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FIRST DIVISION
May 17, 2004

Plaintiff Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (Farmers)appeals from an order of the trial court granting defendantUniversal Underwriters Insurance Company's (Universal) motion todismiss, holding that Universal did not owe collision coverage toFarmers' three insureds. In the instant appeal, Farmers asks usto determine whether the dealer's insurer, Universal, is requiredto indemnify the drivers for collision damages to dealer-ownedautomobiles. The trial court found no such requirement, and weaffirm.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Farmers' three insureds, driving auto dealervehicles with permission, caused the following collision damageto the dealer autos: (1) Mark Wilder, test-driving a Geiser Ford,Inc., Ford Mustang, caused $2,433.45 damage to the dealer auto;(2) Cecilia M. Butler, test-driving a Sierra Motors, Inc.,Plymouth Grand Voyager, caused $13,878.57 damage to the dealerauto; (3) Carol Jones, using a Ford Taurus loaner auto fromGeiser Ford, Inc., caused $6,037.31 damage to the dealer auto.

Universal paid these collision claims from the dealers forthe damages to the three autos and then sought recovery from thethree individuals by way of subrogation, which triggered Farmers'complaint. Farmers' complaint contended that Universal wasresponsible to Farmers' three insureds for the collisioncoverage, and that Farmers was not responsible because itspolicies provided collision coverage only on an excess basis whenits insureds damaged nonowned autos they were driving. Universalthen filed a motion to dismiss, and Farmers filed a motion forjudgment on the pleadings. On April 22, 2002, the trial courtgranted Farmers' motion for judgment on the pleadings and enteredjudgment in favor of Farmers.

Upon denial of its motion to dismiss, Universal filed amotion for rehearing, calling attention to two matters thatUniversal asserted to be error. Universal contended that thetrial court erred, first, by treating permissive users as"insureds" under Universal Underwriters' Auto Inventory PhysicalDamage Coverage Part 300 and second, by inserting a collisioncoverage requirement into the Mandatory Insurance Act, (625 ILCS5/7-601 (West 1998)).

On October 31, 2002, the trial court agreed with Universaland reversed its order of April 22, 2002, thereby grantingUniversal's motion to dismiss. The trial court declared thatFarmers' insureds were not covered as permissive users underUniversal's Auto inventory coverage part 300, and the mandatoryinsurance statute, while requiring vehicle owners to provide"liability" insurance, does not require that collision coveragebe provided. 625 ILCS 5/7-601 (West 1998). Farmers then filed itstimely notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

The question of whether an auto owner or auto dealer owescollision coverage to a permitted user of its auto was an issueof first impression when the trial court first addressed Farmers'complaint in this case. During the pendency of this appeal,however, this court decided this issue in the case of UniversalUnderwriters Group v. Pierson, 337 Ill. App. 3d 893, 897, 787N.E. 2d 296 (2003).

The decision in Universal Underwriters Group v. Pierson, 337Ill. App. 3d 893, 897, 787 N.E. 2d 296 (2003), involved the sameUniversal "Auto Inventory Coverage Part 300" and the same type offactual setting as are at issue here. In Pierson, the permitteduser of a dealer auto caused collision damage to the auto and thepermitted user's insurer contended that Universal, the insurer ofthe auto dealer, owed the permitted user collision coverage.

This court in Pierson held that Universal owed no collisioncoverage to the permitted user customer of the auto dealer whichwas insured by Universal. First, this court reviewed the samePart 300 of the insurance policy at issue in this case andconcluded that the section's protections, as defined therein,included only the dealer and its partners and employees, notothers driving a vehicle with the dealer's permission. Pierson,337 Ill. App. 3d at 895. This is because Part 300, while coveringthe type of loss caused by the accident, lacked the sameexpansive definition of "Who is an insured" specifically listedin other parts of the policy. Pierson, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 895. For example, the court in Pierson reviewed Part 500, whichexplicitly included a section of defined "Exclusions," listing"personal property, including AUTOS, owned by, rented or leasedto, used by, in the care, custody or control of, or beingtransported by the INSURED" in that list. Pierson, 337 Ill. App.3d at 895. Unlike Part 500, Part 300 did not include suchspecific exclusions. As such, the Pierson court reasoned that thepolicy's terms therefore provided coverage for the dealer'spermitted users for damages sought by injured third parties, andcompensation for the dealer for loss to its car, but not thepermitted user for damages to the dealer car she drove. Pierson,337 Ill. App. 3d at 895.

The Pierson court further addressed the mandatory insurancestatute, holding that public policy does not require an autoowner/dealer to provide collision coverage for permitted usercustomers of its auto. Noting that the mandatory insurancestatute requires vehicle owners to provide "liability" insurance,the court reasoned that, by leaving out terms to the contrary,our legislature appears to have enacted a provision requiringinsurance coverage only for claims advanced by third partiesinjured by a driver and not for the losses of the driver or thevehicle. Pierson, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 896.

