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SECOND DIVISION
NOVEMBER 19, 2002

JUSTICE CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:

In this appeal, defendant, American National Bank and TrustCompany of Chicago, as trustee under trust number 25628, datedDecember 29, 1967 (the Land Trust), contends that the trial courterred in: (1) finding plaintiff, Chicago Transparent Products,Inc. (CTP), did not breach its sublease; (2) denying the LandTrust's motion for substitution of judge or, in the alternative,in granting summary judgment in favor of CTP; and (3) denying theLand Trust's motion to reconsider and modify the court-orderedescrow agreement. In its cross-appeal, CTP contends that thecourt erroneously permitted the Land Trust to participate in theappraisal process after granting CTP's motion for summaryjudgment. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1972, Sara Lee Corporation (Sara Lee) entered into alease for property located at 2700 North Paulina Street inChicago. The property was a manufacturing and warehouse complexconsisting of a main building and three connected buildings. Themain building was owned by the Land Trust, while the connectedbuildings were owned by another trust and are not involved inthese proceedings.

Sara Lee's lease for the main building contained analterations provision, which provided in part:

"(b) Alterations. Lessee shall not make orcause to be made any alterations, additionsor improvements to the demised premises of acost of $50,000 or more without the priorwritten consent of Lessor."

The lease further required Sara Lee to keep the property in goodrepair and provided an expiration date of April 30, 1992, with anoption to extend until April 20, 2002.

In a separate document, Sara Lee was given the option topurchase the property for its fair market value. The optionagreement required that the property be valued by each partyselecting an appraiser, who would then select a third appraiser.

In 1978, Sara Lee subleased the main building to CTP. Thesublease was subject to all of the terms and conditionsenumerated in the lease between Sara Lee and the Land Trust,including the alterations provision. However, the subleasecontained its own option to extend the original lease for anadditional five years. Sara Lee's option to purchase was alsoassigned to CTP.

1990 Option to Purchase Litigation

In early 1990, CTP initiated the appraisal process asrequired by the option to purchase agreement. The appraisersagreed to a fair market value of $775,000, and on April 3, 1990,CTP notified the Land Trust of its desire to exercise its optionto purchase the property.

On September 17, 1990, prior to closing, CTP filed acomplaint against the Land Trust alleging the existence of anenvironmental hazard on the property. In response, the LandTrust demanded fulfillment of CTP's contractual obligations underthe option to purchase. After CTP refused to close withoutperformance of an environmental study, the Land Trust filed acounterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the option topurchase agreement was null and void due to CTP's breach. The1990 option to purchase litigation remained unresolved.

Alterations Provision Litigation

On September 24, 1993, the Land Trust filed a complaintagainst CTP and Sara Lee, alleging they breached the alterationsprovision contained in the lease. The complaint alleged that CTPmade alterations to the main building totaling $77,293.19. TheLand Trust requested possession of the building, damages torestore the building, attorney's fees, and costs. On November19, 1993, the 1990 option to purchase litigation was consolidatedwith the litigation over the alterations provision.

1997 Option to Purchase Litigation

On October 9, 1997, CTP informed the Land Trust that itagain wished to initiate the appraisal process as defined by theoption to purchase agreement. On October 31, 1997, the LandTrust informed CTP that, due to pending litigation regardingCTP's 1990 breach of the option agreement, it believed CTP nolonger had a legal right to purchase the property. CTP respondedthat the option to purchase was still valid and requested theLand Trust's participation in the appraisal process. The LandTrust did not obtain an appraisal of the property.

On March 17, 1998, CTP filed a second amended complaint,adding count VI. Count VI requested a declaratory judgment thatCTP had properly exercised its option to purchase in 1997, andwas entitled to purchase the property at the value established byits appraiser. In response, the Land Trust raised twoaffirmative defenses: (1) that CTP had breached the lease byviolating the alterations provision; and (2) that CTP hadbreached the option to purchase provision by failing to close onthe property after exercising the option in 1990.

