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FIRST DIVISION
August 30, 2004

Plaintiff, Franklin Cross, was discharged from his position as a probationary laborer in theChicago Department of Water. He subsequently brought this action alleging that his dischargehad been in retaliation for exercising his rights pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (820ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2002)). After discovery, defendant, the City of Chicago (the city), filedits first motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff had adduced no evidence establishinga causal connection between the exercise of his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act andhis termination. The circuit court granted the city's motion. We reversed and remanded, holdingthat a question of fact existed on that issue.⁽¹⁾

On remand, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The city argued thatunder the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS10/1-101 et seq. (West 2002)) (hereinafter Tort Immunity Act), it is immune from liability fordiscretionary policy choices regarding whether to terminate its probationary personnel. Plaintiffargued that the evidence established each element of retaliatory discharge as a matter of law. Thecircuit court granted the city's motion and denied plaintiff's cross-motion. Plaintiff now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

The underlying facts of this case were set out in detail in our order deciding the previousappeal in this matter. Cross v. City of Chicago, No. 1-96-1857 (September 10, 1997)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (hereinafter Cross I). As a result, we will onlybriefly summarize them here.

The record shows that on August 10, 1992, plaintiff was hired as a probationary careerservice laborer in the Chicago Department of Water (water department). As a probationaryemployee, plaintiff was required to successfully complete a six-month probationary period. ByOctober of 1992, plaintiff's immediate supervisors and his district foreman, Robert Green, hadfiled reports documenting what they regarded as plaintiff's poor work performance, bad attitude,sexually harassing conduct, and insubordination. In those reports, plaintiff was described as aworker whose behavior was disruptive, who lacked motivation, and whose work was sub-standard. On October 30, 1992, Green forwarded the reports and his own memorandum to firstdeputy commissioner Donald Tomczak. On November 2, 1992, deputy commissioner Tomczakforwarded the reports to water department commissioner John Bolden, who had the ultimateauthority to terminate the employment of probationary career service employees of the waterdepartment. With the reports, deputy commissioner Tomczak included his own recommendationthat plaintiff be terminated immediately. On November 4, 1992, Commissioner Bolden respondedwith a memorandum ordering that plaintiff be suspended without pay for 29 days and that he bestrongly reprimanded.

Meanwhile, plaintiff filed a report claiming that he sustained an on-the-job injury onOctober 26, 1992, while he was excavating. Plaintiff had not reported the injury to his supervisoruntil October 28, 1992. In the injury report, plaintiff's supervisor indicated that he was notsatisfied that the injury had occurred in the course of plaintiff's employment. Beginning October28, 1992, plaintiff was examined and treated at MercyWorks Occupational Medicine Center. Hewas placed on duty disability on November 4, 1992.

On November 5, 1992, the day after Commissioner Bolden ordered plaintiff's suspension,Bolden received a copy of plaintiff's October 28, 1992, injury report. Based on the supervisor'sindication that the injury was not work-related, Commissioner Bolden suggested furtherinvestigation of plaintiff's claimed injury.

On November 20, 1992, the Chicago city council's committee on finance (the Committee),which administers workers' compensation in Chicago through its bureau of workmen'scompensation,⁽²⁾ denied plaintiff's claim for temporary total disability benefits because it believedthat the medical condition for which plaintiff was requesting benefits was not causally connectedto the alleged on-the-job injury. The Committee made this determination based, in part, onmedical reports. The treating physician's report from MercyWorks indicated that plaintiff'sreported symptoms were not consistent with the physician's own findings. The report also notedthat plaintiff appeared to be magnifying his symptoms. In addition, plaintiff failed to appear for atleast three of his scheduled appointments in a two-week period. The Committee also relied on astatement of plaintiff's coworker, Ed Formas, who worked with plaintiff on the date of the allegedinjury. Formas stated that plaintiff had flagged traffic on the day of the alleged injury, plaintiffhad not engaged in any excavation, and plaintiff had not engaged in any other activity that couldhave caused his injury.

Commissioner Bolden stated in his affidavit and his deposition testimony that, after beinginformed of the decision of the Committee and of the bases of that decision, he questioned theveracity of plaintiff's injury report. Bolden's determination that plaintiff had apparently falsifiedthe injury report led him to reconsider his earlier decision to suspend plaintiff rather thanterminate his employment with the city. On November 20, 1992, Bolden decided that plaintiffshould be terminated. He stated that his decision was based on the reports of plaintiff's poorwork performance, the allegations of sexual harassment, the indications that plaintiff had falsifiedthe injury report, and the additional factor that all of those events had occurred within the firstthree months of plaintiff's probationary period. On November 30, 1992, Bolden notified theDepartment of Personnel that he intended to terminate plaintiff effective December 15, 1992, andon December 2, 1992, he signed a letter informing plaintiff of the decision to terminate hisemployment as a probationary employee with the Department of Water.

