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THIRD DIVISION
February 6, 2002

JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

On May 10, 1994, an unidentified intruder sexually assaulted Friedman in heroffice suite. Friedman brought an action for damages against Safe Securitycontending that Safe Security was negligent in securing the Garland building andthat such negligence was a proximate cause of her sexual assault by an unknownintruder. L.J. Sheridan was not sued. In August 2000, a jury was selected andthe case was tried until the trial judge granted Safe Security's motion for adirected verdict "due to the lack of evidence as to the element of causation."

On appeal, Friedman contends the trial court erred (1) ingranting defendant's motion in limine barring certain opinions ofFriedman's security expert, Gerald Brandt, regarding proximatecause; (2) in granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict;and (3) in disregarding the testimony of defense witness GeorgeMcAlister when it ruled on defendant's motion for a directedverdict.

We affirm.

FACTS

On Tuesday, May 10, 1994, Dr. Janice Friedman went to workin her office suite in the Garland building in Chicago. She sawpatients all day. At about 7:00 p.m., she tidied the office,checked the answering machine, turned off the lights, and headedhome. As she opened her office door to leave, she heard theelevator -- the elevator was across the hall, directly in frontof her office door.

Friedman did not reach the elevator. As she opened theoffice door, an intruder suddenly thrust her back into her officeand threw her to the floor. From her vantage point, inside heroffice and behind the door, she could not see where the intrudercame from. She did not know whether the intruder had just exitedthe elevator and rushed the office door or whether he was in thehallway waiting for her to open the door.

The unknown intruder, wearing a T-shirt, jeans, and big,dark sunglasses, entered Friedman's office. He held a knife toher throat and sexually assaulted her. The identity of theintruder was and is unknown.

After sexually assaulting Friedman, the intruder tied her upand told her not to move for ten minutes. He then left. Aboutten minutes later, Friedman left her office, went to thebuilding's lobby, saw defendant's employee, security guard GeorgeMcAlister -- he had been on duty since 5:00 p.m. -- and calledher husband. A short time later, Friedman's husband arrived andtook her to Northwestern Memorial Hospital emergency room. Friedman received treatment for her physical injuries and wasreleased.

After filing suit against Safe Security, Friedman retainedGerald Brandt ("Brandt") to give his expert opinion on the issueof building security. At the outset of the trial, Safe Securityfiled a motion in limine to preclude Friedman's expert, Brandt,from opining: (1) the intruder entered the building immediatelybefore, or some short time before, sexually assaulting Friedman;and (2) the intruder walked through the front door of thebuilding, past the person occupying the security desk, and rodeup the elevator to Friedman's office.

Safe Security contended Brandt's opinions had no basis infact and were pure surmise and conjecture. After an extensivehearing, the trial court agreed. It barred Brandt from givingthose opinions.

At trial, Brandt testified he was the owner of BakerEubanks, a security guard and security consulting company. Brandt's company had been located in the Garland building since1998.

Brandt held a license required by the State of Illinois tooperate his company and he possessed a private detective'slicense. He had taught courses in security, both as a policeofficer and in the private sector. He explained to the jury therequirements of becoming a security guard/officer in Illinois andwhat it was to work as one. He also explained his familiaritywith post orders ("instructions to the guard to tell him what todo at the specific location at various times of the day"), guardreports ("a document that a guard should fill out *** to indicateanything *** that occurred on his post during the course of theevening"), security manuals (a larger, more detailed version ofthe post orders), and other materials relevant to a building'ssecurity operation.

In formulating his opinions regarding Safe Security and itsbreaches of standards of care in securing the Garland building onMay 10, 1994, Brandt reviewed the depositions of plaintiff JaniceFriedman; George McAlister, the security guard on duty at thetime of Friedman's sexual assault; Lucy Sliepka, a representativeof L.J. Sheridan; and Charles Saul, the vice president and seniorrepresentative of L.J. Sheridan. He also reviewed police reportsrelating to the investigation of Friedman's sexual assault, theguard report and sign-in sheets for the evening of the assault,reports reflecting a prior sexual assault in the building, andother documents. Brandt also inspected the Garland building,despite his familiarity with parts of it.