The 1997 option to purchase action was consolidated with thealterations provision cause of action, and the parties filedcross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of alterations. In denying the motions, trial court Judge Thomas Hett stated hecould not make a decision without hearing evidence on the issue. He further stated that bricking up the loading dock and puttingin a new employee entrance sounded like alterations, but he was"worried about how much of the electrical was for replacingwhatever was there because it was burned out and what was anaddition to that [sic] service they had." The judge proceededwith a bench trial on the alterations issue on August 11, 1999.

At trial, invoices attached to a stipulation establishedthat in late-1989, CTP hired Taylor Electric to install 2,000 ampelectrical service and an 800 amp feeder to an existingelectrical distribution panel. Taylor Electric also cleaned andtightened the existing electrical switchgear. The cost of laborand materials associated with this project totaled $47,742. Theinvoice specifically itemized $1,350 for the cost of cleaning andtightening the existing switchgear.

Also in late-1989, CTP hired Old Chicago ConstructionCompany to brick up the loading dock in the main building,install a concrete walkway, install a gate, and repair damagedwalls. CTP paid Old Chicago $26,900 for its services.

Alan Edelstein, an electrical contractor, testified as anexpert witness for the Land Trust. Edelstein stated that he sawtwo electrical services on the property -- an older 1,600 ampservice and a newer 2,000 amp service. He further stated thatthe cleaning and tightening work, for which Taylor Electriccharged $1,350, was probably necessitated by the electricalproject. Edelstein estimated that it would cost about $10,000 torestore the electrical system to its previous condition.

Marilyn Cooper, an agent of the Land Trust, testified thatin 1988, Stanley Manne, the owner of CTP, contacted her andrequested permission to install additional electric power forCTP's equipment. She did not grant permission.

Paul Rosenberg, an electrician/electrical contractor,testified as an expert for CTP. He stated CTP needed additionalelectrical service to run its operations, and had to brick overthe loading dock to install the new switchboard next to the oldsystem. Rosenberg stated that the cleaning and tightening workwas routine maintenance and was not associated with theelectrical project. He further stated that only $3,340 of OldChicago's bill was for work related to the new electrical system.

Stanley Manne testified that in 1989, CTP acquired newbusiness, which required the expansion of the electrical system.He stated that the work done by Old Chicago was done in all fourbuildings, not just the main building. The repair of wallsoccurred in one of the connected buildings and Manne estimatedthe cost to be from $5,000 to $7,000. Manne further testifiedthat the Old Chicago bill included repair of the rear loadingdock, which was not in the main building, and some generalmaintenance, such as securing loose floor tiles and repairingceilings. Manne said he never discussed the electrical work withCooper because he considered it an addition of equipment, not abuilding modification.

On cross-examination, Manne testified that Old Chicago builta concrete sidewalk and a new employee entrance, put in fencing,removed the overhead loading dock door, bricked over the loadingdock, and built a wall and a concrete pad inside the formerloading dock area in the main building.

Judge Hett found that CTP did not breach the alterationsprovision. He interpreted the provision as follows:

"* * * to require the landlord'spermission if any one addition or improvementprojects [sic] exceeds the $50,000limitation. The same provision of the leasegoes on to say, 'lessee may make otheralterations, additions, or improvementswithout the lessor's consent provided lesseeshall comply with the terms of this lease.'

This proviso makes no sense unless thetotal clause contemplates separate andindividual projects that must meet the$50,000 barrier. I do not read the clause asadding all the projects together and seeingif the total exceeds the $50,000 plateau."

Using this interpretation, the court found that CTP wasconducting multiple projects around the same time. Theelectrical project included the addition of the 2,000 ampelectrical service, bricking over the loading dock, building thewalls to form the electrical room, and laying concrete footingfor the new electrical service. The court found that the LandTrust had failed to prove the new employee entrance, sidewalk,fencing, rebuilding of an office, repair of damaged walls inanother building, removal of trees, tile installation, and dockrepairs in another building were part of the electrical project.

