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SECOND DIVISION
December 30, 2004

JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

The decedent's son, the administrator of her estate, broughta proceeding to recover real property purportedly belonging tothe estate. The decedent's two daughters and son-in-lawcontended the decedent granted the property to the daughters in aquit claim deed two weeks prior to her death. The trial courtgranted partial summary judgment for the son and declared thedeed invalid. The daughters and son-in-law appeal that decision. We affirm.

FACTS

The decedent, Carolyn J. Jackson, died intestate on May 4,2002. She left as heirs two daughters, Kimberly R. Jackson andStephanie M. Tyler, and one son, Darrell B. Jackson, theadministrator of the estate. On April 17, 2003, Darrell("petitioner") initiated a proceeding pursuant to section 16-1 ofthe Probate Act, 735 ILCS 5/16-1 (West 2002), for issuance of acitation to recover an asset owned by the decedent--the realproperty at 11538 S. Elizabeth in Chicago. Named in the petitionwere respondents Kimberly, Stephanie, and Stephanie's husband,Timothy Tyler ("respondents"). Tyler is an attorney.

At issue in the proceeding was a "Quit Claim Deed" datedApril 20, 2002, conveying the property to Stephanie and Kimberly. The deed indicates it was prepared by Timothy Tyler. The deed isnotarized by Norma Herrera, dated April 20, 2002. Althoughdecedent's signature is on the deed, Stephanie admitted in herresponse to a request to admit facts that the decedent did notsign her name to the deed. Stephanie admitted she wrote thewords "Carolyn J. Jackson" on the deed. She also admitted thenotary's statement that the decedent personally appeared beforeher and signed the deed in her presence was false. The deed wasrecorded on May 24, 2002, three weeks after decedent's death.

In his motion for partial summary judgment, petitionercontended the deed was a nullity because respondents admitted thedecedent did not sign the deed conveying the property. In theirresponse, respondents said Stephanie and Timothy had bothtestified that decedent had asked, authorized, and directedStephanie to sign the deed for her. Respondents also referred tothe discovery depositions of Decota Wilmington and Bernard Lee,who testified that prior to her death, decedent informed them ofher desire to convey and leave her house to Stephanie andKimberly. In his reply, Petitioner contended the evidenceproffered by respondents was inadmissible because: (1) thetestimony was not part of the trial court record; (2) the allegedstatements by decedent were hearsay; (3) the testimony ofStephanie and Timothy, as interested parties, was barred by theDead Man's Act, 735 ILCS 5/8-201 (West 2002); and (4) Wilmingtonand Lee's testimony of decedent's future intent was irrelevant towhether decedent directed Stephanie to sign her name to the deed. None of the deposition testimony to which respondents referis in the trial record. Apparently, none of the depositions wasever filed in the trial court.

On January 23, 2004, the trial court entered an orderfinding the deed invalid and entering partial summary judgmentfor petitioner. The order states:

"The court finds that, while there is no evidence of anintent to forge the deed dated April 20, 2002, ***there is no competent admissible evidence that Decedentdirected respondent Stephanie Tyler to sign Decedent'sname to the Deed."

Respondents filed a motion to reconsider on February 23,2004. The trial court denied the motion on March 30, 2004,finding "there was no evidence to show that decedent directedsomeone to sign her name to a conveyance deed." Respondentsfiled their notice of appeal on April 9, 2004.

DECISION

First, we must consider our jurisdiction. Respondentsincorrectly assert that we have jurisdiction pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 304(a). 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). Rule 304(a) does notapply to this appeal. The trial court's order entering partialsummary judgment did not contain the requisite language findingthere is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appealor both. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).

Petitioner suggests this case falls under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1), which makes appealable a judgment or order entered inthe administration of an estate, guardianship, or similarproceeding which finally determines a right or status of a party. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(1). We agree. The order in this case wasa final determination of the rights of the parties to the realproperty. The court found respondents had no right to theproperty because the deed was invalid, and the propertyrightfully belonged to the estate. See In re Estate of Thorpe,282 Ill. App. 3d 612, 617, 669 N.E.2d 359 (1996) (orderconstruing will and approving sale of farm was final order whichhad to be appealed within 30 days under Rule 304(b)(1)); In reEstate of Mueller, 275 Ill. App. 3d 128, 139, 655 N.E.2d 1040(1995) (court's denial of petition to intervene in estateproceedings was a final and appealable order under Rule304(b)(1)).

