmed.

Affirmed.

CAHILL and GORDON, JJ., concur.

1. Ernie C. has filed a separate appeal.

2. It should be noted that the instant appeal concerns onlythe adjudication of wardship of April, Amy, and Anna.

3. Respondent actually cites to the Second District's opinionin that same case. In re M.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d 205, 729 N.E.2d86 (2000). Since the filing of briefs in the instant case, theIllinois Supreme Court filed their opinion affirming the SecondDistrict.