The court accepted Rosenberg's estimate of $3,340 for OldChicago's work associated with the electrical project and statedit believed Rosenberg's testimony that the tightening andcleaning of the existing switchgear was routine maintenance,which was not necessitated by the project. Therefore, $3,340added to Taylor Electric's bill of $46,392 ($1,350 for thecleaning and tightening not included), equaled $49,732. Thecourt found that the addition of the new electrical service didnot violate the lease provision requiring the landlord'spermission for an addition or improvement exceeding $50,000. Judgment was entered for CTP and against the Land Trust, with thetrial court declaring the order final and appealable.

On September 10, 1999, the Land Trust filed a posttrialmotion contending that the trial court should not have separatedthe cost of the electrical project from the cost of the "entirejob" undertaken by CTP in October 1989. It argued that the trialcourt misled the parties into believing the only issue to beconsidered at trial was whether the electrical project was an"addition" to the property. As a result, the Land Trustneglected to introduce evidence showing all of the work was oneconstruction job, and it did not produce a $2,651.19 bill paid toCommonwealth Edison in connection with the electrical project. The Land Trust requested that proofs be reopened to introducefurther evidence relating to the court's theory of the case.

The trial court denied the motion on October 18, 1999,stating:

"I was here to determine the terms ofthe lease and under the evidence that youfolks presented that I came up with a theorythat you didn't think about, Mr. Landis, isnot something that I have to tell you aheadof time in explicit terms ***.

In trying a lawsuit where the issues arethe terms of a particular document andevidence concerning that document and how ithas or has not been breached, I don't believethat it is my function to tell you how I'mgoing to decide the case ahead of time sothat you can tailor your evidence to meet myunderstanding.

* * *

If you decided not to for whateverreasons, not to present that evidence, Idon't know that now in hindsight I shouldgive you an additional opportunity to talk tome about the evidence that was not presentedduring of [sic] the course of the trial orfor an opportunity to allow an offer of proofto put before the Appellate Court that whichyou did not present to me during the courseof this trial."

The Land Trust Appeals.

Disrepair of the Main Building

On August 11, 1998, CTP filed a counterclaim against SaraLee, alleging the structural floor slab under the main buildinghad sunk, causing damage to the floor and interior walls.

On February 22, 2000, CTP filed a motion for summaryjudgment on count VI of its second amended complaint, seeking anorder by the court to compel the transfer of the propertypursuant to the exercise of its option to purchase in 1997.

Following Judge Hett's retirement, the case was assigned toJudge Bush in March 2000. On March 13, 2000, Judge Bush set abriefing schedule and hearing date for CTP's motion for summaryjudgment. She also entered and continued CTP's motion to staydiscovery. On March 20, 2000, Judge Bush entered an ordergranting the Land Trust's motion for leave to file acounterclaim, entering and continuing the Land Trust's motion tocompel discovery, and granting CTP's motion to stay discovery asto the Land Trust's propounded interrogatories.

On March 22, 2000, the City of Chicago filed a complaintagainst a beneficiary of the Land Trust and Marilyn Cooper,claiming various building code violations. The next day, theLand Trust filed a counterclaim against CTP and Sara Lee,alleging they had breached the lease by failing to keep theproperty in good repair. The Land Trust later presented a motionfor summary judgment on the counterclaim. The court entered andcontinued the motion pending the outcome of CTP's motion forsummary judgment regarding the exercise of its option to purchasein 1997.

The trial court also revised the briefing schedule for CTP'ssummary judgment motion, and reset the hearing date from May 3,2000, to May 5, 2000. On April 13, 2000, the Land Trust filedits brief in opposition to CTP's motion for summary judgment.

The Land Trust's Motion for Substitution of Judge

On April 17, 2000, the Land Trust filed a motion forsubstitution of judge as a matter of right under section 5/2-1001(a)(2) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS5/2-1001(a)(2) (West 2000). The motion alleged that the partieshad appeared before Judge Bush three times and she had made onlyadministrative, not substantial rulings. CTP and Sara Lee arguedthat the motion was brought merely as a delay tactic to postponethe hearing on CTP's motion for summary judgment. The trialcourt denied the Land Trust's motion.

