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"Personal property purchased by a governmental body, by a corporation, society, association, foundation, orinstitution organized and operated exclusively for charitable, religious, or educational purposes ***." 35 ILCS 105/3-5(4) (West 1996).

At the administrative hearing, the six exhibits submitted by the Department were admitted into evidence, includingplaintiff's articles of incorporation, with amendments thereto, plaintiff's by-laws, plaintiff's audited financial statement for1991 and correspondence concerning plaintiff's application for tax-exempt status.

Plaintiff offered affidavits, all of which were excluded, verifying that five other organizations have received tax exemptionsin Illinois despite the fact that all of their donations fund organizations and activities in Israel. A lengthy program pamphletidentifying contributors to the 1993 Friends of Israel Defense Fund dinner was also excluded from evidence. The onlyexhibits offered by plaintiff that were admitted into evidence were the following: 86 Illinois Administrative Code sections130.2005 through 130.2010 and 200.155 (1996), and three pamphlets describing plaintiff-funded facilities and activities inIsrael.

The Department rejected plaintiff's contention that it was entitled to an educational exemption. Plaintiff did not ask thecircuit court to review that decision, and this court will not address it here. In addition, the Department concluded thatplaintiff did not meet the statutory requirement that a charitable organization seeking exemption must benefit an indefinitenumber of persons or in some way reduce the burdens on government. Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Department'sdecision to deny plaintiff's application for charitable exemption from the use tax in the circuit court.

The circuit court reversed the Department's decision, concluding that plaintiff's operations do benefit an indefinite numberof persons. The court stated that the Department erred in requiring plaintiff to additionally show that its operations reducedthe burdens of the government of the State of Illinois. The circuit court ruled that an applicant for a charitable exemptionunder the Use Tax Act may show that its operations either benefit an indefinite number of persons or that its operations insome way reduce the burdens of government. Thus, the circuit court deemed plaintiff to be exempt from taxation under theUse Tax Act as an entity organized exclusively for charitable purposes.

The Department now appeals the ruling of the circuit court. The Department argues that plaintiff is not entitled to acharitable exemption because it does not benefit an indefinite number of persons or reduce the burdens of Illinoisgovernment. The Department argues further that plaintiff does not dispense benefits to all who need or apply for it and thatplaintiff does not use its property exclusively for charity. We affirm the order of the circuit court reversing the Department'sruling and granting a charitable exemption to plaintiff.

In reviewing a final decision under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 1998)), we review theadministrative agency's decision and not the circuit court's determination. XL Disposal Corp. v. Zehnder, 304 Ill. App. 3d202, 207, 709 N.E.2d 293 (1999). An administrative agency's decisions on questions of fact are entitled to deference and arereversed only if against the manifest weight of the evidence. XL Disposal, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 207. Questions of law decidedby such an agency are not entitled to deference, however, and are reviewed de novo. XL Disposal, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 207.

There is a conflict in recent appellate decisions as to which standard of review applies in cases where the only question isthe legal conclusion to be drawn from the facts. In Richard's Tire Co. v. Zehnder, 295 Ill. App. 3d 48, 57, 692 N.E.2d 360(1998), the Second District held that a de novo standard of review is appropriate in such cases. In XL Disposal, 304 Ill. App.3d at 207, the Fourth District held that the clearly erroneous standard of review is applicable in such cases. We agree withthe Fourth District's holding and with its analysis of our supreme court's holding in City of Belvidere v. Illinois State LaborRelations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998).

As here, the facts in Belvidere were not in dispute. Our supreme court held that "because this case involves an examinationof the legal effect of a given set of facts, it involves a mixed question of fact and law." City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205.The court then held that a clearly erroneous standard of review is appropriate when mixed questions of law and fact areinvolved. Prior to its holding in Belvidere, our supreme court had held that, where facts were undisputed, a determination ofwhether property is exempt from taxation was a question of law. Chicago Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 171Ill. 2d 263, 271, 664 N.E.2d 52 (1996). We will apply the clearly erroneous standard as enunciated in Belvidere.

The clearly erroneous standard of review is between a manifest weight of the evidence standard and a de novo standard soas to provide some deference to the administrative agency's experience and expertise. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205.Under this standard, we must accept the administrative agency's findings unless we are "'left with the definite and firmconviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction LaborersPension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622, 124 L. Ed. 2d 539, 563-64, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2279 (1993), quoting United States v. UnitedStates Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766, 68 S. Ct. 525, 541-42 (1948). Each claim must be determinedfrom the facts presented. City of Chicago v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 147 Ill. 2d 484, 491, 590 N.E.2d 478 (1992). Inthis case, the facts surrounding plaintiff's organization are not in dispute; the issue is whether the charitable exemptionprovided in the Use Tax Act applies to it. The Department's decision that the exemption does not apply must be affirmed bythis court unless that conclusion is clearly erroneous.

Statutory exemptions to taxation such as the charitable exemption sought by plaintiff are to be strictly construed in favor oftaxation. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 163 Ill. 2d 290, 301, 644 N.E.2d 1166 (1994). The taxpayer seekingthe exemption bears the burden of proving clearly and conclusively that it is entitled to it. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 163 Ill. 2d at300. Furthermore, in reviewing the Department's decision, all facts and debatable questions must be construed in favor oftaxation. Wyndemere Retirement Community v. Department of Revenue, 274 Ill. App. 3d 455, 459, 654 N.E.2d 608 (1995).

Section 3-5(4) of the Use Tax Act provides for an exemption from taxation if the corporation purchasing property isorganized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes. 35 ILCS 105/3-5(4) (West 1996). Despite the fact thatMethodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d 149, 233 N.E.2d 537 (1968), was a property tax case, the guidelines thecourt laid out for determining whether an entity is tax-exempt are also applicable to use tax cases. Wyndemere, 274 Ill. App.3d at 459. The Methodist⁽¹⁾ guidelines for charitable exemptions are as follows: (1) the charity is applied for the benefitof an indefinite number of persons, persuading them to an educational or religious conviction, for their general welfare - orin some way reducing the burdens of government; (2) the charitable institution has no capital, capital stock or shareholders,earns no profit or dividends but, rather, derives its funds mainly from public and private charity and holds them in trust forthe objects and purposes expressed in its charter; (3) the charitable institution dispenses charity to all who need it, does notprovide gain or profit in a private sense to any person connected with it, and does not appear to place obstacles of anycharacter in the way of those who need and would avail themselves of the charitable benefits it dispenses; (4) the fact thatthe institution's statements and wording of legal documents evidence an intention to use its property exclusively forcharitable purposes does not relieve the institution of proving that its property actually and factually is so used; and (5) theterm "exclusively used" means the primary purpose for which property is used and not any secondary or incidental purpose.Wyndemere, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 459-60, citing Methodist, 93 Ill. 2d at 156-57.

Further considerations regarding charitable purposes are stated in the Illinois Administrative Code (Code). Section130.2005 notes that "a charitable purpose may refer to almost anything which promotes the well-being of society." 86 Ill.Adm. Code