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FOURTH DIVISION
March 17, 2005

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Brouwer Brothers Steamatic, Inc. (Brouwer Brothers), appeals from two ordersentered by the circuit court of Cook County, one granting a motion filed by plaintiffs, Perry and MaryCianci and their children, Danielle and Michael Cianci, to approve a settlement they entered into withdefendant American Cleaning Co. (American Cleaning), and the other granting a motion filed bydefendant Safeco Insurance Co. (Safeco) to approve a settlement between it and plaintiffs. BrouwerBrothers contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that these settlements wereentered into in good-faith such that American Cleaning and Safeco would be discharged from liabilityfor contribution to Brouwer Brothers pursuant to section 2(c) of the Joint Tortfeasor ContributionAct (Act) (740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 2002)). Brouwer Brothers also contends that the circuit courterred in entering its orders approving the settlements before it ruled on a pending motion to transfervenue to Will County based on forum non conveniens, which had been filed by American Cleaningand which it had joined.

Plaintiffs, joined by Safeco and American Cleaning, have filed a motion to dismiss BrouwerBrothers' appeal, which we have taken with the case. Therein, plaintiffs contend that BrouwerBrothers has no standing to object to the settlements because it has not filed a claim for contributionagainst either of the settling defendants. Plaintiffs also contend that Brouwer Brothers cannotchallenge the manner in which the settlements have been allocated because the issue is not ripe foradjudication. For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs' motion to dismiss is denied and the judgment ofthe circuit court of Cook County is reversed and remanded with directions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs alleged the following facts in their complaint. Plaintiffs Perry and Mary Cianciowned a home in New Lenox, Illinois, in which they resided with their children, plaintiffs Danielle andMichael. They purchased a homeowner's insurance policy from Safeco, which covered, inter alia,losses to real and personal property, as well as additional living expenses incurred as a result ofdamage to their home.

On January 14, 1999, plaintiffs' home sustained water damage resulting from ice dams whichhad accumulated on their roof. Plaintiffs claimed that Safeco negligently delayed removal of thewater damage for two weeks. Safeco hired American Cleaning to remediate the water damage;however, American Cleaning failed to properly clean and remove water-damaged carpeting andfurniture.

The water damage enabled toxigenic mold to grow and to contaminate the home. Plaintiffsbegan experiencing flu-like symptoms, respiratory ailments, headaches, and fatigue. They notifiedSafeco of the problem, but Safeco did not agree to test for mold for more than nine months. Whenthe test results confirmed the presence of mold, plaintiffs were advised to evacuate their home and toleave their belongings behind.

Based on a referral from Safeco, plaintiffs retained Brouwer Brothers to perform the moldcleaning and remediation work. However, Brouwer Brothers was unsuccessful, and Safecoultimately resolved to tear down plaintiffs' home and to build a new one.

Plaintiffs alleged that during the demolition and reconstruction of their home, Safeco refusedto pay additional living expenses covered by their homeowner's insurance policy, includingreplacement costs for household and personal items, repairs, relocation costs, and medical bills,leaving them to pay many of these expenses themselves. Plaintiffs' initial complaint sought adeclaratory judgment that Safeco was obligated to continue paying for their additional living expensesas required by the insurance policy and an injunction barring Safeco from discontinuing additionalliving expense coverage under the policy until their new house was ready.

On February 11, 2003, plaintiffs filed their second amended verified complaint, whichcontained 14 counts against Safeco, American Cleaning, and Brouwer Brothers. Count I allegedbreach of contract against Safeco for failing to uphold its obligations under the insurance policy. Count II alleged that Safeco violated section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155(West 2002)) by vexatiously and unreasonably refusing to pay them the full amount of their losses anddamages under the insurance policy. Count III alleged that Safeco, individually and through those itheld out as its agents, acted negligently with regard to the health risk posed by possible moldcontamination and acted negligently in carrying out repairs to plaintiffs' home. Count IV alleged thatSafeco intentionally or recklessly disregarded the risk that its behavior would cause plaintiffs extremeemotional distress, and plaintiffs suffered depression and other physical and emotional injuries as aresult. Count V alleged that American Cleaning was negligent in the repair and remediation of thewater damage in plaintiffs' home, resulting in toxigenic mold contamination. Count VI alleged thatSafeco was vicariously liable for American Cleaning's negligence because Safeco held AmericanCleaning out as its agent. Count VII alleged that American Cleaning violated the Consumer Fraudand Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2002)) by deceptivelyconcealing, omitting, or suppressing the fact that its work failed to remedy the water damage inplaintiffs' home. Count VIII alleged that Safeco was vicariously liable for American Cleaning'sfraudulent and deceptive business practices. Count IX alleged that Brouwer Brothers breached itscontract with plaintiffs by failing to remediate the mold contamination in their home. Count X allegedthat Brouwer Brothers was negligent in performing the decontamination work and in failing toremedy the problem, resulting in injury to plaintiffs. Count XI alleged that Safeco was vicarouslyliable for Brouwer Brothers' negligence because it held Brouwer Brothers out as its agent. CountXII alleged that Brouwer Brothers intentionally or recklessly caused plaintiffs emotional distress by,inter alia, delaying its work, leaving contaminated tools and items on the premises, and ultimatelyfailing to remediate the mold contamination, causing plaintiffs to suffer from depression and severeemotional distress and also causing property damage. Count XIII alleged that Brouwer Brothersviolated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West2002)) by deceptively and unlawfully concealing, omitting, or suppressing the fact that its work failedto properly treat the mold contamination in their home. Count XIV alleged that Safeco wasvicariously liable for Brouwer Brothers' fraudulent and deceptive business practices.