Brandt offered the jury three opinions with respect to SafeSecurity and its breaches of standards of care on May 10, 1994. First, he opined George McAlister's security guard report fromthe evening of May 10, 1994, did not comply with properprocedures for filling out a guard report in the securityindustry. Most significantly, McAlister's guard report failed toshow he was relieved at any time.

According to Brandt, "It would be extremely unusual for asecurity officer to go to a post and remain there for eighthours." Because McAlister's report did not show he was relievedon the evening of May 10, 1994, Brandt concluded the guard reportshowed he abandoned his post -- the security desk in the lobby ofthe Garland building -- throughout the evening and abandoned hispost without appropriate relief.

Second, Brandt opined the sign-in sheet from the evening ofMay 10, 1994, confirmed McAlister must have been away from hispost throughout the evening. Brandt testified that beginning at5:30 p.m. a visitor to the Garland building was required to signin at the security desk in the lobby and indicate which suite heor she was visiting. Likewise, the visitor was required to signout when he or she left the building.

Brandt said the sign-in sheet from the evening of May 10,1994, was not accurate or complete. Specifically, visitors wrotesuite numbers for nonexistent suites, or did not write down asuite number, and others left their sign-out time blank. Brandtnoted that a substantial number of these inaccuracies involved aperiod of time he contended the intruder must have entered thebuilding.

Brandt concluded that the sign-in sheets from the evening ofMay 10, 1994, provided additional evidence McAlister was absentfrom his post. According to Brandt, because Safe Security didnot have a field supervisor supervising McAlister and did notproperly relieve him when necessary, Safe Security and itsemployee McAlister violated an industry standard for properlymaintaining a security post.

Brandt acknowledged L.J. Sheridan determined the number ofsecurity guards Safe Security was to provide and the number ofhours that guard was to work. It was L.J. Sheridan's decisionnot to have 24-hour security services. It was L.J. Sheridan'sdecision to have only one guard on duty from 5:00 p.m. tomidnight, and midnight to 7:00 a.m.

Finally, Brandt opined, over Safe Security's objection, thatbecause "the post was not properly manned[,] *** the violator orthe offender, in this case, [had] an opportunity to go up to thesuite unchallenged, and attack Ms. Friedman." Brandt furtheropined the intruder entered the building immediately before theassault. He found no evidence the intruder planned the assault;he believed it was a spontaneous attack.

On cross-examination Brandt agreed he had not "found anyspecific evidence about the time that this individual[, theintruder,] entered the building." Brandt said, "I don't knowthat there is specific evidence, but I think there areindications that he was there immediately -- obviously prior tothe rape. I don't believe he was in the building all day, ifthat's what you're asking me."

Charles Saul, vice president of L.J. Sheridan & Co., was theproperty manager of the Garland building at the time ofFriedman's assault. He testified for Friedman.

Saul testified that in 1991 L.J. Sheridan took over propertymanagement responsibilities for the Garland building from HudsonPark Management Company. The building had gone intoreceivership. Hudson Park Management Company originally hiredSafe Security to provide a single security officer/guard to bestationed in the lobby of the Garland building duringnon-business hours, i.e., between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.

When L.J. Sheridan took over management responsibilities ofthe Garland building, it continued the same contractual securityservice with Safe Security. Saul could not produce a copy of thecontract for security services between L.J. Sheridan and SafeSecurity.

According to Saul, Safe Security, through its employees,acted as the security experts for the Garland building. He saidSafe Security wrote the post orders that told the security guardhow to perform his duties. L.J. Sheridan relied on Safe Securityto supervise its guard and insure a reasonable level of security.Notwithstanding, Saul acknowledged that L.J. Sheridan "had thefinal say as to how much security [it was] willing to pay for inthat building."

L.J. Sheridan chose not to contract with Safe Security toprovide security service for the Garland building between thehours of 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Instead, L.J. Sheridan used itsown employee as an "elevator starter." Although the elevatorstarter was not a trained security guard, L.J. Sheridan expectedits starter to meet and greet people, usher them into theelevator and, at the same time, screen out any undesirables.

