Find Legal Information

THIRD DIVISION
December 26, 2001

Plaintiff Kenneth Frank (Frank) filed this productsliability suit after a wood roof truss system manufactured bydefendant Edward Hines Lumber Company (Hines) collapsed duringinstallation. Plaintiff was one of three carpenters who wereinstalling the roof when it collapsed.⁽¹⁾ A jury found in favor ofdefendant and against all three carpenters.

Plaintiff appeals, contending: (1) the trial court erred indenying a jury instruction tendered by plaintiff; (2) the trialcourt erred in excluding one of plaintiff's exhibits; (3) thetrial court erred in allowing two of defendant's exhibits to goto the jury and denying plaintiff's "countervailing exhibits" togo to the jury; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the issueof assumption of risk to be submitted to the jury; (5) the trialcourt erred in directing the verdict for defendant on the breachof warranty count; (6) the trial court erred in grantingdefendant's summary judgment motion on the Structural Work Act(740 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1998)) count.

We affirm.

FACTS

On June 24, 1991, three carpenters installing a wood rooftruss system at the Evergreen Plaza Shopping Center in VernonHills were injured when several trusses collapsed. Hinesdesigned, built, and furnished the truss system to comply withthe architect's plans.

Frank filed a products liability suit against Hines. In hiscomplaint, Frank included a count alleging violation of theStructural Work Act. The trial court summarily dismissed thiscount, finding plaintiff could not show Hines was in charge ofthe work within the meaning of the Act.

The Sixth Amended Complaint, filed after the court grantedsummary judgment in defendant's favor on the Structural Work Actcount, alleged the roof truss system was defective in its designand engineering. Plaintiff also alleged the truss was improperlypackaged, stacked, and delivered and was given to Frank in adeformed, bowed and unsafe condition. The complaint allegedHines failed to give Frank adequate instructions for erecting theroof and that Hines did not provide adequate warnings of thedangers posed by the product. Plaintiff also included countsalleging breach of UCC warranties.

At trial, the evidence established that Antonio Fanizza wasthe architect and general contractor for the Evergreen Plazaproject. Fanizza created Artech, Inc. and hired subcontractorsthrough Artech. Artech employed Louis Garcia (Garcia) as alaborer. It did not have any other employees.

Fanizza's building plans called for prefabricated rooftrusses. Fanizza accepted a bid from Hines for a wood roof trusssystem. According to the terms of their contract, Hines was tomanufacture, design, build, deliver, and provide instructions forthe erection of the trusses. Hines included lumber to be used astemporary bracing with the package.

After Hines designed and manufactured the trusses, they weredelivered on a flatbed truck. Hines provided instructions forerecting the trusses, referred to during trial as the "GreenSheet." Hines also provided structural drawings bearing astructural engineer seal. Both the Green Sheet and thestructural drawings were admitted as exhibits at trial.

Artech hired C. Bentley Construction (Bentley) to installthe trusses. Frank was employed by Bentley. Frank testifiedthat on the day of the accident, the last thing he remembered wastelling another worker to get some bracing. Frank said they hadproblems installing the trusses because they were bowed or bent. Frank testified they were delivered bowed and the bowing remainedafter they were removed from the truck. Frank said he appliedlateral bracing to straighten out the bowing, but did not applycross-bracing. Frank said nobody told him the bracing wasinadequate during the installation of the trusses. Frank said helooked at the Green Sheet briefly, but did not have a copy of it.

Plaintiff used several exhibits as feasible alternativewarnings. Frank's witnesses noted the differences between theseexhibits and the Green Sheet and concluded the information andwarnings in these exhibits were more complete than the GreenSheet. Several witnesses testified that flourescent stickersshowing where to use temporary bracing were sometimes affixed totrusses. However, Hines did not use stickers of this type at thetime that the accident occurred.

Plaintiff's witnesses testified the trusses were bowed upondelivery. Fanizza testified he contacted Hines about the bowingand was told it was not a problem. Plaintiff's witnesses said the bowing made installation difficult.

