Horvath v. White
Case Date: 06/30/2005
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-03-1726 Rel
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FIRST DIVISION
Plaintiff, James T. Horvath, appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County upholding the Illinois Secretary of State's (the Secretary) order suspending his license pursuant to recommendations and findings issued by hearing officer Tony Jones (hearing officer). Plaintiff claims that: (1) section 6-206(a)(10) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-206(a)(10) (West 2000)) violates due process under the Illinois and United States Constitutions; (2) the hearing officer's decision was based upon an unconstitutional presumption; (3)the hearing officer's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (4) the punishment under section 6-206(a)(10) violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. BACKGROUND On August 21, 2000, plaintiff, a 19-year-old student at the University of Iowa, was arrested by the Iowa City police for public intoxication. Following his arrest, an Iowa City police officer searched plaintiff's wallet and found an Illinois State identification card belonging to Daniel Horvath. Daniel Horvath, plaintiff's brother, was above the legal drinking age on August 21, 2000. Following the disposition of the public intoxication charges in Iowa, the Secretary was notified by the Iowa City police department that plaintiff was arrested for public intoxication and in possession of another's identification card showing a legal drinking age. The Secretary thereafter issued a notice of suspension of plaintiff's driver's license pursuant to section 6-206 of the Code. 625 ILCS 5/6-206(a)(10) (West 2000). Plaintiff filed a motion to rescind the suspension of his license or, alternatively, to have a hardship license issued during the period of his suspension. In a written motion, plaintiff alleged that section 6-206(a)(10) of the Code was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him in this case. Plaintiff argued that the provision of the Code did not comport with principles of due process and that the punishment imposed violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that his brother, Daniel Horvath, came to visit and help him move into an apartment in Iowa City on the weekend prior to Monday, August 21, 2000. Plaintiff testified that his brother slept on the couch on Saturday, August 19, 2000, and left early Sunday morning to return home. He further testified that he received a call from his brother advising him that his identification card was missing. Plaintiff testified that he searched the couch where his brother had slept and found the identification card under a cushion. Plaintiff testified that his brother instructed him to put the identification card in a safe place. Plaintiff testified that he placed it in his wallet for safekeeping. Plaintiff stated that he neither received nor used the identification card belonging to his brother for purposes of gaining entrance to any bar or for the purpose of acquiring or consuming alcohol. Plaintiff also testified that he never displayed the identification card to anyone. Plaintiff admitted that he was intoxicated when arrested by the Iowa City police on August 21, 2000, however, he was not present at any bar that day or any day that he was in possession of the identification card. Plaintiff testified that he had been drinking on the night of August 20, 2000; at a private party prior to his arrest during the early morning hours of August 21, 2000. Daniel testified on behalf of plaintiff at the hearing to rescind the suspension of plaintiff's driver's license. Daniel testified to facts that were consistent with plaintiff's testimony. Daniel also testified that he and plaintiff visited bars and drank alcohol while he was in Iowa City with plaintiff. Daniel testified that he had both an Illinois driver's license and state identification card. Following the testimony and argument regarding the constitutionality of section 6-206(a)(10) of the Code, the hearing officer denied plaintiff's request and recommended that the Secretary suspend his license. On January 22, 2002, the Secretary affirmed and adopted the hearing officer's recommendations, denied plaintiff's request for rescission or modification of the order of suspension issued on July 23, 2001, and denied his motion for an employment-restricted driving permit. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County. In addition to the claims alleged in the administrative proceeding, plaintiff claimed that the Secretary's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The circuit court affirmed the order of the Secretary and held that the Secretary's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, section 6-206(a)(10) of the Code was not unconstitutional on its face or as applied to plaintiff in this case and that plaintiff's claim that the punishment in this case violated the proportionate penalties clause lacked merit. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court and the order of the Secretary. ANALYSIS Section 6-206(a)(10) of the Code provides in pertinent part: "Discretionary authority to suspend or revoke license or permit; Right to a hearing. (a) The Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or revoke the driving privileges of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing of the person's records or other sufficient evidence that the person: * * * (10) Has possessed, displayed, or attempted to fraudulently use any license, identification card, or permit not issued to the person[.]" 625 ILCS 6-206(a)(10) (West 2000). On appeal, plaintiff argues that the suspension of his driving privileges pursuant to section 6-206(a)(10) of the Code was unconstitutional. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that section 6-206(a)(10) of the Code violates his right to due process and that it creates an unconstitutional presumption that plaintiff intended to use the card for purposes of obtaining alcohol by merely possessing it. The constitutional provisions implicated are the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, |
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