There was no testimony from the elevator starter on dutyduring the day of May 10, 1994. We do not know whether thatstarter actually performed those duties on that day.

With respect to the duties of Safe Security's security guardfrom 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. at the Garland building, Saul said hewas familiar with the guard's duties. Specifically, beforevisitors were supposed to start signing in and out, which was at5:30 p.m., the guard had the duty to lock off certain doors thatwould control access to the building. After performing thatduty, the guard was required to post himself at the security deskin the lobby of the building. The guard was not permitted topatrol the building.

While posting the security desk, the guard had the duty toscreen people entering the building. As part of the screeningprocess, the guard was required to have all persons entering thebuilding after 5:30 p.m. sign in, to verify their authority to bein the building, and to have every person leaving the buildingafter 5:30 p.m. sign out. If the guard determined a person wasan "undesirable," the guard was required to withdraw that personfrom the building. All information taken down on thesign-in/sign-out sheet by the guard was expected to be accurate.

In the event the guard had to leave his post, according toSaul, Safe Security was responsible for providing an additionalguard to relieve the security guard. Saul said Safe Security wasrequired to provide such relief on a nightly basis. Saulacknowledged, however, that it was not unusual for the Garlandbuilding's engineer, an employee of L.J. Sheridan, to relieve theguard.

Before the close of Friedman's case-in-chief, she offeredthree additional witnesses: (1) her husband, Theodore Eisenman;(2) a medical psychological expert on sexual assault victims,Nurse Anne Burgess; and (3) her psychiatrist, CharlesHillenbrand. Each witness's testimony related to the plaintiff'sinjuries and damages stemming from her sexual assault, althoughBurgess was allowed to characterize the attack as a "blitz stylerape," where no plan was involved.

At the close of plaintiff's case, Safe Security made an oralmotion for directed verdict. The trial judge asked both partieswhether there was any objection to proceeding with evidence untilthe jury's lunch hour, after which the judge would hear fullargument on the motion. Neither party voiced any objection tothe judge's suggestion.

Safe Security proceeded with testimony of a single witness:George McAlister, the security guard on duty in the lobby of theGarland building on May 10, 1994. At the lunch hour, McAlister'stestimony was interrupted and the trial judge excused the juryfor lunch. The judge then reminded both parties Safe Securityhad made a motion for a directed verdict, and suggested they waituntil the lunch hour to argue the motion. Again, there was noobjection from either side.

Safe Security presented a written motion, and a recess wastaken to afford Friedman and the trial judge an opportunity toread it. After the lunch recess, the judge reconvened outsidethe jury's presence to hear argument on Safe Security's motion. Again, there was no objection or reference to the timing of thehearing.

The court then heard both parties' arguments and grantedSafe Security's motion. After the trial court granted SafeSecurity's motion for a directed verdict, Friedman filed a motionrequesting a new trial. The trial court, after hearing argument,entered a written order detailing its denial of Friedman'srequest. This appeal followed.

DECISION

MOTION IN LIMINE

Friedman contends the trial court erred in barring GeraldBrandt's opinion testimony about when the intruder entered thebuilding, particularly testimony that the intruder gained accessto the Garland building during a time when McAlister was awayfrom his security post.

Friedman contends Brandt's opinions were admissible becausethey were "based in part upon the testimony of Dr. Friedman, whotestified she heard the sound of the elevator immediately priorto the attack[,] *** his experience as a police officer, hisinvestigations of violent crime, other law enforcementexperience[,] *** his experience in the security field[, and]finally, *** on the sign in sheet for the night of the rape, aguard report, other documents and testimony."

Safe Security responds Brandt's testimony was speculativeand properly barred by the trial court. Safe Security contendsBrandt's testimony was based "purely upon speculation andconjecture." We agree.

Expert testimony is admissible if the proffered expert isqualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,or education, and the testimony will assist the trier of fact inunderstanding the evidence. See Hiscott v. Peters, 324 Ill. App.3d 114, 122, 754 N.E.2d 839 (2001). "The decision of whether toadmit expert testimony is within the sound discretion of thetrial court [citation], and a ruling will not be reversed absentan abuse of that discretion [citation]." Reed v. Jackson ParkHospital Foundation, 325 Ill. App. 3d 835, 842, 758 N.E.2d 868(2001).