Plaintiff's expert witnesses testified the Green Sheet didnot provide adequate instructions and warnings and that thetrusses were shipped in a manner that allowed them to bendexcessively. The experts opined the bowing and the inadequateinstructions regarding temporary bracing caused the collapse. They testified there were better instructions and warningsavailable at the time of the accident. They agreed thatflourescent warning tags placed on the trusses would have helpedwarn and instruct plaintiffs as to proper bracing andinstallation.

Hines' defense centered around its claim that the trusssystem was not defective and provided adequate instructions andwarnings to Frank. Hines claimed the accident occurred becausethe contractors did not read the instructions and warnings beforeattempting to assemble the roof truss system.

Hines' witnesses testified the builder was responsible forerection and bracing of the trusses. The bracing materials wereprovided to the builder along with the trusses.

Arthur Gurevich, the building commissioner for the Villageof Vernon Hills, testified he went to the job site before theaccident occurred. He said he was concerned about the way thetrusses were stored. Once the building crew began to erect thetrusses, Gurevich became concerned that they were not adequatelybraced. He told a worker named "Kenny" that the crew needed toinstall cross-bracing.

Hines' experts testified the Green Sheet adequatelyinstructed and warned plaintiff about proper temporary bracingand installation of the truss system. They said if the erectioncrew had properly braced the trusses, they would not havecollapsed. They said the trusses collapsed because the erectioncrew failed to use the temporary bracing specified in the GreenSheet. They did not believe the bowing in the trusses caused thecollapse.

Defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict on thebreach of warranty counts of the complaint. The trial courtgranted defendant's motion, finding Frank was not an employee ofArtech or Fanizza, and was not covered by the UCC warranties thatextended only to the buyer and its employees.

The jury ruled in defendant's favor on the remaining counts.

DECISION

Failure to Give IPI Civil No. 400.10

Frank contends the trial court erred in refusing to giveIllinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 400.10 (2000ed.)(hereinafter IPI Civil No. 400.10).

The decision to give or deny a jury instruction is withinthe trial court's discretion and a new trial should not begranted unless a party's right to a fair trial has been seriouslyprejudiced. Carey v. Lazzara, Inc., 277 Ill. App. 3d 902, 906,661 N.E.2d 413 (1996). "The standard for determining whether atrial court abused its discretion in giving or refusing a juryinstruction is whether, taken as a whole, the instructions fully,fairly and comprehensively informed the jury of the relevantlegal principles." Carey, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 906.

IPI Civil No. 400.10:

"400.10 Strict Product Liability - Due Care Not aDefense - Personal Injury - One Plaintiff and OneDefendant.

If you decide that the plaintiff has proved allthe propositions of his case, then it is not a defense[that the condition of the product could not have beendiscovered by the defendant][or][that care was used inthe manufacture of the product]." IPI Civil No.400.10.

The notes on use that follow the instruction indicate it isto be given only "if the jury heard from suggestion, evidence, orargument that the defendant exercised care in the manufacturingprocess or could not discover the condition of the product." IPICivil No. 400.10, Notes on Use.

Defendant never argued it should not be held liable becausethe roof trusses were manufactured with due care. Instead, Hinesargued the trusses were not unreasonably dangerous and based itsdefense on its claim that the warnings and instructions that wereprovided were adequate and that the accident occurred becausethose in charge of the construction failed to read theinstructions and warnings. Defense counsel did not raise theissue of due care in opening or closing argument, and evidencethat defendant used due care in manufacturing the trusses was notproduced during trial.

Plaintiff argues "the core" of Hines' defense was "that itmanufactured a truss which itself contained no defects and ***provided [warnings and instructions] which told the installer allhe needed to know ***." This defense, plaintiff says, "embracedthe concept that [Hines] 'exercised due care.'" Plaintiffmisconstrues the type of argument that a defendant must advancebefore the trial court is required to give IPI Civil No. 400.10.

In Renfro v. Allied Indus. Equipment Corp., 155 Ill. App. 3d140, 507 N.E.2d 1213 (1987), a case cited by plaintiff, the courtsaid:

"Plaintiff's Instruction No. 13 is a version ofIPI, Civil, No. 400.10 ***. Here, the jury did hearevidence that when the [product] left the Crown factoryit was in compliance with standards promulgated by theAmerican National Standards Institute, and that Crown'svehicle was the 'Cadillac' of [these products]. Thejury also saw literature from both Crown and Logisticontouting the safety, quality and durability of theirrespective products. In our view, these matters raisedan inference of the exercise of care in the manufactureof the products sufficient to justify use of theinstruction." Renfro, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 166.

