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SECOND DIVISION
JUNE 30, 2005

JUSTICE GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal concerns the application of section 14(k) of theIllinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS 315/14(k) (West2002)), to an arbitration award that became part of a collective-bargaining agreement between the petitioners, County of Cook andSheriff of Cook County (collectively County), and the respondent,Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (Union). See 5ILCS 315/14(n) (West 2002). For the reasons that follow, weaffirm the judgment of the circuit court in part and reverse itin part.

I. Background

The County employs approximately 120 deputy sheriffsergeants who are represented for collective bargaining under theAct by the Union. In the course of collective bargaining, theCounty and Union reached an impasse on two issues, includingwages, for fiscal years 2000 through 2002. The Union proposed awage increase of 23% over the life of the contract, December 1,1999 through, November 30, 2002; the County proposed an increaseof 16.5%.⁽¹⁾

Pursuant to the Act, the parties submitted those issues tomandatory interest arbitration. On January 30, 2002, following ahearing and arguments, the arbitrator adopted the Union'sproposal. On February 7, 2002, the County rejected thearbitration award. On July 15, 2002, following an additionalhearing, the arbitrator rendered a supplemental decisionupholding its prior ruling adopting the Union's proposal(hereinafter arbitration award). The arbitration award thusbecame the final decision as to the mandatory interestarbitration, which was subject to review in the circuit courtunder section 14(k) of the Act.

In August 2002, the County filed a petition for review ofthe arbitration award in the circuit court. In September 2002,the County filed a motion to partially stay enforcement of thearbitration award pending the ultimate outcome of the review. OnNovember 20, 2002, the court granted the motion and allowed theCounty to implement its proposed wage increases totaling 16.5% (hereinafter November 20 order). In February 2003, the Countyimplemented these wage increases. On March 18, 2003, the courtdenied the County's petition for review and confirmed thearbitration award (hereinafter March 18 order).

In June 2003, the Union filed a motion in the circuit courtto enforce the arbitration award. On July 9, 2003, the courtentered an order that required the County to produce, within 30days, (1) a list of names of deputy sheriff sergeants covered bythe arbitration award, (2) the date the new pay scale wasimplemented, (3) the date, and the manner in which, theretroactive payments were made, and (4) the amount of any payincreases (hereinafter compliance reports). The order alsorequired the County to pay the sergeants the statutory interestof 12% retroactive from December 1, 1999, through November 30,2002 (hereinafter July 9 order).

The County moved the circuit court to reconsider its July 9order. On September 24, 2003, the court denied the motion as itpertained to the production of compliance reports. However, thecourt modified its order with respect to the payment of statutoryinterest. The court held that the statutory interest appliedonly to the difference (6.5%) between what the County paid underthe court's November 20 order (16.5%) and the full amount awardedby the arbitrator (23%); the interest was due retroactive fromthe effective date of the increases, December 1, 1999(hereinafter September 24 order). The court also held that"[t]here is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal." Thisappeal followed.

II. Analysis

Both the County and the Union appeal the judgment of thecircuit court. The County argues that the court did not havejurisdiction to modify and supplement its March 18 order and didnot have the statutory authority to require the County to producethe compliance reports. Both parties challenge the court's orderconcerning statutory interest. The Union argues that theinterest should apply to the full arbitration award and is dueretroactive from December 1, 1999. The County argues that theinterest should apply only to the difference between what theCounty already paid pursuant to the November 20 order and theamount of the arbitration award. The County also argues that theinterest is retroactive only from July 10, 2002, the date of thearbitration award, or at the earliest, January 30, 2002, the dateof the initial arbitration decision.

A. Appellate Court Jurisdiction Before we consider the parties' arguments, we must determinewhether this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. In theSeptember 24 order, the circuit court ordered the County (1) topay statutory interest on the difference between what the Countypaid under the November 20 order and the amount of thearbitration award and (2) to produce the compliance reports. Theorder also contained a written finding that there was no justreason for delaying enforcement or appeal. Both parties assertthat this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant toIllinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).

Rule 304 permits appeals from final judgments that do notdispose of an entire proceeding. Section (a) provides:

"If multiple parties or multiple claimsfor relief are involved in an action, anappeal may be taken from a final judgment asto one or more but fewer than all of theparties or claims only if the trial court hasmade an express written finding that there isno just reason for delaying eitherenforcement or appeal or both." 155 Ill. 2dR. 304(a).

"'A judgment is final if it determines the litigation on themerits so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is toproceed with the execution of the judgment.'" Lewis v. FamilyPlanning Management, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d 918, 921, 715 N.E.2d743 (1999), quoting People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 87 Ill.2d 167, 171, 429 N.E.2d 483 (1981).

The circuit court's judgment requiring the County to paystatutory interest was a final judgment and is properly beforethis court. However, the court's judgment concerning theproduction of compliance reports was akin to a discovery order,which is not appealable under Rule 304(a). See Lewis, 306 Ill.App. 3d at 921-22 (discovery orders are not appealable under Rule301, 304, 306, or 307, and are only appealable under Rule 308 ifcertain conditions are met).