Here, Friedman sought to prove generally, through Brandt'stestimony, that Safe Security's breach of the applicable standardof care more probably than not was the cause of Friedman'sinjury. Friedman failed to acknowledge, however, the admissionof Brandt's testimony required her to lay an adequate foundationestablishing that the information upon which he based his opinionwas reliable. "It is the function of the trial court, and notthe jury, to determine whether the foundational requirements havebeen met." Hiscott, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 122-23.

As the trial court correctly noted, Brandt's opinions wereinadmissible because the causal connection he opined to wascontingent, speculative, and/or merely possible. See Reed, 325Ill. App. 3d at 842-45. That is, Brandt's opinions assumed theattacker entered the building after 5:00 p.m.

Modelski v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 302Ill. App. 3d 879, 707 N.E.2d 239 (1999), supports our conclusion.In Modelski, the appellate court reversed the judgment for thedefendant in an action for negligence and wrongful death based,in part, on the trial court's error in denying the plaintiff'smotion in limine to bar the defendant's expert witness testimonyas speculative, and in denying her motion at trial to strike thattestimony. Modelski, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 886-87.

Specifically, the court found the defendant's reconstructionexpert had no factual basis to support his opinion that theplaintiff's husband had caused his own death by restarting "thetractor while standing on the ground; whereupon, the tractormoved forward when the engine engaged, knocking Modelski to theground under the rear axle and causing the Bush Hog to be drawnover him[, killing him]." Modelski, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 885-86.The defendant's expert admitted there was no physical evidence tosupport his opinion.

The court said, "We would hardly expect 'expert' opiniontestimony to be objective in the traditional sense of the term,but neither would we expect it to take the form of fictionalmusings as to what might have happened." Modelski, 302 Ill. App.3d at 886. From the expert's admissions, the court found it was"quite apparent that his opinions regarding a mechanicalbreakdown necessitating Modelski to dismount the tractor werebased on sheer speculation and should have been stricken asunreliable and totally irrelevant." Modelski, 302 Ill. App. 3dat 886.

Similarly, here, the record before us is devoid of factsthat reasonably could form the basis for Brandt's opinions aboutwhen the intruder entered the building or whether the intruderwalked past the security desk at a time the guard was notpresent. Brandt's own deposition testimony reveals the lack offactual support for his opinions.

At Brandt's discovery deposition, he was asked the followingquestions and gave the following answers:

"Q: What information do you have to demonstrate theattacker did not enter the building between normalbusiness hours, let's say 9:00 [a.m.] to 5:00 p.m. onthe date of the occurrence?

A. There is no specific evidence one way or another whenthe person entered. I'm basing my opinion on myexperience in law enforcement and then in security thatwhen you determine the time of an incident or anattack, the person entered onto the scene, most likelyimmediately prior to that time.

Q. Is there any text, treatise, or study citation that youcan give me that would support your opinion?

A. No. I think it's a commonsense opinion is that when aperson is committing a crime, it behooves them to spendas little time as possible at the scene. *** Soagain, it's an opinion in lack of having evidence tosupport it. My opinion is that he entered the facilityimmediately prior or some short time prior to theincident.

Q. It's your opinion that this person walked in the frontdoor of the building, walked by the person who wasoccupying the desk, requiring people to sign-in,sign-out?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And gained access to the building?

A. That's my opinion.

Q. And what evidence do you have for that?

A. There is no evidence one way or another. The opinionis based on my experience of criminals ***." (Emphasisadded.)

Brandt reiterated his deposition opinion and its basis, over SafeSecurity's objection, at trial.

Friedman contends these opinions are supported by Decker v.Domino's Pizza, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d 521, 644 N.E.2d 515 (1994)and Verbance v. Altman, 324 Ill. App. 3d 494, 754 N.E.2d 856(2001). We disagree.