The instruction is not to be given when a defendant merelyargues its product was not unreasonably dangerous. Otherwise,the instruction would have to be given in virtually all productsliability suits. It is to be given when the defendant countersthe plaintiff's claims by arguing it wasn't negligent or a lackof due care did not occur in its manufacture of the product. Thedanger is that when a defendant advances this due care in themanufacture argument, the jury's focus will shift from theinherent dangers posed by the product itself to the defendant'sactions in creating the product.

In a strict liability suit, as contrasted with a negligenceclaim, a plaintiff is not required to prove the defendantbreached a duty of due care. Cunningham v. MacNeal MemorialHospital, 47 Ill. 2d 443, 454, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). Theplaintiff is required to prove only that the product was"unreasonably dangerous." Cunningham, 47 Ill. 2d at 454. Wherea product is unreasonably dangerous, its manufacturer may be heldliable even if it used due care in manufacturing the product. Ina trial in which a defendant suggests due care in the manufactureas a defense, IPI Civil No. 400.10 is meant to instruct the jurythat, if a product is unreasonably dangerous, whether themanufacturer used "due care" in creating it is irrelevant.

Hines did not advance due care in the manufacture as adefense to Frank's allegations. The trial court did not abuseits discretion in refusing to give IPI Civil No. 400.10. SeeDavis v. International Harvester Co., 167 Ill. App. 3d 814, 828-29, 521 N.E.2d 1282 (1988)(instruction properly refused wheredefendant did not produce evidence of due care but insteadclaimed product was not unreasonably dangerous and had not causedplaintiff's injuries).

Frank's Exhibit 224 - The Warning Poster

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in excludingFrank's exhibit 224. Exhibit 224 is a warning poster thatenlarges upon the information included in the Green Sheet. Theposter was produced by the Wood Truss Council of America andpublished in 1992.

The trial court's determination of admissibility of evidencelies within its sound discretion. First Midwest Trust Co. v.Rogers, 296 Ill. App. 3d 416, 426, 701 N.E.2d 1107 (1998). Areviewing court will not reverse the trial court's decisionabsent an abuse of that discretion. First Midwest, 296 Ill. App.3d at 426.

The jury saw examples of two feasible alternative warnings. Several witnesses discussed these alternative warnings at length. Admitting the warning poster would have been cumulative. SeeAguinaga v. City of Chicago, 243 Ill. App. 3d 552, 572, 611N.E.2d 1296 (1993)(admissibility of cumulative evidence withindiscretion of trial court). Moreover, because the poster was notpublished until 1992, it is not clear this version of the posterwas available before the accident occurred in June of 1991. Wefind the trial court's refusal to admit the poster was not anabuse of discretion.

Warning Stickers  

During its deliberations, the jury sent out a noterequesting to see the sales contract between Hines and Fanizza,the layout plan, and structural drawings of the trusses (referredto as the "Hugh Cahill" drawings). Plaintiff objected and askedthe court to refuse the jury's request.

Alternatively, plaintiff asked that in addition to the threerequested exhibits, the jury be sent plaintiff's exhibits 509Aand 509B, two flourescent warning stickers. Plaintiff hadearlier asked the trial court to send these exhibits to the jurywhen it retired to deliberate, but the trial court had deniedplaintiff's request after finding the stickers had been used onlyfor "demonstrative purposes" during trial.

The trial court denied the jury's request to see the salescontract, but allowed the layout plan and the structural drawingsto be sent back to the jury room. The court again refused tosend the flourescent warning stickers to the jury.

"The trial court has considerable discretion in determiningwhether an exhibit may be taken into the jury room." Becht v.Palac, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1039, 740 N.E.2d 1131 (2000). Thetrial court's decision will not be disturbed on review absent anabuse of that discretion. Becht, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 1040.

Plaintiff claims "the request from the jury demonstrated itsconcentration on a particular phase of the dispute which ***should have been equalized by the showing of Frank'scountervailing evidence," and cites Becht.