On March 27, 2003, American Cleaning filed a motion to transfer venue to Will County basedon forum non conveniens (forum non conveniens motion). Brouwer Brothers joined that motion, aswell as a previous motion to transfer venue based on forum non conveniens which had been filed bySafeco a year earlier and had been continued several times.

Each of the defendants then filed separate motions to dismiss certain counts of plaintffs'complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2002)). On June 12, 2003, the circuit court denied Safeco's motion todismiss and continued the motions to transfer venue. At the status hearing preceding that order, thecourt indicated it wanted to wait and see if the case would be transferred to the law division ratherthan rule on the motion to transfer venue immediately.

At a status hearing on October 17, 2003, plaintiffs informed the circuit court that they hadreached a settlement agreement with Safeco and American Cleaning, and that American Cleaningwould withdraw its motion to dismiss and forum non conveniens motion. The court subsequentlycontinued Brouwer Brothers' pending motions for hearing twice more. The record does not containany objections by Brouwer Brothers to these continuances.

On December 15, 2003, Safeco filed a "Motion for Good Faith Settlement," requesting thatthe circuit court enter an order finding that its settlement with plaintiffs had been made in good-faithso that it would not be subject to any contribution liability in the future. The terms of the settlementprovided that Safeco would pay plaintiffs $150,000 and assign them:

"any and all legal and equitable rights, including any rights to which it is subrogated atlaw or in equity, as well as claims, demands, damages, actions, and causes of actionwhich it has or hereafter may have against American Cleaning Co., Brouwer BrothersSteamatic, Inc., and Boelter & Yates, and any of their agents, successors and assigns,or against any other person causing any damage to the Ciancis for which SafecoInsurance Company of Illinois paid, which Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois maypossess arising out of claims made under [the policy] for any claim or loss related tocertain ice damming occuring in or about January 1999 and additional losses thereafteralong with any subsequent damage caused by American Cleaning Co., BrouwerBrothers Steamatic, Inc., and Boelter & Yates, among others, and any other person orentity."

The settlement further provided that "[i]n order to make the foregoing assignment fully effective,Safeco shall waive any right of subrogation against American Cleaning Co., Brouwer BrothersSteamatic, Inc., and Boelter & Yates, among others, and any other person or entity against whichSafeco may have acquired such rights." Plaintiffs joined Safeco's motion for a good-faith finding andfiled another motion for a good-faith finding regarding a settlement they entered into with AmericanCleaning. Pursuant to that agreement, American Cleaning would pay plaintiffs $30,000 in exchangefor settlement of their claims. Both the Safeco and American Cleaning settlements were conditionedupon the circuit court making findings of good-faith. Brouwer Brothers filed a response in oppositionto these motions.

On January 27, 2004, following argument, the court found that Brouwer Brothers had nostanding to object to either settlement and, alternatively, that the settlements were made in good-faith. On the same date, the court entered written orders finding the settlements to have been made in good-faith, but also directing the settling parties to draft orders approving the settlements and allocating thesettlement amounts.

On January 30, 2004, the circuit court heard argument on Brouwer Brothers' forum nonconveniens motion. At that hearing, Brouwer Brothers' counsel stated that he had been trying topresent that motion for months, but it was continued. The court indicated that it was waiting to see ifthe parties would settle. At the close of the hearing, the court found Will County to be a moreappropriate forum; however, Brouwer Brothers requested that the court wait to enter that order untilafter the settlement order was amended to include the settlement allocations.

