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FIRST DIVISION
MAY 6, 2002

JUSTICE COUSINS delivered the opinion of the court:

On January 22, 1999, Horace Mann Insurance Company (HoraceMann) filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declarationthat Horace Mann had no obligation to submit to arbitration or toprovide insurance coverage under its policy to Marion Williams,Erica Williams (deceased), and Eugene Williams, asserting thatthey were not insured under the policy issued to ShirleneWilliams.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Thetrial court granted Horace Mann's motion for summary judgment anddenied the Williamses' cross-motion. The Williamses filed amotion for reconsideration. The motion was denied. ShirleneWilliams, Marion Williams, as administratrix of the estate ofErica Williams, and Eugene Williams appeal the trial court'sorder granting summary judgment and present the following issueson appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred as a matter of lawin granting Horace Mann's motion for summary judgment and indenying defendants' motion for reconsideration; (2) whether theterm "lives with," as it is used in the policy of insurance, isambiguous and should be strictly construed against the insurerand in favor of the covered; and (3) whether, after viewing theevidence in the light most favorable to the defendants, there isample evidence in the record to support the fact that Marion,Erica, and Eugene Williams lived with the named insured, ShirleneWilliams.

BACKGROUND

Marion Williams and Shirlene Williams have lived in abuilding on Constance Avenue in Chicago, Illinois, since Augustor September 1984. The building was originally built as a two-flat. The building has a first floor apartment and a secondfloor apartment. Each apartment has a separate kitchen with arefrigerator, a dining room, and three bedrooms.

Shirlene Williams, her mother, Rachel Williams, herdaughter, Allison, and her sister, Marion Williams, and Marion'stwo children, Erica and Eugene Williams resided in the building. Also residing in the building was Charles Wright. Wright isErica and Eugene's father and Marion's live-in boyfriend.

On December 28, 1988, Horace Mann issued an automobilepolicy to Shirlene Williams. On May 29, 1989, Erica and EugeneWilliams were passengers in a vehicle driven by Charles Wrightwhich collided with another vehicle. Eugene suffered injuriesand Erica suffered fatal injuries as a result of the accident. Shirlene Williamses policy was in effect at the time of theaccident.

On November 6, 1998, attorney Edward Scanlon sent a letterto Horace Mann on behalf of Marion Williams, as administratrix ofthe estate of Erica Williams, and Eugene Williams, requestingcoverage under the uninsured and underinsured motorist provisionsof the policy issued to Shirlene Williams. Marion Williamsdemanded $200,000 in the settlement of her claim, $100,000representing the policy limit for uninsured motorist coverage and$100,000 for underinsured motorist coverage. Eugene Williamsdemanded $30,000 under the uninsured motorist coverage and$30,000 for underinsured motorist coverage. The Williamsesfurther sought arbitration.

On December 2, 1998, Horace Mann advised attorney Scanlonthat there existed questions of coverage under the policy and theWilliamses request for arbitration was denied until the questionsof coverage were resolved by a court of law.

The policy at issue here provides:

"Who is an insured?

When we refer to your car, a newly acquired car or atemporary substitute car insured means:

1. you;

2. your relatives ***." (Emphasis omitted and added.)

A "relative" is defined by the policy as "a person related to youby blood, marriage or adoption who lives with you." (Emphasisadded.)

Horace Mann filed a complaint for declaratory judgment onJanuary 22, 1999, asserting that Marion Williams did not have anyrights under the policy of insurance issued to Shirlene Williamsand Horace Mann had no duty to submit to arbitration with theWilliamses.

The Williamses answered the complaint, requesting the courtto order Horace Mann to arbitrate the claims, to declare thatHorace Mann had an obligation to Marion, Erica, and EugeneWilliams under the policy, and to declare that Marion, Erica, andEugene Williams were insured under the policy with Horace Mann. The Williamses reasoned that Marion, Erica, and Eugene Williamswere all living with Shirlene Williams on December 28, 1988, andMay 29, 1989, and, accordingly, were insured under the terms andconditions of the policy.

