Courtney v. County Officers Electoral Bd.

Case Date: 06/30/2000
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-00-0283

SECOND DIVISION
JUNE 30, 2000

No. 1-00-0283

THOMAS FRANCIS COURTNEY,


                  Petitioner-Appellant,


v.

COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD;
HONORABLE DAVID ORR, by Daniel P.
Madden; HONORABLE RICHARD A.
DEVINE, by David A. Bonoma;
HONORABLE AURELIA PUCINSKI, by
Jeffrey M. Jacob; and the CHICAGO
BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS
and its members, LANGDON NEAL,
THERESA PETRONE and RICHARD COWEN;
and DAVID ORR, as COOK COUNTY
CLERK; ROBERT F. HOGAN; andNADINE M. ZAPOLSKY,



                  Respondents-Appellees.
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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County County
Department, County
Division







No. 00CO-E-0001
Consolidated with
        00CO-E-0002





The Honorable
Shelli D. Williams-
Hayes,
Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE COUSINS delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Petitioner, Thomas Courtney, appeals the trial court'saffirmance of the removal of his name by respondents, the CookCounty Officers Electoral Board; Honorable David Orr, by DanielP. Madden; Honorable Richard A. Devine, by David A. Bonoma; Honorable Aurelia Pucinski, by Jeffrey M. Jacob; and the Chicago Board Of Election Commissioners and its members, Langdon Neal, Theresa Petrone and Richard Cowen; and David Orr, as Cook CountyClerk, from the March 21, 2000, ballot as a candidate in theDemocratic primary for the office of commissioner of theMetropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago. Petitioner's candidacy was objected to by Robert F. Hogan and Nadine M. Zapolsky, objectors, in proceedings before the CookCounty Electoral Board because petitioner did not simultaneouslyfile his nominating petition sheets and statement of candidacy.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a candidate for the Democratic nomination forthe office of commissioner of the Metropolitan Water ReclamationDistrict of Greater Chicago in the March 21, 2000, election. Hefiled over 9,000 signatures for an office that required a minimumof 4,839 signatures for the Democratic nomination.

The sole issue that is the subject of this review is theobjection that petitioner did not simultaneously file hisnominating petition sheets and his statement of candidacy. It isagreed by the parties that the statement of candidacy, a singledocument, was filed three days after the nominating petitionsheets but well within the filing deadlines for all nominationsas prescribed by statute.

The electoral board and circuit court granted the objectors'petitions and removed petitioner from the ballot based on theseparate filing of the statement of candidacy from the petitionsheets. Petitioner appealed and this court granted an expeditedbriefing schedule. On February 15, 2000, this court reversed thedecision of the trial court and ordered petitioner's name to beplaced on the March 21, 2000 ballot. This court also wrote thata "more detailed memorandum of this decision shall issue in duecourse."

ANALYSIS

Petitioner contends that his failure to simultaneously filehis statement of candidacy with his nomination petition sheetsdid not mandate that his name be stricken from the March 21,2000, ballot. Specifically, petitioner contends that the filingof his petition sheets and statement of candidacy within thestatutorily prescribed filing period constituted substantialcompliance with the requirements of the Illinois Election Code,(10 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)), even though he did not fileboth documents at the same time.

Respondents contend that the election statute expresslydeclares the submission of statements of candidacy withnomination petitions to be mandatory. Here, respondentsspecifically contend that petitioner's failure to simultaneouslyfile his statement of candidacy and petition sheets vitiated hiscandidacy pursuant to sections 1-3(12) and 7-10 of the IllinoisElection Code. 10 ILCS 5/1-3(12); 7-10 (West 1998). We disagreewith respondents' interpretation of these provisions as appliedto the facts of the instant case.

The general purposes of election laws is to obtain fair andhonest elections and to obtain a correct expression of the intentof the voters. Ferguson v. Ryan, 251 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1047,623 N.E.2d 1004, 1008 (1993) (minor procedural statutoryviolations during caucus to select slate of candidates from theDemocratic party to run for township offices did not vitiateelection proceedings). A court, under the appearance ofenforcing election laws, should not defeat the very objects thoselaws were intended to achieve. Ferguson, 251 Ill. App. 3d at1047, 623 N.E.2d at 1008.

Whether an enactment is directory or mandatory depends onthe legislative intention, to be ascertained from the nature andobject of the act and the consequences that would result from anygiven construction. Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett, 117 Ill.App. 3d 1011, 1016, 454 N.E.2d 29, 33 (1983).

