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SECOND DIVISION
November 07, 2000

We review a trial court order that barred rejection of arbitration awards in 122 cases because the notices of rejection werenot personally signed by an attorney of record. The notices were filed under Supreme Court Rule 95 (134 Ill. 2d R. 95), 1of 10 supreme court rules (Supreme Court Rules 86 through 95) that govern mandatory arbitration of civil actionsexclusively for money in an amount or of a value not in excess of the monetary limit authorized by the supreme court. 155Ill. 2d R. 86. In most of the cases, the notices of rejection were signed in the name of a law firm entered on the rejectionforms by someone who was not an attorney. In others, the notices contained the name of a lawyer but the names wereentered on the forms by someone, not an attorney, who placed his or her initials above the name of the lawyer.

Relying on our decision in Bachmann v. Kent, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 689 N.E.2d 171 (1997), plaintiffs filed motions to barrejection of the awards as a sanction, some citing Supreme Court Rule 95 (134 Ill. 2d R. 95) or Supreme Court Rule 137(155 Ill. 2d R. 137), or both. The trial court consolidated the cases for hearing and argument on the motions. All caseswere set for oral argument on February 24, 1998. In the words of the trial court: "The court heard arguments first fromplaintiffs' attorneys with multiple motions or unique circumstances, with all other plaintiffs' attorneys *** given theopportunity to offer any additional comments. Each of the involved defense offices then answered and plaintiffs' attorneysthen replied."

On April 23, 1998, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting plaintiffs' motions. In the trial court'sdispositive words: "The rejections of the awards are stricken, and judgments are entered on the awards in favor of theplaintiffs and against the defendants in the amounts of the awards, plus costs." Although the individual attorneys offered tosign the notices of rejection in response to plaintiffs' motions, the trial court, in its discretion, refused to allow them to doso. All defendants filed timely notices of appeal. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

The trial judge did not make clear in his order and memorandum opinion whether he imposed sanctions under Rule 95 orRule 137, but he relied heavily on Bachmann. The Bachmann trial court relied on Rule 95, but also held that the signatureof a nonattorney on the notice of rejection violated Rule 137. In Bachmann, the defendant failed to attend the arbitrationhearing, despite the plaintiff's request in a request to produce that he do so. We affirmed the trial court in Bachmann. Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 689 N.E.2d 171.

On February 24, 1999, the chairman of the executive committee of this court conducted a prehearing conference underSupreme Court Rule 310 (134 Ill. 2d R. 310) to expedite resolution of the 122 appeals. On March 26, 1999, the executivecommittee entered an order finding that the issues raised in the 122 cases were similar. Eleven cases were consolidated forbriefing (two more were later added), and the remaining appeals were stayed, pending resolution of the consolidatedappeals or until further order of this court. We now reverse the order of the trial court and remand the consolidated andstayed appeals for dispositions consistent with this opinion.

The standard of review of sanctions imposed under a supreme court rule is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112, 120, 692 N.E.2d 286, 289 (1998). But we must first address threeissues raised by the pleadings and briefs, for which the standard of review is de novo. First, in the trial court'smemorandum and opinion the court suggests that the notices of rejection filed by defendants were "void" for lack of anattorney's signature, without explaining why it believed this to be so. Second, defendants argue on appeal that theunderlying arbitration awards are "void" for failure of the arbitrators to execute an oath before each arbitration hearing, asrequired by Supreme Court Rule 87. 134 Ill. 2d R. 87. Third, some defendants argue that the trial court lacked jurisdictionover some of the cases for various reasons: In one case (No. 1-98-4040), the underlying action had been settled anddismissed more than 30 days before the motion for sanctions was filed. In others (not identified by number in the briefs),the action had proceeded to trial and judgment more than 30 days before the motion for sanctions was filed. In yet another(No. 1-98-4056), the action was on the military calendar and stayed at the time the motion for sanctions was filed. Challenges to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and issues raised as to whether an order is void are reviewed denovo. Margaret Manor, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 279 Ill. App. 3d 776, 779, 665 N.E.2d 318, 320 (1996).

We first address the issue of whether the notices of rejection were "void."

The trial court said:

"This court finds that the notices of rejection are void. Supreme Court Rule 137 is violated by the signatures having beenaffixed by non-attorneys. Resultantly, valid notices of rejection in the form and manner as required by Supreme Court Rule95 have not been filed in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 93 and the rejections must be stricken. 134 Ill. 2d R. 93, 95,137."

