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Plaintiff Armand Gonzalzes, M.D., appeals from an order of thecircuit court dismissing counts VI through XVI of his sixth amendedcomplaint, with prejudice, pursuant to defendants American ExpressCredit Corp.'s (American Express), Montgomery Ward Enterprises,Inc.'s (Montgomery Ward), and Signature Agency, Inc.'s (Signature)section 2--615 motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 1998)). On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred indismissing the counts against defendants because he sufficientlypled causes of action against defendants for breach of contract,negligent referral, breach of fiduciary relationship, unauthorizedpractice of law, and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud andDeceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (705 ILCS220/1 (West 1996)) based on defendants' referral of attorney RobertS. Levy and the Chicago law firm of Robert S. Levy & Associates(Levy)⁽¹⁾ to him pursuant to a legal services referral plan. For thereasons set forth below, we affirm.

On July 22, 1991, plaintiff entered into a "contract" (legalservices plan or plan) with American Express whereby AmericanExpress agreed to provide plaintiff with legal representation inexchange for a monthly fee from plaintiff.⁽²⁾ Plaintiff signed amembership form to become a participant in the plan. Plaintiffreceived a return letter from the vice president of the plan whichstated, in pertinent part:

"Our goal for this plan is to provide members,like you, with quality legal representationfor a reasonable fee. And, in our constantefforts to provide you with this highlyprofessional service, we have provided youwith another law firm to meet your specificlegal needs."

The letter also included a membership card informing plaintiff thathis legal representation under the plan would be provided Levy.

The plan was administered by Signature. Plaintiff's benefitsin the plan were more fully set out in the "Confidential BenefitHandbook" (handbook).⁽³⁾ The handbook instructed participants on howto use the legal services detailed in the plan. When calling theirplan attorney, participants were asked to

"be prepared to say, in general terms, whatthe nature of your request or problem is sothat you will be referred to the appropriateattorney in that law firm who handles thatarea of law."

The handbook explained that attorneys were chosen for participantsbased on geographic location. The handbook described thequalifications of its plan attorneys, stating:

"All plan attorneys are licensed to practicein your state. They are registered with theState Bar Association or appropriateregulatory agency and proper references havebeen checked. All are experienced and inprivate practice. Plan attorneys have theirown offices and are not employees of thePlan."

The handbook also contained a section on "Limitation of Liability"which explained the following:

"The State Bar does not guarantee the quantityor quality of legal services provided underthis plan. Total responsibility for deliveryof services rests with the Plan and the PlanAttorneys in their individual attorney-clientrelationships. Plan Members may at any timefile a complaint with the State Bar or otherattorney regulatory authority concerning aproblem with an attorney's professionalconduct."

From July 22, 1991, to February 17, 1994, plaintiff paid all of hisfixed monthly fees to American Express as required by the plan.

On June 26, 1996, plaintiff filed an eight-count complaintagainst Levy, American Express, Montgomery Ward, and Signature. Counts I through III of the complaint were directed against Levyfor legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach ofcontract, respectively. Plaintiff alleged that he retained Levy in1991 to represent him in a breach of warranty action against acompany from which he had purchased a boat and that Levy failed tofile an action against the company within the appropriate statuteof limitations period. Plaintiff also claimed that he retainedLevy to represent him in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, butLevy failed to file a motion to modify his spousal support paymentsand to notify plaintiff that a judgment had been entered againsthim for unpaid support payments, thereby causing him damages.

Counts IV through VIII of the complaint were directed againstAmerican Express, Montgomery Ward, and Signature. Count IV was aclaim for negligent referral. Plaintiff alleged that defendants"held themselves out as providers of legal services" and thatdespite their duty to provide "competent legal representation,"defendants breached this duty, injuring plaintiff "in anundetermined amount." Counts V and VI were claims for breach offiduciary duty and breach of contract, respectively, and containedsimilar allegations against defendants for failing to provideplaintiff with "competent" legal representation. Count VII of thecomplaint was a claim for the unauthorized practice of law bydefendants. Plaintiff alleged that defendants had receivedcompensation for "providing the legal services of [Levy] to[plaintiff]" in violation of the Illinois Corporation Practice ofLaw Prohibition Act (705 ILCS 220/1 (West 1996)). Count VIII wasa claim for defendants' violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.

