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SECOND DIVISION
OCTOBER 26, 2004
(Nunc pro tunc
September 14, 2004)

Defendants Richard Lind, M.D., Surgical Associates of FoxValley, S.C. (SAFV), and Centegra Health Systems NorthernIllinois Medical Center (NIMC) appeal from an order of thecircuit court of Cook County denying their motion to transferthis medical malpractice action to the circuit court of McHenryCounty based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Inaccordance with a supervisory order from the Illinois SupremeCourt, we granted defendants' petition for leave to appealpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2) (166 Ill. 2d R.306(a)(2)). On appeal, defendants contend that the circuit courtabused its discretion when it denied their motion to transferbecause it misapplied the predominate-connection test anderroneously relied on Chung v. Advocate Health Care, 336 Ill.App. 3d 789 (2002), as the controlling case law, and the publicand private interest factors weigh heavily in favor oftransferring this case to McHenry County. We reverse and remand.

The following facts were obtained from defendants' record insupport of their petition for leave to appeal to this court. OnOctober 3, 2002, plaintiffs Teri and David Gundlach filed acomplaint in the circuit court of Cook County alleging that, dueto defendants' negligent acts or omissions related to hergallbladder surgery, Teri suffered severe and permanent injuriesthat will continue to cause her future pain and suffering andcost her great sums of money. In addition, David alleged thatdefendants' negligence caused him to suffer the loss of serviceof his wife, and he will be deprived of her affection, society,companionship and consortium in the future.

The complaint referred to NIMC as "Centegra" and allegedthat it "owned and maintained medical facilities in the County ofCook," that it offered medical services to the citizens of CookCounty and to plaintiff, and that it employed Lind. Thecomplaint also alleged that Lind was employed by SAFV, which waslocated in McHenry County, and that plaintiffs resided in FoxLake, Illinois.

Lind and SAFV filed a joint motion to transfer venue to thecircuit court of McHenry County arguing that venue was not properin Cook County. In their motion, defendants asserted thatneither was a resident of Cook County, that they did not believethat NIMC was a resident of Cook County, and that Lind'streatment of plaintiff occurred in McHenry County. Because noneof the defendants resided in Cook County and the allegednegligence did not occur there, they maintained that venue wasimproper in Cook County.

NIMC also filed a motion to transfer venue, advancing thesame argument as codefendants. NIMC asserted that it was a not-for-profit corporation that owned and operated a hospital inMcHenry County, that it did not own any other facilities orconduct any business outside McHenry County, and that Centegrawas a separate and distinct legal entity.

Alternatively, NIMC argued that the cause should betransferred to McHenry County based on the doctrine of forum nonconveniens. It averred that McHenry County was the moreconvenient forum for the parties and witnesses because all of thepeople who participated in plaintiff's treatment worked andresided there, the residents of McHenry County had an interest inthe case because the alleged malpractice occurred there, and theburden of a jury trial should not be imposed on the citizens ofCook County because that forum did not have a significantconnection to this case. NIMC also maintained that plaintiffs'choice of Cook County was entitled to less deference because thealleged malpractice did not occur there and plaintiffs wereresidents of Lake County. Lind and SAFV subsequently joinedNIMC's motion to transfer based on forum non conveniens.

In their response to defendants' motion, plaintiffs arguedthat NIMC was conducting business in Cook County because Centegrahad a medical facility located there and its website stated thatit served part of Cook County. Plaintiffs further argued thatsince February 2, 2002, Teri had received extensive treatmentexclusively at Northwestern Memorial Hospital (Northwestern) inCook County. Plaintiffs relied solely on the Chung case andaverred that the facts of their case were "very analogous."

