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No. 1-99-1935

                                                                                                                  FOURTH DIVISION
                                                                                                                   March 22, 2001

JUSTICE BARTH delivered the opinion of the court:

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 10, 1997, plaintiffs, Steven I. Givot, P. James Perille, Frank J.Perhats, Arden D. Perhats, Thomas J. Roeser, and Jeanette Muench, filed atwo-count complaint against defendants, David D. Orr, the county clerk of CookCounty (Cook County clerk); Edward Rosewell, the Cook County treasurer; WillardR. Helander, the county clerk of Lake County; Katherine Schultz, the countyclerk of McHenry County; Lorraine P. Sava, the county clerk of Kane County; andCommunity Unit School District No. 220. The complaint sought "relief undersection 18-145 of the Illinois Property Tax Code" (35 ILCS 200/18-145 (West1994)) and declaratory judgment relief. Plaintiffs Givot and Perille(appellants) appeal from the trial court's order dismissing the complaint. Weaffirm.

II. BACKGROUND

The boundaries of Community Unit School District 220 (District 220) includeproperty in Cook, Kane, Lake, and McHenry Counties. Plaintiffs are propertyowners whose property lies within the boundaries of District 220.

In count I of the complaint, Givot alleged that the Cook County clerk erredin his calculation of the extension of taxes for the District 220 educationaland special education funds for tax year 1993 by creating a deficiency in thetax levy. In particular, the complaint alleges that, in the 1992 tax year, theCook County clerk reduced the tentative extensions for the District 220educational fund and the District 220 special education fund by $3,397,657 and$49,174, respectively. When multiplied by the Cook County percentage of burden,47.39%, the Cook County clerk's reduction in extensions produced a net reductionof $1,633,453 in the Cook County portion of the District 220 extension. Thecomplaint further alleges that, for the 1993 tax year, the Cook County clerkillegally created his own district-wide levy of $3,468,866 and denominated it asa "deficiency in tax levy." When multiplied by the Cook Countypercentage of burden, 47.56%, the Cook County clerk's "deficiency in taxlevy" extension produced a net extension of $1,640,281 in the Cook Countyportion of District 220.

Givot asserted that the "deficiency in levy" resulted in the taxespaid on Givot's property and all other property in the Cook County portion ofDistrict 220 being higher than required by law. He further alleged that the CookCounty clerk did not abate an amount equal to the excess taxes erroneouslyextended in the following tax year, as required by section 18-145. The complaintfurther states that "1994 tax bills have issued, so that the fulfillment ofthe purpose of Section 18-145 *** can be accomplished only by refunding theexcess taxes" to every individual who paid them. Givot sought a judgmentdeclaring that the deficiency in the tax levy was an error in the extension oftaxes, ordering the Cook County clerk to calculate the refund due to everyindividual who paid 1993 taxes based on the error, and ordering the Cook Countytreasurer to pay the refund to each taxpayer.

In count II, all plaintiffs alleged that the Cook County clerk inflated by$2.3 million the aggregate extension base for the 1995 tax levy for District220. Plaintiffs alleged that this was an error in the extension of taxes andresulted in the 1995 taxes paid on all property in the Cook County portion ofDistrict 220 being higher than required by law. Plaintiffs further alleged thatDistrict 220 brought an action in the circuit court of Lake County assertingthat, because the Cook County clerk inflated the aggregate extension base, thecounty clerks of Lake, Kane, and McHenry Counties must be directed to do thesame.

In count II, plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the Cook Countyclerk's inflation of the aggregate extension base was an error and ordering theCook County clerk to abate an amount equal to the alleged error in thecalculation of the aggregate extension base in the 1995 levy year from theproperty taxes extended for the 1996 levy year as against all property in theCook County portion of District 220. Further, plaintiffs sought relief in theform of an order setting the aggregate extension base at $45,597,606.51, thatthe county clerks of Cook, Kane, Lake, and McHenry Counties are to use in thecalculation of a uniform aggregate extension base for the 1996 levy year. Also,plaintiffs requested that, if the county clerks of Cook, Kane, Lake, and McHenryCounties were to use a figure higher than the specific amount requested for1996, then the court declare that to be an error and order an abatement in the1997 levy year.