In Decker, the plaintiff's expert, a police officer, gaveopinion testimony that a "robber beat plaintiff up because he didnot believe that plaintiff could not open the safe." There was afactual basis for the expert's opinion -- a conversation he hadwith the robber's cellmate. Decker, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 529. Inaddition, the appellate court held the trial court did not abuseits discretion by allowing the proffered testimony because thedefendant failed to timely object to the expert's hearsay basisfor the opinion, which constituted a waiver of the issue. Decker, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 529.

In Verbance, the appellate court held the trial court hadbroad discretion in determining whether to admit or excludeexpert testimony. Verbance, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 502-03. Specifically, the court held the trial court had not abused itsdiscretion in allowing the plaintiff's expert to express hisopinion about what caused the plaintiff's pain because the trialcourt made its decision only after it carefully considered thewitness's factual basis: the expert's medical specialties, thehistory he obtained from the plaintiff -- his patient, and thetreatment he provided to the plaintiff. Verbance, 324 Ill. App.3d at 504.

Here, there was no evidentiary basis for the opinionsexpressed by Brandt. "Experts cannot base opinions on what mayhave occurred or what the expert believed might have happened ina particular case." Reed, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 844, citingSchuler v. Mid-Central Cardiology, 313 Ill. App. 3d 326, 335, 729N.E.2d 536 (2000), and Dyback v. Weber, 114 Ill. 2d 232, 244, 500N.E.2d 8 (1986). Brandt did not demonstrate that his opinionswere based on anything more than an educated guess.

Brandt did not indicate a reliable, credible foundation forhis conclusions that the security post was not properly manned orthat the guard sat at his desk as the attacker walked past andtherefore had "an opportunity to go up to the suite unchallengedand attack Ms. Friedman." In short, there is no factual supportfor the conclusion that the attacker entered the building after5:00 p.m. Without those facts, Brandt's testimony was notreliable. The court did not abuse its discretion in barring histestimony.

DIRECTED VERDICT -- PROXIMATE CAUSE

Friedman next contends the trial court erred in grantingSafe Security's motion for a directed finding where, according toFriedman, the testimony of Friedman, Gerald Brandt, and AnnBurgess, as well as other circumstantial evidence, was sufficientto defeat Safe Security's motion and, more importantly, tosatisfy the requisite element of proximate cause.

We review a trial court's grant of a directed verdict denovo (Susnis v. Radfar, 317 Ill. App. 3d 817, 825, 739 N.E.2d 960(2000)), and will affirm that grant where the evidence, viewed inthe light most favorable to the plaintiff, so overwhelminglyfavors the defendant that no contrary verdict based on thatevidence could ever stand (Mort v. Walter, 98 Ill. 2d 391, 396,457 N.E.2d 18 (1983)).

In an action for negligence, a plaintiff must set out factsestablishing (1) the existence of a duty of care, (2) a breach ofthat duty, and (3) an injury proximately resulting from thatbreach. N.W. v. Amalgamated Trust and Savings Bank, 196 Ill.App. 3d 1066, 1071, 554 N.E.2d 629 (1990). Where the plaintiffhas not established a prima facie case, a directed verdict isappropriate. See Mengelson v. Ingalls Health Ventures, 323 Ill.App. 3d 69, 74, 751 N.E.2d 91 (2001), citing Saxton v. Toole, 240Ill. App. 3d 204, 210, 608 N.E.2d 233 (1992).

Here, the trial court declared, "Because plaintiff failed toprove proximate cause, she failed to sustain her burden ofestablishing a prima facie case. Consequently, a directedverdict was proper." We agree.

Proximate cause exists when the injury is "the natural andprobable result of the negligent act or omission and *** of sucha character as an ordinarily prudent person ought to haveforeseen as likely to occur as a result of the negligence." Greene v. City of Chicago, 73 Ill. 2d 100, 111, 382 N.E.2d 1205(1978). It is not necessary that the precise injury thatoccurred was foreseable. Greene, 73 Ill. 2d at 111.