On February 11, 2004, the court entered orders modifying the January 27, 2004, settlementorders to include certain allocations. The order regarding the Safeco settlement allocated $15,000 toplaintiffs' tort, stautory, and vicarious liability claims and $135,000 to the contractual claims, andfound these to be reasonable amounts. The order further specified that of the $15,000 for tort,statutory, and vicarious liability claims, $12,000 was allocated to Mary Cianci, and $1,000 each wasallocated to Perry, Danielle, and Michael Cianci. The order regarding the American Cleaningsettlement allocated the entire $30,000 settlement payment to "tort claims" and found that amount tobe a reasonable sum. The order further allocated $5,000 each to Mary and Perry Cianci, $9,000 eachto Danielle and Michael Cianci, and $2,000 for property damage. Both orders included SupremeCourt Rule 304(a) language that "there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal orboth." 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). On February 23, 2004, the circuit court entered its order grantingBrouwer Brothers' forum non conveniens motion. On February 26, 2004, Brouwer Brothers filed atimely notice of appeal from the court's orders approving, and modifying the prior approval of, thesettlements between plaintiffs and Safeco and plaintiffs and American Cleaning.

We initially observe that jurisdiction is proper in this court, even though the circuit courtentered its order granting Brouwer Brothers' forum non conveniens motion before Brouwer Brothersfiled its notice of appeal. Cf. Majewski v. Von Bergan, 266 Ill. App. 3d 140, 142, 638 N.E.2d 1189,1191 (1994). The circuit court's findings on February 11, 2004, that "there [was] no just reason fordelaying either enforcement or appeal or both," made the good-faith orders final and appealable (155Ill. 2d R. 304(a); McGath v. Price, 342 Ill. App. 3d 19, 26, 793 N.E.2d 801, 807 (2003)) before thecircuit court entered its order granting the forum non conveniens motion. The circuit court thenretained residual jurisdiction over the good-faith orders for 30 days (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1); Brewerv. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 165 Ill. 2d 100, 105, 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1333 (1995)), duringwhich time Brouwer Brothers filed its notice of appeal. Therefore, this court has jurisdiction toentertain Brouwer Brothers' appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). 155 Ill. 2d R.304(a).

ANALYSIS

As noted above, plaintiffs, joined by Safeco and American Cleaning, have filed a motion todismiss Brouwer Brothers' appeal. In that motion, they first contend that Brouwer Brothers lacksstanding to appeal the circuit court's good-faith orders because it has not filed a contribution claimagainst either of the settling defendants.

"Generally, to have standing, a litigant must show (1) it has suffered some actual or threatenedinjury; (2) the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action'; and (3) the injury is likely to beredressed by a favorable decision." Sampson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 195 Ill. App. 3d 715, 722, 552N.E.2d 1194, 1198 (1990), quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United forSeparation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700, 709, 102 S. Ct. 752, 758(1982). In order for a party to have standing to appeal a particular judgment, that party's rights musthave been prejudiced by that particular judgment. Clay v. Pepper Construction Co., 205 Ill. App. 3d1018, 1022, 563 N.E.2d 937, 940 (1990).

In support of their claim that Brouwer Brothers lacks standing, plaintiffs cite Stickler v.American Augers, Inc., 303 Ill. App. 3d 689, 708 N.E.2d 403 (1999). In Stickler, a plaintiff injuredin the course of his employment sued four defendants, who, in turn, filed a third-party complaint forcontribution against the plaintiff's employer. Stickler, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 691, 708 N.E.2d at 405. The plaintiff reached a settlement with three of the defendants and the third-party defendant, and overthe nonsettling defendant's objection, the circuit court entered a good-faith finding. Stickler, 303 Ill.App. 3d at 691, 708 N.E.2d at 405. On review, this court found that the nonsettling defendant lackedstanding to appeal the circuit court's order as to its codefendants, but not the third-party defendant. Stickler, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 692, 708 N.E.2d at 405. The court explained that the nonsettlingdefendant's failure to timely file a contribution claim against the codefendants resulted in a waiver ofthe nonsettling defendant's right to object to the settlement. Stickler, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 692, 708N.E.2d at 405; see also Clay, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 1023, 563 N.E.2d at 940 (codefendants who did notassert a counterclaim for contribution against defendant in whose favor summary judgment wasgranted lacked standing to appeal the summary judgment order dismissing that defendant from thecase); Tisoncik v. Szczepankiewicz, 113 Ill. App. 3d 240, 446 N.E.2d 1271 (1983) (defendant whodid not assert counterclaim for contribution against codefendant in whose favor trial court granteddirected verdict lacked standing to appeal the dismissal of the codefendant from the case).