District 220 moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West1996)), and the Lake County clerk joined in this motion. In its motion, District220 asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to providethe relief requested because the tax objection procedure outlined in sections23-5 and 23-10 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/23-5, 23-10 (West 1994))provides an adequate remedy at law and because section 23-15 of the Property TaxCode (35 ILCS 200/23-15 (West 1994)) prohibits actions seeking class-widerelief.

With regard to count II, District 220 asserted that all plaintiffs other thanGivot intervened in the Lake County action referenced in the complaint and that,on February 19, 1997, the circuit court of Lake County entered a final orderdirecting action on the part of the county clerks of Kane, Lake, and McHenryCounties, so that all of the county clerks are using the same aggregate taxextension base figures for the 1996 tax year. Thus, according to District 220,the ruling of the circuit court of Lake County barred count II under thedoctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

The Cook County clerk and the Cook County treasurer (Cook County defendants)moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-615, 2-619, and 2-619.1 ofthe Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619, 2-619.1 (West 1996)). These defendantsadopted the contentions of District 220 and further argued that section 18-145confers neither an equitable nor a private right of action and that Givot failedto exhaust his administrative remedies.

On April 6, 1998, the trial court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Inits written opinion, the trial court concluded that (1) the complaint did notpresent allegations of an unauthorized tax which would permit a declaratoryjudgment action, (2) the tax objection process provides an adequate remedy atlaw, (3) section 18-145 does not grant plaintiffs an implied private cause ofaction, (4) Givot did not have standing to bring the action because he did notfile tax objections for the years in question, and (5) because all plaintiffsother than Givot had tax objections pending in Lake County, their claims werebarred pursuant to section 2-619(a)(3) of the Code.

On May 6, 1998, plaintiffs Givot, Perille, Frank J. Perhats, and Arden D.Perhats (moving plaintiffs) moved for reconsideration of the trial court'sruling and sought leave to file an amended complaint. The moving plaintiffs didnot attach to this motion a copy of a proposed amended complaint. District 220filed a timely memorandum opposing the motion for reconsideration. The movingplaintiffs took no action on the motion.

On January 26, 1999, the Cook County defendants filed a motion requestingthat the trial court deny the motion for reconsideration on the ground that themoving plaintiffs failed to request a hearing on the motion within 90 days, asrequired under local rules. On February 23, 1999, the moving plaintiffs filed a"supplement" to their motion for reconsideration. In this filing, themoving plaintiffs averred that the 28 largest taxpayers in District 220 hadfiled objections regarding the amount of their 1993 taxes. The moving plaintiffsrequested that the trial court continue their action pending a decisionregarding the tax objections and attached a proposed amended complaint.

The moving plaintiffs proposed the amendment in light of the trial court'scomment in its written opinion that, if it were proven in a tax objectionproceeding that the Cook County clerk did in fact commit the errors plaintiffsallege, then the court in that matter could order the Cook County clerk to abatethe excess taxes in the following year pursuant to section 18-145. The proposedamended complaint added allegations regarding the 28 pending tax objectionproceedings and claimed that, if the objectors are successful, then thecondition precedent to the granting of relief under section 18-145 will havebeen satisfied.

On April 21, 1999, the trial court granted the Cook County defendants' motionto deny the motion for reconsideration. This timely appeal followed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code challengesonly the legal sufficiency of a complaint and alleges only defects on the faceof the complaint. Board of Directors of Bloomfield Club Recreational Ass'n v.Hoffman Group, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d 419, 423 (1999); Vernon v. Schuster,179 Ill. 2d 338, 344 (1997). The critical inquiry in ruling upon a section 2-615motion to dismiss is whether the allegations of the complaint, when consideredin a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause ofaction upon which relief can be granted. Board of Directors of BloomfieldClub Recreational Ass'n, 186 Ill. 2d at 424; Vernon, 179 Ill. 2d at344. A cause of action will not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearlyappears that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that will entitle himto relief. Board of Directors of Bloomfield Club Recreational Ass'n, 186Ill. 2d at 424; Vernon, 179 Ill. 2d at 344. In reviewing the circuitcourt's ruling on defendants' section 2-615 motion to dismiss, we apply a denovo standard of review. Doe v. McKay, 183 Ill. 2d 272, 274 (1998).