Section 1-3(12) of the Election Code provides:

"'Petition' of candidacy as used in Sections 7-10and 7-10.1 shall consist of a statement of candidacy,candidate's statement containing oath, and sheetscontaining signatures of qualified primary electorsbound together." 10 ILCS 5/1-3(12) (West 1998).

Section 7-10 of the Election Code, in pertinent part,provides:

"Each petition must include as a part thereof, astatement of candidacy for each of the candidatesfiling, or in whose behalf the petition is filed. Thisstatement shall set out the address of such candidate,the office for which he is a candidate, shall statethat the candidate is a qualified primary voter of the

party to which the petition relates and is qualifiedfor the office specified ***, shall state that he has

filed (or will file before the close of the petitionfiling period) a statement of economic interests asrequired by the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act, shall request that the candidate's name be placed uponthe official ballot, and shall be subscribed and swornto by such candidate before some officer authorized totake acknowledgment of deeds in the State ***.

* * *

The petitions, when filed, shall not be withdrawnor added to, and no signatures shall be revoked exceptby revocation filed in writing with the State Board ofElections, election authority or local electionofficial with whom the petition is required to befiled, and before the filing of such petition." 10ILCS 5/7-10 (West 1998).

The use of the word "shall" in a statutory provision, thoughgenerally regarded as mandatory, does not have a fixed orinflexible meaning and may, in fact, be construed as meaning"may" depending on the legislative intent. Andrews v. Foxworthy,71 Ill. 2d 13, 21, 373 N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (1978); Ferguson, 251Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 623 N.E.2d at 1008. And, the word "shall,"in construing election statutes, has been held directory ratherthan mandatory in a variety of cases. People ex rel. Meyer v.Kerner, 35 Ill. 2d 33, 39-40, 219 N.E.2d 617, 620-21 (1966);People ex rel Bell v. Powell, 35 Ill. 2d 381, 383-84, 221 N.E.2d272, 273 (1966); People ex rel. Harris v. Powell, 35 Ill. 2d 384,387-88, 221 N.E.2d 274, 275 (1966); Ferguson, 251 Ill. App. 3d at1048, 623 N.E.2d at 1009; Ballentine v. Bardwell, 132 Ill. App.3d 1033, 1036-37, 478 N.E.2d 500, 503 (1985). The criteria fordetermining whether provisions of an election statute aremandatory or directory were set forth by the Kerner court, andlater quoted in Harris and Ballentine, as follows:

"Where a statute provides that an election shall berendered void by failure of those involved in theelection process to perform certain duties, the courtsare bound to enforce it as mandatory. [Citations.] But,where the statute does not expressly declare itsprovisions to be mandatory or compliance therewith tobe essential to its validity, the failure to strictlycomply, in the absence of fraud or a showing that themerits of the election were affected thereby, is notfatal. [Citation.]" Kerner, 35 Ill. 2d at 39, 219N.E.2d at 620.

Ballentine, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 1036-37, 478 N.E.2d at 503. Seealso Bell, 35 Ill. 2d at 383, 221 N.E.2d at 273; Harris, 35 Ill.2d at 386-87, 221 N.E.2d at 275; Ferguson, 251 Ill. App. 3d at1048, 623 N.E.2d at 1008-09.

Petitioner cites Ballentine in support of his assertion thathe substantially complied with the Election Code and should,therefore, be placed on the March 21, 2000, ballot. InBallentine, the court held that the petitioners' failure to filetheir statements of candidacy simultaneously with theirnominating petitions did not mandate the removal of thecandidates from the ballots. Ballentine, 132 Ill. App. 3d at1040, 478 N.E.2d at 505.

Here, while we do read the aforementioned statute asmandating the filing of a statement of candidacy as inBallentine, we do not read the above-referenced statute asmandating that a statement of candidacy be filed simultaneouslywith nominating petition sheets. Where the statute does notexpressly declare its provisions to be mandatory or compliancetherewith to be essential to its validity, the failure tostrictly comply is not fatal in the absence of fraud or a showingthat the merits of the election were thereby affected. Ballentine, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 1036-37, 478 N.E.2d at 503.

We find that Ballentine is apposite. Moreover, respondentshave not shown that the petitioner's failure to simultaneouslyfile his statement of candidacy and petition sheets was caused byfraud or that it affected the results of the election. Further,respondents' objection had nothing to do with the form of thestatement of candidacy, its timeliness (as far as applying withinthe deadline), or whether it was genuine. Absent some contentionas above described, petitioner's failure to simultaneously filehis statement of candidacy and nominating petition sheets was notfatal.