In Becht, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suitagainst two doctors whom he alleged negligently prescribed amedication which caused him to develop a bone disease. Duringits deliberations, the jury sent out a note requesting that it beallowed to see several demonstrative exhibits used by one of thedefendants during trial. The codefendant's counsel objected,arguing all of the evidence should go back or none at all. Thetrial court said it would send the exhibits back to the jury onlyif all of the attorneys could agree. When the attorneys couldnot agree, the trial court refused the request.

We affirmed the trial court, finding, "More than likely, theattorneys were concerned that sending only [the doctor's]exhibits back would unduly emphasize her evidence." Becht, 317Ill. App. 3d at 1040.

Here, the jury was given several of plaintiff's anddefendant's exhibits when it retired to deliberate. There was nodanger that two more exhibits, which it requested, would in anyway unduly emphasize defendant's evidence.

The flourescent warning stickers were used as exhibitsduring trial and testified to by several witnesses. The jury hadalready seen them and did not ask to see them again. Thestickers were in no way directly related to the exhibits the jurydid ask to see, though plaintiff claims they were"countervailing."

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion indenying plaintiff's request to send his exhibits back to thejury.

Assumption of Risk

Frank contends the trial court erred in submitting anassumption of risk instruction to the jury. According to Frank,none of the evidence at trial supported issuing this instruction.

"[I]n Illinois, 'all that is required to justify the givingof an instruction is that there be some evidence in the record tojustify the theory of the instruction.'" Boland v. KawasakiMotors Manufacturing Corp.,309 Ill. App. 3d 645, 653, 722 N.E.2d1234 (2000), quoting Leonardi v. Loyola University, 168 Ill. 2d83, 101, 658 N.E.2d 450 (1995).

The instructions issued to the jury in this case includedthe following:

"With respect to the claim of Kenneth Frank only,defendant *** claims that the plaintiff Kenneth Frankassumed the risk of injury in the following respect:

(a) He was aware that the roof trusses could fallif they were not braced during erection towithstand lateral movement;

The defendant also claims that the foregoing was aproximate cause of Kenneth Frank's injury.

Plaintiff Kenneth Frank denies that he assumed therisk of injury and also denies that any assumption ofthe risk on his part was a proximate cause of hisinjuries."

Frank testified he knew the trusses required temporarybracing. He testified he saw the Green Sheet. He said he didnot cross-brace the trusses, but used only lateral bracing in anattempt to correct for the bowing of the trusses.

Gurevich testified he visited the site while the trusseswere being installed. While he was there, he spoke to "Kenny." Gurevich said he told "Kenny" he believed the trusses wereinadequately braced. Gurevich referred "Kenny" to the GreenSheet, and "Kenny" showed him his copy of the sheet. Gurevichsaid he saw the scene after the accident occurred and noticed thecross-bracing he recommended had not been installed. WhileGurevich did not know "Kenny's" last name, there was no evidenceindicating anyone else on the job site shared Frank's first name. Frank admitted that he talked to Gurevich at the site, althoughhe denied anything was said about inadequate bracing.

Frank claims there was no evidence that he deliberatelyencountered a known risk. He supports his contention that theinstruction should not have been given with the testimony of oneof his expert witnesses:

"Q: And you would agree with me that even you ***if you had been at the site with your degree ofknowledge, given the short time frame in which toanalyze the situation, would not have predicted thatthe bracing being used by those workers on that sitewould fail; true?

A: If I were there only with the benefit oflooking, I would not be able to predict that it wouldfail."

While this may call into question Gurevich's credibilitywhen he claimed he could see the trusses were not adequatelybraced, credibility questions are left to the jury. Aguinaga,243 Ill. App. 3d at 560 ("It is the function of the jury toresolve substantial factual disputes requiring either theassessment of the witness' credibility or an election betweenconflicting evidence"). The fact that the jury heard conflictingtestimony on this issue does not mean the trial court should nothave issued an instruction on assumption of risk.

Gurevich's testimony was sufficient to support the trialcourt's submission of the assumption of risk instruction. Boland, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 654 (assumption of risk instructionproperly issued where plaintiff was orally warned of potentialdanger). Plaintiff's expert testimony does not negate Gurevich'sclaims, it simply creates a factual issue for the jury toresolve.

