Find Legal Information

FIRST DIVISION
July 12, 2004

JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises from a simple set of undisputed facts. In 2003, a church's boardmembers voted to remove a pastor from his pastoral duties. The church's bylaws provided thatthe congregation could vote to terminate a pastor's service, and no provision permitted the boardto terminate a pastor's service without a vote of the church's members. The pastor sued for aninjunction to prevent the church from terminating his service as pastor without such a vote. Thechurch responded that the employee handbook and the church covenant gave the board the powerto remove the pastor. After a trial, the court refused to interfere with the church's ecclesiasticaldecision to terminate the pastor's service. The judge dismissed the complaint.

On appeal the pastor contends that the trial court could determine whether the properchurch authority made the decision to terminate the pastor's service without deciding matters ofreligious doctrine. We agree and therefore we reverse the judgment and remand for furtherproceedings.

BACKGROUND

The bylaws of Lilydale Progressive Baptist Church (Lilydale) provide:

"Upon recommendation by the Joint Boards of the Church, the Pastor'sservice may be terminated by a vote of two-thirds of the members present andqualified to vote."

Reverend Rubin Ervin served as Lilydale's pastor. Lilydale's joint boards moved todeclare the pulpit vacant at two separate meetings in 2002. Both times fewer than two-thirds ofthe congregation voted to remove the pastor. In March 2003 the joint boards in a special meetingvoted to dismiss Reverend Ervin from his pastoral service at Lilydale. The boards did not submitthe issue to a vote of the general membership.

After the meeting, the joint boards sent Reverend Ervin a letter to inform him that itterminated his employment. The following Sunday, Reverend Ervin returned to the church toconduct Sunday service. Members of the boards called the Chicago police department. Thepolice attempted to remove Reverend Ervin from the church during the service.

Reverend Ervin sued to enjoin the church from terminating his service as pastor withoutfollowing the procedures established by the bylaws. The joint boards responded that ReverendErvin engaged in church activities while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Lilydale'semployee handbook. The boards claimed that the handbook and the church covenant gave themthe power to terminate the pastor's service. In the covenant the church members "engage towatch over, to pray for, to exhort and stir up each other to every good word and work; to guardeach other's reputation, not needlessly exposing the infirmities of others."At trial, various members of Lilydale testified that they saw Reverend Ervin, apparentlyunder the influence of alcohol, at various church functions. The trial judge said that although thehandbook states that the church can terminate the employment of an employee, includingReverend Ervin, for alcohol use, "there's a provision in the by-laws that states that if you're goingto terminate [the pastor], you do it a certain way. *** [T]he handbook and bylaws are notcontradictory." However, the trial court found that the joint boards made an ecclesiasticaldecision to remove Reverend Ervin from his pastoral service, and therefore the court refused toexercise jurisdiction to resolve Reverend Ervin's claims. The court dismissed the complaint. Thisappeal followed.

ANALYSIS

We must decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction to decide the dispute between theparties would violate the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Wereview this legal issue de novo. Cleeland v. Gilbert, 334 Ill. App. 3d 297, 300 (2002); Keller v.Walker, 319 Ill. App. 3d 67, 70 (2001).

Under the first and fourteenth amendments, state courts must not decide matters ofreligious doctrine. Amato v. Greenquist, 287 Ill. App. 3d 921, 926 (1997). But a court mayresolve a dispute that arises within a church if the dispute does not require determination of anydoctrinal issue. Bivin v. Wright, 275 Ill. App. 3d 899, 903 (1995). Civil courts may apply neutrallegal principles " to interpret provisions of religious documents involving *** nondoctrinalmatters, to the extent that the analysis can be done in purely secular terms." Abrams v.Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1011 (1999); seealso People ex rel. Muhammad v. Muhammad-Rahmah, 289 Ill. App. 3d 740, 744 (1997).

In Muhammad, a corporation organized to promote the Islamic faith operated a mosque. Some members of the corporation's board of directors voted to remove its president. Muhammad, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 742. The corporation's bylaws required notice to all directorsand a majority vote of the directors for removal of a president. Muhammad, 289 Ill. App. 3d at745. The board members who voted to remove the president characterized the removal as anissue of religious doctrine, and they relied on a written document entitled "'The Top IslamicAgreement Commitment for the Cause of Allah (SWT).'" Muhammad, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 743. According to the agreement, any member of the board could call for the termination of the serviceof a president if the president had violated church rules. The board members alleged that thepresident had violated such rules. Muhammad, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 743-44. The court found thatthe agreement set forth reasons for termination, but it did not conflict with the removal procedureestablished in the bylaws. Muhammad, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 745. The agreement did not give theboard members the power to terminate the service of the president without following theestablished termination procedures.

The Muhammad decision persuades us to reject Lilydale's argument that the employeehandbook and the church covenant gave the joint boards the power to terminate Reverend Ervin'sservice as pastor without submitting the issue to a vote of church members. The employeehandbook establishes an alcohol-free policy and states that the church may dismiss any employeewho engages in church activities while under the influence of alcohol. As the trial court observed,the handbook does not specify procedures for termination. The covenant declares broadprinciples fundamental to the church, but it does not offer a remedy for a pastor's violation ofchurch rules. The trial court correctly found that neither the handbook nor the covenantcontradicts the bylaws. Like the bylaws in Muhammad, Lilydale's bylaws establish the procedurefor removal of the pastor. Although the handbook specifies reasons for terminating a pastor'semployment, neither the handbook nor the covenant allows the joint boards to avoid the removalprocedure established in the bylaws.