On April 25, 2000, the Land Trust filed a petition in theIllinois Supreme Court requesting either a supervisory order or awrit of mandamus requiring the trial court to permit thesubstitution of judge as of right. It also filed a motion tostay proceedings in the trial court pending the supreme court'sdecision. Judge Bush denied the motion to stay proceedings,stating that she believed the motion for substitution of judgehad been filed as a delay tactic. Subsequently, on May 10, 2000,the supreme court entered an order denying the petition.

On May 23, 2000, the Land Trust filed a motion to reconsiderthe trial court's April 17 denial of the motion for substitution.The Land Trust argued that it was not attempting to delay thehearing on CTP's motion for summary judgment as evidenced by itslengthy response to the motion, which had been filed on April 13. The Land Trust told the trial court it was ready for the summaryjudgment hearing on the scheduled date, but wanted a differentjudge to preside over the hearing. The trial court denied themotion for reconsideration.

Ruling on CTP's Motion for Summary Judgment
and Enforcement Litigation

On June 8, 2000, the trial court granted CTP's motion forsummary judgment on count VI of its second amended complaint. The court found CTP had properly exercised its option to purchasein 1997, and the Land Trust was obligated to sell the property toCTP. The court ordered the Land Trust to obtain an appraisal ofthe main building's value as of November 1997.

The parties subsequently filed cross-motions to enforce thecourt's June 8, 2000, ruling. On January 10, 2001, the courtordered CTP to take title to the property after Sara Lee and theLand Trust each deposited in escrow one-third of the cost neededto dismiss the City of Chicago lawsuit.

On March 2, 2001, the trial court entered an escrow orderrequiring the Land Trust to deposit trustees' deeds conveying themain building to a land trust identified by CTP. The Land Trustwas also ordered to deposit with the title company the lesser of$10,000 or one-third of the cost of repairs from the City ofChicago lawsuit. The order required CTP to deposit reconveyancedeeds and $2,538,334 in a supplementary escrow account in theevent the causes of action were reversed on appeal.

The Land Trust subsequently filed a motion for leave to filean appearance by additional counsel, for referral to mediation,and for modification of the escrow order. The trial courtgranted the motion to file an additional appearance, but deniedthe motion in all other respects. The Land Trust appeals fromthe denial of its motion for modification.

In sum, the parties appeal from three orders: 1) the findingthat CTP did not breach the alterations provision (appeal no. 1-99-3745); 2) the denial of the Land Trust's motion forsubstitution of judge, or, in the alternative, the granting ofsummary judgment on count VI of CTP's second amended complaint(appeal no. 00-3224); and 3) the denial of the Land Trust'smotion to reconsider and modify the escrow order (appeal no. 01-1187). We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

II. ANALYSIS

The Land Trust first contends that CTP breached the leaseby spending $77,293.19 on alterations to the main building. Itfurther contends the court erred when it separated the cost ofthe electrical project, misled the parties into believing thatthe trial would be focused solely on whether the electricalequipment was an alteration, and misconstrued the word "other" asused in the alterations provision.

Where a party challenges the trial court's ruling followinga bench trial, the reviewing court will not reverse the findingsof fact unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of theevidence. Nokomis Quarry Company v. Dietl, 333 Ill. App. 3d 480,775 N.E.2d 669, 673 (2002). A fact finder's determination isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence where, upon reviewingthe evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the finding ispalpably erroneous or arbitrary and unsubstantiated by theevidence. Joel R. v. Board of Education of Mannheim SchoolDistrict 83, 292 Ill. App. 3d 607, 613, 686 N.E.2d 650 (1997).

"Under Illinois law, a lease is an agreement subject to thelaw of contracts." Towne Realty, Inc. v. Shaffer, 331 Ill. App.3d 531, 536, 773 N.E.2d 47 (2002). A lease must be construed asa whole to determine the parties' intent, and the words usedtherein must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. TowneRealty, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 536. Where the terms areunambiguous, they should be strictly enforced as written;however, where the terms are ambiguous, the language must beconstrued in the lessee's favor and against the lessor. TowneRealty, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 536.

