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SECOND DIVISION
December 30, 2003

PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

The law is clear: "shall" means shall, except when it doesn't.

In this case we must decide what the legislature meant when it used"shall" in a 1999 amendment to the Riverboat Gambling Act (Act) (230 ILCS 10/1et seq. (West 2000)). The answer to that question determines whether theamendment tells the Illinois Gaming Board (Board) it must grant EmeraldCasino, Incorporated's (Emerald) application to renew its license and relocateits gambling business to Rosemont.⁽¹⁾

FACTS

Illinois' Riverboat Gambling Act authorizes the Board to issue tenlicenses for riverboat gambling, the first four of them for gambling on theMississippi River. 230 ILCS 10/7(e) (West 2002). In 1992, the Board issuedone of the Mississippi River licenses to HP, Incorporated, now known asEmerald Casino. The license was renewed for one year in 1995 and again in1996.

In April 1997, Emerald applied for a license renewal; however, insteadof remaining on the Mississippi, Emerald wanted to relocate to Rosemont. TheBoard refused Emerald's application two months later. Emerald pursued anadministrative appeal. While the administrative appeal was pending in July1997, Emerald stopped operating its casino.

The administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an order agreeing with theBoard's denial. The ALJ denied both of Emerald's motions for reconsideration. Before Emerald's administrative appeal went back to the Board, thelegislature added section 11.2 to the Act, effective June 25, 1999. 230 ILCS10/11.2(a) (West 2002). In part, the section reads as follows:

"(a) A licensee that was not conducting riverboatgambling on January 1, 1998, may apply to the Board forrenewal and approval of relocation to a new home docklocation authorized under section 3(c) and the Boardshall grant the application and approval upon receipt bythe licensee of approval from the new municipality orcounty, as the case may be, in which the licensee wishesto relocate pursuant to section 7(j)." 230 ILCS10/11.2(a) (West 2002).

Only Emerald fit that description, then and now.

Once section 11.2(a) passed, the Board declared the ALJ's previous ordermoot and allowed Emerald to file a new application for renewal and relocationunder the new section. On July 7, 1999, the Board of Trustees of Rosemontapproved Emerald's request to dock in Rosemont. Emerald submitted its revisedapplication to the Board on September 24, 1999.

On January 30, 2001, the Board announced its intent to deny Emerald'srequest for renewal and relocation. On March 6, 2001, the Board issued itswritten notice of denial in addition to a five-count disciplinary complaintseeking to revoke Emerald's existing license. Emerald requested a hearing onthe denial of its application and answered the Board's disciplinary complaint. The record provides no specific reason why the revocation proceedings lingerwithout resolution.

On May 21, 2001, Emerald filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of CookCounty seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus ordering the Board toapprove Emerald's application for renewal and relocation. Subsequently, theparties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, disputing whether the Boardhad the authority to deny Emerald's application even though Emerald met thetwo criteria set forth in section 11.2(a) of the Act.

Before the trial court ruled on the summary judgment motions, theVillage of Rosemont (Rosemont) filed an emergency motion to intervene and joinEmerald's motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summaryjudgment in favor of the Board and denied Emerald's motion for summaryjudgment. The court did not address Rosemont's motion to intervene.

Rosemont filed a renewed motion to intervene. Rosemont also filed amotion requesting the court to vacate the previous summary judgment order andgrant summary judgment in favor of Emerald based on the legislative history ofsection 11.2(a). The trial court granted Rosemont's request to intervene, butdenied the motion to vacate its previous order.

Emerald and Rosemont now appeal the orders granting the Board summaryjudgment. We reverse and remand.

DECISION

I. Standard of review

Generally, a trial court's decision to deny declaratory relief or a writof mandamus will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifestweight of evidence. Villareal v. Village of Schaumburg, 325 Ill. App. 3d1157, 1160, 759 N.E.2d 76 (2001); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Leverton,314 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1083, 732 N.E.2d 1094 (2000). However, this appealarises from a grant of summary judgment. "In all cases involving summaryjudgment, we review the evidence in the record de novo." West AmericanInsurance Co. v. J.R. Construction Co., 334 Ill. App. 3d 75, 80, 777 N.E.2d610 (2002) (applying de novo standard when reviewing summary judgment thatdenied declaratory relief); see also Villareal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1160(conducting de novo review of summary judgment denying writ of mandamus).

II. Procedural issues

There are three procedural issues that must be addressed. They aredirected to whether this court should entertain this appeal.

The first issue was raised by this court during oral argument. We askedwhether there has been a sufficient determination by the Board to warrantjudicial consideration. That is, since there was no final Board action, isthere a controversy "ripe for adjudication"? See Bio-Medical Laboratories,Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill. 2d 540, 545-46, 370 N.E.2d 223 (1977).

The Board contends we have no jurisdiction to proceed, relying entirelyon National Marine, Inc. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 159 Ill.2d 381, 639 N.E.2d 571 (1994). The issue in National Marine was whether thecircuit court properly dismissed National Marine's complaint challenging theIllinois Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) issuance of a section 4(q)(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 111