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FOURTH DIVISION
August 14, 2003

JUSTICE KARNEZIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Pierre Ferguson appeals from an order of the circuit court dismissing hisaction for malicious prosecution pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(5) (West 2000)) on the grounds that it was barred by thestatute of limitations.

Ferguson was arrested on July 31, 1999, after he observed an ambulance drivethe wrong way down a one way street and strike another vehicle. As Chicago policeofficers were investigating the accident, Ferguson approached to tell the officers whathe had witnessed. He was ordered to return to his property and complied. When itappeared that the officers were accepting the ambulance driver's version of events,Ferguson again approached the officers to tell them that the ambulance's emergencylights and sirens had not been activated at the time the ambulance was driving downthe street. At that time, officers walked into Ferguson's yard, arrested him and chargedhim with three misdemeanor offenses. Those charges were stricken with leave toreinstate on August 25, 2000. Ferguson demanded trial.

On January 29, 2002, Ferguson filed a one-count complaint for maliciousprosecution against the City of Chicago as a result of the officers' wrongful actions. Ferguson alleged that Chicago police officers arrested him without probable causebecause the officers knew that Ferguson had committed no criminal offense. Inaddition, Ferguson alleged that the officers provided false information to the State'sAttorney's office when the officers stated that Ferguson had been swearing in a loudvoice at the officers and refused to stop yelling. The officers also falsely relayed to theState's Attorney's office that Ferguson had resisted arrest and struck one of the officersin the chest.

In response, the City of Chicago moved for the dismissal of the complaintpursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West2000). First, the city alleged that the action was time barred because theGovernmental and Local Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort ImmunityAct) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et. seq. (West 2000)) requires that a suit against amunicipality be brought within one year from the date the cause of action accrued. Thecity argued that the cause of action in this case accrued on August 25, 2000, the datethat the charges were stricken with leave to reinstate (SOL). Therefore, for the actionto be timely, it had to have been filed no later than August 25, 2001. In addition, thecity argued that Ferguson failed to state a cause of action for malicious prosecutionbecause he failed to demonstrate that the underlying criminal case was terminated inhis favor.

After a hearing, the court granted the motion to dismiss on the basis that it wasbarred by the statute of limitations. The court did not rule on the city's claim thatFerguson had failed to state a cause of action. It is from this order that Ferguson nowappeals. We affirm.

We review the granting of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss de novo. Neppl v.Murphy, 316 Ill. App. 3d 581, 583, 736 N.E.2d 1174, 1178 (2000).

To state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege factsshowing: " ' "(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civiljudicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor ofthe plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceedings; (4) the presenceof malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff. " ' " (Emphasis added.) Swick v.Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 512, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (1996), quoting Joiner v. BentonCommunity Bank, 82 Ill. 2d 40, 45, 411 N.E.2d 229 (1980), quoting Ritchey v. Maksin,71 Ill. 2d 470, 475 (1978).

Ferguson named the City of Chicago, a municipality, as the defendant in thiscase. Therefore, the action fell under the ambit of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS10/8-101 (2000)). The Tort Immunity Act limits actions against municipalities andprovides in relevant part:

"No civil action may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of it's employees for any injury unless it is commenced within oneyear from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued." 745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 2000).

Here, Ferguson argues that the trial court erred when it found that the statute oflimitations for malicious prosecution in his case accrued on the date that the trial courtentered an order striking the case with leave to reinstate (August 25, 2000). Fergusonurges us to consider that the cause of action did not actually accrue until after theexpiration of the 160-day reinstatement period because when a criminal case is"SOL'd" and a demand for trial is asserted by a defendant who is not in custody, as inthe case at bar, the charges can be reinstated at any time within the 160-day "speedytrial period" of section 103-5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. 725 ILCS5/103-5(b) (West 2000).

It is well settled that the statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution claimaccrues on the date that the underlying criminal proceedings have terminated in adefendant's favor. Stanger v. Felix, 97 Ill. App. 3d 585, 586-87, 422 N.E.2d 1142, 1144(1981); Ghosh v. Roy, 208 Ill. App. 3d 30, 32, 566 N.E.2d 873, 875 (1991). Therefore,the salient question before us is whether the SOL order entered in this case on August25, 2000, can be construed as a "favorable termination."

An SOL, while not provided for by any rule or statute, is nonetheless commonpractice in the circuit court, especially in criminal cases. People ex rel. De Vos v.Laurin, 73 Ill. App. 3d 219, 222, 391 N.E.2d 164, 166 (1979). A case that is strickenremains an undisposed action and may still be placed on the docket and brought to trialso long as the court allows a subsequent motion to reinstate. People v. St. John, 369Ill. 177, 178, 15 N.E.2d 858, 859 (1938). The case, therefore, remains a pending case. People v. Johnson, 278 Ill. App. 204, 207 (1934) rev'd on other grounds, 363 Ill. 45(1936).

In Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 662 N.E.2d 1238 (1996), our supreme courtconsidered, as a matter of first impression, whether the nolle prosequi of a criminalcharge constituted a favorable termination in a malicious prosecution action. Swickalleged that the nolle prosequi was entered in his case because of a lack of evidencedemonstrating his guilt. With respect to the nolle prosequi, the court noted the majorityrule that a criminal proceeding has been terminated in favor of the accused when aprosecutor formally abandons the proceedings by means of a nolle prosequi, unless theabandonment is for reasons not indicative of the accused's innocence. Restatement(Second) of Torts