Generally, the question of proximate cause is a question offact. Salinas v. Werton, 161 Ill. App. 3d 510, 515, 515 N.E.2d142 (1987). However, where the material facts are undisputed andreasonable men would not disagree as to the inferences to bedrawn from them, proximate cause becomes a question of law. Salinas, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 515. If, given all the evidencecontained in the record, nothing is left to go to the jury, thecourt is required to direct a verdict. Palumbo v. Frank'sNursery & Crafts, Inc., 182 Ill. App. 3d. 283, 288, 537 N.E.2d1073 (1989).

Although Safe Security expressed a general intent to protecttenants of L.J. Sheridan's property, the Garland building, thispurpose and Safe Security's duties were limited by its specificundertaking to provide guard service only between the hours of5:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. Safe Security did not assume a duty toprovide guard service for the protection of tenants in theGarland building between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.,and, therefore, did not assume such a duty for Friedman'sbenefit. Accord Cross v. Chicago Housing Authority, 74 Ill. App.3d 921, 930, 393 N.E.2d 580 (1979).

Thus, the question for us on appeal:

Did Friedman provide sufficient evidence to show SafeSecurity acted or failed to act in some way that allowed theintruder entry and access to her office suite during the hoursSafe Security was contractually obliged to act?

Friedman says she presented a great amount of evidence thatthe rapist entered the building shortly before 7:15 p.m., thetime of the attack. That evidence included: (1) Dr. Friedman'stestimony that she heard the elevator door open immediatelybefore she was attacked, at approximately 7:15 p.m.; (2) theelevator starter on duty all day until 5 p.m. screened peopleentering the building and no evidence was presented that anyundesirables entered the building the day of the rape; (3) thebuilding had a low traffic flow on the floors where professionalslike Dr. Friedman had their offices, and no one came to her floorwithout an appointment; (4) in all her years in the building, Dr.Friedman never saw an alcoholic or drug abuser come into thebuilding; (5) the stairwells were locked, prohibiting potentialrapists from hiding inside them; (6) the bathrooms on each floorwere locked preventing access by unauthorized persons; (7) therewas nowhere to hide in the building or on the 20th floor; (8)unrebutted expert testimony established the blitz style nature ofthe rape - where the rapist quickly enters a building, finds hisvictims, and attacks with no plan or stalking; (9) immediatelyprior to the rape, the guard left his post unattended, resultingin easy access for the rapist; and, (10) loitering was never aproblem in the building either on the day of the rape or prior tothe rape.

The trial court found the evidence offered by Friedmaninsufficient to "fill in the causation gap" and "puzzling giventhe lack of anything in the record to support it." So do we.

As the trial court correctly found, "None of thiscircumstantial evidence compensated for the void on the issue ofwhen the rapist entered the Garland building. Plaintiff simplydid not know and the rapist was never apprehended."

Our review of the record shows that the time and manner bywhich the intruder gained access to the Garland building, andultimately Friedman's office, can be determined only by engagingin speculation, surmise, and conjecture. Proximate cause can beestablished only when there is a "reasonable certainty" that thedefendant's acts caused the injury. See N.W., 196 Ill. App. 3dat 1076. Proximate cause cannot be established on the facts ofthis case.

No one at trial could substantiate the existence of therequisite causal link, and that link is scarcely self-evident. For example, Friedman contends that because she heard theelevator door open immediately before she was attacked andbecause expert testimony characterized her assault as a "blitzstyle rape," the intruder must have gained access to the buildingjust before the assault by the absence of the security guardand/or inadequate access control.

However, as the trial court pointed out, if the intruderwere one of the many visitors to the Garland building who enteredbefore 5:30 p.m., and if he waited for an opportunity to committhe "blitz style rape," no additional actions by Safe Securitywould have prevented the intruder's assault of Friedman.

Because there was no evidence, direct or otherwise, as tohow or when the intruder entered the Garland building, aconclusion that Safe Security's deficiencies were linked in anyway to Friedman's assault would be purely speculative.

It is fundamental that in a negligence action a jury mustbase its decision on evidence, not on guess or speculation. N.W., 196 Ill. App. 3d at 1076. Liability cannot be predicatedupon surmise or conjecture as to the cause of the injury. Mortonv. F.B.D. Enterprises, 141 Ill. App. 3d 553, 560, 490 N.E.2d 995(1986).

