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SIXTH DIVISION
October 26, 2001

JUSTICE O'MARA FROSSARD delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Marilyn Cole appeals pro se from a trial court order striking her second amendedcomplaint against defendants Hoogendoorn, Talbot, Davids, Godfrey, and Milligan (Hoogendoorn,Talbot), a law firm, and Bruce J. Van Heukelem, a partner at Hoogendoorn, Talbot. Plaintiff alsoappeals from the subsequent denial of her motion to reconsider that order.

This case arises from a dispute over defendants' billing of plaintiff for legal services performed on her behalf. In her pro se second amended complaint, plaintiff alleged common lawfraud, breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and constructive fraud against defendants. Defendants filed a motion to strike and dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint, contendingthat plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to sustain any cause of action.

On October 3, 2000, the trial court granted defendants' motion to strike and dismiss plaintiff'ssecond amended complaint. The court ordered:

"(1) Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is stricken in itsentirety.

(2) Plaintiff is granted 14 days, to October 17, 2000, to file a

Third Amended Complaint limited to a breach of contract claim."

Defendant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's order striking her secondamended complaint. In her motion, plaintiff stated she was electing to stand on her second amendedcomplaint. On December 14, 2000, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider and toldplaintiff during the hearing on the motion that "[y]our case is not dismissed with prejudice, not atall." However, the court's written order stated that "[p]ursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) ***the Court finds that no just reason exists to delay the enforcement of or appeal from this order."

On appeal, plaintiff asserts this court has jurisdiction over her appeal pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) and contends that her second amended complaint statedvalid causes of action against defendants for common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, legalmalpractice, and constructive fraud. Defendants respond that the appeal should be dismissedbecause there has never been a final and appealable order that would provide this court withjurisdiction over the appeal.

The finality of an order is determined by an examination of the substance as opposed to theform of that order. Gutenkauf v. Gutenkauf, 69 Ill. App. 3d 871, 873 (1979). Appellate jurisdictionis limited to review of final judgments unless an order falls within a statutory or supreme courtexception. Pekin Insurance Co. v. Benson, 306 Ill. App. 3d 367, 375 (1999). Normally an orderstriking or dismissing a complaint is not final and therefore not appealable unless its languageindicates the litigation is terminated and the plaintiff will not be permitted to replead. Ben Kozloff,Inc. v. Leahy, 149 Ill. App. 3d 504, 506 (1986). Even if a plaintiff subsequently elects to stand onhis or her complaint, an order striking or dismissing a complaint is not final until the trial courtenters an order dismissing the suit. Wick Building Systems, Inc. v. Bunning, 107 Ill. App. 3d 61, 62-63 (1982).

In Hicks v. Weaver, 255 Ill. App. 3d 650, 651 (1994), plaintiff sued her landlord for damagesarising from injuries she incurred when she slipped on a patch of snow and ice on her landlord'sproperty. Defendant moved to dismiss her second amended complaint pursuant to section 2-615 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1992)), for the failure to state a cause ofaction. The court granted the motion to dismiss and in its order stated there was no just reason todelay enforcement or appeal of the order. The court further indicated that "Plaintiff shall have 21days to amend complaint and defendants 14 days to respond." Hicks, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 652. Onappeal, the court found that the order of the trial court did not fix, determine, or dispose of the rightsof the parties, but instead allowed for additional pleadings. The court held that the order allowingfor amendment of the complaint was not a final order and dismissed the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction. Hicks, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 652-53.

Similarly, in this case, the order of the trial court does not fix, determine, or dispose of therights of the parties. The order allows additional pleadings. It is not a judgment ordering dismissal,but an order calling for amendment within 14 days. The trial court's order striking plaintiff's secondamended complaint expressly granted plaintiff the right to file a third amended complaint. Thisorder entered October 3, 2000, gave plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint and did not dismissthe suit with prejudice; therefore, it is not a final judgment. Hicks, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 652.

On December 14, 2000, plaintiff argued her motion to reconsider. During that hearing theplaintiff correctly requested that the court enter an order dismissing her entire suit so she couldproceed in the appellate court:

"PLAINTIFF: No. My complaint is just fine the way it is and you just don't agree with that, then let the appellate court make adecision. If they dismiss it, that's the end of it. That's fine.

THE COURT: I'm trying to figure out a way to do that. I don'tknow how - -

PLAINTIFF: Dismiss the whole thing with prejudice so I can go to the appellate court. The appellate court - - I do have thatdecision someplace here, maybe back there, the appellate court - - I'vealready tried doing it, they said it's too early - -

THE COURT: It wasn't final - -

PLAINTIFF: - - it's not a final appealable order. So dismissit with prejudice, make it a final appealable order, let me go to theappellate court and they can make their ruling on it - - on my wholeSecond Amended Complaint.