This court further noted that this conclusion is well-settled and confirmed by our courts' interpretations of thepublic policy underlying the mandatory insurance law. Accordingto the supreme court in State Farm Mutual Automobile InsuranceCo. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d 369, 376, 757 N.E.2d 881 (2001), "themandatory insurance statute's "principle purpose" is "to protectthe public by securing payment of their damages." In Smith, asnoted by the court in Pierson, the party seeking damages was anindividual injured by the insured's vehicle, not the insured orits permissive user seeking recovery for injury to his own personor to the insured vehicle. Upon review of public policy inIllinois, the court in Pierson concluded that public policymandates that claims of injured third parties be covered by a carowner's insurance policy, but there is no indication that itextends to require coverage for damages to the insured vehiclewhile in the control of a permissive user. Pierson, 337 Ill. App.3d at 897.

Farmers cites to several Illinois cases to support itscontention that primary coverage is generally placed on theinsurer of the vehicle rather than the insurer of the driver,regardless of whether the permissive user is insured under aseparate personal liability policy. State Farm Mutual AutomobileInsurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d 369, 375-76, 757 N.E.2d 881(2001); Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Universal UnderwritersInsurance Co., 316 Ill. App. 3d 161, 735 N.E.2d 1032 (2000);Pekin Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile InsuranceCo., 305 Ill. App. 3d 417, 711 N.E.2d 1227 (1999); State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group,182 Ill. 2d 240, 695 N.E. 2d 848 (1998). Farmers fails torecognize a crucial element of the statute, however, as themandatory insurance statute only requires liability insurance,not primary insurance, as noted by this court in Pierson.Pierson, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 896. As such, Farmers next argumentthat permissive users cannot be excluded under certain sectionsof the owner's liability policies fails because the coverage atissue in this case is primary, not liability insurance.

Farmers further attempts to extend public policy in Illinoisfrom one that simply mandates coverage for injury to thirdparties, to a broader policy that requires coverage for damage tothe vehicle driven by an insured's permitted user. There issimply no indication, however, by the legislature or the courtsshowing a willingness to provide such extensive coverage. InPierson, this court noted that courts and legal commentators havereached widespread consensus on the meaning of the term"liability" insurance, which is much more narrowly defined thanFarmers argues. According to this court in Pierson, Illinoispublic policy mandates that claims by injured third parties becovered by a car owner's insurance policy, but there is noindication that it extends to require coverage for damages to theinsured vehicle while in the control of a permissive user. Thatis currently the responsibility of the user's insurance carrier.This court further noted in Pierson that "[c]ourts of otherjurisdictions, interpreting the interplay between their mandatoryinsurance provisions and insurance policy terms nearly identicalto those we review here, have reached the same conclusion."Pierson, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 897, citing Western Motor Co. v.Koehn, 242 Kan. 402, 748 P.2d 851 (1988).

Finally, Farmers argues that the trial court committedreversible error in granting Universal's motion for rehearingbecause Universal did not satisfy the requirements for a motionto reconsider. Universal's motion requested the trial court toreconsider the matter "in light of its being a matter of firstimpression and there being a separation of powers of the threebranches of government constitutional violation if collisioncoverage is read into state statutes where no such provision isfound therein." Farmer's contention is without merit.

The intended purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bringto the court's attention newly discovered evidence, changes inthe law, or errors in the court's previous application ofexisting law. The decision to grant or deny a motion forreconsideration lies within the discretion of the circuit courtand will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.Chelkova v. Southland Corp., 331 Ill. App. 3d 716, 729-30, 771N.E. 2d 1100 (2002), citing Landeros v. Equity Property &Development, 321 Ill. App. 3d 57, 65, 747 N.E.2d 391 (2001). Thecourt in this case clearly did not abuse its discretion ingranting the motion for rehearing. Universal's motion wasappropriate in that it suggested that the court may have erred inits prior decision on the matter, as the decision had thepractical effect of violating the separation of powers clause ofthe 1970 Illinois Constitution by reading collision coverage intothe state statute where no such provision is found therein.

Further, according to the supreme court in Kingbrook, Inc.v. Pupurs, a postjudgment motion in a non-jury case issufficient, even if it consists of merely a single sentence.Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, 202 Ill. 2d 24, 779 N.E. 2d 867,citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1202(b) (West 1998). The court in that caseheld that a single sentence moving the court to reconsider itsdecision was proper. The court reasoned that Supreme Court Rule303(a)(1) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303 (a)(1)) makes no mention of thecontents of any postjudgment motion, nor does section 2-1203(a)of the Code speak to the contents of any such motion. Kingbrook,202 Ill. 2d at 28-29. If the supreme court held that a singlesentence was proper, then there is no reason to add additionalrequirements to the motion in the instant case. We therefore findno reversible error in the trial court's ruling on the motion.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cookcounty is affirmed.

GORDON and McNULTY, JJ., concur.