B. Availability of Equitable Relief

Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and rely on section 18-145 of the PropertyTax Code as the basis for such relief. Section 18-145 provides:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, if, because of an error in the calculation of tax rates or extension of taxes by the county clerk, the taxes paid on any property are higher than required by law, the county clerk shall in the following year abate an amount equal to the excess taxes from the property taxes extended for any tax levy or fund affected by the error. This Section shall not deprive any taxpayer of the right to maintain a tax objection under Sections 23-5 and 23-10 challenging the legality of the county clerk's actions; but the amount of any subsequent tax abatement shall be credited toward the payment of any refund ordered by the court." 35 ILCS 200/18-145 (West 1994).

We agree with the trial court that plaintiffs' complaint does not presentallegations of an unauthorized tax that would permit a declaratory judgmentaction and that, because the tax objection process provides an adequate remedyat law, plaintiffs are not entitled to the declaratory relief they seek. In thefield of real estate taxation, the general rule applies that equity will notassume jurisdiction to grant relief where an adequate remedy at law exists. Schlenzv. Castle, 115 Ill. 2d 135, 141 (1986); Clarendon Associates v. Korzen,56 Ill. 2d 101, 105 (1973). Independent grounds for equitable jurisdiction incases involving real estate taxes exist only where a tax is unauthorized by lawor where it is levied upon exempt property. First National Bank & TrustCo. v. Rosewell, 93 Ill. 2d 388, 392 (1982); Clarendon, 56 Ill. 2d at105. Equitable jurisdiction may also arise where special circumstances exist,such as a fraudulently excessive assessment and the unavailability of anadequate remedy at law. Hoyne Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Hare, 60 Ill.2d 84 (1974); Clarendon, 56 Ill. 2d at 105. The same rule holds true withrespect to declaratory relief. Schlenz, 115 Ill. 2d at 141.

Under the Property Tax Code, if a person desires to object to all or any partof a property tax for any reason other than that the property is exempt fromtaxation, then that person must pay the disputed taxes under protest and file atax objection complaint. 735 ILCS 200/23-5, 23-10 (West 1994). The complaintcontains no allegations to the effect that plaintiffs were unable contest thealleged errors through the tax objection procedure. The complaint merely allegesthat, because the 1994 tax bills have already issued, the purpose underlyingsection 18-145 can be fulfilled only through the relief plaintiffs sought in thecomplaint.

Because plaintiffs do not claim that their property was exempt from taxation,the tax objection process was certainly available to them. Plaintiffs do notclaim that the taxes in question were unauthorized by law but instead assert anerror in the calculation of the amount of the taxes. Where, as here, the taxobjection procedure provides the taxpayer with an adequate remedy at law,dismissal of a complaint seeking equitable relief is proper. Schlenz, 115Ill. 2d at 142-43; Rosewell, 93 Ill. 2d at 392; Illinois Power Co. v.Henkhaus, 149 Ill. App. 3d 649, 651-52 (1986). See also Alexander v.County of Tazewell, 181 Ill. App. 3d 1070 (1989) (affirming denial ofpreliminary injunction).

C. Private Cause of Action Under Section 18-145

Appellants assert that section 18-145 of the Property Tax Code grants them acause of action beyond the remedies available through the tax objection process.According to appellants, when the legislature enacted this provision in 1990, itintended to create a new cause of action for tax relief outside of the objectionprocess. Appellants claim that this cause of action is available to alltaxpayers affected by a county clerk's error in rate calculation or extension oftaxes regardless of whether the person seeking relief paid his taxes underprotest and filed a tax objection.