Plaintiff filed first and second amended complaints namingadditional defendants, but did not make any substantive changes inthe allegations made in his initial complaint. Plaintiff filed athird amended complaint which only amended the counts directedagainst Levy in response to a motion to dismiss filed by Levy. OnJune 16, 1997, the trial court entered a default judgment in favorof plaintiff and against Levy in the amount of $235,555.59 pluscosts based on Levy's failure to respond to plaintiff's thirdamended complaint.

Plaintiff also filed a fourth and fifth amended complaint inresponse to defendants' additional motions to dismiss, which werebased upon, among other reasons, plaintiff's failure to attach tohis complaint a copy of the contract between the parties.

On April 17, 1998, plaintiff filed a sixth amended complaint. Counts VI through XVI were directed against defendants. Thecomplaint alleged the same causes of action as plaintiff's priorcomplaints, but divided the causes of action against AmericanExpress, Montgomery Ward and Signature into separate counts. Plaintiff also added a "third party beneficiary breach of contract"claim (count VII) against Montgomery Ward and Signature based ontheir agreement with American Express to provide legalrepresentation to participants in American Express' plan andSignature's administration of the plan. All of the causes ofaction in the sixth amended complaint were again based ondefendants' alleged failure to provide "quality legalrepresentation" for plaintiff's "specific legal needs." Similar tothe prior complaints, the sixth amended complaint contained countsfor breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligentreferral, unauthorized practice of law, and violation of theConsumer Fraud Act.

On June 9, 1998, defendants filed a section 2--615 motion todismiss counts VI through XVI of plaintiff's sixth amendedcomplaint (hereinafter referred to as complaint). With respect toplaintiff's "breach of contract" claims (counts VI through VIII),defendants argued that the legal services plan "[made] it clearthat the plan removed [d]efendants from any responsibility for thelegal services delivered by the receiving attorney [Levy]." Defendants further argued that Weisblatt v. Chicago BarAssociation, 292 Ill. App. 3d 48, 648 N.E.2d 984 (1997), held thata legal referral service was not absolutely liable for thenegligence of the attorney providing the legal services through theplan. With respect to the dismissal of plaintiff's claims for"negligent referral" (counts IX and X), defendants relied on aprovision in the handbook which stated that defendants were notresponsible for, nor involved in, "the attorney-client relationshipbetween the plan member and the receiving attorney." Defendantsclaimed that the plan was not a lawyer, and they did not have aduty or responsibility to monitor the services of the referredattorney. Defendants also argued that they had confirmed that Levywas a licensed attorney in good standing in Illinois in accordancewith the provisions of the handbook.

With respect to plaintiff's claims for "breach of fiduciaryduty" (counts XI and XII), defendants argued that the counts shouldbe dismissed because plaintiff only pled conclusory allegationsthat a fiduciary relationship existed between defendants andplaintiff and failed to plead the prima facie elements of thiscause of action. With respect to plaintiff's claims for the"unauthorized practice of law" (counts XIII and XIV), defendantsagain relied on Weisblatt, arguing that the acceptance of areferral fee did not make defendants the "guarantors of the legalservice[s] delivered or not delivered by the Levy Defendants." Lastly, with respect to plaintiff's claims for violation of theConsumer Fraud Act (counts XV and XVI), defendants argued thatthere was no evidence to support plaintiff's allegation thatdefendants committed a deceptive act. Defendants further arguedthat plaintiff had admitted in the allegations of his fourthamended complaint that Levy was licensed to practice law inIllinois, thereby negating any suggestion that defendants committeda deceptive act in the referral of Levy.