Marion Williams stated during deposition that the twointerior doors in the foyer of the two-flat building were"[n]ever ever locked." She stated that the keys used to lock andunlock the interior doors were not the same keys used on the mainentrance. The upstairs apartment had one kitchen, one livingroom, one dining room, and one bathroom. The downstairsapartment also had one kitchen, one living room, one dining room,and one bathroom. Additionally, there was a kitchen area andbathroom in the basement. The building contained one washer andone dryer located in the basement that everyone used. MarionWilliams testified that her mother, Rachel Williams, cooked foreveryone in the house in the downstairs kitchen and they atetheir meals downstairs, as well.

Marion stated that there were three separate phone lines inthe building and all three were used by all members of the house. Marion explained that she primarily used one particular phoneline because the other phone line was the line that her sister,Shirlene, used to "operate her TDD." The phone line that Marionused rang only upstairs. The other two numbers at the addressrang downstairs.

Marion Williams testified that the "gas bill comes for thewhole house," the electric bills come separately and each comeaddressed to Shirlene Williams, and she pays half of the electricbill. Marion stated that tax bills and mortgage bills were inboth her name and Shirlene's name.

Marion was asked the following during deposition:

"Q. Now, your daughter Erica Williams and your nieceAllison Jenkins are actually biologically first cousins,correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. How did they consider themselves, though, while theylived together in your home at 7824 South Constance.

A. As sisters.

Q. Did they share a bedroom together?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. Where was that bedroom located?

A. On the first floor.

Q. From time to time, would they also come upstairs, thetwo of them, that being Allison Jenkins and your deceaseddaughter Erica Williams, did they come up to the secondfloor from time to time?

A. Yes. Yes, they did.

Q. To sleep I mean?

A. Yes, yes. To sleep, yes.

Q. Were the arrangements with respect to where a personslept on a particular night kind of open inasmuch as therewere six bedrooms in the building itself?

A. You're right. Wherever you could pick a spot, ifthere wasn't noise, or if you could beat that person therefirst, yes, yes."

Marion also stated that her bedroom was upstairs.

At deposition, Charles Wright stated that he has lived inthe home on Constance Avenue since 1984. Marion Williams,Shirlene Williams, Marion and Shirlene's mother, Rachel Williams,Allison Jenkins, and Wright's two children, Erica and EugeneWilliams, also lived there. He testified that Allison lived bothupstairs and downstairs. Wright explained that "[i]t was like abig house." He stated that there were two apartments in thehouse, one upstairs and one downstairs.

Wright further stated that the two interior doors had lockson them, but the doors were open all of the time. Wrighttestified that he used only one phone number and that phonenumber rang on the second floor. He stated that there wasanother phone line that rang on the first floor, but neither ofthe phone numbers rang on both floors. His phone number wasplaced in Shirlene Williams' name. Wright stated that he did notpay his phone bill and payment was worked out between Shirleneand Marion. When Wright received mail at the home, it was notaddressed to the second floor, just to the street address. Counsel asked Wright, "Do you know whose name the other phoneline is in?" He responded, "Shirlene, if I'm not mistaken."

The following colloquy also occurred during deposition:

"Q. Did you pay the--do you know how many ComEd billswere received per month at 7824 South Constance?

A. I know one because I know one was for me. But I guessthey got one of their own. I know I got one.

Q. When you say 'one of their own,' what do you mean bythat?

A. I guess for Shirlene.

Q. So was one ComEd bill for upstairs?

A. Well, for me, yeah, for upstairs, yeah.

Q. Was that in your name?

A. Yes.

Q. And Shirlene received a separate ComEd bill fordownstairs?

A. Yeah, I guess so."

Wright testified that each of the kitchens in the home hadtheir own major appliances, such as a stove, sink andrefrigerator. Wright was further asked:

"Q. In May of 1989 when you ate meals at your home, withwhom did you eat?

A. It's hard to say. Most times I would come in and itwould be late at night they eating dinner. So most times Iwould be upstairs, second floor, by myself. ***

Q. When you were eating your meals with others, whocooked these meals?

A. Well, I guess Shirlene would cook some, Ms. Williams,Racheal [sic], would cook some, or Marion. Everybody just,you know, would chip in and help.

