Holland v. City of Chicago
Case Date: 06/27/1997
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-95-2491
|
June 27, 1997 No. 1-95-2491 NORMAN HOLLAND, CARLYLE JAKOVEC, ) Appeal from the SALVATORE TRICOCI, THOMAS KELLY, ) Circuit Court of and JAMES McDONOUGH, individually ) Cook County. and on behalf of all others ) similarly situated and derivatively) on behalf of the Policemen's ) Annuity and Benefit Fund and the ) Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund ) No. 90 CH 9756 of Chicago, ) ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) v. ) The Honorable ) Dorothy Kirie Kinnaird, THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal ) Judge, Presiding. corporation; RICHARD M. DALEY, ) Mayor of the City of Chicago; ) MIRIAM SANTOS, Treasurer of the ) City of Chicago and Trustee of the ) Policemen's Annuity and Benefit ) Fund and Firemen's Annuity and ) Benefit Fund of Chicago; WALTER ) KNORR, Comptroller of the City of ) Chicago and Trustee of the ) Policemen's Annuity and Benefit ) Fund and Firemen's Annuity and ) Benefit Fund of Chicago; WALTER ) KOZUBOWSKI, former City Clerk of ) the City of Chicago and Former ) Trustee of the Firemen's Annuity ) and Benefit Fund of Chicago; ) ERNEST WISH, City Clerk and ) Trustee of the Firemen's Annuity ) and Benefit Fund; RUSSELL EWERT, ) THOMAS ALLISON, CHESTER JASKOLA, ) Former Trustees and CHARLES R. ) LOFTUS, RONALD R. NORRIS, GARY B. ) HELMS, ROBERT F. RUESCHE and ) RICHARD J. JONES, Trustees of the ) Policemen's Annuity and Benefit ) Fund, and JAMES T. NOLAN, FRED ) GAWRYK, JOSEPH F. QUINN, WILLIAM ) J. WILKINSON and JAMES T. JOYCE, ) Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity ) and Benefit Fund of Chicago, and ) DONALD STENSLAND, Former Trustee, ) all as direct and/or derivative ) defendants; and THE RETIREMENT ) BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY ) AND BENEFIT FUND and THE ) RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN'S ) ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF ) CHICAGO as direct defendants only, ) ) Defendants-Appellees. ) JUSTICE HOURIHANE delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiffs, current or former members of the Chicago police and fire departments, who are or will be entitled to receive retirement benefits, brought an action against the City of Chicago (City), various city officials, the trustees of the Policemen's and Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Funds (hereafter Policemen's and Firemen's Pension Funds or the Funds), and the Retirement Boards of the Funds (hereafter pension boards or boards), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that the City failed to report to the pension boards the full amount of "salary" paid to plaintiffs, contrary to the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 1994 and Supp. 1995)), thereby decreasing plaintiffs' total vested pension benefits. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants' practice of excluding certain items of compensation from "salary" deprived plaintiffs of their due process rights in violation of federal civil rights law. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1988). The circuit court dismissed all of plaintiffs' claims with prejudice either on the pleadings, pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994)), or pursuant to the provisions of section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1994). Plaintiffs appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 301. The principal issue on review is whether the circuit court properly construed the Pension Code to exclude certain items of compensation from "salary" for purposes of calculating pension contributions and benefits. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ANALYSIS As a preliminary matter, the Funds argue that judicial review of certain counts of the complaint is barred because plaintiffs ran afoul of the Administrative Review Law. 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 1994). We decline to entertain the Funds' argument as it finds no support in the record before this court. As to the principal issue on appeal, plaintiff police officers contend that the following items of compensation, negotiated under one or more collective bargaining agreements, fall within the definition of "salary" as used in Article 5 of the Pension Code: duty availability allowance, uniform allowance, overtime pay, holiday pay, optional pay for personal days, pay for baby furlough days, final vacation pay, pay for work out of grade, and supplemental pay for sergeants, lieutenants and captains. Plaintiffs also claim that a one-time lump sum payment of $1,250 made during 1989 pursuant to an arbitration award also constitutes "salary". Plaintiff firefighters contend that the following items of compensation fall within the definition