In response, plaintiff, relying on Petrovich v. Share HealthPlan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 17, 719 N.E.2d 756 (1999),argued that defendants were providing a "managed legal care planvia its legal services plan" similar to an "HMO." Plaintifffurther argued that the HMO in Petrovich was held potentiallyliable on many of the same legal theories upon which plaintiffbased his cause of action against defendants and that there was nobasis to distinguish Petrovich from the present case. Plaintiffalso argued that the disclaimer in the handbook, that participatingattorneys were not employees of the plan, created a genuine issueof material fact regarding the degree of defendants' control overLevy and did not eliminate their responsibility for Levy'snegligent representation of plaintiff.

Plaintiff further argued that he properly pled the variouscauses of action included in his complaint. Plaintiff claimed thathe adequately pled a cause of action for breach of contract bydefendants based on his allegation that they did not provide the"quality legal representation" to serve his "specific legal needs"as defendants had promised. Plaintiff maintained that defendants'claim, that Levy was chosen based on his geographic location toplaintiff, supported his claim that defendants did not properlyinvestigate Levy's competence and were negligent in their referralof him because he could not meet plaintiff's specific legal needs. Plaintiff further argued that he had "adequately pled therelationship between himself and Robert Levy [attorney-client] aswell as the agency relationship between the Defendants and RobertLevy" and that these allegations sufficiently supported theexistence of defendants' fiduciary duty to him to satisfy thepleading requirements for breach of that duty. Plaintiff alsoargued that he properly pled a cause of action for the unauthorizedpractice of law by defendants because he was only required toallege that defendants had violated the statute (705 ILCS 220/1(West 1998)) prohibiting corporations from such practice. Plaintiff maintained that "defendants made certain representationsconcerning [their] legal abilities and what [they] could legallyprovide to the plaintiff and therefore [had] violated the statute." With respect to his claim for defendants' violation of the ConsumerFraud Act, plaintiff argued that he properly pled a deceptive actby defendants based on his allegation that they had failed toprovide him with the quality legal service defendants promised himto meet his specific legal needs.

On September 21, 1998, the trial court entered an orderdismissing, with prejudice, counts VI through XVI of plaintiff'scomplaint, finding that the facts alleged were legally insufficientto state the causes of action claimed in those counts. This appealfollowed.

Plaintiff contends that he properly pled the elements for acause of action based on breach of contract against defendants incounts VI through VIII of his complaint, arguing that defendantsbreached the contract by failing to provide "quality legalrepresentation" to serve his "specific legal needs" as promised inthe contract.

Defendants contend that the language in the contract, statingthat the referral plan sought to provide "quality legalrepresentation" to serve plaintiff's "specific legal needs," didnot make them guarantors or absolute insurers regarding the qualityof the legal service ultimately delivered under the plan.Defendants argue that the trial court properly found that the termsof the contract revealed an "unambiguous contractual purpose torefer a duly licensed attorney who will provide specified servicesat a fixed or reduced rate" and that they performed this duty.

A section 2--615 motion to dismiss a complaint challenges onlythe legal sufficiency of a complaint and alleges only defects onthe face of the complaint. Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338,344, 688 N.E.2d 1172 (1997). The critical inquiry in deciding asection 2--615 motion to dismiss is whether the allegations of thecomplaint, when considered in a light most favorable to theplaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon whichrelief can be granted. Vernon, 179 Ill. 2d at 344, citing Brysonv. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86-87, 672N.E.2d 1207 (1996). A cause of action will not be dismissed on thepleadings unless it clearly appears that the plaintiff cannot proveany set of facts that will entitle it to relief. Vernon, 179 Ill.2d at 344. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a defendant'ssection 2--615 motion to dismiss, we apply a de novo standard ofreview. Doe v. McKay, 183 Ill. 2d 272, 274, 700 N.E.2d 1018(1998). A reviewing court must take all well-pleaded facts in thechallenged complaint as true. Person v. Behnk, 242 Ill. App. 3d933, 935, 611 N.E.2d 1350 (1993).