If the County wants to secure review of this discoveryorder, it could refuse to comply with the order and be found incontempt. When a party refuses to comply with a discovery order,a trial court will be forced to find the party in contempt and toimpose appropriate sanctions. Lewis, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 922. Acontempt order that imposes sanctions is final and appealablepursuant to Rule 304(b)(5). 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(5); Lewis,306 Ill. App. 3d at 922. Because no contempt order was issued,this court does not have the jurisdiction to review the circuitcourt's judgment concerning the production of compliance reports.

B. Circuit Court Jurisdiction

The County argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdictionto enter its July 9 and September 24 orders. The County contendsthat the March 18 order, which denied its petition to review thearbitration award and confirmed the award, fully and completelydisposed of the County's petition. Pursuant to section 2-1203 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West2002)), any motion asking the court to modify that order or foradditional relief had to be filed within 30 days. The Countycontends that the Union's motion to enforce the arbitration awardsought "other relief" and was a section 2-1203 motion; further,because it was filed more than 30 days after the March 18 order,the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the order. The Unionargues that the court retained jurisdiction to enforce its March18 order indefinitely.

A circuit court generally retains jurisdiction over casespending before it until a final judgment is entered and thelitigation is effectively terminated between the parties in thatcourt. Brigando v. Republic Steel Corp., 180 Ill. App. 3d 1016,1020, 536 N.E.2d 778 (1989). There is, however, an exception tothe general rule relevant to this case -- a circuit court has theinherent authority to enforce its orders and judgments. AmericanSociety of Lubrication Engineers v. Roetheli, 249 Ill. App. 3d1038, 1042, 621 N.E.2d 30 (1993), citing Cities Service Oil Co.v. Village of Oak Brook, 84 Ill. App. 3d 381, 384, 405 N.E.2d 379(1980) ("It is an elementary principle of law that judicial poweressentially involves the right to enforce the results of its ownexertion"). Because the statutory interest was mandatory undersection 14(k) of the Act, the circuit court was merely exercisingits inherent authority by ordering its payment.

The County argues that, in its motion, the Union did notmerely ask the circuit court to enforce its order, but it soughtother relief pursuant to section 2-1203 of the Code. Section 2-1203 provides that a court has 30 days after the entry of a finaljudgment to hear motions "for a rehearing, or a retrial, ormodification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or forother relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2002). To qualify as amotion under section 2-1203, one or more of the types of reliefspecified in that section must be specifically requested; arequest for "other relief" must be similar in nature to the otherforms of enumerated relief. Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Churchof Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 461-62, 563 N.E.2d 459 (1990).

The Union's motion to enforce the arbitration award was nota motion pursuant to section 2-1203 of the Code. The Union didnot request "other relief" that would have either modified oraffected the arbitration award. Instead, the Union moved thecircuit court to enforce the award through the payment of backpay and statutory interest. The court, therefore, retainedjurisdiction to enter both the July 9 and September 24 orders.

C. Statutory Interest Because the circuit court had the jurisdiction to order theCounty to pay the statutory interest required under section 14(k)of the Act, we now must determine what constitutes an "award ofmoney" and the "effective retroactive date."

Section 14(k) provides:

"Orders of the arbitration panel shall bereviewable, upon appropriate petition by either thepublic employer or the exclusive bargainingrepresentative, by the circuit court for the county inwhich the dispute arose or in which a majority of theaffected employees reside, but only for reasons thatthe arbitration panel was without or exceeded itsstatutory authority; the order is arbitrary, orcapricious; or the order was procured by fraud,collusion or other similar and unlawful means. Suchpetitions for review must be filed with the appropriatecircuit court within 90 days following the issuance ofthe arbitration order. The pendency of such proceedingfor review shall not automatically stay the order ofthe arbitration panel. The party against whom thefinal decision of any such court shall be adverse, ifsuch court finds such appeal or petition to befrivolous, shall pay reasonable attorneys' fees andcosts to the successful party as determined by saidcourt in its discretion. If said court's decisionaffirms the award of money, such award, if retroactive,shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum fromthe effective retroactive date." (Emphasis added.) 5ILCS 315/14(k) (West 2002).

"The cardinal rule of interpreting statutes, to which allother canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and giveeffect to the intent of the legislature." McNamee v. FederatedEquipment & Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415, 423, 692 N.E.2d 1157(1998). The plain language of a statute provides the mostreliable indicator of legislative intent and courts will notdepart from that language by reading into it exceptions,limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expresslegislative intent. Statutory construction is a question of lawthat this court reviews de novo. Hawes v. Luhr Brothers, Inc.,212 Ill. 2d 93, 105, 816 N.E.2d 345 (2004).

1. Award of Money

The Union argues that the "award of money" referenced insection 14(k) of the Act refers to the entire arbitration awardof 23%. The Union contends that not only is the language of thestatute clear and unambiguous, but this interpretation isconsistent with the public policy behind the Act, i.e., toprovide an expeditious, equitable, and effective procedure forthe resolution of labor disputes.

