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This appeal arises out of an action for declaratory judgment filed by plaintiff, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company,Inc., (Farm Bureau), to determine liability for damages incurred as a result of an automobile accident involving its insured,the renter of a vehicle owned by defendant, Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. (Alamo). Both parties filed cross-motions forsummary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Alamo and Farm Bureau appeals, contendingthat Alamo, as vehicle owner, is required to provide primary liability insurance coverage. We affirm.

The following facts are undisputed. On September 30, 1996, Donna Fletcher rented a 1996 Corsica from Alamo. Therecord indicates that Alamo filed a certificate of self-insurance in accordance with sections 9-101 and 9-102 of the IllinoisVehicle Code (the Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/9-101, 9-102 (West 1996)). Although a complete copy of the rentalagreement is not a part of the record, it is undisputed that Fletcher was offered the option to purchase liability insurancefrom Alamo when she rented the car. Fletcher declined and instead chose to rely on her own personal liability policy withFarm Bureau, which was in full force and effect during the rental period.

In its "Terms for Renting an Alamo Car" section, the Alamo rental agreement contained the following provision entitled"Liability Insurance":

"Unless contrary to state law or otherwiseprovided by this agreement, if there is no other valid and collectible insurance whether primary, excess or contingent,available to the renter (or to any authorized driver while operating the car) sufficient to meet minimum financialresponsibility requirements, then, except as to rental occurring in California, Alamo shall provide protection againstliability for bodily injury, death or property damage to others up to the minimum financial responsibility limits required byapplicable law. Such protection shall be provided through either an insurance policy or a certificate of self insurance (ifprovided, you have no duty to defend after tendering minimum limits). I agree that any amounts over this minimum will becovered by me or by my liability policy and I will indemnify you for any losses that exceed the minimum limits."

The record indicates that Alamo's insurance coverage also provided an amendatory endorsement and defined an insured as"any rentee/lesee who purchases the Extended Protection (EP) Option, but only while the Alamo vehicle is being driven bythe rentee/lesee or an 'Alamo Authorized Additional Driver' and all terms and conditions of the Rental Agreement havebeen met." However, this amendatory endorsement was effective on June 30, 1997. As the accident occurred on October1996, this provision does not apply to the instant case.

On October 5, 1996, Fletcher, while driving the Alamo rental car, was involved in an accident with Richard and LucySmith. At the time of the accident, State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm) insured the Smiths' vehicle. After theaccident, State Farm paid benefits to the Smiths in the amount of $9,257.74 and sought recovery of this amount from FarmBureau and Alamo. As Alamo denied that it provided liability coverage to Fletcher, Farm Bureau reimbursed State Farmfor amounts paid to the Smiths.

Farm Bureau's insurance policy contained the following provision entitled "Other Insurance":

"If there is other applicable liabilityinsurance on a loss covered by this Part, we will pay our proportionate share as our limits of liability bear to the total of allapplicable liability limits. Any insurance afforded under this Part for a vehicle you do not own or lease, however, is excessover any other liability insurance and shall be limited to the difference between the liability limits on the nonowned vehicleand the liability limits on the described vehicle."

Farm Bureau's policy also contained an amendatory endorsement. Of particular note is the section entitled "Exclusions,"which provided as follows:

"2. For damage to property owned by, rented to,in charge of or transported by any insured person but this exclusion does not apply to damages to a rented residence, arented private garage, or any of the following:

a. a rented auto."

After Alamo filed an answer to Farm Bureau's amended complaint for declaratory judgment, Farm Bureau filed a motionfor summary judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 1996)) and reiterated its argument that Alamo was required to provideprimary liability coverage to those who rent its vehicles. Farm Bureau asserted that it is the public policy of the state thatthe owner of the vehicle, rather than the vehicle operator, provide primary coverage. Alamo responded with a cross-motionfor summary judgment and argued that because Fletcher did not purchase additional insurance coverage from Alamo, it wasnot required to provide primary coverage.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Alamo. In so doing, the court found that there was no statutory orcontractual basis to require Alamo to provide primary liability coverage to Fletcher, citing Insurance Car Rentals, Inc. v.State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 152 Ill. App. 3d 225, 232, 404 N.E.2d 256 (1987). Farm Bureau filed atimely appeal.

