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              JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the court:

              Defendant Anthony J. Caliendo appeals from an order of the circuit court vacating, undersection 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)), thedismissal for want of prosecution (DWP) of plaintiff Robert Coleman's civil action against him. Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it vacated the DWP,because plaintiff failed to state a meritorious claim and failed to demonstrate the requisitediligence to obtain relief under section 2-1401.

In December 1999, plaintiff filed a two-count civil action for fraud and punitive damages. He alleged that defendant, a dealer in war memorabilia, sold him various items of German WorldWar II vintage between 1996 and August 1998. Plaintiff alleged that defendant represented themerchandise to be genuine war memorabilia rather than replicas. Plaintiff later discovered that theitems were replicas. When plaintiff returned the items to defendant and requested a refund,defendant refused.

In his answer, defendant denied that the merchandise was not genuine and that he madeany false representation to plaintiff. Defendant specifically averred that some of the appraisersengaged by plaintiff found the merchandise to be genuine. Defendant also argued that he sold themerchandise "as is," with a refund available only within 30 days of sale and with a receipt, andthat plaintiff was denied a refund because he failed to comply with either condition.

The case proceeded through discovery, and a case management conference was set forJuly 29, 2002. When plaintiff's attorney did not attend the conference, the case was dismissed forwant of prosecution on that date. Official "postcard" notice of the DWP was sent to "Marsh &Marsh, 48 W. Roosevelt, Lombard, IL 60148." Plaintiff's counsel at the time, Alan Katz, hadprovided either a Chicago or Skokie address on all court documents.

On February 11, 2004, plaintiff filed a section 2-1401 petition to vacate the DWP. Regarding the necessity of a meritorious claim, plaintiff stated that he had testified in hisdeposition that defendant knew he wanted to buy only genuine war memorabilia and representedthat the merchandise sold to plaintiff was genuine. Plaintiff had also disclosed in discovery thatthree expert witnesses would testify that either all or a majority of the items they examined werereplicas. He argued that he had stated valid claims of fraud and breach of implied warranty ofmerchantability, the latter being a new count that he would include in an amended complaint if theDWP was vacated.

Regarding his diligence concerning the DWP, plaintiff argued that sole practitioner Katzhad undergone knee surgery on July 11, 2002, about two weeks before the DWP, and was unableto attend appointments for several weeks afterwards. Regarding plaintiff's diligence in seekingrelief under section 2-1401, Katz' case file did not indicate that Katz had received postcard noticeof the DWP, and Katz did not indicate to plaintiff that his case was dismissed or was otherwisedelayed from its ordinary course. In November 2002, about three months after the DWP, Katzwas diagnosed with colon cancer and underwent a long and painful course of treatment that endedwith his death in November 2003. When plaintiff learned of Katz's death, he employed newcounsel, who discovered the DWP and filed the instant section 2-1401 petition as soon as all thesupporting affidavits were available.

The petition was supported by attached affidavits and exhibits. Katz's widow attested toKatz's surgery, postsurgical disability, and colon cancer. Plaintiff's new attorney attested thatKatz's files did not include any notice or correspondence referring to the DWP, nor any indicationthat Katz was aware of the DWP. Plaintiff attested that Katz had never indicated to him that hiscase was doing anything but proceeding in due course. An excerpted copy of plaintiff'sdeposition was attached to the petition, as was a letter from one of plaintiff's expert witnessesdescribing how the items he examined were replicas.

Defendant responded to plaintiff's section 2-1401 petition. Defendant noted that, while anattorney's illness may justify his or her failure to comply with a court deadline or attend a hearing,the nature and timing of the illness are major factors in determining whether section 2-1401 reliefis appropriate. Defendant argued that no evidence had been presented that Katz was ill on theday of the DWP, July 29, 2002, but only that he had knee surgery two weeks before the DWP andwas diagnosed with cancer three months after the DWP. There was no affidavit from a physicianor psychologist as to Katz' mental condition at the time of the DWP, or during his cancertreatment, only "the self serving statements of the Plaintiff and Katz's wife." Defendant alsoargued that Katz's representation to plaintiff that his case was proceeding in a timely manner wasinsufficient to overcome plaintiff's duty to follow the progress of his case. Lastly, plaintiff did notstate a meritorious claim for breach of implied warranty because the merchandise in question wassold "as is."

