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SIXTH DIVISION
December 14, 2001

JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Ruby Davis, filed a negligence complaint againstdefendant, Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), and its agent, RouhyClay, seeking damages for injuries she sustained while a passengeron a CTA bus. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor ofthe CTA pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 1998)) finding plaintiff had failedto comply with the notice requirements of section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (the Act) (70 ILCS 3605/41 (West1998)). On appeal, plaintiff argues that CTA was not entitled tosummary judgment because plaintiff substantially complied with thestatutory requirements and CTA was able to and did investigate thefacts of the occurrence immediately after it happened. For thereasons that follow, we affirm.

On May 20, 1994, plaintiff was a passenger on a bus that wasowned and operated by the CTA and was being driven by defendantRouhy Clay, a CTA employee. While traveling westbound on 103^rd Street, the driver applied the brakes suddenly. Plaintiff wasthrown sideways, towards the bus driver, and her head and shoulderstruck either a pole, a seat, or another passenger.

The bus driver pulled over and told the passengers to sitstill if they were hurt and that he was going to call the CTA. Hethen passed out CTA courtesy cards to those who were hurt and toldthose who were not that another bus would be coming.

Plaintiff filled out a courtesy card and returned it to thedriver. The completed courtesy card provided the following information: plaintiff's name, address, telephone number, employer'sname, and employer's telephone number. Plaintiff also wrote thefollowing remarks on the card: "Truck pull around in front of bus. I hit my head and neck against another passenger and I can feel apull in my left shoulder." The driver also received courtesy cardsfrom four other passengers.

The CTA police arrived at the scene and shortly thereafter anambulance arrived and took plaintiff to the emergency room atLittle Company of Mary Hospital. Plaintiff was X-rayed and givenmedication for the pain in her head. The emergency room physician,Dr. Joseph, told plaintiff to see her own doctor for follow-uptreatment.

On November 18, 1994, plaintiff submitted her notice of claimfor personal injuries to CTA's secretary of the board and itsgeneral attorney. In this notice, plaintiff stated the following:(1) that the accident occurred on May 20, 1994 at about noontime;(2) that it occurred at 103rd and Ashland; and (3) that the nameof her attending physician is Dr. Zanelli of the city industrialclinic.

On May 18, 1995, plaintiff filed suit against the CTA and thebus driver, Rouhy Clay. In her complaint, plaintiff identified thelocation of the occurrence as "103rd Street, at or near its inter-section with Ashland Avenue." On September 15, 1997, plaintiffvoluntarily dismissed her complaint and refiled on August 7, 1998. In her refiled complaint, plaintiff identified the location of theoccurrence as "on 103rd Street, at or near the intersections ofVincennes Avenue, Ashland Avenue and 103rd Street, in Chicago,Illinois."

On February 22, 2000, CTA moved for summary judgment based onplaintiff's failure to comply with the provisions of section 41 ofthe Act (70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998)). The motion identified threedeficiencies with plaintiff's notice.

First, the motion observed that by identifying "103rd andAshland," a nonexistent location, the notice sets forth the wronglocation. Attached to the motion was a Chicago police departmentmap of the area and an affidavit from William Platt, the generalmanager of the 103rd Street garage. Platt's affidavit averred that"Ashland Avenue does not intersect with 103rd Street." The mapsupports this statement. The map shows that 103rd Street intersecs with Vincennes, but not with Ashland Avenue. Ashland Avenueterminates at about 96th Street. A diagonal street called SouthBeverly Avenue originates at that point.

Second, the motion observed that the notice sets forth thewrong time of the occurrence. The notice stated that the incidenttook place at "about noontime." In contrast, the complaint identified the time of the incident as "approximately 8:00 a.m." Like-wise, in her deposition, plaintiff stated that the incidentoccurred at "about 7:55 a.m."

Finally, the motion observed that the notice fails to list thename and address of an attending physician. At her deposition,plaintiff stated that she had received medical treatment rightafter the incident at Little Company of Mary Hospital. She indicated that she had been attended there in the emergency room by aDr. Joseph. She was unsure whether Joseph was the doctor's firstor last name. The notice contains no reference to Little Companyof Mary Hospital or to any physician at that hospital. Instead,the notice identified plaintiff's attending physician as Dr.Zanelli at the city industrial clinic. In her deposition, plain-tiff identified her treatment as a type of massage, administered bya therapist, to improve blood circulation. Plaintiff began seeingDr. Zanelli in June 1994 and stopped when the doctor told her shecould not figure out why plaintiff was experiencing pain.

In her response to CTA's motion for summary judgment,plaintiff did not argue that her notice complied with section 41. Rather she argued that Dr. Zanelli was properly identified asplaintiff's treating physician and that the CTA is estopped fromseeking dismissal by virtue of their "extensive" involvement in thelitigation. Plaintiff conceded that the notice she filed identified the wrong time and a nonexistent address.

Following briefing, the trial court granted summary judgmentin favor of the CTA. On May 15, 2000, the court entered an orderdismissing the cause of action based on plaintiff's failure to meetthe requirements of section 41. Plaintiff now appeals.

Our review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is denovo. Dunlap v. Alcuin Montessori School, 298 Ill. App. 3d 329, 338(1998). A summary judgment motion should be granted when " 'thepleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with theaffidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to anymaterial fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgmentas a matter of law.' " Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240(1986), quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c) (now735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 1998)). Summary judgment is a properremedy where a claimant files a defective section 41 notice. Yokley v. Chicago Transit Authority, 307 Ill. App. 3d 132, 135-36(1999).

Plaintiff argues that summary judgment was improperly grantedin favor of the CTA because the CTA timely investigated theoccurrence based on plaintiff's immediate notice of the injury viathe courtesy card, the reports of other passengers and occurrencewitnesses, and plaintiff's timely filed statutory notice.

At the time of plaintiff's accident, section 41 of the Actprovided as follows:

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