But later, the court went on to say:

"All parties to these motions seem to agree that this court has discretion to allow or disallow the rejection. To the extentthat this is so and even if the notices of rejection are voidable and not void, this court is required to give the intendedstrength and purpose to the mandatory arbitration program and the administration of the court system."

What, perhaps, the trial court intended to say was that a judicial order confirming rejection of arbitration awards based onthe notices could be voidable because the notices were defective for lack of an attorney's signature.

The failure to serve proper notice on a nonmoving party has no effect on the notice itself, but affects only the order entered. See 134 Ill. 2d R.104(d); Savage v. Pho, 312 Ill. App. 3d 553, 557, 727 N.E.2d 1052 (2000) (failure to serve notice underSupreme Court Rule 104(d) renders an order based on the motion voidable, not void). See also Illinois Service FederalSavings & Loan Ass'n v. Academy of St. James College Preparatory, 227 Ill. App. 3d 507, 592 N.E.2d 126 (1992) (failureto serve proper notice of judicial sale under section 12-115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110,par. 12-115) did not render judicial sale void or voidable).

While we later hold in this opinion that notices of rejection must be signed by an attorney, the orders allowing therejections are, at most, voidable, if it can be shown that the notices giving rise to the orders were defective. People ex relHamer v. Jones, 39 Ill. 2d 360, 371-72, 235 N.E.2d 589, 596 (1968). There is no evidence in these records or in the briefsthat the lack of an attorney's signature on the notices of rejection hampered the appearance of the plaintiffs or denied theman opportunity to be heard. Plaintiffs were, in fact, served with notices of rejection in each case and were aware thatdefendants intended to reject the awards. To refer to the notices of rejection as "void" was incorrect and interjected ajurisdictional issue where none existed. The inference in the trial court order that a properly served and docketed noticelacking an attorney's signature may invalidate subsequent orders entered by a court is one unsupported by any case wecould find.

We next address defendants' jurisdictional argument. Defendants maintain that the failure of the arbitrators to execute anoath before each hearing, as required by Supreme Court Rule 87 (134 Ill. 2d R. 87), rendered the arbitration awards void. We disagree. This issue has arisen before and was ably reviewed in a trial court memorandum and opinion, which is citedand appended to some of the appellee briefs in this case. Governmental Employees Insurance Company v. Sheppard, Nos.96- M1-01999, 96-M1-304736, 96-M1-306055, 96-M1-307491, 96-M1-301866, cons. (August 11, 1998). We agree withthe reasoning in the cited trial court memorandum opinion and order and briefly summarize its research:

"The objection that the arbitrators were not sworn was waived by the plaintiff in error by appearing and going to trialwithout requiring an oath to be administered." Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 581, 583, 24 L. Ed. 1085, 1086(1878).

"[S]ilence ought to be regarded as acquiescence. If the objection that the oath has not been administered is made in apttime, it may be cured, and time and expense may be saved. It is not sufficient for the defendants to say they did not knowof the failure to take the oath until after the report was filed. They knew, or were bound to know, what the law was. Thelaw required the [arbitrator] to be sworn before he entered upon his duties. If they intended to insist upon a compliancewith this requirement, they should have made known their intention before the duties were entered upon." Pardridge v.Ryan, 134 Ill. 247, 255, 25 N.E. 627 (1890).

"[I]f the parties proceeded to a hearing before unsworn arbitrators without objection, they will be deemed to have waivedthat requirement." City of Carlyle v. Village of Beckemeyer, 243 Ill. App. 460, 463-64 (1927).

Here, none of the parties objected before or during the arbitrations to the arbitrators' failure to take an oath. As inPardridge, the parties' silence is a waiver of their right to insist that the arbitrators be sworn.

While we agree that arbitrators are required to comply with Rule 94 and sign an oath before each hearing, we believe theissue has been waived in the cases before us.

Last, we agree with defendants that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over cases that were settled and dismissed pursuantto settlement (No. 1-98-4040) or in which a judgment had been entered more than 30 days before the motions for sanctionswere filed. The trial court lost jurisdiction over these cases 30 days after judgment or entry of the dismissal orders. In reMarriage of Stufflebeam, 283 Ill. App. 3d 923, 671 N.E.2d 55 (1996). A final and appealable order is not subject tomodification unless the trial court reacquires jurisdiction. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v.Rosewell, 262 Ill. App. 3d 938, 635 N.E.2d 413 (1992). But we do not agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction overthe stayed case placed on the military calendar (1-98-4056). Although it is unusual for the trial court to lift a stay of a caseon the military calendar without a showing that the defendant will not be prejudiced thereby (see section 521 of theSoldiers' & Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940. 50 U.S.C.A. App.