Appellants ask us to consider the legislative history of section 18-145,which has its origin in the wake of Alexander v. County of Tazewell, 181Ill. App. 3d 1070 (1989). There, the court affirmed the denial of a preliminaryinjunction against the distribution of taxes collected when the county clerk haderroneously included increased school district rates in the plaintiffs' taxbills. Although 16 taxpayers in the affected districts paid their taxes underprotest, none of the plaintiffs took such action. The court noted that thehigher tax rate approved through a referendum was implemented one year early andthat there was no dispute that the tax rate used by the county clerk was notproper. Nevertheless, the court held that the tax objection procedure providedan adequate remedy. Alexander, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 1107.

After Alexander, Senator Luft, whose district encompassed TazewellCounty, introduced a bill that ultimately became section 18-145. Both houses ofthe General Assembly passed the bill without debate. In support of his proposal,Senator Luft stated:

"[I]f a tax is illegally extended and so ruled by the court, the only person that presently benefits under that objection is the individual or individuals that file the objection. What I am trying to do with this amendment is to allow every individual who pays taxes within that district where the tax has been levied illegally, to be able to credit on their next tax statement that money that was illegally extended." 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 15, 1989, at 66 (statements of Senator Luft).

When interpreting a statute, the primary rule of construction is to ascertainand give effect to the true intent of the legislature. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar,138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). Courts should look to the language of the statuteas the best indication of legislative intent and should give the terms of thestatute their ordinary meaning. In re Application for Judgment & Sale ofDelinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161, 168 (1995).Statutes also should be construed in conjunction with other statutes addressingthe same subject. In re Application for Judgment, 167 Ill. 2d at 168-69.Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain and ordinarymeaning of the words will be given effect without resorting to extrinsic aidsfor construction (e.g., legislative history). People ex rel. Baker v.Cowlin, 154 Ill. 2d 193, 197 (1992).

Section 18-145 does not expressly create a cause of action of the sortclaimed by plaintiffs. For a court to find that a statute implies a privateright of action, the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the plaintiff isa member of the class of persons for whose benefit the legislature enacted thestatute, (2) implying a private right of action is consistent with theunderlying purpose of the statute, (3) the plaintiff's injury is one the statutewas designed to prevent, and (4) implying a private right of action is necessaryto provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute. Corgan v.Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296, 312-13 (1991).

In Noyola v. Board of Education, 179 Ill. 2d 121 (1997), the courtstated that the analysis for determining whether a private right of actionshould be implied is appropriate only where the plaintiff is attempting to use astatutory enactment as the predicate for a tort action. Noyola, 179 Ill.2d at 132. According to Noyola, the Illinois courts have identified theimplied statutory action with modern actions based upon the law of thereasonable person. Underlying these cases is the notion that statutes andordinances designed to protect human life or property establish the standard ofconduct required of a reasonable person. Noyola, 179 Ill. 2d at 129-130.

In Noyola, the plaintiffs were the parents of economicallydisadvantaged school students who brought an action challenging the manner inwhich the state and local boards of education allocated funds pursuant to astatute designed to enable school districts with modest property tax bases toachieve a minimum level of funding per pupil. The court concluded that, becausethe plaintiffs were not attempting to use the statute as a predicate for a tortaction but instead were attempting to force public officials responsible forimplementing the statute to do what the law requires, it was not necessary toexamine the criteria for determining whether an implied statutory action exists.As in Noyola, plaintiffs' asserted cause of action pursuant to section18-145 does not fall within the framework for an implied statutory action.

Even if it were appropriate to consider here the criteria for an impliedstatutory action, plaintiffs would not be able to establish such a right.Although plaintiffs arguably are members of the class for whose benefit section18-145 was enacted, and their alleged injury arguably is one the statute wasdesigned to remedy, plaintiffs cannot establish that the second and fourthelements of the analysis are present here.

The second element cannot be established because to imply a private right ofaction would be wholly inconsistent with the purpose of section 18-145 and theProperty Tax Code in general. Sections 23-5 and 23-10 provide for the taxobjection process. Addressing the tax objection procedure, section 23-15 of theProperty Tax Code states:

"The court, sitting without a jury, shall hear and determine all objections specified to the taxes, assessments, or levies in question. This Section shall be construed to provide a complete remedy for any claims with respect to those taxes, assessments, or levies, excepting only matters for which an exclusive remedy is provided elsewhere in this Code." 35 ILCS 200/23-15(b)(1) (West 1996).