The circumstances of this case closely resemble those inN.W. There, a tenant brought a negligence action against theowners and manager of her apartment building to recover damagesfor injuries she sustained after an intruder broke into herapartment through the kitchen door and sexually assaulted her. The tenant argued that defendants should be held liable for theattack because (1) they failed to repair the lock on thebuilding's rear entrance, and (2) it was through this unlockedback door that the assailant was able to gain access to thetenant's kitchen door before the assault.

The identity of the assailant was unknown. There was noevidence he was not simply another tenant, or a social guest of atenant, who would have had access to the plaintiff's kitchen doorregardless of whether the rear entrance was locked. Assuming,without deciding, that the assault was reasonably foreseeable orthat defendants had, in fact, engaged in a voluntary undertakingto protect the tenant from criminal activity, the court held thetenant's action was defeated.

The court said:

"The only piece of evidence supporting the plaintiff onthe issue of proximate cause is the fact that the lock wasinoperable on the night of the attack and, hence, a mode ofaccess to plaintiff's apartment was available. From thisthe plaintiff infers that the assailant entered the buildingthrough the unlocked rear entrance. Such an inference wouldbe quite reasonable but for the fact that access to theplaintiff's kitchen door was also available to other tenantsand their social guests. A mere possibility of a causalconnection is insufficient to raise the requisite inferenceof fact." N.W., 196 Ill. App. 3d at 1077.

The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Here, the failure of proof on the question of proximatecause is no less evident. The law of this State does not supporta reversal of the trial court's decision.

We have confined our analysis to the proximate cause issue,because that is the issue addressed by the trial court. But wenote the same failure of proof that motivated the trial court'sruling would apply to the question of whether there was anyevidence Safe Security breached its duty to the plaintiff. Thatis, unless there was enough evidence the intruder entered thebuilding after 5:00 p.m., the jury could not have found SafeSecurity breached any duty it owed to the plaintiff. The factthat the security guard did not adequately do his job after 5:00p.m. would have made no difference. See Taylor v. Hocker, 101Ill. App. 3d 639, 643-44, 428 N.E.2d 662 (1979).

DIRECTED VERDICT -- TESTIMONY GEORGE McALISTER

Friedman's final contention is that "The trial court erredin failing to consider the testimony of security guard McAlisterwhere Mr. McAlister's testimony established clear voluntaryundertakings, breach of those undertakings, and proximatecausation requiring denial of defendant's motion for a directedverdict."

We reject Friedman's contention. As the trial courtexplained, "Plaintiff's claim of error on this point ignores thefacts, as well as a concession made by plaintiff's counsel duringpost-trial proceedings."

Because Safe Security moved for a directed finding orjudgment at the conclusion of Friedman's case, only the evidencepresented by Friedman was to be considered by the trial court inruling on Safe Security's motion for a directed finding. SeeCentury National Insurance Co. v. Tracy, 316 Ill. App. 3d 639,645, 737 N.E.2d 353 (2000).

In Century, we held the trial court's reliance on thetestimony of an expert witness for the defense -- which had beentaken out of order to accommodate the defense expert's schedule-- in granting defendants' motion for a directed finding wasimproper and required reversal. Century, 316 Ill. App. 3d at645.

Our review of the records shows the trial court was correctto consider only evidence presented by Friedman on SafeSecurity's timely motion for a directed finding. Accord Century,316 Ill. App. 3d at 645; Williams v. Chicago Osteopathic HealthSystems, 274 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1047, 654 N.E.2d 613 (1995) ("Inruling on a motion for a directed verdict, courts must evaluatethe relative strength of the nonmovant's evidence in the contextof the entire record at the time the motion is presented" (Emphasis added)); Gillock v. City of Springfield, 268 Ill. App.3d 455, 456, 644 N.E.2d 831 (1994) (On defendant's motion fordirected verdict, "only plaintiff's evidence may be considered,and it must be evidence actually introduced at trial, notevidence which could have been introduced").

CONCLUSION

We affirm the decision and rulings of the trial court.

Affirmed.

HALL, P.J., and CERDA, J., concur.