Respondents, however, assert that Ballentine is inappositebecause Ballentine involved Article 10 of the Illinois ElectionCode, new political parties, and the instant case involvesarticle 7 of the Election Code. Respondents contend that theBallentine court stated that section 1-3(12), which provides thata petition of candidacy as used in sections 7-10 and 7-10.1 shallconsist of a statement of candidacy, candidate's statementcontaining both, and sheets containing signatures of qualifiedprimary electors bound together, applied to Article 7 cases. Ballentine, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 1038, 478 N.E.2d at 504. However, our reading of Ballentine indicates that theBallentine court stated that section 1-3(12) clearly provides that the definition of "petition of candidacy" set forth thereinis as used in sections 7-10 and 7-10.1 of the Election Code. (10ILCS 5/1-3(12), 7-10 (West 1998)), and could not be enlarged toencompass Article 10 of the Election Code. In our view, thatstatement was unnecessary to the holding in Ballentine. We haveexamined Article 10 of the Election Code, which provides, inpertinent part:

"All petitions for nomination under this Article10 for candidates for public office in this State,shall in addition to other requirements provided bylaw, be as follows: Such petitions shall consist ofsheets of uniform size and each sheet shall contain,above the space for signature, an appropriate heading,giving the information as to name of candidate orcandidates in whose behalf such petition is signed; theoffice; the party; place of residence; and such otherinformation or wording as required to make same valid,and the heading of each sheet shall be the same. Suchpetition shall be signed by the qualified voters intheir own proper persons only, and opposite thesignature of each signer his residence address shall bewritten or printed. The residence address required tobe written or printed opposite each qualified primaryelector's name shall include the street address orrural route number of the signer, as the case may be,as well as the signer's city, village or town. *** Apetition, when presented or filed, shall not bewithdrawn, altered, or added to, and no signature shallbe revoked except by revocation in writing presented orfiled with the officers or officer with whom thepetition is required to be presented or filed, andbefore the presentment or filing of such petition." (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/10-4 (West 1998).

Section 10-5 of the Election Code provides, in pertinentpart:

"All petitions for nomination shall, besidescontaining the names of candidates, specify as to each:



1.The office or offices to which such candidate orcandidates shall be nominated.

* * *

Such certificate of nomination or nomination

papers in addition shall include as a part thereof, theoath required by Section 7-10.1 of this Act and mustinclude a statement of candidacy for each of thecandidates named therein ***. Each such statementshall set out the address of such candidate, the officefor which he is a candidate, shall state that thecandidate is qualified for the office specified and hasfiled (or will file before the close of the petitionfiling period) a statement of economic interests asrequired by the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act, shallrequest that the candidate's name be placed upon theofficial ballot and shall be subscribed and sworn to bysuch candidate before some officer authorized to takeacknowledgments of deeds in this State ***." 10 ILCS5/10-5 (West 1998).

The pertinent provisions of Article 7 and Article 10 of theElection Code are analogous. Accordingly, in our view, since theprovisions in Article 7 and Article 10 of the Election Code areanalogous, we hold, as did the court in Ballentine, that the factthat the statement of candidacy was not filed simultaneously withthe nomination petitions did not mandate removal of thepetitioner's name from the ballot, where petitioner filed thestatement within the requisite filing period.

While all of the requirements of the election law statutesare mandatory in the sense that they impose a duty of obedienceon those who come within their purview, and even directoryprovisions may not be disregarded, it does not follow that everydeparture or omission will vitiate the ballot or the proceedings.Ferguson, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 1048, 623 N.E.2d at 1008-08. Ballentine, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 1040, 478 N.E.2d at 505. Inthe instant case, the statute is mandatory in that its provisionscannot be disregarded. A statement of candidacy and thenomination petitions must be filed within the requisitelimitations period. 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 1998). Petitionerfiled his nominating petitions three days before he filed hisstatement of candidacy. Both were filed within the limitationsperiod. We hold that, based on the aforementioned principles oflaw relating to elections, in the instant case, petitioner, byfiling both documents before the deadline, fulfilled therequisite substantial compliance with the statute and the trialcourt erred in removing his name from the ballot. The decisionof the trial court is reversed.

Reversed.

GORDON and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.