Gaines v. Chicago Transit Authority

Case Date: 02/04/2004
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-03-0447 Rel

THIRD DIVISION
February 4, 2004



 

No. 1-03-0447

GRACE GAINES,

                         Plaintiff-Appellant,

         v.

CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

                         Defendant-Appellee

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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County.



Honorable
Ronald S. David,
Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Grace Gaines, filed a negligence action against defendant, Chicago TransitAuthority (CTA), to recover damages in the amount of $30,000 for personal injuries sustainedwhen she suffered a fall while a passenger on one of its buses. The trial court granted summaryjudgment in favor of the CTA, and plaintiff has appealed, contending that the trial court erred inruling as a matter of law that the CTA did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff and that the trialcourt based its decision on an erroneous standard of care.

The complaint alleged that the CTA, as a common carrier, owed a duty to exercise thehighest practicable degree of care to its passengers, and that it was guilty of one or more of thefollowing negligent acts or omissions: (1) operated its vehicle in a careless, reckless, and negligentmanner; (2) negligently operated its vehicle at a speed greater than that allowed by statute orordinance and greater than reasonable and proper under the circumstances; (3) negligently,carelessly and recklessly disregarded traffic signals; and (4) failed to maintain and exercisereasonable care to discover and prevent danger and injury to its passengers. The complaintfurther alleged that "as a direct and proximate result of the careless and negligent conduct ofdefendant as above set forth, plaintiff[,] while walking down the aisle of the carrier[,] wasinjured."

Plaintiff gave a discovery deposition in which she testified as follows: on October 11,2000, she boarded a southbound bus on 55th and Cottage Grove Avenue in Chicago atapproximately 4:30 p.m. She was the last passenger to board at that stop and entered behindseveral students who were carrying book bags. The students were standing in the front of thebus, which was crowded at the time. After paying her fare, plaintiff walked to the rear of the buswith the intent to sit near the rear exit because she would be getting off at a nearby stop. According to plaintiff's deposition testimony, as she walked down the aisle, the bus lurchedforward and because of a book bag on the floor that she did not see, she tripped and was throwntowards the back of the bus. She testified that as she walked down the aisle, she was trying tokeep one student's book bag from hitting her in the face while holding onto a handrail with herother hand, and that she was not expecting anything to be on the floor. She let go of the handrailfor a second and that's when the bus "must have launched [lurched]," causing her to trip over thestudent's book bag. Other passengers helped her to a seat, and plaintiff sat down for a short timebefore exiting the bus. She never motioned for the bus driver to stop the bus, nor did she alert thedriver that she had fallen. Plaintiff continued to her destination although she was in some pain. However, she did not seek medical attention for her injury until two days later. The day after heraccident, plaintiff notified the CTA that she had been injured on one of its buses.

The cause proceeded to mandatory arbitration, and an award was entered in favor ofplaintiff and against the CTA for $13,800 plus costs. CTA rejected the award, and the cause wassubsequently scheduled for trial.

The CTA filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it did not owe plaintiff aduty of care regarding the book bag, which was under the control of a third party. The CTAcontended that there was no evidence indicating that its driver knew of the obstruction placed inthe aisle by a third party or that a substantial length of time had passed to imply such notice. TheCTA further contended that in the absence of proof of knowledge or implied knowledge, plaintiffcould only seek recovery from an injury proximately caused by an obstruction placed in the aisleby a third party if she could produce some evidence of negligent operation of the vehicle, citingHeineke v. Chicago Rys. Co., 279 Ill. 210, 213 (1917), but she offered no evidence that the buswas driven in a negligent manner. The trial court denied the CTA's motion for summary judgmentand again set the matter for trial. There is no report of proceedings or bystander's report includedin the record from that date, although the trial court's written order indicates that argument washeard on that motion.

The CTA subsequently filed an emergency motion for reconsideration of the denial of its motion for summary judgment,(1) contending that plaintiff's deposition testimony that the bus"must have launched [lurched]" was insufficient as a matter of law to create a genuine issue ofmaterial fact at to its negligence. The trial court granted the CTA's emergency motion forreconsideration and dismissed plaintiff's case with prejudice.(2)

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by ruling, as a matter of law, thatdefendant did not owe her a duty of care and that the CTA's motion for reconsideration was basedupon an erroneous standard of care.

A reviewing court conducts a de novo review of the evidence in a summary judgmentcase. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 315 Ill.App. 3d 552, 559 (2000). The reviewing court must construe all evidence strictly against themovant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Atlantic Mutual, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 559. Where the pleadings, depositions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of materialfact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Atlantic Mutual, 315 Ill. App.3d at 559. If reasonable persons could draw different inferences from the undisputed facts,summary judgment should be denied. Atlantic Mutual, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 559.

To sustain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of aduty owed by defendant to plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury to plaintiff proximatelycaused by the breach. Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n, 195 Ill. 2d 210, 228 (2000).

Here, plaintiff was a passenger on one of CTA's busses, which it operates in its role as acommon carrier. It has long been the law of Illinois that a common carrier owes its passengersthe highest degree of care consistent with the practical operation of its vehicles, but it cannot bean absolute insurer of the safety of its passengers. Morris v. Chicago Transit Authority, 28 Ill.App. 3d 183, 185 (1975). A carrier is liable to its passenger only for injuries that are caused by itsnegligence; it is not liable for injuries that result from a cause beyond its control. Nilsson v.Checker Taxi Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 718, 722 (1972). Hence, the mere fact that there is an accidentwhich injures a passenger does not warrant a presumption that the carrier was negligent. Nilsson,4 Ill. App. 3d at 722.

In the case at bar, we find that plaintiff presented no evidence of CTA's negligence in theoperation of its vehicle. In her deposition, plaintiff testified that as she walked down the aisletowards the rear of the bus, she was trying to avoid being hit in the face by a student's book bagwhile holding onto the handrail with her other hand and was not looking at the floor. She alsostated that she let go of the handrail briefly and that the bus "must have" lurched, causing her totrip over the book bag that was on the floor. Plaintiff's testimony clearly establishes that herinjury arose from the unseen book bag on the floor, which was placed there by a third party, andnot from the actions of the CTA driver. Plaintiff has neither alleged nor proven that the driverknew or should have known that the book bag was on the floor. The CTA's high duty of care as acommon carrier applies to the operation of its vehicle but not to the actions of third parties. SeeMorris, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 185. We find that the evidence is insufficient to raise an issue ofmaterial fact as to CTA's negligence in the operation of its bus. Based upon these undisputedfacts, we find that the circuit court properly granted CTA's motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HALL and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur.

 

 

1. CTA's emergency motion is not contained in the record; however, a copy of the motionwas included as part of the plaintiff's appendix.

2. The record contains no report of proceedings or bystander's report from this hearingeither.