***

THE COURT: The October 3^rd order to strike the complaintand grant 14 days to amend the complaint is the only order that's ineffect at this point in time. What I'll do is I'll give you [Rule]304(a) language as to that order and/or this order denying yourMotion to Reconsider if it's appropriate. I'm not even sure thatthere's any basis here set out for reconsideration even in the motionitself, but the [Rule] 304(a) language will apply to the previousorder.

***

PLAINTIFF: So I can go to the appellate court at thispoint?

THE COURT: I don't know what the appellate court isgoing to do and I don't want to mislead you into telling you theappellate court is going to accept it. I'm giving you a basis to start.

***

THE COURT: Your case is not dismissed with prejudice,not at all.

PLAINTIFF: It's like an interlocutory appeal, is that true?

THE COURT: Potentially."

The trial court's order denying plaintiff's motion to reconsider stated that, pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), there was no just reason to delay enforcementor appeal. The inclusion of this language, however, did not render this order final because theorder itself, like the order striking and dismissing plaintiff's second amended complaint, did notdismiss plaintiff's suit or bar her from filing an amended complaint. "In order to have preservedthe trial judge's rulings for review, it would have been necessary for plaintiff to have stood on thedismissed complaints and obtained an order dismissing the action with prejudice." Boatmen'sNational Bank of Belleville v. Direct Lines, Inc., 167 Ill. 2d 88, 99 (1995). That is exactly whatplaintiff attempted to do in this case. The plaintiff during the hearing on her motion to reconsiderclearly and correctly requested that the trial court enter an order dismissing her entire suit withprejudice so she could proceed in the appellate court. "Dismiss the whole thing with prejudice soI can go to the appellate court." The trial court erroneously rejected that request.

Moreover, during the hearing on the motion to reconsider, the trial court denied plaintiff'smotion to reconsider, yet informed plaintiff that her case was not dismissed with prejudice. Thatdiscussion was at best confusing. The Rule 304(a) language added by the trial court to the orderdenying plaintiff's motion to reconsider only served to escalate the confusion. Moreover, thedefendants correctly objected to the Rule 304(a ) language being given at that point in theprocess. Yet the trial court over defense objection included the language in the order enteredDecember 14, 2000. In that order the court denied the plaintiff's motion to reconsider, allowedthe order of October 3, 2000, to stand and added Rule 304(a) language.

The law is clear that in a case such as this where a plaintiff chooses to stand on thecomplaint, the order is not final or appealable until the trial court enters an order dismissing thesuit. "When a plaintiff subsequently elects to stand on his complaint rather than amend, the orderstriking or dismissing the complaint is not appealable until an order dismissing the action isentered." Miller v. Suburban Medical Center at Hoffman Estates, Inc., 184 Ill. App. 3d 545, 547(1989); County of Knox v. Switzer, 151 Ill. App. 3d 873 (1987); Ben Kozloff, 149 Ill. App. 3d504; Wick Building Systems, 107 Ill. App. 3d 61; Martin v. Marks, 80 Ill. App. 3d 915 (1980);Schoen v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 77 Ill. App. 2d 315 (1966).

Where an order is not final and appealable, the trial court cannot confer appellatejurisdiction by simply stating in such order that there is no just reason for delaying enforcementor appeal. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Technam, Inc., 171 Ill. App. 3d 818, 821 (1988);Savage v. Schoenstadt, 68 Ill. App. 3d 552 (1979); Coble v. Chicago Health Club, Inc., 53 Ill.App. 3d 1019 (1977); Mexicali Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 37 Ill. App. 3d 797(1976). In Aetna, the third-party plaintiff appealed an order dismissing the third-party complaint. The order gave plaintiff 14 days to file amended pleadings and indicated if no such pleadingswere filed, "the order of dismissal shall be final." Aetna, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 820. The appellatecourt dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court's order was insufficient to change thedismissal order into a final and appealable order. Aetna, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 821.

In the present case the court indicated in the order resolving the plaintiff's motion toreconsider that "Pursuant to Supreme court Rule 304(a), over defendants' objection, the courtfinds no just reason exists to delay the enforcement of or appeal from this order." That languagedoes not change the fact that the order does not fix, determine, or dispose of the rights of theparties. That order is not a final order just because the trial court says that it is by using Rule304(a) language.

For the reasons previously discussed, neither order from which plaintiff appeals is final.

We are at this point without jurisdiction to address the merits of plaintiff's appeal and musttherefore dismiss her appeal. We note, however, that our decision does not preclude plaintifffrom filing a motion with the trial court stating her intent to stand on her second amendedcomplaint and seeking dismissal of that complaint with prejudice. A trial court order grantingsuch a motion would constitute a final order over which this court would potentially havejurisdiction. Pro se litigants are entitled to equal access to the courts, and the court has anobligation not to undermine that access by interjecting confusion into the process.

Appeal dismissed.

GALLAGHER, P.J., and O'BRIEN, J., concur.