of "salary" under Article 6 of the Pension Code: shift reduction allowance, clothing allowance, overtime pay, holiday pay, final vacation pay, pay received for acting out of classification, pay received for attending recertification training seminars during off-duty hours, pay for unused administrative days, training instructor incentive pay, and a $1,250 one-time lump sum payment made during 1988. All of these pay provisions arise under the firefighters' collective bargaining agreements. The circuit court concluded that none of the disputed compensation items constitute "salary" for purposes of the Pension Code. The court noted that there was no evidence that the legislature intended that the additional benefits firefighters and police officers receive under their labor contracts should be included in salary, and that "salary" means "the base salary in the budget line item as appropriated in the municipality's appropriation ordinance." Plaintiffs argue that the language of the Pension Code, the Illinois Constitution, and caselaw construing the Pension Code require the opposite conclusion, and that pension rights cannot be decided based on how the City and the unions label a pay provision. We agree with defendants that the circuit court correctly construed the Pension Code. The primary object of statutory construction is to give effect to the true intent of the legislature. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656 (1995). Such inquiry necessarily begins with the language employed in the statute, as this is the best evidence of the legislature's intent. Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d at 189. Where a statute defines its own terms, those terms will be construed in accordance with the statutory definitions. Puss N Boots, Inc. v. Mayor's License Comm'n of the City of Chicago, 232 Ill. App. 3d 984, 987, 597 N.E.2d 650 (1992). Absent such definitions, the words used in a statute will be given their plain and ordinary meanings. Eagan v. Chicago Transit Authority, 158 Ill. 2d 527, 531-32, 634 N.E.2d 1093 (1994). In ascertaining the plain and ordinary meaning of words, courts have used the dictionary as a resource. People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 1, 15, 585 N.E.2d 51 (1992). We turn first to the provisions of Article 5 of the Pension Code which governs policemen's annuity and benefit funds. Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund Section 5-114 of the Pension Code defines a police officer's "salary" as follows: "(a) Annual salary, provided that $2,600 shall be the maximum amount of salary to be considered for any purpose under this Act prior to July 1, 1927. (b) Annual salary, provided that $3,000 shall be the maximum amount of salary to be considered for any purpose under this Act from July 1, 1927 to July 1, 1931. (c) Annual salary, provided that the annual salary shall be considered for age and service annuity, minimum annuity and disability benefits and $3,000 shall be the maximum amount of salary to be considered for prior service annuity, widow's annuity, widow's prior service annuity and child's annuity from July 1, 1931 to July 1, 1933. (d) Beginning July 1, 1933, annual salary of a policeman appropriated for members of his rank or grade in the city's annual budget or appropriation bill, subject to the following: (1) For age and service annuity, minimum annuity and disability benefits, the amount of annual salary without limitation; (2) For prior service annuity, widow's annuity, widow's prior service annuity and child's annuity from July 1, 1933 to July 1, 1957, the amount of annual salary up to a maximum of $3,000; beginning July 1, 1957, for such annuities the amount of annual salary without limitation. (3) When the salary appropriated is for a definite period of service of less than 12 months in any one year, disability benefits shall be computed on a daily wage basis computed by dividing the amount appropriated by 365. (e) For a policeman assigned to a non-civil service position as provided in Section 5-174 from and after January 1, 1970, (with the hereinafter stated excess not considered as salary for any purpose of this Article for any of the years prior to 1970 except to the extent provided by the election in Section 5-174), annual salary means the total salary derived from appropriations applicable to the civil service rank plus the excess over such amount paid for service in the non-civil service position." (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/5-114 (West 1994). Plaintiffs focus on the "without limitation" language in subsection (d)(1) and argue that the obvious meaning of this language is that the legislature intended that all compensation, in whatever form, be included in salary for pension purposes, as long as the funds were budgeted and appropriated by the City. We disagree. When interpreting a statute, it must be viewed as a whole. People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 420, 425, 656 N.E.2d 118 (1995). Thus, a particular provision must not be read in isolation, but rather must be read in conjunction with all other relevant provisions. