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On June 9, 1998, plaintiff James W. Collins filed a complaintfor administrative review and other relief with the circuit courtof Cook County from a decision by the Retirement Board of thePolicemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund - City of Chicago (Board)denying Collins certain benefits under the Illinois Pension Code(40 ILCS 5/5-10 et seq. (West 2000)). On remand, the Boardaffirmed its decision. The circuit court then heard the matter onappeal from the administrative review. On May 9, 2001, the courtaffirmed the decision of the Board by written opinion and order. Collins now appeals to this court.

The following facts are not in dispute. James W. Collinsjoined the Chicago police department on January 9, 1961. OnFebruary 5, 1985, while on duty, Collins was seriously injured whena car crossed the center line and struck the squad car Collins wasdriving. At the time of the accident, Collins was assigned to Area2 as a youth officer. Following the accident, Collins attempted toreturn to active duty but was unable. On August 14, 1987, Collinswas informed by the Board in writing that he was placed on "dutydisability." In the August 14 letter, the Board informed Collinsthat he was to be awarded 75% of his salary at the time of hisaward. Additionally, the Board advised Collins that while he wascarried as a disability beneficiary, his "service and monetarycredits for annuity purposes go on just as though [he were]performing active duty." The status of "duty disability" removedCollins from the City of Chicago payroll and made him subject tothe compensation structure of the Illinois Pension Code. Collinsremained on "duty disability" until his retirement on November 30,1998.

At the time of his award, Collins was awarded 75% of thesalary of an active-duty youth officer. Pursuant to the statute,an active police officer who becomes disabled is entitled toreceive "duty disability" benefits "during any period of suchdisability for which he does not have a right to receive salary,equal to 75% of his salary, as salary is defined in this Article, at the time the disability is allowed." 40 ILCS 5/5-154 (West2000). Beginning January 1, 1996, the statute was amended toprovide that "no duty disability benefit that has been payableunder this Section for at least 10 years shall be less than 50% ofthe current salary attached from time to time to the rank held bythe policeman at the time of removal from the police departmentpayroll." 40 ILCS 5/5-154 (West 2000). Therefore, starting inJanuary 1998, Collins was awarded an amount equal to 50% of thecurrent salary of an officer of similar rank, that amount beinggreater than 75% of Collins' salary at the time of his disabilityaward.

The statute also provided Collins with a pension uponretirement based on life annuity credits while on "dutydisability." Section 5-172 provides that "[i]n lieu of salarydeductions for annuity purposes, the city shall contribute therequired amounts for any period during which a policeman receivesa duty disability benefit. The city shall also contribute allamounts ordinarily contributed by it for annuity purposes for thepoliceman as though he were in active discharge of his dutiesduring such disability." 40 ILCS 5/5-172 (West 2000).

At issue in this dispute is the statutory definition of"salary." Under the statute, "salary" is the "annual salary of apoliceman appropriated for members of his rank or grade in thecity's annual budget or appropriation bill." 40 ILCS 5/5-114(d)(West 2000). Effective January 1, 1998, the Illinois legislatureexpanded the meaning of "salary": "Beginning January 1, 1998, thesalary of a policeman, as calculated under subsection (d), shallinclude any duty availability allowance received by the policeman." 40 ILCS 5/5-114(f) (West 2000). We note the use of the word"shall." Under rules of statutory construction, we accept this asmandatory. Curtis Investment Firm, Ltd. Partnership v. Schuch, 321Ill. App. 3d 197, 746 N.E.2d 1233 (2001). Section 5-114 alsoprovides an option to officers to apply this provisionretroactively:

"An active or former policeman who (1) eitherretired between July 1, 1994 and December 31,1997, both inclusive, or attained or willattain age 50 and 20 years of service betweenJuly 1, 1994 and January 1, 2002, bothinclusive, and (2) received a dutyavailability allowance at any time after June30, 1994 and before January 1, 1998 may electto have that duty availability allowanceincluded in the calculation of his or hersalary under subsection (d) for all or anyportion of that period for which the allowancewas received, by applying in writing andpaying to the Fund, no earlier than January 1,1998 and no later than July 1, 1998, thecorresponding employee contribution withoutinterest. Thereafter the City shall make itscorresponding contribution, without interest." 40 ILCS 5/5-114(f) (West 2000).

Collins does not dispute that the Board correctly calculated andawarded him his "duty disability" benefit prior to the amendment tosection 5-114.

On April 13, 1998, Collins sent a letter to the Boardrequesting that his award be recalculated to include "dutyavailability allowance" pursuant to the January 1, 1998, amendmentto section 5-114. He advised the Board that he wished to exercisehis option to have the provision apply retroactively and, as such,enclosed a check for his past contributions. On May 1, 1998, theBoard responded to Collins' request in writing. The Board deniedCollins' request, stating that since he did not receive a "dutyavailability allowance" from the time he began receiving "dutydisability" benefits to the present, he did not now qualify forthis additional benefit. The Board returned his check.