The alterations provision at issue provided in part:

"(b) Alterations. Lessee shall not make orcause to be made any alterations, additionsor improvements to the demised premises of acost of $50,000 or more without the priorwritten consent of Lessor. *** Lessee maymake other alterations, additions orimprovements without Lessor's consent,provided Lessee shall comply with all theother terms and conditions of this Lease."

The language of the lease is clear in that any alterationsor improvements must cost less than $50,000. The trial courtinterpreted the provision to apply on a project by project basis,finding that any one alteration project may not exceed $50,000. The court stated that the language "Lessee may make otheralterations, additions or improvements without Lessor's consent"made "no sense" unless it contemplated individual projects.

We do not believe that an opposite conclusion is clearlyapparent or that the court's finding was unsubstantiated by theevidence. The plain language of the lease allows thisinterpretation. The lease does not specify whether the lesseecannot make any single alteration, which costs over $50,000 orwhether all alterations over the life of the lease may not totalmore than $50,000. However, the language "Lessee may make otheralterations, additions or improvements without Lessor's consent"does support the conclusion that the lease prohibits any singleproject from costing $50,000 or more.

Furthermore, it would not be reasonable to require thelessee to add together all addition, alteration or improvementprojects over the life of the lease to determine whether thetotal exceeded $50,000. See Scoville Court CondominiumAssociation v. Orozon, 171 Ill. App. 3d 932, 935, 525 N.E.2d 1109(1988) (a lease should be interpreted fairly and reasonably inlight of all its provisions and language). The lease was for aterm of 20 years and was extendable for another 5-year term.

The Land Trust points to no language in the lease, whichestablishes that the trial court's decision was palpablyerroneous or arbitrary. As a result, the trial court's findingthat, according to the lease, the electrical project should betreated as a single job and should not be added to all otheralterations, additions and improvements made since 1972 was notagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Land Trust argues in the alternative that the electricalproject alone exceeded the $50,000 ceiling. We disagree.

The trier of fact determines the credibility of thewitnesses, the weight to be afforded their testimony, and theinferences to be drawn therefrom. See People v. Rodriguez, 312Ill. App. 3d 920, 932, 728 N.E.2d 695 (2000). In a bench trial,the court is in the best position to observe the witness'demeanor and resolve conflicts in the testimony. People v.Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2000).

CTP presented testimony establishing that a portion of theOld Chicago invoice reflected work done on the connectedbuildings. Specifically, Stanley Manne testified that theloading dock repair and wall repair occurred in the connectedbuildings. He estimated the cost of the wall repair alone to be$5,000 to $7,000. Manne further testified that Old Chicagoconducted some routine maintenance, such as securing loose tilesand repairing ceilings, which was included in the invoice. TheLand Trust provided no evidence to rebut this testimony.

Paul Rosenberg testified that approximately $3,340 of OldChicago's bill was for work related to the new electrical systemin the main building. Again, the Land Trust offered no evidenceto refute this testimony. Rosenberg also stated that the $1,350Taylor Electric charge for cleaning and tightening the existingswitchgear was routine maintenance and was not related to theelectrical project. Although the Land Trust's expert witnesscontradicted this testimony, the trial court specifically statedthat it believed Rosenberg.

As a result, the court added the $3,340 Old Chicago chargeto the $46,392 Taylor Electric bill (which did not include thecleaning charge) and determined that the work associated with theelectrical project cost a total of $49,732. Given the evidencepresented at trial, it was not against the manifest weight of theevidence for the court to conclude that CTP spent under $50,000on the electrical project.

Finally, the Land Trust argues that the court misled theparties into believing the only issue being considered at trialwas whether the electrical work constituted an addition,alteration or improvement under the lease. Instead, the courtdecided the case by determining the cost of the electricalproject alone. As a result, the Land Trust states it did notpresent certain evidence in support of its case, such as aninvoice from Commonwealth Edison, and claims that the court erredin denying its motion to reopen proofs to present that evidence.