During the period between plaintiff's alleged injury and the termination of his employment,plaintiff filed an "Application of Adjustment of Claim" (workers' compensation claim) with theIllinois Industrial Commission (IIC). He apparently did not inform anyone at the city that he haddone so, and it is unclear when the city received notice of that filing. The city claims that none ofthe people involved in the decisions that led to plaintiff's discharge were aware, at the time thedecisions were made, that plaintiff intended to file or had already filed a claim with the IIC. In hisaffidavit, Commissioner Bolden stated that at the time of the termination decision, he had noknowledge or information that plaintiff intended to file or had filed a workers' compensationclaim. Foreman Green stated in his affidavit that when he submitted the reports and hismemorandum regarding plaintiff's on-the-job conduct, he had no knowledge or information thatplaintiff intended to file or had filed a workers' compensation claim. The city subsequently settledplaintiff's worker's compensation claim with a lump-sum payment.

On or about September 3, 1993, plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Plaintiff alleged that he wasdischarged in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. Afterdiscovery, the city filed its first motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff had comeforward with no evidence that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensationclaim. The circuit court granted the city's motion. In Cross I, we reversed the judgment of thecircuit court and held that a retaliatory motive could be inferred from the timing of plaintiff'stermination and that the city's settlement of plaintiff's workers' compensation claim was at leastsome evidence that he was not terminated for filing a fraudulent claim, but in retaliation forexercising his rights. Cross I, slip op. at 9-10. The matter was remanded for the resolution ofthat question of fact. Cross I, slip op. at 10.

On remand, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the city filed asecond motion for summary judgment. The city argued that it is immune from liability for thecommissioner's discretionary policy choices regarding whether to terminate probationarypersonnel. The circuit court initially denied the city's motion. After the city moved to reconsider,the court granted summary judgment for the city. Plaintiff now appeals.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavitson file reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party isentitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002); Khalil v.City of Chicago, 283 Ill. App. 3d 161, 162, 669 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (1996). The grant ofsummary judgment is reviewed de novo (see Delaney v. McDonald's Corp., 158 Ill. 2d 465, 467,634 N.E.2d 749, 750 (1994)), and the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable tothe nonmoving party (see In re Estate of Roeseler, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1013, 679 N.E.2d 393,400-01 (1997)).

Plaintiff contends on appeal that in light of Commissioner Bolden's admissions thatplaintiff's filing of the injury report was a cause of plaintiff's discharge, there exists no question offact that plaintiff was terminated for exercising his rights guaranteed under the Workers'Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2002)) and, therefore, his discharge violated aclear mandate of public policy. The city, on the other hand, contends that plaintiff's claim wasbarred by sections 2-201 and 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-201, 2-109 (West2002)), which provide immunity to governmental entities for discretionary policy decisions.

Section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act provides:

"Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in aposition involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is notliable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy whenacting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused." 745 ILCS 10/2-201(West 2002).

Section 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act extends this protection to local governments byproviding that a local public entity is not liable for an "injury resulting from an act or omission ofits employee where the employee is not liable." 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 2002). Our supremecourt held that "this broad discretionary immunity applies to the [local public] entitiesthemselves." Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475, 484,763 N.E.2d 756, 762-63 (2002). The city thus argues that, by its plain language, the TortImmunity Act immunizes the city from liability resulting from Commissioner Bolden'sdiscretionary decision to discharge plaintiff.

Plaintiff disagrees with the city's position that the city is permitted, under the TortImmunity Act, to violate public policy and engage in conduct otherwise prohibited by theWorkers' Compensation Act. To the contrary, plaintiff argues that an action for retaliatorydischarge may be maintained against a governmental body. Plaintiff specifically relies on thestatutory protection against retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim, undersection 4(h) of the Workers' Compensation Act. The relevant portion of section 4(h) of theWorkers' Compensation Act provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any employer *** to discharge or to threaten todischarge, or to refuse to rehire or recall *** an employee because of the exerciseof his or her rights or remedies granted to him or her by this Act." 820 ILCS305/4(h) (West 2002).