On June 9, 1998, Collins filed an action for administrativereview. After the filing, the Board requested that the matter beremanded to the Board for a de novo review. Collins agreed. Aftera hearing on September 23, 1999, the Board issued its decision inwriting on July 27, 2000. In its decision, the Board affirmed itsearlier ruling on the matter. Collins then appealed to the circuitcourt. On May 9, 2001, in a written opinion and order, the circuitcourt affirmed the decision of the Board.

Collins argues that we must reverse the Board's decision anddefine the word "salary" uniformly to both active and disabledpolice officers. Collins also asks us to reject the Board's effortto read the word "received" in isolation and instead give effect tothe provisions of the Illinois Pension Code as a whole. Specifically, Collins asks us to determine that the Board failed tocorrectly calculate his "duty disability" benefits from January 1,1998, to November 30, 1998, by not considering his "salary" toinclude the "duty availability allowance" pursuant to the section5-114 amendment.

Under the Administrative Review Law, we review the finaldecision of the administrative agency and not the decision of thecircuit court. 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000). We willdefer to the agency's findings of fact, yet we conduct anindependent review of its conclusions of law. Home Interiors &Gifts, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 318 Ill. App. 3d 205, 209,741 N.E.2d 998 (2000). When deciding a mixed question of law andfact, we review the agency's decision under a clearly erroneousstandard. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor RelationsBoard, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998). When the issueon appeal involves no dispute of fact and is one of law only, wereview the agency's decision de novo. Home Interiors & Gifts,Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d at 209. Here, the facts were uncontrovertedand the Board was charged with interpreting the statute. Becausethese are issues of statutory interpretation, we will apply a denovo standard of review. White v. City of Aurora, 323 Ill. App. 3d733, 753 N.E.2d 1244 (2001).

It is not in dispute that when Collins was placed on "dutydisability" in 1987, he was effectively removed from the City ofChicago payroll. This subjected him to the compensation structureof the Illinois Pension Code. 40 ILCS 5/5-101 et seq. (West 2000). It is also undisputed that but for the January 1, 1998, amendmentto section 5-114, Collins would not be entitled to a "dutyavailability allowance" as part of his salary calculation for anytime after he began receiving "duty disability" benefits. Thus,the controversy here is one of statutory construction and whetheror not, under the statute's amendment, Collins is afforded thebenefit of "duty availability allowance" as part of his "salary."

Collins correctly points out in his brief that the primarypurpose of statutory construction is to give effect to the languageand intent of the legislature. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v.Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 149, 688 N.E.2d 90 (1997). Advincula v.United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 16, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996). People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 420, 425, 656 N.E.2d 118(1995). The statute must be read and considered as a whole suchthat each section of the statute is examined in relation to othersections and all words should be given their plain and ordinarymeaning. Advincula, 176 Ill. 2d at 16-17. We must presume thatthe legislature did not intend for any absurd or unjust meaning. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 426. Additionally, the"responsibility for the wisdom or justice of legislation rests withthe legislature, and courts may not rewrite statutes to make themconsistent with the court's idea of orderliness and public policy." People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 29, 740 N.E.2d 755 (2000). Also,where a statute defines its own terms we consider those terms inaccordance with the statutory definition provided. A.R. v. ChicagoBoard of Education, 311 Ill. App. 3d 29, 33, 724 N.E.2d 6 (1999). Holland v. City of Chicago, 289 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686, 682 N.E.2d323 (1997).

We also note the well-settled principle that the purpose oflaws regarding pension is beneficial, and statutes of this natureshould be liberally construed in favor of those to be benefitted. The Holland court specifically noted that Article 5 of the IllinoisPension Code should be interpreted in favor of police officers. Holland, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 689-90. Board of Trustees of thePolicemen's Pension Fund v. Department of Insurance, 42 Ill. App.3d 155, 159, 356 N.E.2d 171 (1976).

Section 5-154 of the Illinois Pension Code allows for a "dutydisability" benefit to an active police officer who becomesdisabled in the performance of an act of duty. The section statesthat this benefit is available during any period of such disability for which the officer does not have a right to draw asalary "as salary is defined in [the] Article." 40 ILCS 5/5-154(a)(West 2000). Section 5-114(f) states that the "salary" of a policeofficer shall include any "duty availability allowance" received bythe police officer. 40 ILCS 5/5-114(f) (West 2000). Also relevantis section 5-172, which requires the city to contribute toward anofficer's annuity while the officer is on "duty disability": "[t]hecity shall also contribute all amounts ordinarily contributed by itfor annuity purposes for the policeman as though he were in activedischarge of his duties during such disability." 40 ILCS 5/5-172(West 2000).

We interpret the "duty availability allowance" to mean thatthe officer is entitled to an allowance in the event he isavailable for duty. The parties draw our attention to an agreementbetween the Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge 7, and theCity of Chicago (FOP agreement). Section 20.13 of this agreementaddresses "duty availability." Specifically, the agreement allowsfor Chicago police officers to receive a certain sum of money perquarter. Section 20.13(B) states: "In accordance with the Letterof Understanding, the Employer shall treat duty availabilityallowance payments as pensionable retroactive to July, 1994." Section 20.13(C) states: "Entitlement to duty availability pay isnot dependent on an officer being present for duty for an entirepay period."