The denial of a motion to reopen proofs is within the sounddiscretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent aclear abuse of that discretion. Dunahee v. Chenoa Welding &Fabrication, Inc., 273 Ill. App. 3d 201, 210, 652 N.E.2d 438(1995); In re Marriage of Davis, 215 Ill. App. 3d 763, 776, 576N.E.2d 44 (1991). If evidence offered for the first time in aposttrial motion could have been produced at an earlier time, thecourt may deny its introduction into evidence. Davis, 215 Ill.App. 3d at 776.

The trial court denied the parties' cross-motions forsummary judgment, stating it needed more evidence to make adecision. The court's statements were not misleading, nor was itobligated to divulge which theory of the case it would ultimatelyemploy in its decision. It is the parties' responsibility topresent evidence at trial in support of their theories of thecase. The fact finder then makes its determination based on theevidence presented. This is what the trial court did here.

Furthermore, because the Land Trust does not allege that theCommonwealth Edison bill could not have been produced at trial,the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying themotion to reopen proofs.

The Land Trust next contends that the trial court erred indenying its motion for substitution of judge, thereby voiding allsubsequent orders entered in this case. We agree.

Pursuant to section 5/2-1001(a)(2) of the Illinois Code ofCivil Procedure, a party is entitled to one substitution of judgeas of right, without cause. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(2) (West 2000). A motion for substitution under this section must be presentedbefore the trial or hearing begins and before the judgeconsidering the motion has ruled on any substantial issue in thecase. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(2)(ii) (West 2000). The right to asubstitution of judge under this section is absolute where themotion is timely filed in accordance with these requirements. Alcantar v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co., 288 Ill. App. 3d 644,648, 681 N.E.2d 993 (1997).

In this case, the Land Trust filed its motion forsubstitution of judge 18 days before the hearing on CTP's motionfor summary judgment. This court has found that it is notimproper for a party to file such a motion even one week before atrial when the trial date has been pending for four months. Sahoury v. Moses, 308 Ill. App. 3d 413, 414, 719 N.E.2d 1157(1999).

In addition, the court had not ruled on any substantialissue in the case. "Rulings directly related to the merits ofthe case are considered substantial." In re Marriage ofPetersen, 319 Ill. App. 3d 325, 338, 744 N.E.2d 877 (2001).

At the time the Land Trust filed its motion for substitutionof judge, the trial judge had held three motion hearings andruled on a number of motions. She granted the Land Trust leaveto file a counterclaim, entered and continued the Land Trust'smotion for summary judgment, stayed discovery on the issue ofbuilding repairs, and set hearing dates and briefing schedulesfor CTP's motion for summary judgment.

Contrary to CTP's argument, we do not find that stayingdiscovery on a related issue amounted to a substantial ruling. See Petersen, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 338 (ruling on a discoveryissue was substantial because it affected the admissibility ofevidence.) In fact, none of the orders here were substantialrulings that went to the merits of the case. Stoller v. PaulRevere Life Insurance Co., 163 Ill. App. 3d 438, 442, 517 N.E.2d5 (1987) (orders regarding compliance with discovery requests,the release of medical records, and the setting of dates forinterrogatories and trial are not substantive rulings); In reMarriage of Roach, 245 Ill. App. 3d 742, 746, 615 N.E.2d 30(1993) (pretrial conferences, where no decisions are madeaffecting the merits of the case, and rulings on unopposedmotions for leave to amend, discovery motions, and motions forseverance are not rulings on substantial issues). The rulingsdid not concern the admissibility of evidence (see Petersen, 319Ill. App. 3d at 339; Bonnie Owen Realty, Inc. v. CincinnatiInsurance Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 812, 821, 670 N.E.2d 1182(1996)), nor had the judge expressed her opinion regarding themerits of the motion for summary judgment (contra Alcantar, 288Ill. App. 3d at 648).

CTP argues that the trial court properly denied the motionbecause it was brought solely to delay the summary judgmenthearing. A court may deny a motion for substitution of judgewhere the motion was made solely to delay or avoid trial. Peoplev. Williams, 124 Ill. 2d 300, 309, 529 N.E.2d 558 (1988);Beahringer v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc., 282 Ill. App. 3d 600,601, 668 N.E.2d 614 (1996); see also Sahoury, 308 Ill. App. 3d at414. Based on the holdings in Beahringer and Sahoury, the motionin this case could not have been brought solely to delay or avoidtrial, as a trial date had not yet been set.

