Find Legal Information

THIRD DIVISION
September 30, 2003

JUSTICE SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court:

This is the second appeal which arises from an order of thecircuit court reopening its decision on defendant's motion for adirected finding upon remand and granting that motion.

The chronology of events is as follows: On February 3, 1999,plaintiff, Richard J. Geske, filed a two-count complaint againstdefendant, Barbara A. Geske, alleging unjust enrichment andfraud. Specifically, the complaint alleged that defendant hadbeen unjustly enriched by depriving plaintiff of his ownershipinterests in property and income and had fraudulently enteredinto an agreement with plaintiff, thereafter defrauding him ofhis property and income interests. A bench trial was commencedon June 5, 2001. At the conclusion of plaintiff's case- in-chief,defendant made a motion for a directed finding, which the trialcourt denied. Immediately after that ruling, defense counselrested without presenting testimony or documentary evidence, andafter closing arguments the trial judge ruled in defendant'sfavor as to both counts of the complaint.

On July 5, 2001, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal of theruling to this court. On March 7, 2002, in a unanimous Rule 23order reversing and remanding the trial court's ruling, thiscourt held in pertinent part:

"Here, the defendant moved for a directed finding, each side argued the motion'smerits, and the trial judge denied themotion. In doing so, the trial judge did notmerely determine that the plaintiff had madea prima facie case and, therefore, a judgmentas a matter of law in the defendant's favor was improper. Instead, the trial judge alsotook into account the credibility of thewitnesses and the quality of the evidence andfound that the plaintiff's evidence wassufficient to satisfy the required burden ofproof. *** Accordingly, when the defendantrested without offering any additionalevidence, the initial determination that theplaintiff had satisfied his required burdenof proof was unchallenged. Therefore, wehold that the trial judge erred in findingthat the plaintiff had failed to satisfy hisrequired burden of proof and entering ajudgment in the defendant's favor." Geske v.Geske, No. 1-01-2512 (2002) (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23).

This court did not address any other issues raised byplaintiff and reversed and remanded the cause to the circuitcourt for further proceedings "not inconsistent with this order."

A petition for rehearing filed by defendant was denied.

On remand, plaintiff filed a motion for "Entry of Order inFavor of Plaintiff on Counts of Unjust Enrichment and Fraud andFor Entry of an Order for Damages Consistent with the IllinoisAppellate Court's Ruling." In her response to that motion,defendant pointed out that this court never directed the trialcourt to enter any findings, judgments or awards of damages forplaintiff. Defendant asked the trial court to deny all relief,enter an order clarifying the reasons for its original findingor, in the alternative, reopen the proofs at the point at whichthe court denied plaintiff's motion for a directed finding andallow her to present evidence in support of her defense.

The trial court denied plaintiff's motion and ruled in favorof defendant on both counts of her motion for a directed finding. In rendering its decision, the court stated:

"Let me say this. There's no questionthat 2-1110 applies. I frankly was not awareof the statute. When you moved for adirected finding at the close of all theevidence *** you didn't, I'm virtuallycertain, cite the statute, and I *** appliedthe Pedrick standard. I don't know whether Iactually said that on the record, but there'sno doubt that I did apply the Pedrickstandard and that is the wrong standard incivil bench trials. *** Basically, thestatute calls for a jury-type assessment; didthe plaintiff establish his case by apreponderance of the evidence considering andweighing all of the evidence *** I just wantto point out the difference between thestandard for directed verdicts in benchtrials. We have to start out from thatpremise. *** [T]he Appellate Court wascorrect in pointing out that I did not apply[sic] correct standard. *** When [defensecounsel] moved for a directed finding, shedid not argue 2-1110. Frankly, I wasn'taware of its existence when this case wastried. Neither of the parties urged thatthat is the standard I was to apply. Ibelieve, [defense counsel], you argued thatthe Pedrick standard was the law for me toconsider, and I obviously ruled from thatlegal position."

The court went on to explain that when it originally ruledon defendant's motion for a directed finding by applying theincorrect standard, it had considered the evidence in the lightmost favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party, and denied themotion because it did not believe the evidence "sooverwhelmingly" favored defendant, the moving party. The trialjudge acknowledged time and time again that he had made a mistakesince the Pedrick standard does not apply in civil bench trials.

The trial judge then reviewed his notes from the originaltrial, and after applying the correct standard, section 2-1110 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2000)), andafter considering the credibility of the witnesses and the weightand quality of the evidence granted defendant's motion for adirected finding, stating that he did not find plaintiff'stestimony to be credible. This second appeal followed.