To properly plead a cause of action for breach of contract, aplaintiff must allege the essential elements, which are: (1) theexistence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance bythe plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and(4) resultant injury to the plaintiff. Gallagher Corp. v. Russ,309 Ill. App. 3d 192, 199, 721 N.E.2d 605 (1999). A defendant'sfailure to comply with a duty imposed by the contract gives rise tothe breach. Hickox v. Bell, 195 Ill. App. 3d 976, 992, 552 N.E.2d1133 (1990).

In the present case, The documents constituting the contractbetween the parties which have been attached to the pleadings donot define the term "quality." Additionally, the handbook merelystates that the plan attorneys are licensed to practice in theparticipant's state and are registered with the state barassociation or appropriate regulatory agency. The language of thecontract, as alleged by plaintiff and indicated in the documentsattached to the complaint, therefore, amounts to a promise bydefendants to furnish plaintiff with a licensed attorney at aspecific price. Defendants did not make any other assertionsregarding Levy's practice capabilities. Defendants only agreed tooffer the name of a licensed attorney who would work at a specifiedrate. Plaintiff did not allege any facts suggesting thatdefendants, through their referral of Levy, breached thisagreement. There are no allegations in the complaint that at thetime of the referral Levy was not licensed as an attorney inIllinois or that any professional regulatory agency hadinvestigated, reprimanded or suspended him for any reason, or thatdefendants were aware of any prior acts of negligence ormalpractice by Levy. Plaintiff therefore failed to sufficiently plead a breach of contract claim, and we find that the trial courtproperly dismissed counts VI through VIII of his complaint.

Plaintiff next contends that he properly pled the necessaryelements for the tort of negligent referral against defendants incounts IX and X. He argues that defendants, as operators of a"profit oriented legal services plan where premiums are collectedmonthly," are potentially liable for the referral of an attorneywho was not competent or qualified to handle his legal claims orprovide professional service. Plaintiff maintains that he did notreceive the benefit of the representation he had "bargained for"under the plan. Defendants contend that nonlawyer entities are notresponsible for the referral of a licensed attorney who commitsmalpractice and that "[t]he pleadings here do not warrant such asweeping and far-reaching change in the law" as proposed byplaintiff.

We find Weisblatt, relied on by defendants, dispositive ofthis issue. In Weisblatt, the plaintiff contacted the defendantChicago Bar Association's (CBA) Lawyer Referral Service seeking thename of a lawyer who specialized in legal malpractice cases. Theplaintiff claimed that the CBA breached its duty of care to herbecause the attorney to whom she was referred did not haveexpertise in legal malpractice matters, resulting in her loss of acause of action against her divorce attorney, and that the referredattorney did not have adequate malpractice insurance herself. Theplaintiff also alleged that the CBA's Lawyer Referral Service wasliable because it required lawyer participants to pay referral feesto the CBA when they were retained by individuals who had beenreferred to them by the CBA. The plaintiff's complaint soughtdamages from the CBA for negligent performance of a voluntaryundertaking and legal malpractice as a "referring attorney."

The Weisblatt court affirmed the trial court's dismissal ofthe plaintiff's complaint. With respect to the plaintiff's claimfor legal malpractice against the CBA, the court stated: "The CBAis not a lawyer. The CBA is not licensed to practice law nor wasit engaged by the plaintiff to represent her." Because the CBA wasa not-for-profit organization providing, among other services, alegal referral service, the court applied Rule 7.2(b) of theIllinois Rules of Professional Conduct to the CBA's acceptance ofa referral fee, stating:

"While that rule [7.2(b)] allows lawyerreferral services to collect referral fees, itdoes not, however, impose any duty orresponsibility upon the lawyer referralservice or legal service organization tomonitor or maintain responsibility for thelegal services ultimately rendered by thelawyer receiving the referral. Thus, the meretaking of a referral fee as a referring agencyunder Rule 7.2(b) rather than as a referringlawyer under Rule 1.5 [of the Illinois Rulesof Professional Conduct] will not suffice tomake the CBA an insurer or otherwisevicariously accountable for the actions of theattorney to whom the matter is referred."Weisblatt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 57.