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Miller, 190 Ill. App. 3d 240, 244, 546 N.E.2d 700 (1989); Acevedo, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 425. Plaintiffs' reading of subsection (d)(1) ignores the preceding subsections. Subsections (a), (b), and (c), which define "salary" for various time periods prior to July 1, 1933, all set a dollar cap on the amount of salary that is to be considered for purposes of Article 5 of the Pension Code. Subsection (d)(1), on the other hand, which covers the period beginning July 1, 1933, refers to "annual salary without limitation". Plainly this language was not intended to enlarge the definition of salary, but rather is indicative only that, unlike prior periods, no dollar cap applies. Similarly, the reference in subsection (d)(2) to "annual salary without limitation" is in contrast to the preceding portion of (d)(2) which refers to the annual salary, up to a certain maximum amount, when computing prior service annuity and widow's and child's annuity for different time periods. Plaintiffs also focus on subsection (e), which provides that annual salary of officers in non-civil service positions shall be the "total appropriations applicable to civil service rank plus the excess over such amount paid for service in the non-civil service position." Plaintiffs contend that the legislature's inclusion of excess compensation derived from the non-civil service position provides conclusive evidence that the legislature intended police officers to receive credit for all appropriated compensation. We cannot agree. We read subsection (e) to mean only that police officers appointed to a non-civil service position will not be penalized by such appointment and thus receive credit for salary attributable to their civil service rank, and any excess paid by virtue of their non-civil service appointment. Plaintiffs' strained interpretation of section 5-114 fails to take into account the unambiguous language found in subsection (d). Subsection (d) plainly states that a police officer's "salary" is the "annual salary of a policeman appropriated for members of his rank or grade in the city's annual budget or appropriation bill". While there is no question that the disputed items of compensation have been duly appropriated by the City as part of the police department's annual budget, plaintiffs cite to nothing in any of the City's appropriation ordinances which demonstrates that such items of compensation have been appropriated as "salary" by "rank or grade". We note that the appropriation ordinance for the City of Chicago, Department of Police, includes a section which lists each "position" within the police department, the number of each position, and the "rate", i.e., "salary", attached to the position. There is no indication that such salary figures include any of the disputed items of compensation. Rather, based on the record before this court, the rates appear to coincide with the "basic salary schedule" set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. We also observe that, with one exception (that being the $1,250 lump sum payment), all of the disputed items of compensation arise by virtue of one or more negotiated labor contracts and that plaintiffs cite to no provision in such contracts indicating that these additional items are intended to be treated as "salary" for purposes of pension contributions. As to the $1,250 payment, the arbitrator referred to it not as salary, but as a "signing bonus". Irrespective of how the various components of a police officer's total compensation are treated in the City's annual appropriation ordinance or in the relevant labor contracts, we are not persuaded that the disputed items of compensation should otherwise be included in "annual salary" for purposes of computing pension contributions and benefits. Jahn v. Woodstock, 99 Ill. App. 3d 206, 425 N.E.2d 490 (1981), on which the circuit court relied, provides some guidance. In Jahn, the court considered whether the term "salary", as used in Article 3 of the Pension Code (which governs police pension funds in municipalities of less than 500,000 inhabitants), should be read to include insurance premiums paid by a municipality on behalf of police officers. The court looked to the definition of "salary" set out in section 3-125(2) which specifically excludes overtime pay, holiday pay, bonus pay, merit pay, or any other cash benefit over and above the salary established in the appropriation ordinance. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1979) ch. 108 |