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THIRD DIVISION

SEPTEMBER 12, 2001

Respondents A.G., L. G., and B.G., minors, appeal from theSeptember 1999 finding of the circuit court of Cook County thatthey were not tortured emotionally when they were forced by theirmother to hold down a fourth sibling, N.G., while their mother,respondent Leslie G., beat her into unconsciousness. The courtorder adjudicated the children wards of the court and appointedthe Illinois Department of Children and Family Services as theirguardian. We remand.

BACKGROUND

L.G., who was born on January 10, 1988, was taken intocustody on March 29, 1999. The State filed a petition foradjudication of wardship. It was alleged that L.G. was neglectedbased upon several occasions in which L.G.'s mother struck L.G.'ssiblings with various objects causing cuts, welts, and bruises,and based upon the mother's threats to kill L.G.'s siblings. Itwas also alleged that L.G. was abused because her mother hadstruck L.G. with various objects, resulting in welts and inbruises on her back and face. It was also alleged that the factssupported findings that excessive corporal punishment wasinflicted and that there was a substantial risk of physicalinjury to the minor by other than accidental means which would belikely to cause death, disfigurement, impairment of emotionalhealth, or loss or impairment of any bodily function.

Similar petitions were filed for B.G., who was born onSeptember 10, 1985, and for A.G., who was born on November 28,1998.

The trial court ordered that the children be removed fromthe home and be placed into temporary custody.

The petitions were amended to add torture as a basis forfinding abuse. It was alleged that on or about February 23,1999, the mother forced A.G., L.G. and B.G. to restrain N.G.while she beat N.G. into unconsciousness. In addition, it wasalleged that the mother had threatened her children with bodilyharm on several occasions if they refused to restrain theirsiblings during beatings.

At trial, there was evidence that the mother forced thethree children to hold down their older sister, N.G., while shewas beaten to unconsciousness. N.G. was unconscious for morethan an hour. According to a Catholic Charities supervisor whointerviewed A.G. and L.G., L.G. stated that her mother said theother children would be beaten if they did not help her hold downa sister. A.G. gave a similar story, stating that she wasfearful that the same thing would happen to her if she did notparticipate.

On September 21, 1999, the trial court found that the minorswere abused or neglected on the bases of injurious environment,physical abuse, substantial risk/physical injury, and excessivecorporal punishment. The findings were made that the childrenhad been forced to hold down siblings during beatingsadministered by the mother, that the children had emotionalscars, and that only N.G. was physically tortured. The trialjudge invited a court of review to provide guidance on thedefinition of torture.

On November 23, 1999, a dispositional order was entered forA.G., granting custody to the Department of Children and FamilyServices with the right to place her. Dispositional orders forthe other children do not appear in the record.

On December 22, 1999, the three minors filed a notice ofappeal from the lack of a finding that they were also tortured.

The issue on appeal is whether the term "torture" as used inthe Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2) (West1998)) includes conduct that involves solely the infliction ofemotional harm.

Upon the court's order, the parties filed supplementalbriefs addressing whether the appeal was moot because, whether ornot the trial court erred in declining to make a finding oftorture, the mother's parental rights were terminated on othergrounds.

The State and the mother argue that there is no furtherissue for this court to resolve because the children were to beadopted and there was no reason why a determination of torturewas an appealable issue in view of the termination of parentalrights order. The minors argue that adjudicatory findings areimportant because they are guideposts for provision of servicesto children and their families and because they are a significantfactor in determining the permanency goals that will be entered.

An appeal becomes moot where the issues involved in thetrial court no longer exist because events occur which render itimpossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief. Inre A.D.W., 278 Ill. App. 3d 476, 480, 663 N.E.2d 58 (1996).

We will not determine whether the issue is moot because,even if it is, the issue can be addressed under the exception fora question of great public interest. Criteria for application ofthat exception include: (1) the public nature of the question,(2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for thepurpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the likelihood thatthe question will generally recur. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d247, 257, 537 N.E.2d 292 (1989); People ex rel. Black v. Dukes,96 Ill. 2d 273, 277, 449 N.E.2d 856 (1983).

Certainly the torture issue is of a public nature, and thequestion may recur in other cases. Furthermore, resolution ofthe issue is desirable because there is no case law addressingwhether torture includes conduct that involves solely emotionalharm. Also, it is desirable that trial judges obtain guidanceregarding the kind of torture that may be dealt with in juvenileproceedings.

Cases involving children who were before the court becauseof neglect or abuse have on occasion held that the publicinterest exception applied. E.g., In re A.F., 234 Ill. App. 3d1010, 1014, 602 N.E.2d 480 (1991) ("this [child neglect] casefalls within the public interest exception to the mootnessdoctrine" because "[c]ertainly, the proper adjudication of whatis in the best interests of minors is of surpassing publicconcern"); In re Patricia S., 222 Ill. App. 3d 585, 589, 584N.E.2d 270 (1991) (the issue whether the trial court deprivedminors of their right to remain with their mother withoutcomplying with due process fell within the public interestexception to the mootness doctrine because "[a] matter of greaterpublic concern is difficult to imagine").

The Act provides that a minor is abused if a parent commitsone of the following behaviors:

"(i) inflicts, causes to be inflicted, or allowsto be inflicted upon such minor physical injury, byother than accidental means, which causes death,disfigurement, impairment of physical or emotionalhealth, or loss or impairment of any bodily function;

(ii) creates a substantial risk of physical injuryto such minor by other than accidental means whichwould be likely to cause death, disfigurement,impairment of emotional health, or loss or impairmentof any bodily function;

(iii) commits or allows to be committed any sexoffense against such minor, as such sex offenses aredefined in the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, andextending those definitions of sex offenses to includeminors under 18 years of age;

(iv) commits or allows to be committed an act oracts of torture upon such minor; or

(v) inflicts excessive corporal punishment." 705ILCS 405/2-3(2) (West 1998).

The Act contains no definition of "torture."

The overriding objective in interpreting a statute is toascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Roser v. Anderson, 222 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1075, 584 N.E.2d 865(1991). To ascertain the legislature's intent, we first look tothe plain language of the statute. Burnett v. Safeco InsuranceCo. of Illinois, 227 Ill. App. 3d 167, 173, 590 N.E.2d 1032(1992). Language is to be given its ordinary and popularlyunderstood meaning. Roser, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 1075. If thestatutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court may not relyupon external aids to construction. Mister v. A.R.K.Partnership, 197 Ill. App. 3d 105, 113, 553 N.E.2d 1152 (1990). Where the statute is unclear or susceptible to more than onemeaning, a court must interpret the statute to clarify itsapplication by looking to similar statutes as aid toconstruction. Mister, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 113. In addition tothe language chosen by the legislature, the court should considerthe reason for the law, the evil to be remedied, and the purposeto be obtained thereby. Roser, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 1075.

Dictionary entries for torture include definitions of"torture" as inflicting anguish of mind:

"--n. 1. the act of inflicting excruciating pain,esp. as a means of punishment or coercion. 2. amethod of inflicting such pain. 3. often, tortures. The pain or suffering caused or undergone. 4. extremeanguish of body or mind; agony. 5. a cause of severepain or anguish. --v.t. 6. to subject to torture. 7. to afflict with severe pain of body or mind. 8. to twist, force, or bring into some unnatural shape." (Emphasis added.) Random House College DictionaryRevised Edition 1387 (1988).