The County argues that "award of money" refers only to theamount that was in dispute -- the difference between what theCounty paid under the circuit court's November 20 order, i.e.,the County's final settlement proposal, and the total amount ofthe arbitration award, i.e., the Union's final proposal. TheCounty contends that because the arbitrator was required toselect either the County's or the Union's final proposal, the16.5% wage increase proposed by the County was never in dispute. Thus, according to the County, the circuit court affirmed onlythe 6.5% difference between their proposals.

We find that the plain language of section 14(k) is clearand unambiguous; "award of money" means any monetary awardordered by the arbitrator. In this case, the arbitrator ordered,and the circuit court confirmed, a 23% wage increase over thelife of the collective-bargaining agreement. This reading isconsistent with the language used throughout section 14(k), whichdiscusses reviewing arbitrator's orders. The section providesthat an order may be reviewed only in limited circumstances. During the pendency of the review proceeding, the order is notautomatically stayed. If the order provides for an award ofmoney, and that award is affirmed and retroactive, the awardbears statutory interest. The legislature, in enacting thissection, was cognizant that an arbitration award was notautomatically stayed during the review proceedings; yet, thelegislature provided that if, in the course of the reviewproceedings, the circuit court affirmed the award, the awardwould bear interest.

Although the Act does not define the term "arbitrationaward" or "award of money," the Uniform Arbitration Act(Arbitration Act) (710 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2002))⁽²⁾ providesthat an "award shall be in writing and signed by the arbitratorsjoining in the award" (710 ILCS 5/8 (West 2002)), and that uponapplication of a party, the circuit court "shall confirm anaward" (710 ILCS 5/11 (West 2002)). In this case, thearbitrator's written and signed order adopted the Union's finalsettlement proposal, which provided for the 23% wage increase. The circuit court then confirmed that award of money.

We therefore find the circuit court erred in determiningthat the "award of money" meant only the difference between theCounty's final offer and the Union's final offer. Instead, theCounty is required to pay the 12% statutory interest on thearbitration award, which in this case was the Union's final offer-- a 23% wage increase over the life of the collective-bargainingagreement.

2. Effective Retroactive Date

The parties also disagree as to the meaning of "effectiveretroactive date." The Union agrees with the circuit court thatthe statutory interest must be paid from the retroactive date ofthe arbitration award, December 1, 1999. The Union argues thatthe County inexcusably delayed paying the deputy sheriffsergeants any wage increase until February 14, 2003, and adetermination that the County is not liable for interest from theeffective date of the contract would reward the County for itsdelay tactics.

The County argues that the term "effective retroactive date"is subject to two interpretations: (1) the retroactive date ofthe arbitration agreement or (2) the period of retroactivityarising from the judicial review proceedings. The County arguesthat in this case, the first interpretation produces absurdresults because the arbitrator did not issue his final orderuntil July 10, 2002, over two years after the retroactive date ofthe collective-bargaining agreement. The County argues that anyperiod of delay prior to the issuance of the arbitrator'sdecision was not associated with the County having soughtjudicial review and, therefore, interest cannot be due for thattime period.

We disagree with the County that "effective retroactivedate," as used in section 14(k), is reasonably subject to twointerpretations and find that the plain language of the statuteis clear and unambiguous. While we recognize that section 14(k)is concerned with the delay that results from judicial review ofcollective-bargaining agreements, the plain language of thestatute does not speak to that delay. Section 14(k) provides,"[i]f said court's decision affirms the award of money, suchaward, if retroactive, shall bear interest at the rate of 12% perannum from the effective retroactive date." (Emphasis added.) 5ILCS 315/14(k) (West 2002). This penalty provision clearlyreferences the retroactive date of the award of money. Where anaward of money is retroactive, it will bear interest from theeffective retroactive date of the award.

In this case, the effective retroactive date of the award isthe effective date of the pay increases in the collective-bargaining agreement, December 1, 1999. We therefore affirm thecircuit court's judgment that the statutory interest is due fromthat date.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated we affirm in part and reverse in partthe judgment of the circuit court. The County is ordered to pay12% statutory interest on the arbitration award retroactive fromDecember 1, 1999, through November 30, 2002.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

BURKE, P.J., and WOLFSON, J., concur.

1. The Union's proposal called for wage increases amountingto 9.5% for fiscal year 2000; 6.75% for fiscal year 2001; and6.75% for fiscal year 2002 - for a total of 23% over the life ofthe agreement. Generally, the County's proposal called for a5.5% increase for fiscal year 2000; a new pay grade ofapproximately 4% in fiscal year 2001; 3% increase for fiscal year2001; 1% special equity adjustment; and a 3% increase for fiscalyear 2002 - for a total increase of 16.5%.

2. Section 8 of the Act provides that the grievance andarbitration provisions of any collective-bargaining agreement aresubject to the Arbitration Act. 5 ILCS 315/8 (West 2002).