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SIXTH DIVISION
May 27, 2005

JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury returned a verdict awarding damages to defendant Interior Pacific Flight Systems (Interior) and John Mitchell, inan action for breach of contract. The court ordered defendantsto return to plaintiff, Paul Heinrich, some of his property indefendants' possession, or to allow Heinrich a setoff for theproperty. Defendants did neither. At a hearing on a motion fora rule to show cause, the court entered a final judgment thatleft both parties to recover nothing from each other. Defendantsappeal. We find that the court did not abuse its discretion byentering the judgment as a sanction for defendants' violation ofcourt orders. Accordingly, we affirm.

Heinrich needed a new fuselage for his aircraft. Hepurchased a fuselage from Interior, and Interior agreed toinstall the fuselage. Interior took Heinrich's aircraft,together with some separate parts Heinrich owned, to itsfacilities to make the necessary modifications. Heinrichretrieved the modified aircraft in 1998. In 2000 Heinrich suedInterior and Mitchell, Interior's president, for breach ofcontract. Defendants counterclaimed for breach of the samecontract. Heinrich alleged that defendants failed to make allpromised repairs and defendants claimed that Heinrich failed tomake all promised payments.

Before trial the court entered an agreed order datedDecember 20, 2000, directing defendants to

"segregate, sequester, and preserve as evidence in thiscause personal property belonging to HEINRICH; namely,aircraft parts (a schedule of which is attached heretoand incorporated herein ***) until further order ofcourt."

The list attached to the agreed order identified, amongst otheritems, a set of flaps, a set of flying wires, an oil gauge, andan original operating handbook as items Heinrich owned thatremained in Interior's possession in December 2000.

Heinrich submitted an affidavit detailing the replacementcosts of some of the items. For those items Heinrich showed areplacement cost exceeding $15,000. The affidavit did not listreplacement costs for some other items Heinrich identified as"irreplaceable."

In a pretrial ruling the court decided not to submit to thejury any issue concerning the value of the parts defendantsretained. Heinrich testified that he paid "probably 18 to 20,000[dollars for] those parts." He added that the "replacement value*** probably was 35 to $40,000."

The jury found that Interior fulfilled its part of thecontract and Heinrich owed Interior $19,000. The court enteredjudgment on the verdict by order dated June 19, 2001. Thejudgment order also provided:

"[B]ased upon open court representations of defensecounsel, that the Defendants will return the airplaneparts alluded to in this court's prior order [ofDecember 2000], this court retains jurisdiction of theparties *** and hereby orders that:

a) The airplane parts owned by the Plaintiffare returned to him by the Defendants withinthirty (30) days following entry of thisorder.

***

c) The prior order of this court regardingthe Defendants' maintenance of the airplaneparts remains in full force and effect untilthe parts are returned to the Plaintiff."

Heinrich filed a posttrial motion seeking a judgmentnotwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Heinrich later movedfor a rule to show cause, claiming that defendants failed toreturn the listed aircraft parts as the court ordered. At thehearing on the posttrial motions, held August 23, 2001, the courtfound that the evidence supported the jury's finding thatInterior made the promised repairs. The court added:

"On the counter claim, there is a discrepancybetween the exact amount asked for by the [defendants]here, which was something in the range of $18,000 plus,and the jury came back with $19,000. That [award ofdamages] is contrary to the manifest weight of theevidence.

I don't know what that amount [of actual damages]is. So if you can tell me what that amount is withsome certainty, I would be happy to remit it to thatamount, and that will be in judgment on the counterclaim."

The written order, entered following the hearing, provided:

"The dollar amount of the judgment will beprovided by the co-defendants *** within fifteen (15)days of execution of this order."

The order also set a hearing on the rule to show cause and said:

"The enforcement of the judgment is stayed untilhearing date or until the court is notified by theparties that the issues addressed in plaintiff's Motionfor Rule to Show Cause have been resolved. ***

*** Evidence of value of the parts in controversywill be presented to the court following the court'sruling on the affidavits and briefs[,] (a) if theparties cannot stipulate to value, and (b) if the courtfinds that the defendant(s) failed to comply with thiscourt's orders of December 20, 2000 and June 19, 2001.

*** Sanctions shall only be assessed to the partyagainst whom the court rules *** if *** the defendantsfail to comply with the court's order of August 23,2001 within fourteen (14) days or fail to givefinancial credit for the value of the parts withinfourteen (14) days following the ruling of the court[on the motion for rule to show cause]."

In response to the order, Mitchell swore in an affidavitthat the flaps and the flying wires were used in Heinrich'splane. Heinrich took them and the operating handbook when hetook the plane, long before the court entered the agreed orderdated December 2000. Mitchell also swore that Interior tradedHeinrich's oil gauge for a new one that it installed intoHeinrich's plane, years before December 2000. The record onappeal includes no response from Interior and Mitchell to theorder for a specification of losses due to Heinrich's breach ofcontract.