Initially, we note that a reviewing court conducts a de novo review of theevidence in summary judgment cases. Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co.,165 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995). The reviewing court must construeall evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmovingparty. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d at 113. Where the pleadings, depositions andaffidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the moving partyis entitled to judgment as a matter of law. First of America Trust Co. v. FirstIllini Bancorp, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d 276, 283, 685 N.E.2d 351 (1997). Ifreasonable persons could draw different inferences from undisputed facts, summaryjudgment should be denied. Smith v. Armor Plus Co., 248 Ill. App. 3d 831, 839,617 N.E.2d 1346 (1993).

We next note that Farm Bureau correctly points out that Alamo was prohibited fromallowing Fletcher to drive its rental car unless Alamo maintained insurance inaccordance with the financial responsibility provisions of the Vehicle Code. TheVehicle Code has a specific section for "Owners of For-Rent Vehicles For-Hire" which applies to the instant case. Thissection has its own financial responsibility law provision delineating the methods of providing proof of financialresponsibility. Owners of for-rent vehicles, in order to operate their business in the State of Illinois, must demonstratefinancial responsibility by: (1) posting bond; (2) obtaining insurance; or (3) obtaining a certificate of self-insurance. 625ILCS 5/9-101 et seq. (West 1996). Alamo properly maintained self-insurance in accordance with this section of theVehicle Code. The question we must address is whether Alamo can assert that it is not required to provide primarycoverage pursuant to the terms of the rental agreement without frustrating the public policy of the state.

Farm Bureau contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Alamo because, in accordancewith public policy, as the vehicle owner, Alamo is required to provide primary liability coverage to those who rent itsvehicles. In support of its position, Farm Bureau relies on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. UniversalUnderwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d 240, 695 N.E.2d 848 (1998). In State Farm, one of State Farm's insureds took a test-drivein a vehicle owned by an automobile dealership. During the test-drive, State Farm's insured was involved in an accident. State Farm paid for all damages to the other party due to the accident and subsequently submitted a claim to the dealership'sinsurance carrier, Universal Underwriters Group (Universal). State Farm argued that the garage policy issued to thedealership by Universal afforded primary coverage for anyone who test-drove their vehicles. Universal denied the claim. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm. Thiscourt affirmed the trial court's ruling. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 285Ill. App. 3d 115, 674 N.E.2d 52 (1996).

On appeal to our supreme court, Universal contended that section 7-601(a) of the Vehicle Code, which governs automobiledealerships, does not specify that a person who test-drives a vehicle must be covered under the dealership's insurancepolicy. Our supreme court disagreed and held that, "under Illinois law, a car dealer's liability policy must provide coveragefor test-drivers." State Farm, 182 Ill. 2d at 243. The court also noted that, "pursuant to custom in the insurance industry,primary liability is generally placed on the insurer of the owner of an automobile rather than on the insurer of the operator." State Farm, 182 Ill. 2d at 246. The driver's insurance policy would then be required to provide coverage only on an excessbasis.

In concluding that Universal was primarily liable, the court considered section 7-317(b)(2) of the Vehicle Code, whichprovides that a "motor vehicle liability policy" issued to an owner must "insure the person named therein and any otherperson using *** such motor vehicle or vehicles with the express or implies permission of the insured." 625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2) (West 1996). Due to this provision, commonly referred to as an "omnibus clause," our supreme court ruled thisclause must be read into all motor vehicle policies that do not expressly include it. State Farm, 182 Ill. 2d at 243-44. Thecourt further held that "the [Vehicle] Code mandates that the insurance policy issued by Universal provide omnibuscoverage in the absence of any statutory language qualifying the mandate, the statute must be construed to require primarycoverage." State Farm, 182 Ill. 2d at 246.

In further support of its contention, Farm Bureau also cites several other cases that affirm the holding in State Farm: JohnDeere Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d 371, 698 N.E.2d 635 (1998); Pekin Insurance Co v. StateFarm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 305 Ill. App. 3d 417, 711 N.E.2d 1227 (1999); and Browning v. Plumlee, No. 5-99-0379 (August 4, 2000).

We find that Farm Bureau's reliance on State Farm and its progeny is misplaced. Each of these cases involved thepermissive use of a vehicle owned by an automobile dealership. Although Farm Bureau argues that the holding of StateFarm is equally applicable to situations involving rental car companies, we find this assertion unpersuasive. This case,unlike State Farm, does not involve a "motor vehicle liability policy" as this term is defined in section 7-317 of the VehicleCode. This case involves the enforcement of a contract between Alamo and Farm Bureau's insured regarding liabilitycoverage.