In response, NIMC argued that all of the private and publicinterest factors weighed strongly in favor of transferring thecase to McHenry County. Specifically, NIMC argued that all ofthe relevant medical treatment and alleged malpractice occurredin McHenry County, the medical records were located at NIMC inMcHenry County, all of the defendants were located in McHenryCounty, 20 witnesses worked and lived in McHenry County,plaintiffs lived in Lake County, the burden of hearing the caseshould not be placed on the citizens of Cook County, and theMcHenry County court system was less congested than Cook County'ssystem. It further asserted that requiring its 20 witnesses totravel to Chicago would impose a significant burden upon NIMC,both financially and in terms of personnel coverage at thehospital while the witnesses were at trial. NIMC also arguedthat plaintiffs failed to identify any witnesses from Cook Countyand that the location of plaintiff's subsequent treatment was tobe given little weight.

At an April 17, 2003, hearing on the motion to transfer,NIMC informed the circuit court that venue was established inCook County because Centegra, which owned NIMC, also owned abehavioral health facility in Cook County, thereby makingCentegra a resident of Cook County. NIMC argued, however, thatthe predominant connection in this case was with McHenry Countybecause all of the care and treatment at issue was rendered inMcHenry County, 20 potential occurrence witnesses resided inMcHenry compared to 2 possible Cook County witnesses, plaintiffsincurred over $487,000 in medical expenses in McHenry Countycompared to $56,000 in Cook County, plaintiff spent 100 days inthe hospital in McHenry County, and there was a span of eightmonths between plaintiff's last treatment in McHenry County andher first treatment at Northwestern. Counsel also argued thatbecause plaintiffs were foreign to Cook County and the allegednegligence did not occur there, it was not reasonable to assumethat Cook County was a convenient forum for the litigation.

Plaintiffs argued that the instant case was "eerily similar"to Chung, and based on the holding in that case, their actionshould remain in Cook County. Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledgedthat he did not know where the two surgeons from Northwesternresided, but, using the language from Chung, he argued that hewould "call a number of witnesses from Northwestern."

The trial court found that the fact that plaintiffs residedin Lake County was a major factor that made this a multicountycase similar to Chung and First American Bank v. Guerine, 198Ill. 2d 511 (2002), and noted that most doctors testify via anevidence deposition. The court further stated it presumed thetwo Northwestern physicians were Cook County residents, and ifthat turned out not to be the case, the court recommendeddefendants file a motion to reconsider. The circuit courtacknowledged that defendants had made a "great" record, butrelying on Chung as the most current case law, it found that itcould not transfer the cause to McHenry County. Based on thatfinding, the court denied defendants' motion to transfer.

On appeal, defendants contend that the circuit court abusedits discretion when it denied their motion to transfer becausethe court misapplied the predominant-connection test fromGuerine, gave greater deference to plaintiffs' choice of forumthan it was entitled, inappropriately emphasized the fact thatCentegra maintained a medical office in Cook County, anderroneously relied on Chung as the controlling case law. Defendants further argue that the public and private interestfactors weigh heavily in favor of transferring this case toMcHenry County because the only connection to Cook County was thelocation of two physicians who subsequently treated plaintiff 15months after the alleged negligence, and the citizens of CookCounty have no interest in this case compared to a stronginterest held by the citizens of McHenry County.

A circuit court's ruling on a forum non conveniens motion isgiven considerable discretion and will not be reversed absent anabuse of discretion in balancing the relevant factors. Dawdy v.Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 176-77 (2003). An abuseof discretion exists where no reasonable person would agree withthe circuit court's finding. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177.

To determine the proper forum in which a cause should betried, the circuit court must balance the private and publicinterest factors. The private interest factors include: (1) theparties' convenience; (2) the ease of access to sources oftestimonial, documentary and real evidence; (3) the ability tosecure attendance of unwilling witnesses with compulsory process;(4) the cost to procure the attendance of willing witnesses; and(5) all other problems that make the trial easy, inexpensive andexpeditious. The public interest factors include: (1) theinterest in deciding local controversies locally; (2) theunfairness of imposing trial costs and jury duty on citizens of acounty with little connection to the action; and (3) theadministrative difficulties that arise from adding litigation toan already-congested court docket rather than handling it in itsvenue of origin. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172-73.

