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SIXTH DIVISION
October 17, 2003

No. 1-02-2714

JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Bradley Harwood, filed this action on July 26, 2001, pursuant to the IllinoisFreedom of Information Act (the Act) ( 5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2000)) against severaldefendants, including the Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs (DCCA). Theother defendants are employees of the State of Illinois, who, in their official capacities, areresponsible for complying with the requirements of the Act at DCCA. Plaintiff made an initialrequest for records under the Act on May 16, 2001. He requested two items: (1) "a copy of thereport prepared by the consulting firm of Arthur Andersen (Andersen) concerning the relocationof the Boeing Company's headquarters to Illinois" (the Andersen report) and (2) "copies of allinvoices concerning the cost to the state of this report."

After the plaintiff received no answer to his initial request, he sent an appeal letter, datedJune 11, 2001. The defendants responded to plaintiff's appeal letter by producing a copy of aone-page "Executive Summary" of the Andersen report, claiming the rest of the report wasexempt from disclosure under exemptions in sections 7(1)(f) and (g) of the Act, and also bystating that "no invoice from Arthur Andersen has been remitted to the department as of thisdate." This action followed. In his complaint, plaintiff sought a permanent injunction againstdefendants prohibiting them from withholding the requested public records and an order for theproduction of these public records.

Defendants answered the complaint regarding the Andersen report by again claiming itwas exempt from disclosure under the previously claimed exemptions in sections 7(1)(f) and (g),as well as the additional exemptions in sections 7(1)(i) and (r) of the Act and by producing a copyof the contract between DCCA and Andersen. Ultimately, the parties filed cross-motions forsummary judgment.

On August 1, 2002, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment andgranted defendants' motion for summary judgment. On August 13, 2002, plaintiff filed a "Motionfor Clarification of Court's August 1, 2002 Ruling or for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff'sOutstanding Claims for a Redacted Andersen Study and Improper Withholding of Invoices andfor Attorneys Fees for Work Required to Obtain Redacted Report and Invoices." This motionwas denied on August 19, 2002. Plaintiff now appeals the orders of August 1, 2002, and August19, 2002.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment. In re Estate of Hoover,155 Ill. 2d 402, 411, 615 N.E.2d 736 (1993). Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposingof litigation. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 179, 186, 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1123(2002). Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate only when " 'the pleadings, depositions, andadmissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as toany material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' " Happel,199 Ill. 2d at 186, 766 N.E.2d 1118, quoting 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000); see alsoEspinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995). Because the parties here filed cross-motions for summary judgment, they have agreed that nogenuine issue of material fact exists and invite the court to decide the issues presented asquestions of law. Allen v. Meyer, 14 Ill. 2d 284, 292, 152 N.E.2d 576 (1958). Nevertheless,where genuine issues of fact exist precluding summary judgment in favor of either party, the merefiling of cross-motions for summary judgment does not require that the court grant the requestedrelief to one of the parties. Hagen v. Distributed Solutions, Inc., 328 Ill. App. 3d 132, 137, 764N.E.2d 1141,1145-46 (2002).

Under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, public records are presumed to be openand accessible. Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456,462-63, 791 N.E.2d 522, 526 (2003), citing Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern IllinoisUniversity, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407, 680 N.E.2d 374 (1997). "[I]f the party seeking disclosure ofinformation under the Act challenges the public body's denial in circuit court, the public body hasthe burden of proving that the records in question fall within the exemption it has claimed."Illinois Education Ass'n, 204 Ill. 2d at 464, 791 N.E.2d at 527, citing Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 408,680 N.E.2d 374, and 5 ILCS 140/11 (West 2000). " 'To meet this burden and to assist the courtin making its determination, the agency must provide a detailed justification for its claim ofexemption, addressing the requested documents specifically and in a manner allowing foradequate adversary testing.' " (Emphasis in original.) Illinois Education Ass'n, 204 Ill. 2d at 464,791 N.E.2d at 527, quoting Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 537, 548N.E.2d 1110 (1989).

Here, defendants raised four affirmative defenses⁽¹⁾ asserting that the Andersen report wasexempt under four separate exemptions of section 7 of the Act. 5 ILCS 140/7 (West 2000). Section 7 and the relevant exemptions state as follows:

"(1) The following shall be exempt from inspection and copying:

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(f) Preliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and otherrecords in which opinions are expressed, or policies or actions are formulated,except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be exemptwhen the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body. The exemption provided in this paragraph (f) extends to all those records ofofficers and agencies of the General Assembly that pertain to the preparation oflegislative documents.

(g) Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from aperson or business where the trade secrets or information are proprietary,privileged or confidential, or where disclosure of the trade secrets or informationmay cause competitive harm, including all information determined to beconfidential under Section 4002 of the Technology Advancement andDevelopment Act. [20 ILCS 700/4002 (West 2000).] Nothing contained in thisparagraph (g) shall be construed to prevent a person or business from consentingto disclosure.

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(i) Valuable formulae, designs, drawings and research data obtained orproduced by any public body when disclosure could reasonably be expected toproduce private gain or public loss.

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(r) Drafts, notes, recommendations and memoranda pertaining to thefinancing and marketing transactions of the public body. The records ofownership, registration, transfer, and exchange of municipal debt obligations, andof persons to whom payment with respect to these obligations is made." 5 ILCS140/7(1)(f), (g), (i), and (r) (West 2000)).

Defendants concede that they have the burden of proving that a withheld document falls within anexemption. Defendants also note correctly that this court need only conclude that one of the fourexemptions applies to plaintiff's request in order for defendants to prevail. We conclude thatsection 7(1)(f) applies to plaintiff's request and exempts the Andersen report from publicdisclosure.

Section 7(1)(f) of the Act is the equivalent of the "deliberative process" exemption foundin section 552(b)(5) of the federal Freedom of Information Act, which exempts from disclosureinter- and intra-agency predecisional and deliberative material. See 5 U.S.C.