In Richards v. SSM Health Care, Inc., 311 Ill. App. 3d 560, 724N.E.2d 975 (2000), this court relied on Weisblatt in finding thatthere was no requirement that a legal referral service "standlegally responsible" for the services provided by a referredattorney in order to enforce a fee remittal agreement between theservice and the attorney. Richards, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 566.

Like the CBA in Weisblatt, defendants in the present case werenot licensed as attorneys nor retained by plaintiff to representhim in legal matters. Plaintiff has failed to present anyauthority in support of the proposition that a nonlawyer becomesthe insurer of, or vicariously liable for, the actions of anattorney referred to a third party by a nonlawyer. In Weisblatt,even the receipt of a referral fee did not create a duty by the CBAto monitor the attorney it had referred to the plaintiff. In thepresent case, plaintiff did not even allege that a referral feeagreement existed between defendants and Levy, and plaintiff thusfailed to plead any basis upon which to hold that defendants had aduty or responsibility to monitor Levy's representation ofplaintiff following the referral.

Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Weisblatt, arguing that thatdecision was limited to not-for-profit, nonattorney referralservices. However, as argued by defendants here, the holding inWeisblatt was not so limited. The rule at issue in Weisblatt, Rule7.2(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, refers to"not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal serviceorganization." (Emphasis added.) Weisblatt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at57. The reference to "other legal service organization" indicatesthat neither Rule 7.2(b) nor the holding in Weisblatt was limitedto not-for-profit lawyer referral services. Weisblatt, 292 Ill.App. 3d 57.

We briefly note that plaintiff's reliance on Petrovich ismisplaced. In Petrovich, our supreme court held that an HMO may beheld vicariously liable for the negligence of its independentcontractor physicians under both the doctrines of apparent andimplied authority. Although the defendant HMO in Petrovich offeredevidence that it customarily supplied its members with informationand documents indicating that participating physicians wereindependent contractors and not agents or employees of the HMO, theevidence did not show that the HMO ever actually provided theplaintiff with that information, creating an issue of fact as tothe issue of apparent authority. The Petrovich court also heldthat the facts of the case created an issue of fact as to whetherthe physician's independent status was negated by the degree of theHMO's control or actual authority over the physician.

Petrovich is distinguishable because the plan handbook issuedby defendants in the present case clearly states that theparticipating attorneys in the plan are independent contractors andnot employees or agents of defendants. Unlike the plaintiff inPetrovich, plaintiff here does not dispute that he received thehandbook which was in fact attached as an exhibit to his complaint. Additionally, neither the allegations in plaintiff's complaint, northe supporting exhibits, suggest that defendants either retainedany control over the attorney-client relationship between Levy andplaintiff or attempted to control Levy's representation ofplaintiff in any manner. Accordingly, we find that the trial courtproperly dismissed counts IX and X of plaintiff's complaint whichwere based on negligent referral claims.

Plaintiff next argues that he adequately pled a cause ofaction for a breach of a fiduciary duty by defendants. Plaintiffmaintains that defendants do not have to be attorneys in order forthe court to find that a fiduciary relationship existed between theparties. Plaintiff argues that when a relationship is that of anattorney-client or principal-agent, a fiduciary relationship arisesas a matter of law and nothing further needs to be pled. Plaintifffurther argues that the allegations in his complaint referring tothe attorney-client relationship between himself and Levy andLevy's agency relationship with defendants satisfies the pleadingrequirements to state a cause of action for breach of a fiduciaryduty. Plaintiff also argues that, at the very least, hisallegations in his complaint raised a genuine issue of materialfact regarding the existence of a fiduciary relationship betweenthe parties.