Plaintiff replied in support of his section 2-1401 petition. He argued that he had stated ameritorious case because the existence of an exception to the implied warranty of merchantabilityis a question of fact, while defendant offered no evidence that the merchandise was sold "as is." On the issue of diligence, plaintiff argued that the First District of this court applies a relaxed,equitable, standard to section 2-1401 petitions. Under this standard, the due diligence standard isrelaxed, and relief is deemed appropriate, where it would be unfair or unjust to have the casedecided on a basis other than the merits. Plaintiff argued that equity required vacatur of the DWPbecause his case had proceeded through discovery and was on the verge of trial, because Katz'sfile included no indication of the DWP, and because Katz's solo practice meant that he had littleability to keep track of cases during periods of ill health.

Defendant filed a surreply, arguing that plaintiff had failed to show that the merchandise inquestion was not genuine. He also argued that, under equity, a relaxed approach to due diligenceis appropriate only where the party seeking relief has "clean hands" and was not himself negligent. Since plaintiff was aware of Katz's illness, he was negligent in not keeping track of his case.

The circuit court held a hearing on the section 2-1401 petition on May 18, 2004. Thecourt noted initially that the facts were "extreme" and that "basically I think Mr. Katz abandonedhis client." Defendant demurred, arguing that there was no evidence that Katz was mentallyimpaired on the date of the DWP; that is, no justification for Katz's failure to attend the hearingthat resulted in the DWP. Defendant also argued that plaintiff did not have "clean hands" forequitable purposes because he was aware of Katz's illness and therefore should have been keepingtrack of the case himself. Plaintiff responded that the instant case was well on course for trial atthe time of the DWP and that he had stated a meritorious claim that should proceed to trial. Thecourt noted plaintiff's affidavit that, while he knew Katz was ill, he did not know about the DWPand believed the case to be duly proceeding. Where "we've got a dead attorney who cannot tellus what *** was going on," and the "case had been prosecuted to the point of almost being readyfor trial," the court stated that it was reluctant to "hang it on the client." The court concludedthat "justice and fairness dictate[] reopening this and letting the client have his day in court." Thecourt therefore vacated the DWP. That same day, the court entered an order granting plaintiff'spetition to vacate the DWP and striking defendant's surreply. This appeal timely followed.

Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting plaintiff reliefunder section 2-1401 by vacating the DWP.

Code section 2-1401 provides that "[r]elief from final orders and judgments, after 30 daysfrom the entry thereof, may be had upon petition" "filed in the same proceeding in which the orderor judgment was entered" and "supported by affidavit or other appropriate showing as to mattersnot of record." 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a), (b) (West 2002). To obtain relief under section 2-1401, apetitioner must set forth factual allegations supporting the existence of a meritorious defense orclaim, due diligence in presenting this defense or claim in the original action, and due diligence infiling the section 2-1401 petition. Dealer Management Systems, Inc. v. Design AutomotiveGroup, Inc., 355 Ill. App. 3d 416, 419 (2005). A petition for relief from judgment invokes thetrial court's equitable powers, which should prevent enforcement of a judgment when it would beunfair, unjust, or inequitable. In re Application of the County Treasurer, 347 Ill. App. 3d 769,774 (2004). Therefore, " 'the current trend in Illinois *** [has] been to relax the due diligencestandard where necessary to prevent the unjust entry of default judgments and to effect substantialjustice.' " In re County Treasurer, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 774, quoting Pirman v. A&M Cartage, Inc.,285 Ill. App. 3d 993, 1003 (1996).

