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Cianci's industrial accident occurred on February 14, 1996. At that time, his labor union was negotiating a pay raise with aretroactive effective date of July 1, 1995. Cianci testified thathe knew the negotiations were occurring when he was injured. Theraise was later approved, and Cianci received a lump sum paymentfor the amount that accrued between July 1, 1995, and his accident. He testified that he was familiar with this procedure and hadreceived other retroactive raises in the past.

At the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator awarded permanenttotal disability benefits based on an AWW of $670.82. That figuredid not include the earnings from Cianci's retroactive pay raise. The arbitrator excluded such earnings because "the retroactive payraise was not in effect at the time of the injury." (Emphasis inoriginal.)

Both parties sought review of the arbitrator's decision beforethe Commission, which modified Cianci's AWW to include the earningsfrom his retroactive pay raise. The modification resulted in anAWW of $698.83. The Commission otherwise affirmed and adopted thearbitrator's decision.

The City appealed the Commission's AWW modification to theCook County circuit court. The court confirmed the modification,and the City filed this appeal.

The City's claim turns on construction of section 10 of theWorkers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/10 (West 2000)). Statutoryconstruction involves a question of law invoking de novo review. King v. Industrial Comm'n, 189 Ill. 2d 167 (2000).

The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain andeffectuate the legislature's intent. Modern Drop Forge Corp. v.Industrial Comm'n, 284 Ill. App. 3d 259 (1996). The best indicatorof legislative intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of thestatutory language. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d469 (1994). We will not resort to extrinsic aids for constructionin lieu of applying such meaning. See Bogseth v. Emanuel, 166 Ill.2d 507 (1995).

Section 10 reads:

"The compensation shall be computed on the basis ofthe Average weekly wage which shall mean the actualearnings of the employee in the employment in which hewas working at the time of the injury during the periodof 52 weeks ending with the last day of the employee'slast full pay period immediately preceding the date ofinjury, illness or disablement excluding overtime, andbonus divided by 52 ***." 820 ILCS 305/10 (West 2000).

Accordingly, a claimant's AWW is determined by (1) ascertaining howmuch money he actually earned during the 52 weeks preceding hisinjury, and (2) dividing that figure by 52.

The instant issue arises from the first step of this process. The relevant inquiry is whether Cianci's retroactive pay raisequalifies as "actual earnings" for purposes of section 10. Theplain meaning of the term "earnings" warrants an affirmativeanswer. A claimant earns wages when he completes the work forwhich the wages are remuneration. See e.g., Black's Law Dictionary525 (7th ed. 1999) (to "earn" means "[t]o do something thatentitles one to a reward or result, whether it is received ornot"). There is no dispute that Cianci's retroactive pay raise wasremuneration for work he completed during the relevant 52-weekperiod. Thus, the Commission properly included the raise whencalculating his AWW.

During its oral argument, the City emphasized the word"actual" to assert that only "presently existing" wages should beincluded in an AWW calculation. However, since "actual" is anadjective that modifies the word "earnings" in section 10, thedefinition of "earnings" is dispositive. In any event, Cianci'sretroactive wages are no less "actual" (i.e., existing in fact)than the wages he received before his injury. We realize that theCity was not contractually bound to pay the disputed wages whenCianci was injured. However, we fail to see how this fact canbenefit the City in light of its subsequent agreement to pay thewages based on work Cianci performed before his injury.

Maintaining its focus on sequence, the City stresses thelanguage from section 10 regarding the 52-week period preceding aclaimant's injury. According to the City, that language excludesCianci's retroactive wages because he did not receive them untilafter his injury. Again we note that the decisive factor insection 10 is the amount of money a claimant actually earns, notthe amount he actually receives, during the prescribed 52-weekperiod. The fact of earning is independent from the fact ofreceiving what has been earned. Cianci's AWW includes hisretroactive pay raise because he earned the raise during theprescribed period. His receipt of the raise at a later date isimmaterial in light of the language in section 10.

Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have reached the sameconclusion. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Bradshaw, 477 So. 2d 624(Fla. App. 1985) (distinguishing between wages actually earned andwages actually paid during relevant statutory period); Gunderson'sCase, 670 N.E.2d 386 (Mass. 1996) (same); see also Coffin v.Hannaford Brothers Co., 396 A.2d 1007 (Me. 1979) (includingretroactive earnings in AWW calculation despite statute definingAWW in terms of amount claimant was receiving when injured).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court'sjudgment confirming the Commission's holding that Cianci's AWWincludes the earnings from his retroactive pay raise.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and HOFFMAN, O'MALLEY and RARICK, JJ.,concur.