Brouwer Brothers responds that it has not failed to timely file a contribution claim, as Sticklerrequires. Rather, Brouwer Brothers points out that at the time the good-faith orders were entered, itsmotion to dismiss and forum non conveniens motion remained pending. Therefore, BrouwerBrothers maintains, it has standing to object to the settlements at issue in this case.

In the case of a claim for contribution, if there is a pending action, then a party seekingcontribution must file that claim as either a counterclaim or third-party complaint in that pendingaction. Laue v. Leifheit, 105 Ill. 2d 191, 196, 473 N.E.2d 939, 941-42 (1984). Filing such a claim ina pending action does not constitute an admission of liability. Laue, 105 Ill. 2d at 197, 473 N.E.2d at942.

In the present case, if Brouwer Brothers were to assert a claim for contribution against one ofits codefendants, it would do so by counterclaim. 735 ILCS 5/2-608(a) (West 2002). Section 2-608of the Code provides that the counterclaim shall be part of the answer. 735 ILCS 5/2-608(b) (West2002); Otto Real Estate, Inc. v. Shelter Investments, 153 Ill. App. 3d 756, 762, 506 N.E.2d 351, 355(1987). However, the circuit court has discretion to permit a party to file a counterclaim subsequentto the answer. Otto Real Estate, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 762, 506 N.E.2d at 355. But see Benckendorf v.Burlington Northern R.R., 112 Ill. App. 3d 658, 445 N.E.2d 837 (1983) (circuit court did not abusediscretion in permitting party to file counterclaim without leave several days before its answer).

Brouwer Brothers elected to respond to plaintiffs' second amended verified complaint byfiling a motion to dismiss based on both sections 2-615 and 2-619. As Brouwer Brothers points out,at the time plaintiffs, Safeco, and American Cleaning settled, its motion to dismiss remained pending,and the time for filing a counterclaim had not arrived. 735 ILCS 5/2-608(b) (West 2002); Otto RealEstate, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 762, 506 N.E.2d at 355. Although Brouwer Brothers could have electedto answer plaintiffs' complaint, its doing so would have waived any objection to defects in thecomplaint. Thilman & Co. v. Esposito, 87 Ill. App. 3d 289, 295, 408 N.E.2d 1014, 1019 (1980).

Thus, the present case is distinguisable from Stickler, Clay, and Tisoncik. In Stickler, unlikethe present case, the nonsettling defendant had the opportunity to file a third-party complaint forcontribution, which, like a counterclaim, is generally filed within the time for filing an answer (735ILCS 5/2-406(b) (West 2002)). Stickler, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 691, 708 N.E.2d at 405. Also unlikethe present case, the matters in Clay and Tisoncik had proceeded to the summary judgment and trialstages, respectively, and the defendants in those cases would have had the opportunity to filecounterclaims or third-party claims. Clay, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 1021, 563 N.E.2d at 939; Tisoncik, 113Ill. App. 3d at 245, 247, 446 N.E.2d at 1275-76.

We therefore find the general rule articulated in Stickler that a party who fails to timely file acounterclaim for contribution lacks standing to appeal a good-faith order inapplicable to the situationin the present case. As Brouwer Brothers observes, if we were to hold otherwise, a defendant whosettles with a plaintiff before the time for filing an answer has arrived would deny a nonsettlingdefendant any opportunity to seek contribution or a setoff from the settling defendant. See In reGuardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153, 163, 642 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (1994) (holding settlementshould not be calculated to deprive nonsettling parties, whose rights would be cut off by an orderfinding the settlement to have been made in good-faith, of notice and the opportunity to object). Accordingly, Brouwer Brothers has standing to challenge whether the settlements were entered intoin good-faith.

Plaintiffs, along with Safeco and American Cleaning, alternatively contend that BrouwerBrothers' appeal should be dismissed because the issue of the manner in which the settlements wereallocated is not ripe for adjudication. Plaintiffs maintain that because there has been no judgmententered against Brouwer Brothers, the manner in which the settlement between plaintiffs and theother defendants has been allocated is not relevant. We disagree.

