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SECOND DIVISION
November 26, 2002

Plaintiff Steevy J. Horton filed a complaint foradministrative review seeking to reverse a decision by the Boardof Review of the Department of Employment Security (Board) thathe was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefitsbecause he voluntarily left work without good cause attributableto his employer. 820 ILCS 405/601(A) (West 2000). The circuitcourt reversed the Board's decision, and the Board appealed,contending that its decision followed plaintiff's failure tomaintain his driver's license, which resulted in a constructivevoluntary leaving without good cause attributable to hisemployer.

In 1996, plaintiff began working as a service agent for AvisRent-A-Car (Avis). Avis and the Teamster's union had acollective bargaining agreement which, in part stated:

"As a condition of employment, employee musthave a valid driver's license. Employees whohave their driver's license suspended and/orrevoked will immediately report this statusto the company prior to starting work,failure to do so will result in immediatetermination of employment. Employees who doinform the company will be given a 30 dayleave of absence to secure a valid driver'slicense (this language is applicable to allemployees driving vehicles as part of theirduties)."

In 1999, plaintiff received citations for three trafficviolations. Pursuant to section 6-206(a)(2) of the IllinoisVehicle Code, plaintiff's driver's license was suspended forthree offenses committed within a 12-month period. 625 ILCS 5/6-206(a)(2) (West 2000). Notice of the suspension, effective July25, 2000, was mailed to plaintiff at a 3110 West Fulton address.

On September 13, 2000, plaintiff was discharged from Avis. A letter memorializing his termination stated that the reason forthe discharge was plaintiff's failure to notify his employer ofthe suspension, a direct violation of the collective bargainingagreement.

On September 18, 2000, plaintiff filed for unemploymentbenefits. He indicated that he was discharged for failure tonotify his employer of his license suspension. Plaintiff wasaware that his employer required notification of licensesuspensions, but he stated that he had not been notified of hissuspension.

On October 7, 2000, a claims adjudicator found plaintiffineligible for benefits, because he was discharged for violatinga "known and reasonable company rule." Plaintiff was deniedbenefits under section 602(A) of the Illinois UnemploymentInsurance Act (Act), which provides:

"An individual shall be ineligible forbenefits for the week in which he has beendischarged for misconduct connected with hiswork and, thereafter ***. *** For purposes ofthis subsection, the term 'misconduct' meansthe deliberate and willful violation of areasonable rule or policy of the employingunit, governing the individual's behavior inperformance of his work, provided suchviolation has harmed the employing unit orother employees or has been repeated by theindividual despite a warning or otherexplicit instruction from the employingunit." 820 ILCS 405/602(A) (West 2000).

Plaintiff appealed the adjudicator's decision and received ahearing before a referee on November 2, 2000. At the hearing,plaintiff testified that he did not know his license had beensuspended until his employer informed him of this fact on the dayhe was discharged. Plaintiff testified that he had three movingviolations, but he was not aware that three tickets in one yearcaused his license to be suspended. He did not know of thesuspension because he had moved and the notice of suspension wasdelivered to his former address. Plaintiff did not notify theSecretary of State that he no longer lived at the address listedon his driver's license. However, he did obtain a Stateidentification card on September 16, 1999, which listed hiscurrent address. Plaintiff also stated that he filed a change ofaddress form with the United States Postal Service in January2000. He admitted he knew a valid driver's license was requiredfor employment.

David Hertowski testified on behalf of Avis. Hertowskiexplained that allowing employees to drive company vehicles withsuspended licenses put the company at risk. According toHertowski, a grievance hearing took place on October 10, 2000, atwhich time plaintiff failed to produce evidence that he had avalid license from July 25 to September 13.

The referee upheld the denial of benefits but determinedthat section 602(A) of the Act did not apply. The referee'sdecision stated, "Claimant did not intend to violate the rulethat provided a worker must notify the company of [his] driver'slicense's suspension. His wanton and wilful misconduct is notestablished. He was not discharged and the misconductdisqualification is not applicable to this claim."

Rather, the referee denied plaintiff benefits under section601A of the Act, which provides: "An individual shall beineligible for benefits *** [if] he has left work voluntarilywithout good cause attributable to the employing unit ***." 820ILCS 405/601(A) (West 2000). She reasoned that there were nounilateral changes in the nature of plaintiff's work, and thathis disqualification for the job was solely his responsibility.