Orders within the scope of Rule 304(b)(1), even thoughentered before the final settlement of estate proceedings, mustbe appealed within 30 days of entry or be barred. Estate ofThorpe, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 616. Petitioner also suggestsrespondents' appeal is untimely because the tolling provisions ofRule 303 do not apply to appeals filed under Rule 304(b). Rule303 allows the filing of post-trial motions in the trial court totoll the time for filing a notice of appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R.303(a)(1).

Here, the respondents filed their appeal within 30 days ofthe court's order denying their motion to reconsider. Ourjurisdiction depends on whether the tolling provision in Rule 303applies to a Rule 304(b)(1) appeal. Rule 304(a) was amended in1988 to provide that "[t]he time for filing a notice of appealshall be as provided in Rule 303." 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). Thesame language is not in Rule 304(b).

In Burnicka v. Marquette National Bank, 88 Ill. 2d 527, 530-32, 431 N.E.2d 358 (1982), the Illinois Supreme Court held amotion to reconsider an order granting or denying a section 72petition (the predecessor to a section 2-1401 petition under theCode of Civil Procedure) tolled the running of the time forfiling a notice of appeal from that order. Section 2-1401 ordersare appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3). 155 Ill. 2dR. 304(b)(3). It is not clear whether that holding also wouldapply to Rule 304(b)(1).

In Elg v. Whittington, 119 Ill. 2d 344, 351, 518 N.E.2d 1232(1987), which was decided prior to the 1988 amendment, theSupreme Court held the Rule 303 tolling provision did not applyto Rule 304(a). The court distinguished its holding from that ofBurnicka, finding that Rule 304(b)(3), unlike Rule 304(a),neither requires a special finding as a prerequisite to anappeal, nor specifies a special date for the running of a noticeof appeal period. Elg, 119 Ill. 2d at 355. In the absence of aspecial provision for the timing of an appeal, the court said itis fair to infer that Rule 304(b)(3) is governed by Rule303(a)(1), including its provision for tolling of an appeal byfiling a post-trial motion. Elg, 119 Ill. 2d at 355. We believethis reasoning applies to Rule 304(b)(1), which also does notrequire a special finding or specify a date for filing a noticeof appeal.

We find we have jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule304(b)(1) and find respondents timely filed their notice ofappeal within 30 days of the court's disposition of their motionto reconsider. We commend petitioner's attorneys for theircandor in raising this issue and their balanced and thoroughdiscussion of the issues throughout their brief.

Unfortunately, the same may not be said of respondents'brief, which contains numerous violations of Supreme Court Rule341(e). 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e). Those breaches include: nointroductory paragraph stating the nature of the action and thejudgment appealed from (Rule 341(e)(2)); no statement of theapplicable standard of review (Rule 341(e)(3)); an incorrectstatement of the basis for jurisdiction (Rule 341(e)(4)(ii)); nocitations to the record in the statement of facts (Rule341(e)(6)); no citations to the record in the argument portion ofthe brief (Rule 341(e)(7)) and; no table of contents to therecord or notice of appeal in the appendix (Rules 341(e)(9);342(a)).

An appellate court has the right to strike an appellant'sbrief and dismiss the appeal as a result of the appellant'sfailure to provide a complete statement of facts. Alderson v.Southern Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 832, 845, 747 N.E.2d 926 (2001). A party's failure to comply with Rule 341 is grounds fordisregarding its arguments on appeal. Jeffrey M. Goldberg &Associates, Ltd. v. Collins Tuttle & Co., Inc., 264 Ill. App. 3d878, 886, 637 N.E.2d 1103 (1994).

Even if we were to consider the merits of respondents'appeal, the absence of a record made at trial compels us todismiss their appeal. Respondents contend decedent directed herdaughter Stephanie to sign decedent's name to the deed, anddecedent had told other witnesses that she wanted to leave herhouse to Stephanie and Kimberly. We do not address these claimsbecause none of them is supported by evidence in the record. This court will not consider facts recited in an appellant'sstatement of facts that find no basis in the record. Piller v.Weippert, 260 Ill. App. 3d 677, 679, 633 N.E.2d 174 (1994). Itis the appellant's burden to provide a complete record on appealin order to facilitate a meaningful review. Foutch v. O'Bryant,99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958 (1984). In the absence ofsuch a record, we presume the trial court's order had asufficient factual basis and conformed with the law. Foutch, 99Ill. 2d at 392. We resolve all doubts arising from theincompleteness of the record against the appellant. Foutch, 99Ill. 2d at 392. A last-minute attempt to supplement theappellate record with documents never presented to the trialcourt is of no avail.

The trial court found there was no evidence that decedentdirected anyone to sign the deed for her and declared the deedinvalid. We affirm the trial court's finding and judgment forpetitioner.

Affirmed.

BURKE, P.J., and GARCIA, J., concur.