In its brief, the Board argues, in examining the language ofamended section 5-114(f), that the "duty availability allowance"benefit is only available to a police officer who has actuallyreceived the benefit and not an officer who could have received thebenefit. It goes on to note that the language of section 5-114(f)is clear and unambiguous in this respect. Therefore, becauseCollins was on "duty disability" when the amended section wasenacted, he never actually received the "duty availabilityallowance" and, thus, is not now entitled to it.

Collins argues that this logic is flawed. First, Collinspoints out that section 5-172 of the Code prevents disparatetreatment between active and disabled officers. As noted above,section 5-172 states that a disabled officer should be treatedunder the Code for purposes of benefits "as though he were inactive discharge of his duties." 40 ILCS 5/5-172 (West 2000). Collins further argues that under the Board's reasoning, therewould be disparate treatment among disabled officers. Collinspresents this court with the following example. If an activepolice officer were to become disabled today, he would already have"received" the "duty availability allowance" as part of his"salary." Thus, this officer would be entitled to receive apercentage of this allowance as part of his "duty disability"benefit but Collins cannot. Collins argues that the Code was notdrafted to draw these distinctions. Collins contends that the"duty disability" benefits he is entitled to are based on thecurrent salary of an officer of similar rank and not what he(Collins) has personally received.

In examining the FOP agreement, the Board argues that notevery officer is going to receive the "duty availability allowance"and, therefore, Collins cannot argue that he is entitled to itunder his "salary." The Board draws our attention to subsection Cof section 20.13 of the agreement, which states that "entitlementto duty availability pay is not dependent on an officer beingpresent for duty for any entire pay period." The Board reasonsthat subsection C means that in order to receive the "dutyavailability allowance," an officer need not be available for an"entire" pay period, but must be available for duty for at least aportion of the pay period. Because not all officers will qualifyfor this benefit, the Board reasons, Collins cannot qualify forthis benefit.

In his reply brief, Collins responds to this argument bysuggesting that subsection C was created to alleviate the problemof active police officers who were suspended for a few days withinthe quarter and being denied the "duty availability allowance." Collins states that instead of treating him as an officer injuredin the line of duty and subject to the rights of active officerswhile on disability, as required by the statute, the Board isattempting to treat him as though he were suspended fordisciplinary reasons.

Studying the legislative history of the section 5-114(f)amendment does not shed additional light on this matter. On April8, 1997, the bill that became the amendment was introduced in itsthird reading by the sponsor of the bill, RepresentativeCapparelli, who stated: "this allowance, which currently totalsabout $400 per quarter does not count as part of their retirement. House Bill 345 would change the definition, from duty availabilityto salary so it would count towards their retirement." 90th Ill.Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 8, 1997, at 112 (statementsof Representative Capparelli). The legislature made no distinctionbetween active and disabled officers in consideration of thislegislation.

We consider that pension benefits should be viewed in favor ofthe beneficiaries - in this case, the police officers. Holland,289 Ill. App. 3d at 689-90. Moreover, we recognize that wheninterpreting a statute, we are to view it as a whole. Particularprovisions of the statute must not be read in isolation, but mustbe read in conjunction with all other relevant provisions of thestatute. Holland, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 685-87.

Taking into account all the relevant sections of the IllinoisPension Code, we find no evidence that the legislature intended toexclude those officers under "duty disability" benefits from theamended definition of "salary" and, thus, from the benefit of "dutyavailability" for purposes of calculating pension benefits. Asnoted above, section 5-114, provides for the meaning of "salary"under the Pension Code: "Beginning January 1, 1998, the salary ofa policeman, as calculated under subsection (d), shall include anyduty availability allowance received by the policeman." (Emphasisadded.) 40 ILCS 5/5-114(f) (West 2000). We note the use of theword "shall." Under rules of statutory construction, we acceptthis as mandatory. Curtis Investment Firm, Ltd. Partnership v.Schuch, 321 Ill. App. 3d 197, 199, 746 N.E.2d 1233 (2001).

Additionally, we are not persuaded by the Board's argumentthat an officer must have "received" the benefit prior to "dutydisability" in order to qualify. We believe the legislatureintended that those officers, disabled in the line of duty, beafforded the same benefits as those officers who continue toactively serve. We find this has been made clear by the languagefound in sections 5-154, 5-114 and 5-172 of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/5-154, 5-114, 5-172 (West 2000).

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Board and remandthe matter for a recalculation of Collins' monthly duty disabilityallowance "salary" to include the duty availability allowance currently paid to youth officers; for a recalculation of Collins'life annuity account credits to include the recalculation of his"salary"; and for the acceptance of a voluntary pensioncontribution from Collins in accordance with the retroactivityprovision in section 5-114(f).

Reversed and remanded.

BURKE, P.J., and GORDON, J., concur.