Q. Where were these meals cooked?

A. Sometimes upstairs, sometimes downstairs. Whereverthey happened to be gathering at the moment."

Wright also testified that his daughter, Erica, wouldfrequently sleep downstairs, in the same bedroom with Allison. His daughter, Erica, did not have her own bedroom or bedupstairs. Wright slept upstairs with his girlfriend, Marion. When Erica slept upstairs, she would sleep in the same bed asWright and Marion.

The following colloquy is taken from Shirlene Williams'deposition:

"Q. Who sleeps on the first floor?

A. Me, my mother, my daughter, and Erica did stay there.

Q. And as of the date of the accident in May 1989, whoslept on the second floor?

A. Marion, Eugene, and Erica.

Q. Is that all?

A. Yes.

Q. And at the time of the accident, who did you eat yourmeals with?

A. All of us ate together."

On June 19, 2000, Horace Mann filed a motion for summaryjudgment. Horace Mann maintained that Marion, Erica, and EugeneWilliams were not insureds under the policy because none was arelative that lived with Shirlene Williams, and, therefore,Marion Williams, as administrator of the estate of EricaWilliams, did not have any rights under the insurance policyissued to Shirlene Williams.

On August 15, 2000, the Williamses filed a cross-motion forsummary judgment. On October 6, 2000, the trial court entered anorder granting summary judgment to Horace Mann and denying theWilliamses' cross-motion for summary judgment. The court deniedthe Williamses' subsequent motion for reconsideration.

ANALYSIS

Appellate courts apply a de novo standard when reviewingsummary judgment rulings. Outboard Marine Corp. v. LibertyMutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d 1204(1992). Where there are no genuine issues of material fact,summary judgment is a proper method of disposing of a cause. Smith v. Allstate Insurance Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 246, 251, 726N.E.2d 1 (1999). Summary judgment is appropriate only when thepleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, ifany, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact andthat the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. Smith, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 251.

Where a reasonable person could draw divergent inferencesfrom undisputed facts, summary judgment should be denied. Pynev. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 358-59, 544 N.E.2d 1304 (1989). Towithstand a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party need notprove his case at this preliminary stage, but must present somefactual basis that would support his claim. Taliaferro v. OneGrand Place Venture, 256 Ill. App. 3d 429, 432, 628 N.E.2d 815(1993).

I

The Williamses assert that the trial court erred in itsentry of summary judgment in favor of Horace Mann. Theymaintain that genuine issues of material fact remain as towhether Marion, Eugene, and Erica Williams were living withShirlene Williams on May 29, 1989. Horace Mann responds that thefacts demonstrate that neither Marion, Erica or Eugene Williamswas living with Shirlene Williams at the time of the accident,and, thus, they are not entitled to coverage under ShirleneWilliams' insurance policy.

The policy at issue here defines "relative" as "a personrelated to you by blood, marriage or adoption who lives withyou." (Emphasis added.) This definition has two prongs thatmust be met in order for coverage to apply. The first prong isthat the claimant must be related to the insured by "blood,marriage or adoption." Marion, as Shirlene's sister, and Ericaand Eugene, as Marion's children, satisfy the first prong in thatthey are related to Shirlene Williams by blood. However, theymust also prove the second prong, which requires that theclaimant must live with the insured.

As the nonmoving party, the Williamses must present somefactual basis that would support their claim that either Marion,Erica, or Eugene was a relative that lived with Shirlene Williamsat the time of the accident in accordance with the meaning andintent of the parties to the insurance contract. See Taliaferro,256 Ill. App. 3d at 432. The Williamses assert that the evidenceoffered by Horace Mann was insufficient to foreclose all genuineissues of material fact and contend that the fact that thebuilding was originally constructed as a two-flat has noprobative value as to how the families lived within it. Wedisagree.

The record in the instant case establishes that Marion andShirlene Williams divided the payments for the mortgage, buildingtaxes, gas bill, and electrical bills of the two-flat buildingthat they purchased as joint tenants in 1984. The foyer of thehome contained two doors, one of which led to the upstairsapartment and the other to the first-floor apartment. While itis true that Marion and Shirlene were sisters, that Marion'sdaughter, Erica, and Shirlene's daughter, Allison, regardedthemselves as sisters, and that the persons living in thebuilding ate most of their meals together, the building containedseparate apartments, each with a separate kitchen, dining room,and three bedrooms. The living arrangement of the familiesestablishes that Shirlene Williams' family and Marion Williams'family were two related families living in separate apartments. Marion Williams and Charles Wright and their family lived in theupstairs apartment and Shirlene Williams, Shirlene and Marion'smother, Rachel Williams, and Shirlene's daughter, Allison, livedin the downstairs apartment. The fact that they have had accessto each other's apartments and ate meals together does not createthe "lives with" aspect of coverage eligibility.

