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                                                                                           SIXTH DIVISION
                                                                                           July 28, 2000

No. 1-98-1095

In November 1994, plaintiff Carolyn Eissman was involved in atraffic accident with a Pace Suburban bus (Pace). In February1995, she filed suit against Pace in the municipal department ofthe Cook County circuit court and the case was assigned formandatory arbitration pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 86. 155 Ill.2d R. 86. On July 11, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion to transferthe case to the law division, stating that she recently underwentsurgery and that her damages now exceeded the monetary limitauthorized for mandatory arbitration in Cook County. While thetrial court ordered on July 18, 1996, that the case be transferred,no one notified the arbitration center of the trial court'stransfer order. Arbitration proceeded and, on August 5, 1996, thearbitrators entered an award in Pace's favor. Plaintiff neverrejected the arbitrator's award and on September 16, 1996, thetrial court entered a judgment on the award. Plaintiff proceededwith her case in the law division, allegedly unaware of thearbitrator's award. After learning of the award, plaintiff fileda series of motions, including a petition to vacate the September16, 1996, judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of CivilProcedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1998)). In February1998, the trial court denied plaintiff's petition. Plaintiffappeals, arguing that (1) the arbitrators had no authority to enteran award; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion bydenying her section 2-1401 petition. We vacate the September 16,1996, judgment on the arbitrators' award and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

In May 1996, plaintiff's case was scheduled for mandatoryarbitration on August 2, 1996. On July 11, 1996, plaintiff allegedthat her medical bills escalated to $22,000 and filed a motion totransfer her case to the law division. The supplemental recordcontains an unsigned and unnotarized affidavit bearing the nameElizabeth Markus. the affidavit's date was left blank, bearing thelanguage "[s]ubscribed and [s]worn to [b]efore [m]e [t]his ___[d]ay of October, 1996." This improper affidavit avers that Markusappeared in court on defendant's behalf on July 18, 1996, inresponse to plaintiff's motion. According to the affidavit,plaintiff failed to appear and the trial court struck the motion. The supplemental record contains a second affidavit from Markus,this one properly signed. In it, Markus avers that she signed theprevious affidavit and that its contents were accurate. However,this second affidavit does not properly identify and incorporatethe first affidavit. In any event, the record indicates that Pacehad knowledge of the motion and contains an order prepared byplaintiff's counsel and signed by Judge Victoria A. Stewart on July18, 1996, transferring the case to the law division.

While Judge Stewart entered an order transferring plaintiff'scase to the law division, no one presented the order to thearbitration center or otherwise informed the arbitrators that thecase had been transferred. Pace states in its brief and throughcounsel's affidavit that it was also unaware that Judge Stewarttransferred the case. On August 2, 1996, Pace appeared for thescheduled arbitration while plaintiff did not. The arbitratorsfound in Pace's favor specifically due to plaintiff's failure toappear. On August 5, 1996, the circuit court clerk mailed noticeof the arbitration award to plaintiff's counsel. However,plaintiff failed to reject the award.

On September 16, 1996, Judge Sidney A. Jones III presided overthe judgment on award call and entered a judgment on thearbitrators' award in Pace's favor. Also on September 16, 1996,Judge Jones entered an order prepared by plaintiff's counselstating that the order transferring the case to the law divisionwould stand. Pace's counsel, Robert H. Lang, averred in a properlyexecuted affidavit that plaintiff was neither present nor notified,either personally or through counsel, of this order. Lang furtheraverred that he appeared at a status call in the law division onSeptember 18, 1996, and that plaintiff failed to appear. Accordingto Lang's affidavit, he informed the court that the matter had beenreduced to judgment in the municipal division. Judge Randy A.Kogan entered an order dismissing plaintiff's case in the lawdivision for want of prosecution. Pace states in its brief(without support in an affidavit) that it learned of the case'sexistence in the law division and of the status call through theChicago Daily Law Bulletin.

On October 1, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate theSeptember 18, 1996, dismissal for want of prosecution order. However, on October 15, 1996, this motion was stricken from thecall. On October 18, 1996, plaintiff filed an emergency notice ofmotion via facsimile seeking to vacate the September 18, 1996,dismissal-for-want-of-prosecution order. No indication exists inthe record that the trial court ruled on this motion.