To determine whether an issue is ripe for adjudication, we are required to evaluate both thefitness of the issue for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of witholding courtconsideration. National Marine, Inc. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 159 Ill. 2d 381,389, 639 N.E.2d 571, 574 (1994). Here, if Brouwer Brothers is unable to establish the amountsallocated in the settlements to each of plaintiffs' individual theories of recovery, it will not be entitledto a setoff. Muro v. Abel Freight Lines, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d 416, 419, 669 N.E.2d 1217, 1218(1996), citing Dolan v. Gawlicki, 256 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156-57, 628 N.E.2d 1188, 1190-91 (1994). Thus, the failure to examine whether the allocation was sufficient could result in hardship to BrouwerBrothers. In addition, as we will discuss below, the issue of whether the allocation in the settlementequitably apportioned damages is central to a circuit court's good-faith determination. Johnson v.United Airlines, 203 Ill. 2d 121, 133, 784 N.E.2d 812, 820-21 (2003). Therefore, we find the issueripe for adjudication.

Turning to the merits of the appeal, Brouwer Brothers contends, inter alia, that the circuitcourt erred in entering orders approving the settlement before it considered its forum non conveniensmotion. Brouwer Brothers first maintains that "it attempted time and again" to have its motion heardto no avail and suggests that the circuit court therefore abused its discretion in waiting to rule on themotion. The settling parties respond that Brouwer Brothers did not object to the variouscontinuances of the forum non conveniens motion and, as a result, it has waived the issue. Inaddition, the settling parties point out that Brouwer Brothers actually requested that the court wait todetermine the forum non conveniens motion until after the good-faith motions had been ruled upon. They also respond that a court does not have to address a forum non conveniens motion beforeaddressing other issues.

In order to preserve an issue for review, a party must make an appropriate objection in thecircuit court. See, e.g., Kambylis v. Ford Motor Co., 338 Ill. App. 3d 788, 798-99, 788 N.E.2d 1, 9(2003). Where the party fails to do so, the issue is waived. Kambylis, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 798-99,788 N.E.2d at 9.

Here, nothing in the record indicates that Brouwer Brothers objected to the continuations ofits forum non conveniens motion at the time when the continuances were discussed on the record. Although Brouwer Brothers' counsel stated at the January 30, 2004, hearing on the motion thatBrouwer Brothers had been trying to present the motion for months, there is nothing in the record tosupport that statement. As a result, the issue is waived. Klein v. Steel City National Bank, 212 Ill.App. 3d 629, 634, 571 N.E.2d 751, 754 (1991).

Moreover, at the January 30, 2004, hearing on Brouwer Brothers' forum non conveniensmotion, counsel for Brouwer Brothers requested that the court wait to enter its order until after it hadamended the orders approving the settlements to include the allocations. Thus, because BrouwerBrothers acutally asked the court to delay its ruling on the forum non conveniens motion, it cannotnow claim that the court committed error in doing so. See McMath v. Katholi, 191 Ill. 2d 251, 255,730 N.E.2d 1, 3 (2000).

Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that this issue were properly preserved for review,Brouwer Brothers would not be successful. The equitable doctrine of forum non conveniens permitsthe court in which an action was filed to decline jurisdiction and direct the lawsuit to an alternativeforum which can better serve the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice. Dawdy v.Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 171-72, 797 N.E.2d 687, 693 (2003). A party does notwaive its right to file a forum non conveniens motion by filing a general appearance and answer. Walker v. Iowa Marine Repair Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 621, 627, 629, 477 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (1985). Rather, because a court is to consider several factors, including the relative capacities of the twocourts to provide a fair trial, the relative inconvenience to the witnesses and parties, and the burdenplaced upon the taxpayers and residents of the jurisdiction to which the cause of action is to betransported, in determining the motion (Torres v. Walsh, 98 Ill. 2d 338, 345, 456 N.E.2d 601, 604(1983)), the court should wait until all of the defendants appear and the parties have engaged indiscovery relevant to the inquiry before making its determination (134 Ill. 2d R. 187(b); Walker, 132Ill. App. 3d at 627, 477 N.E.2d at 1339).

Here, the record discloses that the parties were engaged in discovery when plaintiffs,American Cleaning, and Safeco settled. The record also reveals that on at least one occasion, thecourt had to order Brouwer Brothers to comply with discovery requests. Thus, the circuit court didnot abuse its discretion in waiting to rule on Brouwer Brothers' forum non conveniens motion.

Brouwer Brothers also claims that because it presented its forum non conveniens motionbefore the settling parties' good-faith motions, the circuit court lacked the authority to rule onanything other than the forum non conveniens motion. Therefore, Brouwer Brothers maintains, thegood-faith orders are nullities.