Plaintiff argues that the Tort Immunity Act and the Workers' Compensation Act do not conflictand, when read together, clearly subject governmental bodies to liability for retaliatory discharge. Plaintiff maintains that the legislature, in passing the Tort Immunity Act, did not intend to insulategovernmental entities from the mandates of the Workers' Compensation Act, as evidenced by theexpress language of the Tort Immunity Act, which states in pertinent part:

"Nothing in this Act affects the right to obtain relief other than damagesagainst a local public entity or public employee. Nothing in this Act affects theliability, if any, of a local public entity or public employee based on:

* * *

c). The 'Workers' Compensation Act', approved July 9, 1951, asheretofore or hereafter amended." (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/2-101 (West2002).

In the alternative, if the two statutes could be seen to be in conflict, plaintiff argues thatthis court must attempt to reconcile the words of the statutes to bring to fruition the intent of thelegislature, which was not to insulate governmental entities from liability for violating theWorkers' Compensation Act. Plaintiff emphasizes that section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act,principally relied on by the city, is a general statement of immunity and specifically recognizes thatother statutory provisions may avoid its terms, since it contains a qualifier "[e]xcept as otherwiseprovided by Statute." Plaintiff thus argues that we should recognize the specific protection of theWorkers' Compensation Act to prevail over the general grant of immunity under the TortImmunity Act. Plaintiff, in sum, urges that the Tort Immunity Act should be interpreted narrowly,so as to not insulate the city from liability for violating the Workers' Compensation Act, and thatthe contrary interpretation would render the protections created by the Workers' CompensationAct a mere illusory promise to governmental workers.

Plaintiff overlooks the important policy considerations embodied in the Tort ImmunityAct. The Tort Immunity Act serves to protect local public entities and public employees fromliability arising from the operation of government. 745 ILCS 10/1-101.1(a) (West 2002);Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 479, 763 N.E.2d at 760. Since the operation of government necessarilyencompasses the policy decisions made by a municipality (West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11, 588N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (1992)), it follows that decisions by municipal employees about how to bestallocate resources and go about providing services, including the selection of employees who willprovide those services for the benefit of the public, should not be unduly controlled by the threatof a tort judgment. Indeed, our supreme court has cautioned against construction of the TortImmunity Act that would entail "second-guessing" these important judgment calls or wouldrequire the decision maker to be "more concerned with avoiding possible litigation than withusing his best judgment to properly balance the competing interests." West, 147 Ill. 2d at 12, 588N.E.2d at 1109.

Further, we disagree with plaintiff's couching his claim as one "based on" the Workers'Compensation Act. As the city points out, plaintiff's position has a fatal flaw. Plaintiffpresupposes that his claim is statutory in nature and, therefore, is not barred by the Tort ImmunityAct. Indeed, it would so appear from the language of section 4(h) of the Workers' CompensationAct. However, as our supreme court has stated, "nothing in section 4(h) expressly provides aremedy for an employee *** in the event that the terms of section 4(h) are violated." Zimmermanv. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 34-35, 645 N.E.2d 877, 880 (1994). Rather, as thecourt in Zimmerman explained, the remedy lies in a tort action, namely, the common law tort ofretaliatory discharge first recognized by our supreme court in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d172, 181, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978). See Zimmerman, 164 Ill. 2d at 33-34, 645 N.E.2d at879.

This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that our supreme court did not limit the rightof action for retaliatory discharge to the workers' compensation setting alone, but extended thatright to discharges based on other grounds as well, so long as those other grounds were protectedby "clearly mandated public policy." See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). There, the supreme court extended the tort of retaliatory dischargebeyond its workers' compensation origins to provide remedy to an employee fired for reportingcriminal activity of a coworker. The court explained:

"By recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge, Kelsay acknowledged thecommon law principle that parties to a contract may not incorporate in it rightsand obligations which are clearly injurious to the public. (See People ex rel.Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co. (1889), 130 Ill. 268, 294.) This principle isexpressed forcefully in cases which insist that an employer is in contempt fordischarging an employee who exercises the civic right and duty of serving on ajury. ( People v. Vitucci (1964), 49 Ill. App. 2d 171, 172; People v. Huggins(1930), 258 Ill. App. 238, 243; see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 155 -- 3(making it a contempt of court to fire or discipline an employee for attending courtwhen subpoenaed as a witness).) * * * When a discharge contravenes publicpolicy in any way the employer has committed a legal wrong. However, theemployer retains the right to fire workers at will in cases 'where no clear mandateof public policy is involved' ( Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co. (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d1022, 1026)." Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 129-130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.