Section 23-15 clearly establishes the tax objection proceeding as theexclusive remedy for taxpayers, except in matters where another section of theProperty Tax Code provides the exclusive remedy. Section 18-145 does not fallwithin this exception because it expressly states that the provision for anabatement in the following tax year "shall not deprive any taxpayer of theright to maintain a tax objection under Sections 23-5 and 23-10 challenging thelegality of the county clerk's actions." 35 ILCS 200/18-145 (West 1994).Therefore, implying a private cause of action would contravene the clear intentof the legislature as expressed in section 23-15.

Additionally, we note that the complaint seeks what is in substanceclass-wide relief for all affected taxpayers. To imply the existence this typeof relief likewise would be inconsistent with the overall purpose of theProperty Tax Code. Section 23-15(a) sets forth the procedure for filing a taxobjection complaint. Although section 23-15(a) permits the joinder ofplaintiffs, "no complaint shall be filed as a class action." 35 ILCS200/23-15(a) (West 1996). In light of the general prohibition against classactions in tax objection proceedings, the justification for implying theexistence of such a cause under section 18-145 is weak.

We acknowledge that the pertinent language of section 23-15 has not been ineffect during all periods relevant to this litigation. In essence, however,section 23-15 is a codification of the long-standing principle that the taxobjection proceeding provides the taxpayer with an adequate remedy at law andthat equitable remedies generally should not be implied. Thus, section 23-15 ishighly relevant to the consideration of whether implying a cause of action isconsistent with the underlying purpose of the statute.

Plaintiffs place great emphasis on the introductory phrase of section 18-145,"Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary," and theproviso that section 18-145 "shall not deprive any taxpayer of the right tomaintain a tax objection." 35 ILCS 200/18-145 (West 1994). According toplaintiffs, this language reveals the legislature's intent to provide alternateremedies to taxpayers aggrieved by a county clerk's error in the ratecalculation or the extension of taxes. We disagree.

When the plain language of sections 18-145 and 23-15 is read together, itbecomes clear that implying a private cause of action is not consistent with thepurpose underlying the relevant provisions. The apparent injustice that section18-145 was intended to remedy is the lack of an error-correction mechanism thatbenefits all affected taxpayers, not only those who filed tax objections. As thetrial court properly recognized, when an error is discovered, through a singletax objection proceeding or otherwise, section 18-145 merely grants a countyclerk the authority to correct the error as to all affected taxpayers by issuingan abatement in the following tax year. The clear purpose of the language uponwhich plaintiffs rely is simply to preserve the tax objection process. There isnothing in the statutory scheme, however, suggesting that the legislatureintended to expand taxpayers' rights under this process.

Because the language of the relevant sections of the Property Tax Code isclear and unambiguous, it is unnecessary to consider the legislative history ofsection 18-145. We note, however, that nothing in the legislative historysupports appellants' position. In fact, the statements of Senator Luft supportthe conclusion that the legislature merely intended to create a mechanism bywhich a county clerk may correct an error so that all affected taxpayers willbenefit. Nothing in the scant legislative history suggests that the legislatureintended to create a new cause of action for aggrieved taxpayers.

The fourth element of the analysis likewise cannot be satisfied here becauseimplying a cause of action pursuant to section 18-145 is not necessary toprovide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute. As we have alreadyconcluded, except under limited circumstances not present here, the taxobjection process provides an adequate remedy for taxpayers aggrieved by errorsin the calculation of tax rates or the extension of taxes. For these reasons,appellants' contention that section 18-145 implies a private cause of action iswithout merit.

D. Mandamus

Appellants contend that, if an implied cause of action pursuant to section18-145 does not exist, then this court should permit the matter to proceed as apetition for mandamus. The Cook County defendants initially respond that,because the complaint does not contain a count requesting mandamus reliefand because plaintiffs did not raise the issue until they filed their reply tothe motions to dismiss, we should decline to consider this issue. In Noyola,the court examined the plaintiffs' complaint to determine whether it stated acause of action for mandamus despite the fact that the complaint did notexpressly seek a writ of mandamus. Noyola, 179 Ill. 2d at 132. Wewill similarly examine the complaint here.