According to Lang's affidavit, on February 13, 1997, heverified that the September 16, 1996, judgment on the arbitrators'award had not been vacated. On that basis, he closed his files andpurged all of the pleadings related to the case.

On July 15, 1997, plaintiff filed another motion to vacate theSeptember 18, 1996, dismissal-for-want-of-prosecution order. OnJuly 22, 1997, Judge Donald J. O'Brien granted plaintiff's motion,reinstated her claim, and set the matter for trial on November 20,1997. According to Pace's brief, it never received notice of theJuly 15, 1997, motion to vacate and was neither present nor awarethat Judge O'Brien granted it.

On November 6, 1997, plaintiff served Pace with notice that itintended to depose Dr. Ronald L. Silver. According to defendants'brief, this was the first document that it received from plaintiffin nearly 14 months. Pace, therefore, filed an emergency motion tostrike the November 20, 1997, trial, arguing that the case hadalready been reduced to judgment on September 18, 1996, and as faras it knew, that judgment had never been vacated.

On November 17, 1997, Judge Jones ordered that the August 2,1996, arbitration was lawful and that the September 16, 1996,judgment was proper. However, Judge Jones did not enter an orderspecifically pertaining to the November 20, 1997, trial date. Pacestates in its brief, unsupported by an affidavit, that it appearedfor the November 20, 1997, call. However, according to Pace, thecase did not appear on the call and Pace learned from the clerkthat the matter was not scheduled for trial on that date. Therecord indicates that, the same day, Judge Earl E. Strayhornassigned the case to Judge Jones for a December 17, 1997, statuscall.

Also on November 17, 1997, plaintiff filed her petition tovacate the September 16, 1996, judgment on award of arbitration,pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code. On February 13, 1998,following oral argument, Judge Jones specifically stated thatplaintiff had a duty to notify the arbitration center but failed todo so. Judge Jones further stated that, "[w]here there are con-flicting orders, the first order drawn is the one that getsentered. In this case, that would have been the judgment on awardorder. The intended disposition, that's the one entered." Finally, Judge Jones noted that plaintiff failed to attend statuscalls for her case, found that the transfer to the law division wasprocedurally deficient, and denied plaintiff's section 2-1401petition. On March 19, 2000, plaintiff filed the instant appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff first argues that the arbitrators lacked authorityto enter an award because the case was no longer before them. Weagree.

Plaintiff filed a motion before the circuit court seeking totransfer her case out of mandatory arbitration because her damagesexceed the monetary limit for mandatory arbitration. Plaintiffclearly had the right to make such a request. As the committeecomments to Supreme Court Rule 86(d) provide, "[a] claimant whobelieves he [or she] has a reasonable basis for having the matterremoved from an arbitration track may move the court for suchrelief prior to hearing." 155 Ill. 2d R. 86(d), Committee Com-ments.

Plaintiff argues that, once the court granted her motion totransfer, the arbitrators lost their authority to issue an award. We agree. Supreme Court Rule 90(a) (166 Ill. 2d R. 90(a))"expressly grants to the arbitration panel the power to decide thelaw and the facts of the case." Kolar v. Arlington Toyota, Inc.,286 Ill. App. 3d 43, 47, 675 N.E.2d 963, 966 (1996). Implicit inthat grant of power is the requirement that the case be before thearbitrators. Indeed, a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence isthat a tribunal's authority is generally limited to the cases orcontroversies before it. See Majewski v. Von Bergan, 266 Ill. App.3d 140, 143, 638 N.E.2d 1189, 1191-92 (1994) (finding that circuitcourt should have declined jurisdiction and deeming the circuitcourt's order void because the case had been transferred and waspending in another court).