In support of this contention, Brouwer Brothers relies upon In re Dominique F., 145 Ill. 2d311, 583 N.E.2d 555 (1991), in which the supreme court held that a timely filed petition forsubstitution of judge as a matter of right pursuant to what is now section 2-1001 of the Code (735ILCS 5/2-1001 (West 2002)) must be granted and any other orders entered after the petition'spresentation are a nullity. However, Brouwer Brothers' reliance on Dominique F. is misplaced. Aright to a substitution of judge pursuant to section 2-1001 because of judicial prejudice is absolute(Dominique F., 145 Ill. 2d at 318-19, 583 N.E.2d at 558) because it relates to a party's entitlement toan impartial hearing, which is a basic tenet of our jurisprudence (Winn v. Mitsubishi MotorManufacturing of America, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1061-62, 721 N.E.2d 819, 825 (1999)). Incontrast, a transfer of venue based on forum non conveniens in accordance with Supreme Court Rule187 (134 Ill. 2d R. 187) is a measure designed to relieve the unnecessary burden of defending alawsuit in an inconvenient forum. Winn, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1061, 721 N.E.2d at 825. Contrary toBrouwer Brothers' assertion, no Illinois court has held that a forum non conveniens motion must begranted as a matter of right and that any orders entered after such a motion's presentation would be anullity. Rather, as we discussed earlier, the circuit court should wait until some discovery has beencompleted before ruling on a forum non conveniens motion. 134 Ill. 2d R. 187(b); Walker, 132 Ill.App. 3d at 627, 477 N.E.2d at 1339. Thus, the circuit court was not required to rule on the forumnon conveniens motion prior to making any other substantive rulings. Winn, 308 Ill. App. 3d at1063, 721 N.E.2d at 826; see also Walker, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 627, 477 N.E.2d at 1339; Johnson, 203Ill. 2d at 125-26, 784 N.E.2d at 816 (trial court ruled on good-faith of settlement before ruling onnonsettling defendant's pending motions to dismiss and transfer venue). But see Majewski v. VonBergan, 266 Ill. App. 3d 140, 638 N.E.2d 1189 (1994) (relying upon Dominique F. and suggesting indicta that it would be improper for a circuit court to rule on a dispositive motion where a motion totransfer venue was pending).

In reaching this conclusion, we find Majewski, which Brouwer Brothers also cites in supportof its argument, distinguishable from the present case. In Majewski, the Second District AppellateCourt found that the circuit court of Cook County lacked jurisdiction to entertain a motion by theplaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss the case pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1009(West 1992)), which had been filed nearly two years after the circuit court of Cook County hadgranted a motion to transfer venue to Lake County. Majewski, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43, 638N.E.2d at 1191.

Here, in contrast, the circuit court ruled on the settling parties' motions for good-faithfindings before it entered its order granting Brouwer Brothers' motion to transfer the case to WillCounty. Thus, the circuit court of Cook County had jurisdiction to rule on the settling parties'motions for good-faith findings. See also Winn, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1062, 721 N.E.2d at 825-26(distinguishing and declining to follow Majewski). We therefore find that the circuit court had thediscretion to rule on the the good-faith motions after Brouwer Brothers filed its forum nonconveniens motion.

Brouwer Brothers alternatively contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in findingthat the settlements between plaintiffs and Safeco, and plaintiffs and American Cleaning were enteredinto in good-faith such that American Cleaning and Safeco would be discharged from liability forcontribution to Brouwer Brothers pursuant to section 2(c) of the Illinois Joint TortfeasorContribution Act (Act) (740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 2002)).

The Act (740 ILCS 100/1 et seq. (West 2002)) creates a statutory right of contribution"where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person orproperty, or the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them, even thoughjudgment has not been entered against any or all of them." 740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 2002); Johnsonv. United Airlines, 203 Ill. 2d 121, 128, 784 N.E.2d 812, 817 (2003). This right "exists only in favorof a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share" of damages to the injured party. 740 ILCS100/2(b) (West 2002); Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 185, 191, 756N.E.2d 836, 839 (2001).