If public officials have failed to comply with requirements imposed upon themby statute, a court may compel them to do so by a writ of mandamus,provided that the requirements for mandamus have been satisfied. Noyola,179 Ill. 2d at 132. "Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to enforce,as a matter of right, 'the performance of official duties by a public officerwhere no exercise of discretion on his part is involved.'" Lewis E. v.Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999), quoting Madden v. Cronson, 114Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986). A court will not grant a writ of mandamus unlessthe plaintiff can demonstrate a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear dutyof the defendant to act, and clear authority in the defendant to comply with thewrit. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d at 229. The writ will not lie when its effectis to substitute the court's judgment or discretion for that of the publicofficer. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d at 229. Thus, mandamus is notappropriate to regulate a course of official conduct or enforce the performanceof official duties generally. In re F.B., 206 Ill. App. 3d 140, 156(1990).

Here, plaintiffs have failed to plead a cause of action for mandamus.They merely allege errors in the calculation of tax rates and the extension oftaxes that they assert would warrant relief pursuant to section 18-145. However,the right to relief to which they claim to be entitled would not be establisheduntil the merits of the claim have been determined in a judicial proceeding.Such is not the office of an action in mandamus. The complaint does notallege a situation where there is a clear duty on the part of the county clerkto act. See In re Application of Anderson, 313 Ill. App. 3d 578, 584(2000) (where county clerk submitted form to state department of revenue withoutfilling in any value for farm property in county, mandamus wasappropriate cause of action to compel department of revenue to perform itsministerial duty of obtaining information it deemed necessary to performassessment ratio study). Rather, in this case, the claimed duty of the countyclerk to act in accordance with section 18-145 remains subject to determinationand must be established in a tax objection proceeding, which remains the solemethod of objecting to real estate taxes. We offer no opinion as to whether acause of action in mandamus would lie if, through a tax objection, it isdetermined that an error in rate calculation or extension of taxes ascontemplated in section 18-145 is found to exist and the clerk fails to abate anamount equal to the excess as section 18-145 directs.

E. Plaintiffs' Proposed Amended Complaint

Appellants' final contention is that the trial court should have allowed themto file their proposed amended complaint. Defendants respond that, because themoving plaintiffs never sought a hearing on their motion for reconsideration andrequest to file an amended complaint, the trial court properly denied the motionpursuant to Rule 2.3 of the circuit court of Cook County (Local Rule 2.3), whichprovides:

"The burden of calling for hearing any motion previously filed is on the party making the motion. If any such motion is not called for hearing within 90 days from the date it is filed, the court may enter an order overruling or denying the motion by reason of the delay." Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 2.3 (eff. July 1, 1976).

A reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's denial of motions forfailure to comply with Local Rule 2.3 unless that decision constitutes an abuseof discretion. In re Marriage of Izzo, 264 Ill. App. 3d 790, 792 (1994).Here, the moving plaintiffs timely moved for reconsideration of the dismissaland submitted their request to amend the complaint. Almost nine months passedbefore defendants requested that the motion be denied pursuant to Local Rule2.3. In light of the substantial delay involved here, we are unable to concludethat the trial court's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion.

We note additionally that, had the trial court addressed the merits of themotion to file an amended complaint, a denial would have been proper because theproposed amendment does not cure any of the defects giving rise to thedismissal. Because the tax objections of the other taxpayers remained pending atall relevant times, plaintiffs cannot allege a clear, affirmative right torelief. Accordingly, the proposed amended complaint does not state a cause ofaction for mandamus. The injury that the proposed amendments allege iswholly speculative because it is entirely possible that the Cook County clerkwill comply with the mandate of section 18-145 if the taxpayers prosecuting thetax objections are successful. Therefore, the proposed amendments fail to allegeany legally cognizable claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court properlydismissed plaintiffs' complaint. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit courtof Cook County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOFFMAN and SOUTH, JJ., concur.