" 'The court must consider all the circumstances of the proceedingsand liberally construe the scope of relief available to prevent anunjust result. [Citation.] The court will consider whether somemeritorious position exists so that vacatur of the order will not be auseless act; whether some particular hardship will result fromvacating the order; and whether some reasons exist for the failureto present a defense in apt time. [Citation.] These determinationsmust be made within the framework of the legal philosophy thatlitigation should be determined on its merits if possible andaccording to the substantive rights of the parties.' " In re CountyTreasurer, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 774, quoting Zee Jay, Inc. v. IllinoisInsurance Guaranty Fund, 194 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1102 (1990).

The decision to grant or deny a section 2-1401 petition is within the sound discretion of the trialcourt and will be reversed only when that discretion is abused. Dealer Management Systems,Inc., 355 Ill. App. 3d at 419.

Here, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to state a meritorious claim. To prove theexistence of a meritorious defense or claim, a petitioner must not merely assert the existence of ameritorious defense or claim, but must plead sufficient supporting facts. Beauchamp v.Zimmerman, 359 Ill. App. 3d 143, 148 (2005). Plaintiff included with his section 2-1401 petitionhis deposition, in which he testified that defendant sold war memorabilia from a store as his full-time occupation for "a number of years" (thus supporting his claim that defendant was an experton war memorabilia), that plaintiff had informed defendant "numerous times" that he wanted tobuy only genuine war memorabilia rather than replicas, and that he solicited the opinions of threespecific dealers in war memorabilia as to the authenticity of certain items purchased fromdefendant. Plaintiff also included the notarized opinion letter of one of the aforementioneddealers, describing in detail the items he examined as being replicas in whole or in part (forexample, genuine badges sewn onto replica uniforms). On this record, we conclude that plaintiffaverred sufficient facts to support the allegations of his complaint. We need not address whetherdefendant's allegation that the goods were sold "as is" defeats a potential claim of breach ofimplied warranty of merchantability because that claim has not yet been properly raised. Our taskis confined to determining whether "plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to set forth a meritorious claimin the complaint" (Beauchamp, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 143), not evaluating claims not yet raised in anamended petition that does not yet exist.

On the dual issues of diligence -- in the original proceeding and in seeking relief --defendant argues that the supporting affidavits are flawed because physicians should attest toillness and because there was no evidence that attorney Katz was ill on the day of the DWP. However, it is apparent from the record that the trial court did not grant relief on the specificbasis of Katz's illness or his mental condition on the day of the DWP. Instead, the courtconcluded more generally that Katz had "abandoned" plaintiff while continuing to represent tohim that the case was duly proceeding. The trial court did not specify why Katz had abandonedplaintiff, whether because he was ill or for improper reasons. As explained below, we similarlyneed not determine why Katz abandoned plaintiff.

In Cohen v. Wood Brothers Steel Stamping Co., 227 Ill. App. 3d 354 (1991), this courtreversed the trial court's denial of a plaintiff's section 2-1401 petition. While the trial court hadfound that plaintiff lacked diligence in pursuing his claim, we found that relaxation of the duediligence requirement was appropriate because we were presented with "not a case of ordinarynegligence, but an extraordinary situation where [an] attorney abruptly and unexplicably [sic]abandoned both his client and his law firm without attending court and without adequatelydocumenting the files for which he retained responsibility." Cohen, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 360. We found it unjust to force the Cohen plaintiff to suffer the "harsh results of such aberrant andunanticipated conduct on the part of his attorney." Cohen, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 360. Similarly, inthe instant case, Katz inexplicably and abruptly -- with discovery almost complete and triallooming -- abandoned plaintiff. Following Cohen, the trial court here did not abuse its discretionwhen it vacated the DWP pursuant to plaintiff's section 2-1401 petition.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Quinn, P.J. and Campbell, J., concur.