Courts in other jurisdictions have held that civil courts can decide whether the properchurch authority terminated a pastor. E.g., Tibbs v. Kendrick, 93 Ohio App. 3d 35, 42, 637N.E.2d 397, 402 (1994); Williams v. Wilson, 349 S.C. 336, 563 S.E.2d 320 (2002). These casesoften involve a question of whether the proper authority, in a congregational polity, made thedecision at issue. The United States Supreme Court has defined a congregational polity as achurch that is "governed solely within itself, either by a majority of its members or by such otherlocal organism." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 724, 20 L. Ed. 666, 675 (1872). Theparties admit that Lilydale is a congregational polity.

The Michigan Court of Appeals dealt with a factually similar case when it decided Vincentv. Raglin, 114 Mich. App. 242, 318 N.W.2d 629 (1981). In Vincent, the plaintiff served as thepastor of a Baptist church for nearly two decades. After issues arose between the pastor and theboard of trustees, the trustees passed a resolution to terminate the pastor's service. Vincent, 114Mich. App. at 244, 318 N.W.2d at 630. The pastor continued to conduct services at his churchafter the board notified him of his purported termination. Vincent, 114 Mich. App. at 244, 318N.W.2d at 630. The trustees hired security guards who forcibly removed the pastor from thechurch. Vincent, 114 Mich. App. at 245, 318 N.W.2d at 630. The pastor sued for an injunctionto prevent the trustees from further interfering with his relationship to the church. Vincent, 114Mich. App. at 245, 318 N.W.2d at 630. The trial court held that "'the doctrine of separation ofchurch and state proscribed judicial review of plaintiff's claims." Vincent, 114 Mich. App. at 246,318 N.W.2d at 631.

On appeal, the court stated that it had jurisdiction to determine if the proper churchauthority made the termination decision. Vincent, 114 Mich. App. at 246-47, 318 N.W.2d at 631. The court consulted the church's governing manual to determine whether the trustees' dismissalwas the "action of the church." Vincent, 114 Mich. App. at 248, 318 N.W.2d at 632. The courtfound that the trustees' dismissal violated the manual because the manual made dismissal of thepastor "the exclusive prerogative of the church membership." Vincent, 114 Mich. App. at 248,318 N.W.2d at 632. Because the board's action violated the church's governing law, the courtheld that the board's action had no legal effect. Vincent, 114 Mich. App. at 248, 318 N.W.2d at632.

Other jurisdictions have made similar findings of law. In Williams, the court held that in acongregational church, the congregation is the highest authority. The court found that theTrustees had no authority to dismiss the preacher because the church's bylaws "clearly reserve tothe congregation the right to dismiss the preacher." Williams, 349 S.C. at 343, 563 S.E.2d at323. Similarly, in Tibbs, the court held that in a congregational church, " a civil court retainsjurisdiction to determine whether the decision concerning 'who shall preach from the pulpit' wasmade by the proper church authority." Tibbs, 93 Ohio App. 3d at 42, 637 N.E.2d at 402. Seealso Gillespie v. Elkins Southern Baptist Church, 177 W. Va. 88, 92, 350 S.E.2d 715, 719 (1986)(in a congregational church, the membership ultimately controls the business of the church and,therefore, has the power to hire and fire the pastor); Hemphill v. Zion Hope Primitive BaptistChurch of Pensacola, Inc., 447 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. App. 1984) (civil courts can determinewhether a minister's discharge accorded with the corporate charter without addressing ecclesiasticmatters).

The church cites several cases that hold that courts must not interfere with ecclesiasticaldecisions, like those regarding the employment of clergy. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151, 162, 96 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (1976); Gabriel v.Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 266 Ill. App. 3d 456, 640 N.E.2d 681 (1994). TheCourt in Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 162, 96 S. Ct. at 2380, held:

"[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall notdisturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church ofhierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in theirapplication to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them."

Again, as the Supreme Court held in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the RussianOrthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 97 L. Ed. 120, 136-37, 73 S. Ct. 143,154-55 (1952), "Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven,we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exerciseof religion against state interference." (Emphasis added.) Thus, any church, whether hierarchicalor congregational, has the autonomy to select the clergy as long as the method of selectioncomports with the church's governing law.

But the first and fourteenth amendments do not prohibit court intervention when thechurch fails to follow the procedures it has, itself, enacted. Abrams, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 1011. Inthis case the church has conceded that its joint boards did not follow procedures set out in itsbylaws for terminating the services of its pastor. The court does not need to interpret religiouslaw to decide the dispute. We decide only that the congregation did not authorize its boards toterminate its pastor's service without following the bylaw procedures for terminating a pastor. The court can decide the issue by applying neutral legal principles to interpret the church's bylaws,handbook and covenant.

The evidence presented at trial, concerning Reverend Ervin's alleged violation of churchrules, does not belong in a civil court. If the joint boards seek to remove Reverend Ervin for thealleged misconduct, they may need to present such evidence to the highest authority within thechurch, and the sole authority with the power to terminate the pastor's service: the churchmembers. We hold here only that the boards have not effectively terminated Reverend Ervin'sservice as pastor, because the church members have not voted, in accord with the bylaws, for thattermination.

The trial court did not need to inquire into religious doctrine and religious law to decidewhether the joint boards violated the bylaws when they purported to terminate Reverend Ervin'sservice as pastor. The first and fourteenth amendments do not forbid judicial determination ofwhether the proper church authority made the decision to remove the pastor. We find that thejoint boards' decision was not an action of the church because it did not comply with the church'sbylaws. We reverse the trial court's order dismissing the complaint and remand for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

GORDON and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.