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This appeal is from the grant of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' class actionlawsuit pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West1998)).

On April 27, 1999, named plaintiffs, Spiros A. Gofis and George Gofis (collectively,plaintiffs or the Gofises), filed the underlying class action lawsuit. The complaint defined theclass as all parties who paid a tax automation fee (Fee) on the redemption of general real estatetaxes sold at Cook County annual tax sales from the time of the imposition of the Fee throughApril 6, 1999.⁽¹⁾ The suit challenged the authority of the Cook County treasurer (Treasurer) tocollect the $10 Fee, and the second amended complaint sought: (1) an injunction enjoining theTreasurer from further collection of the Fee and requiring the Treasurer to return any Feepreviously collected, and (2) an accounting. Defendants, the County of Cook (the County) andthe Treasurer, Maria Pappas, in her capacity as the Cook County treasurer and ex officio countycollector,⁽²⁾ moved to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615, arguing that the Treasurer's collection ofthe Fee is allowed by section 21-245 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/21-245 (West1994)); that Cook County's Tax Sale Automation Fund Ordinance additionally authorizes theTreasurer to collect the Fee; that the voluntary payment doctrine bars the claims; and thatplaintiffs did not plead the elements of injunctive relief or an accounting.

On November 22, 1999, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss in its entirety,finding that the Treasurer has the requisite statutory authority to collect the Fee.

The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether Illinois law authorizes theTreasurer to collect the Fee; (2) whether Cook County's Tax Sale Automation Fund Ordinanceadditionally authorizes the Treasurer to collect the Fee; and (3) whether the voluntary paymentdoctrine bars the claims in the second amended complaint.⁽³⁾

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On or about January 29, 1997, the Gofises' property taxes for the nonpayment of 1995general taxes were sold at the Cook County annual tax sale. The Gofises redeemed the taxes onor about April 22, 1997, by paying $7,796.96 to the county clerk. As part of that redemption, afee of $200 was designated for the Cook County treasurer's fund, which included the $10 Fee thatwas collected from the purchaser of the delinquent taxes.

On April 29, 1999, the Gofises filed the original underlying "Class Action Complaint ForAn Injunction And Accounting against the Cook County Board of Commissioners and theTreasurer," challenging the Treasurer's authority to assess the Fee. Gofis also filed an"Emergency Motion For a Preliminary Injunction And Other Relief," seeking an order restrainingdefendants from spending any money collected in Fees. This motion was denied on May 4,1999.

The Board moved to quash service, asserting that it is not a suable entity, and theTreasurer moved to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615. Prior to responding to the motions, theGofises filed the first amended complaint, which named the County as a defendant instead of theBoard of commissioners. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the Gofises responded. The Gofiseswere subsequently granted leave to file a second amended complaint. In it, they alleged that,although the Board is the County's legislative body which operates pursuant to the County'shome-rule powers, prior to April 6, 1999, the Board never enacted an ordinance to impose a taxautomation fee on the purchaser of delinquent taxes and that when it enacted a tax automation feeordinance on April 6, 1999, it failed to follow its own rules. It was further alleged that, althoughshe had no authority to collect the Fee, the Treasurer collected it and put it in a "Tax SaleAutomation Fund" (Fund), which now contains in excess of $1 million.⁽⁴⁾

On September 20, 1999, the County and the Treasurer moved to dismiss the secondamended complaint on section 2-615 grounds, arguing that, as a matter of law, the Treasurer isauthorized to collect the Fee; that the Gofises' claims are barred by the voluntary paymentdoctrine; and that the second amended complaint fails to state a claim for injunctive relief or foran accounting. The motion was fully briefed and on November 22, 1999, was granted by the trialcourt, which issued a memorandum order as to both counts. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice ofappeal.

ANALYSIS

Upon review of the grant of a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, the standard is whetherthe allegations in the complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,sufficiently set forth a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Saunders v. MichiganAvenue National Bank, 278 Ill. App. 3d 307, 310 (1996). A ruling on a motion to dismiss doesnot require a court to weigh facts or determine credibility and therefore we review the complaintde novo. Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344 (1997). A complaint should not be dismissedunder section 2-615 unless it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under thepleadings that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d469, 488 (1994). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action may be acted upon in aclass action before determination of certification issues. Arriola v. Time Insurance Co., 296 Ill.App. 3d 303, 307 (1998).

Plaintiffs assert that section 21-245 of the Illinois Property Tax Code does not, alone,authorize the Treasurer to collect the Fee without prior Board approval. Section 21-245provides:

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