Plaintiff has raised three issues for our review: (1)whether questions of law presented and determined in a priorappeal become the law of the case and are binding on the partiesand the trial court in any subsequent proceeding on remand; (2)whether the trial court can sua sponte reopen its decision of thedefendant's motion for a directed verdict after remand when thetrial court's decision was not appealed by the defendant; and (3)whether the trial court on remand must follow the opinion andmandate of the appellate court.

In ruling on a motion for a directed finding or judgment,the court must consider all of the evidence, including anyfavorable to the defendant, and pass on the credibility ofwitnesses, draw reasonable inferences from the testimony, andgenerally consider the weight and the quality of the evidence. Kokinis v. Kotrich, 81 Ill. 2d 151, 154 (1980). On appeal, thedecision of the trial court should not be reversed unless it iscontrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Kokinis, 81Ill. 2d at 154.

On remand, the trial judge conceded that he had applied thewrong standard in his original ruling on the motion for adirected finding because he applied the Pedrick standard ratherthan section 2-1110. In Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37Ill. 2d 494 (1967), our supreme court held that "verdicts oughtto be directed and judgments n.o.v. entered only in those casesin which all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect mostfavorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant thatno contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand." Pedrick, 37 Ill. 2d at 510.

Section 2-1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) statesin pertinent part:

"In all cases tried without a jury,defendant may, at the close of plaintiff'scase, move for a finding or judgment in hisor her favor. In ruling on the motion thecourt shall weigh the evidence, consideringthe credibility of the witnesses and theweight and quality of the evidence. If theruling on the motion is favorable to thedefendant, a judgment dismissing the actionshall be entered. If the ruling on themotion is adverse to the defendant, thedefendant may proceed to adduce evidence insupport of his or her defense ***." 735 ILCS5/2-1110 (West 2000).

Contrary to the Pedrick standard, which governs a motion fora directed verdict during a jury trial, under section 2-1110 thecourt is not to view the evidence in the light most favorable tothe plaintiff. Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154. Rather, the circuitcourt must weigh all of the evidence, determine the credibilityof the witnesses, and draw reasonable inferences therefrom. Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154-55.

In Illinois there is a two-stage process when a trial courtrules on a motion for a directed verdict at the close of theplaintiff's evidence in a bench trial. First, the judge mustdetermine whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154-55. Secondly, the judge, as the trierof fact, must weigh the evidence, and based on the weighing makea ruling. Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154-55. If the plaintiff failsto make out a prima facie case, the defendant is entitled tojudgment in his favor as a matter of law, and the court mustenter a directed finding in favor of the defendant without goingto the second stage under section 2-1110. Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at154-55. If the plaintiff has presented at least some evidence onevery element essential to the plaintiff's cause of action, theplaintiff has succeeded in making out a prima facie case, and thejudge, as the trier of fact, must move on to the second stage ofthe process. Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154-55.

Trial courts have the inherent power to correct theirprevious rulings. People v. Van Cleve, 89 Ill. 2d 298, 432N.E.2d 837 (1982). It would be absurd to suppose that trialjudges who conclude they have made mistakes should not be free tocorrect them within an appropriate time frame.

Here, the trial judge acknowledged numerous times that hehad made a mistake when he originally ruled on the motion for adirected finding by applying the Pedrick standard rather than theKokinis-section 2-1110 standard. We find, therefore, that havingonce determined he had erred by applying an incorrect standard,the trial judge had the inherent authority to reopen the motionfor a directed finding and rule on it accordingly by applying thecorrect standard.

Having determined that the judge was not in error inreopening the motion for a directed finding, we must nowdetermine whether his decision that plaintiff had failed toestablish a prima facie case was against the manifest weight ofthe evidence.

Only two witnesses testified at trial, plaintiff anddefendant. According to the testimony there was an oralagreement between plaintiff and defendant that plaintiff wouldmove back into the home, at defendant's request, in exchange forhis helping her raise and care for their teenage daughter. Plaintiff testified that defendant induced him to return to thepremarital property by promising him that they would "share ineverything." Plaintiff lived in that home for 24 years,purchased automobiles, some of which were new, took vacations,and basically lived independently from defendant.

Initially, the court noted that plaintiff's testimony waslacking in credibility. As to the first count of the complaintalleging unjust enrichment, the trial judge held that the oralagreement between plaintiff and defendant that plaintiff wouldmove back into the marital abode to help defendant with theraising of their teenage daughter was unenforceable under thestatute of frauds because it was not in writing and could not beperformed within one year. The court also found that theagreement was lacking in consideration.