The fact that there was a pending motion for summaryjudgment is not reason enough to deny a substitution of judgemotion. In Delta Oil Company, Inc. v. Arnold, 66 Ill. App. 3d375, 384 N.E.2d 25 (1978), the defendant filed a motion forchange of venue while motions for summary judgment were pending. The trial court heard arguments on the motion six weeks beforethe scheduled summary judgment hearing, and denied the motionthirteen days before the hearing. This court reversed thedenial, finding that the motion was timely and should have beengranted as of right. Delta Oil Company, 66 Ill. App. 3d at 381. In the case sub judice, the substitution motion was filed andheard 18 days before the summary judgment hearing. As in DeltaOil, the fact that the summary judgment hearing was pending whenthe motion was filed does not render the motion untimely.

Despite the lack of a pending trial date, we will alsoaddress CTP's claim that the Land Trust meant to delay thesummary judgment hearing. Where an attempt to delay is madeclear by motions for continuances or other conduct, the trialcourt may inquire into the good faith of the movant. SeeHoffmann v. Hoffmann, 40 Ill. 2d 344, 348, 239 N.E.2d 792 (1968);People v. Mosley, 24 Ill. 2d 565, 569, 182 N.E.2d 658 (1962). If, after the inquiry, it is apparent that the motion was madeonly to delay or avoid trial, the trial court may deny themotion. Hoffmann, 40 Ill. 2d at 348; Mosley, 24 Ill. 2d at 569.

When a motion for substitution of judge is properly denied,the attempts at delay are very clear. In Hoffmann, the courtgranted the movant's request for a continuance, denoting it a"final continuance." Hoffmann, 40 Ill. 2d at 348. The movantsubsequently requested another continuance, which was denied. After the case was assigned to a trial judge, the movant renewedher request, and it was again denied. She then filed a motionfor change of venue. During the court's inquiry into the motion,counsel stated, "We are not ready, we have asked for acontinuance and we do not feel we can get a fair and impartialtrial." Hoffmann, 40 Ill. 2d at 346. The movant furthertestified that she was not prepared to go to trial. The sequenceof motions combined with the testimony of the movant and hercounsel left no doubt that the motion for change of venue wasfiled solely for the purpose of delay. Hoffmann, 40 Ill. 2d at348; see also People v. Stewart, 20 Ill. 2d 387, 391-92, 169N.E.2d 796 (1960) (motion for change of venue was properly deniedwhere trial was reset once by the court, continued twice ondefendant's motion, and defendant filed his motion for change ofvenue one day before trial was to begin). Where there is noclear indication of an attempt to delay trial, however, a motionfor substitution should not be denied. See Mosley, 24 Ill. 2d at569 (motion for change of venue erroneously denied where nocontinuances were requested prior to the filing of the motion).

In this case, the Land Trust did not request anycontinuances prior to filing its motion, and it had alreadysubmitted a detailed response to CTP's motion for summaryjudgment. Although the trial court did not make an officialinquiry into the motion, the Land Trust told the court it wasprepared to proceed with the hearing on the scheduled date. There was no indication that it was attempting to delay thehearing. Given these facts and the absolute nature of thisright, we find the motion for substitution of judge wasimproperly denied.

Because the Land Trust's motion for substitution of judgewas erroneously denied, all orders entered subsequent to thedenial are null and void. See In re Dominique F., 145 Ill. 2d311, 324, 583 N.E.2d 555 (1991). As a result, we need notaddress appellant's arguments regarding the granting of summaryjudgment on count VI of CTP's second amended complaint and theescrow order entered by Judge Bush.

Accordingly, the circuit court's finding that CTP did notbreach the alterations provision is affirmed; the denial of theLand Trust's motion for substitution of judge is reversed and allorders entered subsequent thereto are vacated. The cause isremanded to the Chief Judge for reassignment to another trialjudge.

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part; vacated inpart.

McBRIDE, P.J., and CAHILL, J., concur.