Generally, plaintiff's choice of forum is given substantialdeference and is rarely disturbed unless the factors weighstrongly in favor of transfer; however, where plaintiff chooses aforeign forum, his choice receives less deference. Dawdy, 207Ill. 2d at 173-74. Moreover, where plaintiff is foreign to theforum, and the acts giving rise to the litigation did not occurthere, the court can reasonably conclude that plaintiff engagedin forum shopping. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 174. In such cases,the court applies an unequal balancing test to determine whetherthe relevant factors, viewed in their totality, strongly favortransferring the cause to defendant's suggested forum. Dawdy,207 Ill. 2d at 175-76, citing Griffith v. Mitsubishi AircraftInternational, Inc., 136 Ill. 2d 101, 107-08 (1990). No singlefactor is given conclusive effect or central emphasis. Dawdy,207 Ill. 2d at 180. In addition, "'[a] defendant seekingtransfer is not required to show that the plaintiff's choice offorum is inconvenient; rather, transfer is allowed wheredefendant's choice is the substantially more appropriate forum.'" Allee v. Myers, 349 Ill. App. 3d 596, 601 (2004), quotingCzarnecki v. Uno-Ven Co., 339 Ill. App. 3d 504, 508 (2003).

Here, we find that the circuit court abused its discretionwhen it denied defendants' motion to transfer. The recordreveals that, rather than balancing the relevant private andpublic interest factors in the instant case, the court agreedwith plaintiffs that this case was factually analogous to Chung,and on that basis, it followed the Chung ruling and denied thetransfer. We also find it significant that the circuit courterroneously found that defendants had not made an affirmativeshowing that Cook County was an inconvenient forum. Such ashowing is not required. Allee, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 601.

We further find that the private interest factors stronglyfavor transferring this case to McHenry County. Plaintiffsreside in Lake County and would have to travel to either McHenryor Cook County; however, defendants Lind, SAFV and NIMC are allresidents of McHenry County, and, thus, that forum would be moreconvenient for them. We also find that evidence would also bemore easily accessible in McHenry County than in Cook County. Defendants identified 20 potential occurrence witnesses who allwork and reside in McHenry County, compared to 2 surgeonsidentified by plaintiff who are believed to reside in CookCounty. Significantly, NIMC asserted that requiring these 20witnesses to travel to Cook County would impose a significantburden upon it, both financially and in terms of personnelcoverage at the hospital while the witnesses are at the trial. NIMC also pointed out that plaintiff's medical records arelocated at its facility in McHenry County.

Likewise, we find that the public interest factors weighstrongly in favor of transferring this case to McHenry County. This litigation arose from alleged negligence during a medicalprocedure performed at a hospital in McHenry County. As such,this is a local controversy that would be of interest to thecitizens of McHenry County who rely on defendants for theirmedical treatment, while the citizens of Cook County have nointerest in this litigation. Accordingly, it would be unfair toimpose the costs of this trial and the burden of jury duty uponthe citizens of Cook County. In addition, although courtcongestion alone is relatively insignificant and does not justifya venue transfer (Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181), we note that,according to the annual report of the Administrative Office ofthe Illinois Courts for calendar year 2003, of which we takejudicial notice (Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177, quoting Boston v.Rockford Memorial Hospital, 140 Ill. App. 3d 969, 972 (1986)("'an appellate court may take judicial notice of matters ***[that] are capable of instant and unquestionabledemonstration'")), McHenry County had 701 pending law casesseeking over $50,000 in relief, while Cook County had 26,353.

Finally, because plaintiffs filed their action in a foreignforum and the acts giving rise to this litigation did not occurtherein, plaintiffs' choice of venue is given less deference. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173-74. We conclude that the relevantfactors, viewed in their totality, strongly favor transferringthis case to the circuit court of McHenry County.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court ofCook County and remand this case to that court with directions totransfer this action to the circuit court of McHenry County.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

WOLFSON and HALL, JJ., concur.