Accord Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985) (formeremployee stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, where he was terminated in retaliationfor refusing to work in the handling of a live radioactive substance, while the operations wereconducted in violation of federal regulations promulgated by the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission).

Plaintiff urges that in the case of Boyles v. Greater Peoria Mass Transit District, 113 Ill.2d 545, 499 N.E.2d 435 (1986), our supreme court explicitly permitted a suit for retaliatorydischarge against a local public entity, notwithstanding the immunity provisions of section 2-201of the Tort Immunity Act. Plaintiff's reliance on Boyles is misplaced. In Boyles, a formeremployee of the mass transit district brought an action against the district and other defendants,alleging that she was discharged in retaliation for filing a claim under the Workers' CompensationAct, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Boyles, 113 Ill. 2d at 547, 499 N.E.2d at435. The plaintiff was a union member covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Boyles,113 Ill. 2d at 551, 499 N.E.2d at 437. The district moved to dismiss the two counts of thecomplaint pertaining to it, arguing that the tort of retaliatory discharge is available only to personsemployed at will, and not to employees, such as the plaintiff, who were protected by a collectivebargaining agreement. Boyles, 113 Ill. 2d at 548, 499 N.E.2d at 436. The trial court denied thedistrict's motion, but certified for interlocutory appeal the question as to whether an employeecovered by a collective bargaining agreement providing grievance and arbitration procedures forwrongful discharge could maintain a common law action for retaliatory discharge against theemployer. Boyles, 113 Ill. 2d at 548, 499 N.E.2d at 436.

While Boyles was pending on interlocutory appeal⁽³⁾ in the appellate court, our supremecourt announced its decision in Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d1280 (1984), answering the same question as that certified by the trial court in Boyles in theaffirmative, that a union employee may bring a cause of action for retaliatory discharge,independent of the employee's collective bargaining agreement. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 150, 473N.E.2d at 1283-84. The appellate court granted the district leave to file a supplemental briefsetting forth its position in view of Midgett. Boyles, 113 Ill. 2d at 548-49, 499 N.E.2d at 436. This time, the district argued that the rationale underlying Midgett was to allow both the unionand "at-will" employees to seek punitive damages. Boyles, 113 Ill. 2d at 549, 499 N.E.2d at 436. The district maintained that because it was not subject to punitive damages under section 2-102⁽⁴⁾of the Tort Immunity Act, no cause of action should lie. Boyles, 113 Ill. 2d at 549, 499 N.E.2d at436. In Midgett, our supreme court had emphasized the significance of allowing punitivedamages against the offending employer, explaining that in the absence of punitive damages, theemployee's remedy is incomplete and there is little to discourage the practice of retaliatorydischarge. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 149-50, 473 N.E.2d at 1283-84. The appellate court disagreedthat the district's position was supported by Midgett. Boyles, 113 Ill. 2d at 549, 499 N.E.2d at436.

The district subsequently appealed to the supreme court. The original question certifiedby the trial court was thus broadened to encompass two issues: (1) whether the district, as amunicipal corporation and pursuant to section 2-102 of the Tort Immunity Act, was immune frompunitive damages, and (2) if immune from punitive damages, could it "still be sued for the tort ofretaliatory discharge." Boyles, 113 Ill. 2d at 549, 499 N.E.2d at 436. On the first issue, oursupreme court held that, regardless of whether the plaintiff could prove discharge in retaliation forfiling a workers' compensation claim, section 2-102 of the Tort Immunity Act precluded theplaintiff from recovering punitive damages from the district. Boyles, 113 Ill. 2d at 554, 499N.E.2d at 439. On the second issue, the court held:

"[U]nder appropriate circumstances, an employee may bring an action forretaliatory discharge against a local public entity employer for compensatorydamages, even though the public entity is not subject to an award of punitivedamages. Under our holding, only the damages available are restricted; the causeof action in tort for retaliatory discharge remains unchanged." Boyles, 113 Ill. 2dat 555-56, 499 N.E.2d at 439.

It is this passage that plaintiff chiefly relies on in support of his position.