Plaintiff appealed to the Board, which issued a decisionaffirming the referee, finding that plaintiff voluntarily leftwork without good cause attributable to his employer. Thecircuit court reversed the Board's decision on administrativereview, and the Board has appealed.

In cases involving a claim for unemployment insurance, theBoard is the trier of fact, and its findings of fact areconsidered prima facie true and correct. Caterpillar, Inc. v.Department of Employment Security, 313 Ill. App. 3d 645, 653(2000). A court conducting administrative review will notreweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of theagency. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor RelationsBoard, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998).

Plaintiff maintains that the Board's decision presents aquestion of law and is subject to de novo review, while the Boardmaintains that this case presents a mixed question of law andfact to which the more deferential "clearly erroneous" standardof review applies. The examination of the legal effect of agiven set of facts is a mixed question of law and fact. AFMMessenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198Ill. 2d 380, 391 (2001). The issue in a mixed question of lawand fact is "whether the rule of law as applied to theestablished facts is or is not violated." AFM Messenger, 198Ill. 2d at 391.

In the present case, the Board's decision presents a mixedquestion of law and fact. Its decision is, in part, factualbecause it involves considering whether the facts support theagency's findings that plaintiff was not discharged and did notengage in misconduct. AFM Messenger, 198 Ill. 2d at 392. Also,the Board's decision concerns a question of law because"discharge," "constructive voluntary leaving," and "misconduct"are legal terms and concepts requiring interpretation. AFMMessenger, 198 Ill. 2d at 392. "[W]hen the decision of anadministrative agency presents a mixed question of law and fact,the agency decision will be deemed 'clearly erroneous' only wherethe reviewing court, on the entire record, is 'left with thedefinite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" AFM Messenger, 198 Ill. 2d at 395, quoting United States v.United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 92 L.Ed. 746, 766,68 S.Ct. 525, 542 (1948).

The Board found that plaintiff was solely responsible forhis termination and that his actions amounted to a constructivevoluntary leaving without good cause attributable to hisemployer. The Board asserts that the constructive voluntaryleaving case Hawkins v. Department of Employment Security, 268Ill. App. 3d 927 (1994), is controlling. The plaintiff in thatcase was a bus driver who was terminated for failing to obtain acommercial driver's license by the date required by his employer. In Hawkins, we upheld the Board's denial of benefits, concludingthat the plaintiff's failure to obtain the required license wasattributable to his own inaction. We reasoned that the Board'sfinding that the plaintiff voluntarily left his job was supportedby the record. Hawkins noted that the purpose of theUnemployment Insurance Act is to provide monetary benefits topersons who become involuntarily unemployed, but that anemployee's discharge resulting from his failure to obtain arequired license stems from his own inaction rather than anyaction attributable to the employer. Hawkins, 268 Ill. App. 3dat 930-31. Likewise, in this case, plaintiff's failure tomaintain a valid driver's license rendered him unable to meet anecessary condition of his employment. As plaintiff voluntarilyleft his job without good cause attributable to his employer, heis ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Hawkins, 268Ill. App. 3d at 930.

Plaintiff relies on Arroyo v. Doherty, 296 Ill. App. 3d 839(1998), to support his argument that his termination wasinvoluntary, and he is thus entitled to unemployment insurancebenefits. In Arroyo, the plaintiff was terminated after she didnot report to work for six weeks. Plaintiff relies upon Arroyoto support his contention that where an employee is terminated,there can never be a determination that his actions constitutedconstructive voluntary leaving. However, in Arroyo, theplaintiff was terminated for prolonged medical absence, aspecific "good cause" exception to section 601(A). Arroyo, 296Ill. App. 3d at 845-46; 820 ILCS 405/601(B)(1) (West 2000). Shenever did anything to disqualify herself from continuedemployment, and therefore, the court did not discuss the theoryof constructive voluntary leaving.

Plaintiff contends that even if his separation from work isa voluntary constructive leave, it is attributable to hisemployer. He cites to the Teamster's contract and asserts thatAvis was contractually obligated to provide him a 30-day absenceto secure a valid driver's license. However, Avis was onlyrequired to do so in the event that its employee immediatelynotified the company of a suspension prior to reporting to work. The contract plainly states, "failure to [immediately reportstatus of suspended license] will result in immediate terminationof employment." Therefore, plaintiff's reliance on thatprovision is unavailing.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the circuit courtand reinstate the order of the Board.

Circuit court reversed, Board decision reinstated.

CERDA and CAHILL, JJ., concur.