Defendants contend that plaintiff failed to plead any factsindicating that a fiduciary relationship existed between theparties as a matter of law. They argue that plaintiff did notplead any facts that there was a "degree of kinship" or a"disparity in age, health or mental condition" that would havecreated a fiduciary relationship. Defendants maintain that nofiduciary relationship existed between them and plaintiff, butrather between plaintiff and Levy, plaintiff's attorney.

A fiduciary duty may arise as a matter of law from theexistence of a particular relationship, such as attorney-client orprincipal-agent relationship. Ransom v. A.B. Dick Co., 289 Ill.App. 3d 663, 672, 682 N.E.2d 314 (1997). A fiduciary relationshipand the attendant duties may also arise as the result of specialcircumstances of the parties' relationship, where one party placestrust in another so that the latter gains superiority and influenceover the former. Ransom, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 672. When therelationship between the parties is not one that gives rise to afiduciary relationship as a matter of law, the party asserting theexistence of the relationship has the burden of establishing suchby clear and convincing evidence. Ransom, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 672. The relevant factors in determining whether a fiduciaryrelationship exists include: the degree of kinship between theparties; the disparity in age, health, mental condition andeducation and business experience between the parties; and theextent to which the "servient" party entrusted the handling of itsbusiness affairs to the "dominant party" and placed trust andconfidence in it. Ransom, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 673.

In the present case, plaintiff has failed to cite to anyauthority in support of his contention that he satisfied thepleading requirements for a cause of action based on a breach offiduciary duty by merely alleging that Levy was his attorney andthat Levy was an agent of defendants. Although plaintiff'sallegations suggest the existence of a fiduciary relationship, asa matter of law, between Levy and himself, plaintiff's allegationsare insufficient to suggest that a fiduciary relationship existed,as a matter of law, between himself and defendants, who wereneither his attorney nor principal.

Additionally, plaintiff's allegations in his complaint areinsufficient to suggest that special circumstances betweenplaintiff and defendants created a fiduciary relationship betweenthem. As argued by defendants, plaintiff did not allege a degreeof kinship between the parties or a disparity in age, health ormental condition that would support a finding of a fiduciaryrelationship. See Ransom, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 673. Plaintiff, alicensed physician, has also failed to plead any disparity betweenhis education and business knowledge and that of defendants whichmight give rise to a fiduciary relationship. We find, therefore,that the trial court properly dismissed counts XI and XII ofplaintiff's complaint.

Plaintiff next contends that he properly pled a cause ofaction for the unauthorized practice of law by defendants. Plaintiff argues that defendants violated the statute prohibitingthe unauthorized practice of law by a corporation in "[furnishing]attorneys to render legal services and [making] variousrepresentations to its plan members regarding the types of caseswhich the plan attorneys were qualified to handle." Plaintiffmaintains that the fact that defendants are not attorneys is notcontrolling on this issue because a claim based on the unauthorizedpractice of law presupposes that the defendants are not licensedattorneys. Without providing further explanation or argument,plaintiff contends that the language in the plan handbook, statingthat the attorney-client relationship exists only between thereferred attorney and the plan member, "raises more questions than[it] answers." Plaintiff also argues that the statute prohibitingthe unauthorized practice of law does not have restrictive languagesupporting the trial court's finding that there was no privatecause of action for the claims pled in counts XIII and XIV ofplaintiff's complaint.

Defendants again emphasize that plaintiff only had anattorney-client relationship with Levy and that the plan handbookclearly states that the plan is not involved in any aspect of thedelivery of legal services by the attorney to the client. Defendants also argue that the Illinois Supreme Court rules, "bynegative inference, provide that group legal services may exist andoperate in Illinois without necessarily engaging in theunauthorized practice of law." Defendants further maintain thatRule 7.2 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct allows anattorney to pay "the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyerreferral service or other legal service organization."

Section 1 of the Illinois Corporation Practice of LawProhibition Act (705 ILCS 220/1 (West 1998)) provides:

"It shall be unlawful for a corporationto practice law *** or to hold itself out tothe public as being entitled to practice lawor to render or furnish legal services oradvice or to furnish attorneys or counsel orto render legal services of any kind inactions or proceedings of any nature ***." 705 ILCS 220/1.