However, a tortfeasor is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor who hassettled with the injured party in good-faith. 740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 2002); Dubina, 197 Ill. 2d at191, 756 N.E.2d at 840. The Act discharges all contribution liability that a tortfeasor who settles ingood-faith might have had to any other tortfeasor. 740 ILCS 100/2(d) (West 2002); Dubina, 197 Ill.2d at 191, 756 N.E.2d at 840. Although the Act does not define the term "good-faith," the supremecourt has explained that a circuit court should consider the totality of the circumstances surroundingthe settlement to make this determination. In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153, 162, 642N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (1994). This standard enables the circuit court to strike a balance between thepublic policy favoring the peaceful settlement of claims and the policy favoring the equitableapportionment of damages among tortfeasors. Associated Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Aon Corp.,344 Ill. App. 3d 163, 175, 800 N.E.2d 424, 433 (2003). A settlement will not be found to have beenmade in good-faith where there has been collusion, unfair dealing, or wrongful conduct by the settlingparties. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d at 162, 642 N.E.2d at 1199. In addition, "a settlement agreement thatconflicts with the terms of the Act and/or is not consistent with the policies underlying the Act cannotsatisfy the good-faith requirement of the Act and cannot thereby discharge the settling tortfeasor fromcontribution liability." Dubina, 197 Ill. 2d at 192, 756 N.E.2d at 840.

In making this determination, the settling parties carry the inital burden to make a preliminaryshowing of good-faith. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 132, 784 N.E.2d at 820. The settling parties mustshow, at a minimum, the existence of a legally valid settlement agreement. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at132, 784 N.E.2d at 820. However, in certain cases, the circuit court may need other factual evidenceto make a determination that an otherwise legally valid settlement agreement is fair and reasonable inlight of the policies underlying the Act. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 132, 784 N.E.2d at 820. Then, theburden shifts to the nonsettling defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that thesettlement is not in good-faith. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 133, 784 N.E.2d at 821.

Ultimately, whether a settlement has been made in good-faith is a matter left to the circuitcourt's discretion. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 135, 784 N.E.2d at 821. Accordingly, a reviewing courtwill not disturb a circuit court's determination absent an abuse of that discretion. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2dat 135, 784 N.E.2d at 821.

Brouwer Brothers claims that the circuit court should have conducted an evidentiary hearingto evaluate the settlement and the method of apportionment of damages therein before entering thegood-faith finding. The settling parties respond that the record was sufficient for the circuit court tomake a determination that the settlements had been entered into in good-faith and that BrouwerBrothers failed to carry its burden of rebutting their prima facie showing of good-faith by apreponderance of the evidence.

The circuit court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to making a finding ofgood-faith. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 136, 784 N.E.2d at 822. The circuit court is "in the best positionto decide what type of hearing is necessary to fully adjudicate the issue of good faith." Johnson, 203Ill. 2d at 136, 784 N.E.2d at 822. In addition, the fact that the circuit court did not conduct a hearingdoes not mean that it failed to consider the appropriate factors. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 136, 784N.E.2d at 822.

In determining whether the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to conduct anevidentiary hearing before making its good-faith finding, we find this court's decision in Muro v. AbelFreight Lines, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d 416, 419, 669 N.E.2d 1217, 1218-19 (1996), to be instructive. In Muro, this court found a good-faith finding entered without an evidentiary hearing to have beenpremature. Muro, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 419, 669 N.E.2d at 1218-19. In that case, the settling partiesdid not provide the court with any information as to how the proceeds of the $75,000 settlement atissue were allocated among the plaintiff's theories of recovery. Muro, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 417-18,669 N.E.2d at 1217. At the settlement hearing, the nonsettling defendant objected to the settlementand asked the court to apportion it among the theories of recovery. Muro, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 418,669 N.E.2d at 1218. The trial court ultimately entered an order apportioning the settlement in amanner proposed by the nonsettling defendant. Muro, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 418, 669 N.E.2d at 1218. In reversing that order on appeal, this court found that the circuit court should have conducted anevidentiary hearing to evaluate both the settlement and the method of apportionment. Muro, 283 Ill.App. 3d at 419, 669 N.E.2d at 1219. Thus, the court reversed the good-faith order and remanded thecause, directing the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the allocation of the settlementproceeds. Muro, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 420-21, 669 N.E.2d at 1219.

In the present case, as in Muro, we find the circuit court's good-faith order to have beenpremature. First, the court approved the settlement even though the settling parties did not obey thecourt's order directing them to allocate the settlement amounts among plaintiffs' theories of recovery. Instead, the settling parties lumped together negligence claims, for which contribution could beavailable, with intentional tort and vicarious liability claims, for which contribution would not beavailable. American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 154 Ill.2d 347, 354, 609 N.E.2d 285, 289 (1992) (holding that contribution is not available for vicariousliability claims); Gerill Corp. v. Jack L. Hargrove Builders, Inc., 128 Ill. 2d 179, 206, 538 N.E.2d530, 542 (1989) (holding that contribution is not available for intentional tort claims). As notedabove, the settling parties' failure to allocate the settlements among plaintiffs' various theories ofrecovery forcloses Brouwer Brothers from seeking a setoff. Muro, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 419, 669N.E.2d at 1218.