Although Marion and her children and Shirlene wererelatives, the facts, considered in the light most favorable tothe defendants, do not support the contention that MarionWilliams, Erica Williams, and Eugene Williams were relatives thatlived with the insured, Shirlene Williams, at the time of theaccident, as intended by the insurance policy issued by HoraceMann. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in grantingsummary judgment in favor of Horace Mann.

II

The Williamses also contend that the term "lives with," asused in the insurance policy, is ambiguous and requiresinterpretation in favor of coverage. Horace Mann responds thatthe language as set forth in the policy is unambiguous. Weagree.

In construing insurance policies, the court's primarypurpose is to determine and to give effect to the intention ofthe parties, as expressed in the agreement. Outboard Marine, 154Ill. 2d at 108. All parts of an insurance contract are to beconsidered together in order to ascertain the meaning and intentof the parties. Grevas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,152 Ill. 2d 407, 410, 604 N.E.2d 942 (1992).

A policy provision is ambiguous only if it is subject tomore than one reasonable interpretation. United States Fidelity& Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64, 74, 578N.E.2d 926 (1991). If the language of an insurance policy isambiguous, it must be construed against the insurance company andin favor of the insured. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Gonzalez-Loya, 226 Ill. App. 3d 446, 449, 589 N.E.2d 882 (1992). However,if a policy of insurance is clear and unambiguous, it must beenforced according to its terms. Allstate, 226 Ill. App. 3d at449.

The policy at issue here defines "relative" as "a personrelated to you by blood, marriage or adoption who lives with you. It includes your unmarried and dependent child who is away atschool." (Emphasis added.) In the Williamses' view, the term"lives with" is susceptible to more than one reasonableinterpretation and is therefore ambiguous.

Horace Mann cites State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.v. Taussig, 227 Ill. App. 3d 913, 592 N.E.2d 332 (1992). InTaussig, State Farm sought a declaratory judgment that it owed noduty to defend or indemnify defendant, Mark Taussig, againstcertain claims arising out of an automobile accident. Taussig,227 Ill. App. 3d at 914. State Farm issued an automobileliability insurance policy to Taussig's father. The policyprovided coverage to the insured and his or her "relative." A"relative" was defined as a person related to the insured byblood, marriage or adoption who lived with the insured. Taussig,227 Ill. App. 3d at 915. In December 1987, defendant moved fromhis parents home in Highland Park to an apartment in Evanston. Defendant was employed full time and ate most of his meals at theapartment. Defendant returned to Highland Park three or fourtimes during the first month after moving to Evanston. Defendantstated that he considered the Evanston apartment a temporaryliving situation and that his permanent address was in HighlandPark. The court held that no ambiguity existed in the policydefinition of "relative" and was unpersuaded by defendant'sargument that because he still had a room in his parents' homeand left some of his personal belongings there and continued touse the mailing address, he was still living with them. Taussig,227 Ill. App. 3d at 916. Moreover, the court wrote: "the factthat defendant continued to use the mailing address andoccasionally visited his parents is not sufficient to meet the'living with' standard for purposes of this insurance policy." Taussig, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 916.

In our view, Taussig is not dispositive of the issue beforeus because no contention was made in Taussig that an ambiguityexisted in the term "lives with." We hold that the term "liveswith" as used in the policy issued by Horace Mann in the instantcase is not ambiguous. Whether or not a relative lives with aninsured is a factual determination and is resolved according tothe particular facts of a case. Our review of the depositionsand exhibits before the trial court establish that MarionWilliams and her children were related to Shirlene Williams, butwere not related persons living with the insured for purposes ofcoverage. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant ofsummary judgment in favor of Horace Mann.

Affirmed.

COHEN, P.J., and McNULTY, J., concur.