As to the second count of the complaint alleging fraud, thecourt held that plaintiff was required to establish anintentional misrepresentation of fact upon which he was inducedto rely by defendant which resulted in his pecuniary detriment. The court found, however, that plaintiff lived independently anddid not suffer any pecuniary or financial harm because he movedback into the marital home and had been "taken care of" sincethat time. Consequently, the court ruled there was nomisrepresentation and, therefore, no fraud, and that plaintiffhad not sustained his burden of proof either in tort or contract. In rendering its decision, the court stated:

"The defendant was kind enough to her formerhusband to let him stay in her house, much toher chagrin, and your client [,] somehowfeeling aggrieved, feeling that he wasentitled to 'palimony,' if you will, underthe guise of fraudulent misrepresentationcame in and offered his testimony, which Ifound was largely not credible. Your clientwas basically able to freeload off his ex-wife because she didn't have the nerve Iguess or was too kind to put him out of herhouse. There was no jural relationshipbetween the parties after 1974 when thedegree [sic] of divorce was entered. He paidrent and I guess in reviewing the evidencebought a conversion van at one time duringthis relationship, but he did little else. He was really no more than a common lawtenant."

After reviewing the evidence and the record in this case, wefind that the trial court's findings were not against themanifest weight of the evidence once it applied the section 2-1110 standard on remand. The court was in the best position tojudge the credibility of the witnesses, observe their manner anddemeanor while testifying and resolve the conflicts in theirtestimony. For these reasons we shall not disturb thosefindings.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HALL, J., concurs.

HOFFMAN, J., dissents.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN, dissenting:

The facts relevant to a resolution of this appeal are not indispute. The plaintiff filed a two-count amended complaint againstthe defendant asserting claims for unjust enrichment and fraud. The matter proceeded to trial without a jury. At the close of theplaintiff's case-in-chief, the defendant moved for a directedfinding pursuant to section 2-1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2000)). The trial court denied themotion. Thereafter, the defendant rested without introducing anyadditional evidence. Following a brief deliberation, the trialjudge entered a judgment in favor of the defendant on both counts. The plaintiff appealed, contending that the court's judgment wasinconsistent with its denial of the defendant's motion for adirected finding. We agreed, reversed the judgment, and remandedthe matter to the circuit court for further proceedings. Geske v.Geske, No. 1-01-2512 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme CourtRule 23) (hereinafter referred to as "Geske I").

On remand, the trial court sua sponte vacated its orderdenying the defendant's motion for a directed finding at the closeof the plaintiff's case-in-chief, granted the motion, and againentered judgment in favor of the defendant. Thereafter, theplaintiff filed the instant appeal. I would again reverse thetrial court's judgment in this matter.

When this court reverses an order of the circuit court andremands the cause for further proceedings, the circuit court isbound by our determination of all issues decided and may act onlyin conformity with our judgment. Aardvark Art, Inc. v.Lehigh/Steck-Warlick, 284 Ill. App. 3d 627, 633, 672 N.E.2d 697(1996). I believe that the procedure employed by the circuit courtin this case on remand was inconsistent with the determinationsmade by this court in Geske I.

In Geske I, we held that "the trial judge erred in findingthat the plaintiff had failed to satisfy his required burden ofproof and entering a judgment in the defendant's favor." As aconsequence, we reversed the judgment entered in favor of thedefendant and remanded the cause for further proceedings "notinconsistent" with our order. (Emphasis added.) Geske I, No. 1-01-2512 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Onremand, the trial court vacated its order denying the defendant'smotion for a directed finding at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, granted the motion, and again entered judgment in favorof the defendant. Implicit in the trial court's order is a findingthat the plaintiff failed, in his case-in-chief, to satisfy hisrequired burden of proof. The finding is obviously inconsistentwith our determination of the same issue in Geske I.

When, as in Geske I, this court remands a cause to the circuitcourt with directions to proceed in a manner not inconsistent withour order, the correctness of the trial court's action on remand isto be determined by reference to the content of our order. PSLRealty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 308, 427N.E.2d 563 (1981). The defendant asserts that the direction wegave in Geske I was "vague". To be sure, we did not specificallydirect the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff. However, our failure in this regard could in no instance beinterpreted as permitting the trial court to enter judgment for thedefendant predicated upon a finding wholly inconsistent with adetermination that this court had made on the same issue.

When we reversed the trial court's judgment for the defendantin Geske I and remanded the cause with a direction to conductfurther proceedings not inconsistent with our order, I believe thatonly two options were available to the trial court. It could haveentered judgment in favor of the plaintiff or, in the exercise ofits discretion, it could have reopened proofs and continued on withthe trial. Unfortunately, the trial court chose neither option andinstead embarked upon a course of action which I believe wasinconsistent with this court's prior order.

I would reverse the judgment entered in favor of the defendantand remand this cause to the circuit court for further proceedingsnot inconsistent with our order in Geske I. Consequently, I mustrespectfully dissent.