Insurance Car Rentals, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 152 Ill. App. 3d 225, 504 N.E.2d 256 (1987),is directly on point. In that case, the renter of the vehicle was involved in an accident while renting a car from InsuranceCar Rentals (Car Rentals). The renter was offered the option of renting the vehicle with complete coverage or relying onhis own insurance to provide coverage.

The insured's policy provided as follows:

"'If a temporary Substitute Car *** has other

vehicle liability coverage on it, then this coverage is excess. THIS COVERAGE SHALL NOT APPLY:

A. IF THE VEHICLE IS OWNED BY ANY PERSON OR

ORGANIZATION IN A CAR BUSINESS; AND

B. IF THE INSURED OR THE OWNER HAS OTHER

LIABILITY COVERAGE WHICH APPLIES IN WHOLE OR IN PART AS PRIMARY, EXCESS OR CONTINGENTCOVERAGE.'" 152 Ill. App. 3d at 228.

The insured opted for the rental agreement, which did not include a cost for insurance coverage. Insurance Car Rentals,152 Ill. App. 3d at 228.

Following the accident, the parties involved in the accident sued the renter for personal injury and property damages. StateFarm paid the personal injury and property damages and demanded that Car Rentals' insurer defend and indemnify StateFarm. This demand was rejected, and Car Rentals filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against State Farm toestablish State Farm's liability. State Farm filed a counterclaim and argued that the public policy of Illinois makes thewaiver term of the rental agreement between Car Rentals and the renter unenforceable. Insurance Car Rentals, 152 Ill.App. 3d at 229.

The trial court granted declaratory judgment in favor of Car Rentals and its insurer. On appeal, State Farm contended thatpublic policy required Car Rentals to provide liability coverage to its renters and that the filing of proof of financialresponsibility meant that Car Rentals had to insure its customer renting the vehicle. This court held that the case involved aseparate agreement between an insured and a customer as to which insurance applied. The court further held that there isnothing in the statute that imposes mandatory primary insurance coverage on a rental agency. Insurance Car Rentals, 152Ill. App. 3d at 231.

Here, as in Insurance Car Rentals, Fletcher chose to rely on her own insurance coverage with Farm Bureau instead ofpurchasing the liability insurance from Alamo. Although Farm Bureau argues that the statute and public policy of the staterequire the owner of the vehicle to provide primary coverage, we hold, after a thorough examination of the sections withregard to the imposition of mandatory primary insurance coverage by a rental agency, that the statute is silent. As stated inHertz Corp. v. Garrott, 238 Ill. App. 3d 231, 239, 606 N.E.2d 219 (1992), "the statute merely prescribes the minimumamounts needed by a rental agency to conduct business in the State. The statute in no way defines the scope of theobligation that may be assumed by the rental agency by separate agreement." This position was initially held in Dotson v.Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 101 Ill. App. 3d 804, 428 N.E.2d 1002 (1981). Neither the language contained in the VehicleCode nor the public policy behind it, which is to protect the public, bars contract terms that purport to shift primary liabilityunder insurance policies. Thus, we cannot ignore the laws and public policy of the State, which permit freedom ofcontracting between competent parties. American Country Insurance Co. v. Cline, 309 Ill. App. 3d 501, 506, 722 N.E.2d755 (1999). Because the parties may properly contract as to which insurer is responsible for primary coverage as long asstatutory minimum requirements are met, we hold that, as a matter of law, the rental agreement between Alamo andFletcher was valid and enforceable, shifting primary coverage to Farm Bureau.

We must also reject Farm Bureau's contention that the provision in Alamo's rental agreement regarding liability insuranceis an "escape" clause which attempts to limit coverage. Farm Bureau argues that, due to this escape clause, Alamo andFarm Bureau should be forced to divide the liability equally between themselves. We disagree. Unlike cases in which atest-driver of a vehicle owned by a car dealership is covered under the dealership's policy because of the expresspermission given to use the vehicle, here, Fletcher explicitly chose not to contract for insurance with Alamo. Therefore,Alamo's escape clause is inapplicable.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County granting summary judgment in favor of Alamo is affirmed.

Affirmed.

THEIS and REID, JJ., concur.