While the term "jurisdiction" may not be strictly applicableto the arbitrators, the term may be used to refer to theirauthority to act, and the terms "jurisdiction" and "authority" havebeen used interchangeably in certain contexts. Gilchrist v. HumanRights Comm'n, 312 Ill. App. 3d 597, 601 (2000), citing Business &Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois CommerceComm'n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243-44, 555 N.E.2d 693, 716-17 (1989);Robinson v. Human Rights Comm'n, 201 Ill. App. 3d 722, 726, 559N.E.2d 229, 231 (1990). Some Illinois decisions have indeedreferred to arbitrators' authority as "jurisdiction." See, e.g.,Bankers Leasing Ass'n, Inc. v. Pranno, 288 Ill. App. 3d 255, 264,681 N.E.2d 28, 34 (1997) (finding that circuit court erred byordering remand to arbitrator, "since the arbitrator no longer hadjurisdiction to resolve the dispute"). In any event, decisions bya tribunal lacking jurisdiction of the parties or of the subjectmatter, or by a tribunal lacking the inherent power to enter theparticular order involved, are void ab initio. See R.W. Sawant &Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 304, 309, 489 N.E.2d1360, 1363 (1986); Gilchrist, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 601. While thetribunal at issue in Gilchrist was the Human Rights Commission, thesame reasoning applies to the mandatory arbitration panel here.

While the arbitrators' award was not an actual judgement (see155 Ill. 2d Rs. 92(b), (c)), the judgment entered by the circuitcourt relied upon the underlying award (hence the term "judgment onaward"). We conclude that, if the underlying award is void, thejudgment on it must also be void. A void judgment can be attackedat any time and need not comply with the requirements of section 2-1401 of the Code. In re Marriage of Stefiniw, 253 Ill. App. 3d196, 202, 625 N.E.2d 358, 363 (1993); Borcherding v. AndersonRemodeling Co., 253 Ill. App. 3d 655, 660, 624 N.E.2d 887, 892(1993).

In a related argument, Pace argues that plaintiff failed tonotify the arbitration administration that the case had beentransferred, thereby precluding her from denying its authority toenter an award. Plaintiff disagrees. She argues that "[c]learly,someone should have notified the arbitration administration thatthe case was no longer subject to arbitration. But Circuit CourtRule 18.10 does not clearly assigning [sic] that duty." (Emphasisin original.) Pace characterizes plaintiff's argument as a"shameless" deviation from common sense.

Cook County Circuit Court Rule 18.10 governs orders relatingto mandatory arbitration proceedings and states:

"All orders of Court which affect a scheduledarbitration hearing shall be presented to thearbitration administration immediately fol-lowing entry of the order by the [c]ourt. Presentation should be made in person unlessother arrangements have been made with thearbitration administration." Cook Co. Cir.Ct. R. 18.10 (eff. April 1, 1994).

As plaintiff notes, Rule 18.10 does not specifically assign aduty to notify the arbitration administration of a transfer. Nevertheless, we conclude that a party seeking to transfer a casefrom arbitration is required to notify the arbitration administra-tion. The law places such a burden on moving parties in othercontexts. See, e.g., Majewski, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 144, 638 N.E.2dat 1192 (1994) (stating that the party filing a motion has theresponsibility to request the trial judge to rule on it); People v.Dylak, 258 Ill. App. 3d 141, 143, 630 N.E.2d 164, 165 (1994)(noting that Supreme Court Rule 271 (134 Ill. 2d R. 271) generallyrequires the prevailing party seeking to have an order or judgmententered must prepare and present the order to the court). At thevery least, a prudent and diligent attorney would have providedsuch notice and avoided, rather than exacerbated, the situation inwhich plaintiff finds herself. However, while the lack ofdiligence demonstrated by plaintiff's attorney may raise ethicalconsiderations, it is insufficient to make a void judgment valid.

The crux of Pace's argument is, because plaintiff did notsatisfy her responsibility to notify the arbitrators, thearbitrators retained authority to enter an award. However, Pacehas failed to cite any authority for the proposition that notice tothe arbitration administration is necessary to divest thearbitrators' authority. To the contrary, the arbitrators losttheir authority to hear plaintiff's case when the circuit courtjudge entered the transfer order. See Illinois State Toll HighwayAuthority v. Marathon Oil Co., 200 Ill. App. 3d 836, 840, 559N.E.2d 497, 499-500 (1990) (recognizing that judgments or ordersgenerally become effective when they are entered).

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the September 16, 1996,judgment on the arbitrators' award and remand for trial in the lawdivision.

Vacate and remand.

Zwick, P.J., and Campbell, J., concur.