We find that the allegations pled in plaintiff's complaint donot state a cause of action against defendants for the unauthorizedpractice of law. Plaintiff has not provided any authoritysupporting his argument that the referral of an attorney at acertain price by a for-profit referral plan violates section 1 ofthe Corporation Practice of Law Prohibition Act or otherwiseconstitutes the unauthorized practice of law. As we held inWeisblatt, nonattorney entities are permitted to receive a fee forreferrals without becoming the insurers or guarantors of the legalservices provided by the attorney.

Additionally, the relevant provisions of the contractincorporated into plaintiff's complaint state that defendants hadno involvement in the legal services provided by the referredattorney, Levy, and that the referred attorney was an independentcontractor with the plan and not an employee. Although plaintiffalleges that defendants made certain assertions regarding thequality of the attorney referred to him, as stated above, theseassertions constitute nothing more than a promise to provide anattorney with a license. Additionally, plaintiff's complaintcontains no allegations that defendants, in fact, performed oroffered legal services. The trial court, therefore, properlydismissed plaintiff's counts based on the unauthorized practice oflaw.

Lastly, plaintiff contends that he properly pled a cause ofaction based on defendants' violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, byalleging that defendants would provide competent legalrepresentation to plaintiff, defendants would provide plaintiffwith highly professional service, and the referred attorney wouldbe able to serve plaintiff's specific legal needs. He also arguesthat defendants' deception was compounded by the fact that they didnot ascertain whether Levy would be competent to handle his legalneeds.

Defendants respond that plaintiff failed to properly plead adeceptive practice on their part because their referral of Levypreceded his alleged malpractice in handling plaintiff's claims. Defendants argue that plaintiff has not alleged that they knew orshould have known that Levy would fail to handle plaintiff's legalmatters based on any prior acts of professional negligence ormalpractice by Levy. Defendants also argue that plaintiff did notsufficiently allege that defendants intended that plaintiff wouldrely on their alleged deceptions. Defendants further maintain thatallegations in the complaint referring to a fiduciary relationshipbetween Levy and plaintiff, as attorney and client, indicates thatplaintiff, in fact, had placed his trust in Levy rather than inthem.

The elements for a cause of action based on a violation of theConsumer Fraud Act are: (1) a deceptive act or practice; (2) thedefendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the deception; (3)the plaintiff, in fact, relied on the deception; and (4) thedeception occurred in the course of conduct involving trade orcommerce. Smith v. Prime Cable of Chicago, 276 Ill. App. 3d 843,856-57, 658 N.E.2d 1325 (1995).

As stated above, in their contract with plaintiff, defendantseffectively promised only to provide a licensed attorney toplaintiff. There are no allegations in the complaint or in any ofthe attached exhibits incorporated into the complaint indicatingthat defendants knew, or should have known, that Levy wasincompetent to render legal services to plaintiff. There are noallegations that Levy did not have his license or was not in goodstanding at the time of the referral. Although plaintiff did pleadthat Levy was negligent in representing him following the referral,those allegations are not the equivalent of pleading factsindicating that defendants knew or should have known that Levy wasineffective. Plaintiff's allegations that defendants did notperform a sufficient background check on Levy before referring him are also insufficient to plead a deceptive act or practice bydefendants. Because plaintiff failed to plead a prima facie casefor violation of the Consumer Fraud Act against defendants, we findthat the trial court properly dismissed counts XV and XVI ofplaintiff's complaint.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuitcourt.

Affirmed.

CAHILL, P.J., and WOLFSON, J., concur.

1. ¹Levy is not a party to this appeal.

2. ²Attached as an exhibit to plaintiff's sixth amended complaintwas an affidavit from plaintiff indicating that he did not possessa copy of an "executed contract for services."

3. ³Plaintiff attached the handbook as an exhibit to his sixthamended complaint.