It is unlikely the assumption of risk instruction had anyimpact on the jury in this case. There were three plaintiffs. Assumption of risk applied only to Frank. No one suggested tothe jury that assumption of the risk had anything to do with theother two plaintiffs. Evidence concerning the warnings appliedequally to all three. The jury found against all three. We findgiving the instruction was not an abuse of discretion.

Directed Verdict - Breach of Warranty

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in grantingdefendant's motion for a directed verdict on the breach ofwarranty count of the complaint.

A trial court's decision to grant a directed verdict isreviewed de novo. Susnis v. Radfar, 317 Ill. App. 3d 817, 825-26, 739 N.E.2d 960 (2000). A motion for directed verdict shouldbe granted if all the evidence, viewed in the light mostfavorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movantthat no contrary verdict could stand. Pedrick v. Peoria & EasterR.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967).

Under section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),unless excluded or modified, every sale of goods includes animplied warranty of merchantibility. 810 ILCS 5/2-314 (West1998). Section 2-315 of the UCC says when the seller has reasonto know the buyer needs the goods for a particular purpose andknows the buyer is relying on the seller's skill in selecting thegoods, an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose isinferred. 810 ILCS 5/2-315 (West 1998).

Section 2-318 defines the reach of these warranties:

"Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Expressor Implied. A seller's warranty whether express orimplied extends to any natural person who is in thefamily or household of his buyer or who is a guest inhis home if it is reasonable to expect that such personmay use, consume or be affected by the goods and who isinjured in person by breach of the warranty. A sellermay not exclude or limit the operation of thisSection." 810 ILCS 5/2-318 (West 1998).

This section of the UCC allows parties having a certainrelationship with the buyer to maintain warranty claims under theUCC despite a lack of privity with the seller of the goods. Lukwinski v. Stone Container Corporation, 312 Ill. App. 3d 385,390, 726 N.E.2d 665 (2000). While we have held a UCC warrantymay extend to the employee of a buyer under section 2-318,Whitaker v. Lian Feng Machine Co., 156 Ill. App. 3d 316, 321, 509N.E.2d 591 (1987), it does not extend to non-employees whocontract with the buyer to provide a service. Lukwinski, 312Ill. App. 3d at 393.

This case is factually similar to Lukwinski. There, theplaintiff was employed as a truck driver for a delivery carriercompany (FAB). Defendant (Stone) was a cardboard boxmanufacturer. FAB contracted with Stone to deliver the boxes tobuyers. Plaintiff was injured while delivering the boxes to abuyer. He claimed section 2-318 covered him as a third-partybeneficiary of the UCC warranty between Stone and the buyer. Wedisagreed:

"Plaintiff *** argues he was akin to an employee ofCoca-Cola by virtue of the directive he received fromStone's dispatcher and the request for assistanceexpressed by Coca Cola's forklift operator. Wedisagree. The record clearly shows that at the time ofhis injuries plaintiff was acting within the course ofhis employment with FAB. ***

As discussed, the courts may enlarge the scope ofsection 2-318 where the circumstances of the casewarrant. Notwithstanding this discretion, we areextremely reluctant, in light of the express wording ofthe statute, to expand this section's operation absenta compelling and well-founded reason. *** Plaintiffhere *** provides no compelling basis under warrantylaw for the extension of third-party beneficiarycoverage under the facts of the case. *** Plaintiff'srelationship with [the buyer] under the facts is toofar removed from those relationships warrantingprotection under section 2-318. Notably, plaintiff isnot without remedy for his injuries and has other legaltheories available under which he can pursue relief." Lukwinski, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 393-94.

In this case, plaintiff does not contend section 2-318should be extended - instead he stretches the facts by claiminghe was "technically *** in Artech's *** employ." Frank was notin Artech's employ. He was employed by C. Bentley Builders. C.Bentley Builders contracted with Artech to erect the trusses. Section 2-318 does not extend to Frank. We affirm the trialcourt's directed verdict on the breach of warranty count.

Summary Judgment - Structural Work Act Count

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in grantingdefendant's motion for summary judgment on the count of thecomplaint alleging violation of the Structural Work Act. 740ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1994)⁽²⁾.