It is clear from the foregoing that plaintiff's reliance on Boyles is misleading. As noted,the procedural context in Boyles was the disposition of issues certified for interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, Boyles only considered whether a municipal corporation was subject to punitivedamages and, if not, whether as a consequence, given the reasoning of the supreme court inMidgett, there would be any viability to an action limited solely to compensatory damages. Asnoted, the court in Midgett had explained that, in the absence of punitive damages, the employee'sremedy is incomplete and there is little to discourage the practice of retaliatory discharge:

" 'In the absence of the deterrent effect of punitive damages there would belittle to dissuade an employer from engaging in the practice of discharging anemployee for filing a workmen's compensation claim[.] * * * The imposition onthe employer of the small additional obligation to pay a wrongfully dischargedemployee compensation would do little to discourage the practice of retaliatorydischarge, which mocks the public policy of this State * * *[.] In the absence ofother effective means of deterrence, punitive damages must be permitted * * *.' " Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 149-50, 473 N.E.2d at 1283, quoting Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at186-87, 384 N.E.2d at 359.

Consequently, having decided, as noted above, that the plaintiff in Boyles was precluded undersection 2-102 of the Tort Immunity Act from recovering punitive damages, our supreme courtthen proceeded to respond to the second issue by stating that the unavailability of punitivedamages does not preclude the maintenance of an action for retaliatory discharge "underappropriate circumstances." Boyles, 113 Ill. 2d at 555-56, 499 N.E.2d at 439.

In light of the foregoing statement, it cannot be said that our supreme court intended tolimit the immunity of a local public entity to exemption from punitive damages under section 2-102 and not permit the protection of the general immunity provisions of section 2-201. In thatregard, we note that the question of general immunity under section 2-201 was never certified onappeal and the supreme court never purported to consider or discuss the impact of that section. Moreover, nothing in Boyles' discussion and holding is inconsistent with the potential applicabilityof section 2-201. In this respect, it is important to remember that the immunity of section 2-201is not all-pervasive, but only applies to protect a governmental entity and its employees fromliability for an injury resulting from an act of a public employee in the exercise of a discretionarypolicy determination. See Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335,341, 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1181 (1998) (both elements are required--a determination of policy andan exercise of discretion). In contrast, ministerial acts are generally not entitled to immunity. SeeIn re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 194, 680 N.E.2d 265, 272 (1997).

With the foregoing in mind, it becomes clear that in holding that there is a right tocompensatory damages "under appropriate circumstances," Boyles is in all likelihood alluding tothose circumstances that are not precluded under section 2-201, namely, where the firing wasministerial. The whole purpose of that statement was not designed to elucidate the circumstanceswhich would permit compensatory damages to be recovered, but rather to establish that, contraryto district's argument, the right to compensatory damages is not wedded to the right to punitivedamages. Because, as noted, the issue of immunity under section 2-201 was not raised on appeal,Boyles left the boundaries of the preclusive effect that section open-ended, but indicating onlythat there are circumstances where an employee's action for retaliatory discharge against a localpublic entity employer may not be barred.

We further note that if plaintiff's interpretation of Boyles was given credence, it wouldeliminate the applicability of section 2-201 with respect to any action for retaliatory dischargeagainst a governmental entity. Such construction would fly in the face of the clear subsequentholdings of our supreme court that an action for retaliatory discharge, even discharge inretaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim, is a common law tort (Zimmerman, 164 Ill.2d at 45, 645 N.E.2d at 885), which would clearly be covered by the general immunity provisionsof section 2-201. Any attempt to preclude the application of those immunity provisions would"impermissibly elevate[] a common law duty over an applicable statutory immunity." Arteman,198 Ill. 2d at 487, 763 N.E.2d at 764. In Arteman the supreme court stated:

"[W]e lack the power to restrict the [Tort Immunity] Act's protective scope ***(see Henrich[ v. Libertyville High School], 186 Ill. 2d [381,] 394 [(1998)] ('Theresponsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation rests upon the legislature');Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d211, 220 (1983) (statutes should not be rewritten by this court to conform to itsidea of public policy))." Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 488, 763 N.E.2d at 765.

It would thus be anomalous to suppose that the supreme court in Boyles intended to casuallyoverride the applicability of section 2-201 without ever discussing that section or attempting toexplain or justify its reasons for doing so.

Lastly, we note that in his briefs on appeal plaintiff neither raised nor argued that the city'sact in firing him would otherwise fall outside the protective ambit of section 2-201, namely, thatthe firing was not the result of a discretionary policy determination. Accordingly, this argument,which is not otherwise meritorious, is in any event waived pursuant to Rule 341(e)(7) (188 Ill. 2dR. 341(e)(7) (points not argued are waived)).

For the reasons set forth above, the city is immune, as a matter of law, from liability forCommissioner Bolden's decision to terminate plaintiff. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment ofthe circuit court.

Affirmed.

McNULTY and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.

1. See Cross v. City of Chicago, No. 1-96-1857 (September 10, 1997) (unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23).

2. See Chicago Municipal Code