Second, the circuit court entered its good-faith order without conducting an evidentiaryhearing, even though the record contained no information upon which the circuit court could havebased its conclusion. One of the factors that a court should consider in making the good-faithdetermination is whether the settlement amounts were within a reasonable range of the settlingparties' fair shares of liability. Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 317 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634, 740 N.E.2d444, 449 (2000). In the present case, the circuit court had no evidence to make such a determination. At the time of the settlements, the case was still in the pleading stage. Motions to dismiss filed byBrouwer Brothers and American Cleaning remained pending. Only Safeco had answered plaintiffs'second amended complaint, and it had done so in a way that framed factual issues to be resolved inthe case. In addition, the settling parties provided the circuit court with no information tosubstantiate why the settlement amounts were within a reasonable range of the settling parties' fairshares of liability in arguing their motions for good-faith findings. Rather, as in Muro, the circuitcourt simply accepted the allocations offered without inquiring into whether the settlement amountsand methods of apportionment were reasonable.

Finally, regarding the Safeco settlement, there is an issue regarding what impact, if any,Safeco's assignment of "any and all legal and equitable rights, *** as well as claims, demands,damages, actions, and causes of action," would have on the respective parties' rights and liabilitiesrelevant to the Act. See, e.g., Dubina, 197 Ill. 2d at 195, 756 N.E.2d at 842 (finding settlementwhich assigned plaintiffs' claims against nonsettling defendant to settling defendants enabled thesettling defendants to indirectly seek contribution from nonsettling defendant in contravention of theAct and could have resulted in nonsettling defendant paying more than its fair share of liability). It isunclear on the present record what rights and/or causes of action this provision might be conferring toplaintiffs, and the parties have each characterized this assignment differently in their briefs and duringoral argument before this court. As a result, the circuit court had no basis to determine that thisprovision did not contravene the purposes of the Act. The record is also void of any evidence of theassignment's value and of how that value might have factored into plaintiffs' decision to settle. See,e.g., Dubina, 197 Ill. 2d at 195, 756 N.E.2d at 842. Accordingly, we find that the circuit courtabused its discretion in approving the Safeco and American Cleaning settlements on the presentrecord. See Muro, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 419-20, 669 N.E.2d at 1219.

In reaching this conclusion, we find the supreme court's recent decision in Johnson factuallydistinguishable from the present case. In Johnson, the third-party defendant settled with the eightplaintiffs in the case for $1,000 each, plus costs. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 125-26, 784 N.E.2d at 816. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court's good-faith finding over the nonsettling defendant'sobjection that the circuit court abused its discretion in doing so without conducting an evidentiaryhearing and where the settlement amount was disproportionately small. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 136,784 N.E.2d at 822. The court observed that the circuit court had sufficient information in the recordupon which to base its decision, including pleadings and memoranda. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 136-37,784 N.E.2d at 822-23. The court also found that where the third-party defendant, a municipality, hadclaimed absolute immunity from all liability under the Tort Immunity Act, the settlement amounts of$1,000 per plaintiff were not unreasonable. Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 136-37, 784 N.E.2d at 822-23.

In the case at bar, unlike in Johnson, the record contains no such justification for thesettlement amounts and the settling defendants' respective liabilities were not as clear. In addition, aswe have already discussed, at the time the settlement agreements were made, Brouwer Brothers' andAmerican Cleaning's motions to dismiss remained pending, and although Safeco had filed an answer,that answer only served to frame factual issues to be resolved.

We therefore reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand this cause so that the circuitcourt may conduct a limited evidentiary hearing to evaluate the fairness and reasonableness of thesettlement amounts and allocations in light of the claims involved. Because the parties have notchallenged the propriety of the circuit court's order granting Brouwer Brothers' motion to transferthe case based on forum non conveniens, which was entered subsequent to the good-faith order butprior to Brouwer Brothers' notice of appeal, we remand this case to the circuit court of Will Countyfor further consideration consistent with this opinion. See People ex rel. East Side Levee & SanitaryDistrict v. Madison County Levee and Sanitary District, 54 Ill. 2d 442, 445, 298 N.E.2d 177, 179(1973); Majewski, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 143, 638 N.E.2d at 1192. Additionally, plaintiffs' motion todismiss this appeal is denied.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

GREIMAN and QUINN, JJ., concur.