Heinrich swore in an affidavit that he received some of theparts listed in the December 2000 order, but he never recovered anumber of items, including the flaps, the flying wires, the oilgauge, and the operating handbook.

On February 24, 2004, at the conclusion of the hearing onthe motion for a rule to show cause, the judge signed an orderInterior's counsel drafted. The order, in the nearly illegiblecopy included in the record, appears to state:

"Judgment of $19,000 entered by Order of 19 June 2001*** is reinstated and the subsequent stay *** isvacated.

***

The ct Reviewed the list of items to be returnedto pl & list of items *** offsets the [judgment for]$19,000.00. Therefore the Rule to Show [Cause] isdenied."

Defendants now appeal.

Because the order disposes of all pending claims, this courthas jurisdiction to consider the case pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301).

To determine our standard of review, we must first ascertainthe nature of the order from which defendants appeal. "A court'sorder must be construed in a reasonable manner, *** withreference to other parts of the record, including the pleadings,so as to give effect to the apparent intention of the trialcourt." American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Department ofRevenue, 242 Ill. App. 3d 716, 720 (1993).

In August 2001, the trial court found that the jury hadawarded Interior an excessive verdict. The court vacated thejudgment entered on the verdict and directed Interior to providea specification of its loss. As the court directed thepresentation of evidence of the amount lost, the order is adiscovery order. Two and a half years later defendants still hadfailed to respond.

In 2001 the court also ordered Interior to return toHeinrich all of the airplane parts listed as in defendants'possession in the agreed order of December 2000. The order ofDecember 2000, which specifically directs defendants to preservethe parts as evidence, also qualifies as a discovery order. Interior responded to the motion for rule to show cause with anattack on the agreed order. Mitchell in his affidavit swore thatHeinrich retrieved many of the parts listed in that order yearsbefore the court entered the December 2000 order.

The trial court's order of February 2004 disposed of thecase without any further exchange between the parties. Heinrichdid not need to pay the judgment originally entered following thetrial and Interior did not need to return the parts. While thecourt formally denied the motion for a rule to show cause, thecourt clarified that it did so only because the judgment leftneither party to recover from the other. In effect, the courtdenied Interior its recovery on the contract because Interiorviolated the court orders directing it to specify its loss and toreturn to Heinrich the items in its possession sequestered by theorder of December 2000.

Because the order of February 2004 effectively imposessanctions against defendants for disobeying discovery orders, wereview it as an order for discovery sanctions. As such we willreverse the order only if the trial court abused its discretionby imposing the sanctions. Vaughn v. Northwestern MemorialHospital, 210 Ill. App. 3d 253, 259 (1991).

The court, with its crowded docket, cannot expend indefinitetime and resources on each case. Discovery rules help the courtexpeditiously resolve litigation. People ex rel. Terry v.Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 236 (1957). Our supreme court hasgranted the trial court broad powers to enforce its discoveryorders. 166 Ill. 2d R. 219(c).

"Our discovery procedures are meaningless unless aviolation entails a penalty proportionate to thegravity of the violation. Discovery for all partieswill not be effective unless trial courts do notcountenance violations, and unhesitatingly imposesanctions proportionate to the circumstances." Buehlerv. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 67 (1977).

Here, the jury returned a verdict for defendants that thecourt found excessive, and the court sought a specification fromdefendants to help it set an appropriate amount for the judgment. The record on appeal shows no response from Interior.

Defendants stated in the agreed order of December 2000 thatInterior had in its possession at that time a number of itemsHeinrich owned, including flaps, flying wires, an oil gauge andan operating handbook for Heinrich's aircraft. This formalstatement in a judicial proceeding of a matter within defendants'knowledge constitutes a judicial admission which defendantscannot contradict. Elliott v. Industrial Comm'n, 303 Ill. App.3d 185, 187 (1999). The agreed order "is conclusive on theparties and can be amended or set aside by one of the partiesonly upon a showing that the order resulted from fraudulentmisrepresentation, coercion, incompetence of one of the parties,gross disparity in the position or capacity of the parties, ornewly discovered evidence." In re Haber, 99 Ill. App. 3d 306,309 (1981). Defendants responded to the rule to show cause bycontradicting its judicial admission, without meeting any of thecriteria for setting aside an agreed order. The record shows nooffer of any setoff for the parts lost.

We find that the circumstances of this case justified animposition of sanctions against Interior. Heinrich, in anaffidavit and in testimony in court, placed the value of theunreturned parts someplace near the amount of the jury's verdictfor Interior on the breach of contract claim. Defendants for 2