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Gounaris v. City of Chicago

Case Date: 03/30/2001
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-99-2519 Rel

1-99-2519 

First Division
March 30, 2001

 

HARRY GOUNARIS and D & R MANAGEMENT,
INC., d/b/a Shadows Night Club,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees,

                    v.

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal
Corporation; RICHARD M. DALEY,
as Mayor of the City of Chicago and Local Liquor
Control Commissioner; the LOCAL LIQUOR
CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF
CHICAGO; the MAYOR'S LICENSE
COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO,
WINSTON L. MARDIS, as Director,

          Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants

(the License Appeal Commission of the City
of Chicago; Anthony John Calabrese,
Chairman, Irving Koppel, Commissioner; Leonard
Branson, Commissioner; and Terry G. Hilliard,
Superintendent, Chicago Police Department,

          Defendants-Appellees).

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)		 Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County.









No. 99 CH 01473









The Honorable
Robert V. Boharic,
Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE COHEN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a hearing in license revocation proceedings, the defendant LocalLiquor Control Commission of the City of Chicago (LLCC) found that theplaintiffs, licensee Harry Gounaris and D & R Management, Inc. (collectivelyD & R), d/b/a Shadows Night Club (Shadows), had allowed two minors, Erik Penaz and Rhonda Bolden, to enter andremain on its licensed premises on separate occasions. The LLCC also found thatalcoholic beverages were sold to Bolden. As a finding of fact, the LLCCdetermined that the circumstances warranted a 21-day license suspension. TheLLCC issued an order of suspension on July 23, 1998 (the original order)suspending D & R's license for a period of 15 days. A copy of the LLCC'sfindings of fact was attached to the copy of the original order served on D& R. The office of the mayor issued a concurring order of disposition alsoreflecting a 15-day period of suspension.

In an amended order of suspension issued November 23, 1998 (the amendedorder), the LLCC changed the 15-day period of suspension stated in the originalorder to reflect the 21-day license suspension set forth in its findings offact. No additional copy of the findings of fact was attached to the copy of theamended order served on D & R. The office of the mayor issued an amendedorder of disposition also reflecting a 21-day period of suspension.

D & R appealed to the defendant License Appeal Commission of the City ofChicago (LAC), which affirmed the 21-day suspension set forth in the amendedorder. D & R subsequently filed a complaint in administrative review in thecircuit court of Cook County. The circuit court affirmed the LLCC's findings offact and the 15-day suspension as stated in the original order, but reversed the21-day suspension in the amended order. D & R appeals the decision of thecircuit court affirming the 15-day order of suspension. The LLCC cross-appealsthat portion of the circuit court's order reversing the LLCC's 21-day order ofsuspension. We affirm in part, reverse in part and reinstate the amended orderas affirmed by the LAC.

I. Analysis.

"Upon administrative review, the function of both the trial court andthe appellate court is limited to determining whether the findings andconclusions of the administrative agency are against the manifest weight of theevidence." Hamwi v. Zollar, 299 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1092(1998). "In order to make a determination that an agency's decision wasagainst the manifest weight of the evidence, a court must conclude that allreasonable and unbiased persons, acting within the limits prescribed by law anddrawing all inferences in support of the finding, would agree that the findingis erroneous and that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident." Haynesv. Police Board, 293 Ill. App. 3d 508, 511 (1997). " 'Because theweight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses are uniquely within theprovince of the administrative agency, there need only be some competentevidence in the record to support its findings.' " Haynes, 293 Ill.App. 3d at 512, quoting Jagielnik v. Board of Trustees of the Police PensionFund, 271 Ill. App. 3d 869, 875 (1995). "[I]t is not a court's functionto reweigh the evidence or make an independent determination of the facts."Board of Education v. Van Kast, 253 Ill. App. 3d 295, 304 (1993).

A. Procedural issues

D & R's first argument is jurisdictional. The assistantcorporation counsel for the City of Chicago argued before the LAC that theamended order imposing a 21-day license suspension was issued solely on a nuncpro tunc basis