Review of the trial court's ruling on a motion for summaryjudgment is de novo. Lajato v. AT&T, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d 126,135, 669 N.E.2d 645 (1996). Summary judgment is proper when thepleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file, construed in thelight most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish there isno genuine issue of material fact and the moving party isentitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lajato, 283 Ill. App.3d at 135.

Section 9 of the Structural Work Act says, in relevant part:

"Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman orother person having charge of the erection,construction, repairing, alteration, removal orpainting of any building, bridge, viaduct or otherstructure within the provisions of this Act, shallcomply with all the terms thereof ***.

***

For any injury to person or property, occasionedby any wilful violations of this Act, or willfulfailure to comply with any of its provisions, a rightof action shall accrue to the party injured, for anydirect damages sustained thereby ***." 740 ILCS 150/9(West 1994).

A plaintiff must establish the following elements in orderto sustain a cause of action for violation of the Act: (1)plaintiff was involved in structural activity; (2) the activitywas being performed with reference to a structure; (3) a scaffoldor other mechanical device was being used; (4) a defect existedin the construction or use of the device; (5) the defectproximately caused his injuries; (6) the defendant had charge ofthe work; (7) the defendant willfully violated the Act's safetystandard. Cockrum v. Kajima, International, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d485, 491, 645 N.E.2d 917 (1994).

Here, the trial court found plaintiff could not establish amaterial issue of fact regarding whether Hines "had charge of"the work which resulted in plaintiff's injuries.

Plaintiff contends the trial court failed to consider theextent to which Hines provided instructions for the erection ofthe trusses. Plaintiff points to deposition testimony indicatingthe reason Hines delivered the Green Sheet to the job site was to"show how to erect trusses and the correct way to pick them upwith the crane." Plaintiff notes Hines' engineering departmentwas available for consultation and "would have" affirmativelyperformed work to insure workers' safety, had it been asked to doso.

The problem with plaintiff's argument is that case lawclearly says the question is not whether the defendant "wouldhave" taken more control over the job site if it had been askedto do so.

The factors to be considered in determining whether a person"had charge of" the work are: (1) supervision and control of thework; (2) retention of the right to supervise and control thework; (3) constant participation in ongoing activities at theconstruction site; (4) supervision and coordination ofsubcontractors; (5) responsibility for taking safety precautionsat the jobsite; (6) authority to issue change orders; (7) theright to stop the work; (8) ownership of the equipment used onthe jobsite; (9) defendant's familiarity with constructioncustoms and practices; and (10) defendant's ability to assureworker safety or alleviate equipment deficiencies or improperwork habits. Cockrum, 163 Ill. 2d at 492-93.

These factors focus on the amount of control the defendantactually exerted, or retained the right to exert, over the workthat resulted in the injury. Plaintiff failed to establish thatHines took any steps to take actual charge of the work. WhetherHines could have exerted some control over the work isinsignificant. Plaintiff may recover only where Hines actuallyexerted control, or was supposed to exert control and failed todo so.

Hines' contract with Fanizza was for the manufacture anddelivery of the trusses. Though Hines included instructions forthe erection of the trusses with the product, the erection of thetrusses was performed by sub-contractors hired by Artech. Areview of the record establishes Hines did not take charge oferection of the trusses once they were delivered, nor did theparties anticipate that it would. We affirm the trial court'sdecision granting summary judgment in defendant's favor on thisissue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the jury's verdict and the trial court orders wehave discussed.

Affirmed.

HALL, P.J., and CERDA, J., concur.

1. In a related case filed by another plaintiff, we upheldthe trial court's summary dismissal of the counts filed againstthe Truss Plate Institute, a construction trade association. Wefound TPI owed no duty to the plaintiff. Bailey v. Edward HinesLumber Co., 308 Ill. App. 3d 58, 719 N.E.2d 178 (1999).

2. The Structural Work Act was repealed in 1995, but becauseit was in effect when the trusses collapsed it applies to thiscase. See Atkins v. Deere & Co., 177 Ill. 2d 222, 224, 685N.E.2d 342 (1997)(causes of action which accrued prior toeffective date of repeal are preserved).